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success and failure causes further failure. There are two market-
based mechanisms of increasing returns, network effects and social
interaction effects, and two firm-based mechanisms of increasing
returns, scale effects and learning effects. 
Empirical research into the relations between these mechanisms and
into the consequences of increasing returns for firm performance is
relatively scarce. The aim of the researcher with this thesis is to fill
part of this gap. Concepts taken from economics and management
sciences are used, building on the industrial organization theory of
the firm. 
Three empirical studies were conducted for which new measurement
models were constructed and tested and for which primary and
secondary data was collected and analyzed. The results show that
the presence of increasing returns in the market influences firm per-
formance, but always through the realization of increasing returns
in the firm. This means that in an increasing returns market, mana-
gement is an important factor determining firm performance. 
It is therefore essential for managers to understand the mechanisms
of increasing returns in their markets and firms and for them to be
able to act strategically upon those mechanisms. This will enable
managers to exploit business opportunities arising from increasing
returns and to avoid pitfalls, which should result in better firm
performance.
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“I stepped into an avalanche 
it covered up my soul” 
 
Leonard Cohen, Avalanche, 
 from the album Songs of Love and Hate, 1971 
 
Preface 
i 
PREFACE 
 
The journey that has resulted in this thesis started somewhere in 1992. At the time I 
was studying business economics with about 1700 fellow students. Business 
economics was fashionable then, causing our large university auditorium to be 
crowded with students. Until then, I had a relatively easy time getting through the 
exams by keeping to a disciplined schedule of studying. Keeping to this schedule 
would have almost certainly made me a well-educated yet somewhat superficial 21-
year old economist. 
 
Then, a few things happened that would radically change this tight schedule. First, I 
became fundamentally interested in economics: I had learned, superficially, about 
many models and theories, but I knew nothing about how economics really worked. 
Why where there no courses on this important issue? Second, I read Chaos, a popular 
scientific book by James Gleick championing chaos theory as a radical scientific 
revolution. It hit a sensitive note: what if the economy was also a chaotic system? 
What would the consequences be? Unable to apply to this issue any of the models 
and theories I had learned, I asked some of the teachers, but few of them seemed to 
have any knowledge of or interest in the direction my thoughts were taking me. 
Finding no answers, I let the subject rest, but it stayed in my mind. Third, I chose to 
follow electives in economic sociology and in industrial economics. The contrast 
with the first two years of study could not have been greater. Instead of crowded 
classes and standard textbooks, I now found small groups of students and we were 
encouraged to ask questions about how the world, social or industrial, worked. Often 
we found that our teachers did not know, nor did they pretend to know, the answers. 
They taught us that it was more important to pose the right questions, supported by 
the right arguments, than it was to find the answers. Such an enquiring way of 
studying suited me very well. At this point I would therefore like to thank my 
teachers from this period for encouraging me and teaching me in me this way of 
doing science. Special thanks to Professor Moerman, who taught the industrial 
economics classes and who supervised my master thesis on this subject. 
 
After graduation I started exploring the labor market with the notion of maybe doing 
a PhD in the back of my head. Within a year I was back at the university, working as 
a research assistant at the department where I had graduated. There I met Fred 
Langerak, now my good friend and co-promotor, and through him I met Harry 
Commandeur, my promotor. I cannot thank both of them enough for recognizing and 
stimulating my academic curiosity at that time. With Harry and Fred, I talked about 
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the possibility of doing a PhD and we exchanged some ideas on possible subjects. 
During this process Harry introduced me to Ton van Asseldonk, who was at that 
point starting his PhD thesis on mass-individualization. In my search for an 
appropriate PhD subject, it would be helpful, Harry thought, if I assisted Ton with his 
thesis for one year. 
 
Meeting Ton I soon recognized that he was not just your typical consultant looking 
for a quick PhD. All the things I had been interested in over the past years came back 
in this man’s thesis: the social, economic and industrial way companies worked, 
connected to theories of chaos and complexity science. I look upon the year of 
assisting Ton as one of the most profound learning experiences of my life. After this 
year, I knew that my thesis would be about increasing returns, one of the basic 
mechanisms of economic and business complexity. Ton offered me a job that enabled 
me to realize this academic ambition, spending half of my time as a consultant for his 
company, TVA developments, and half of my time as a PhD student at the Erasmus 
University. Ton, I cannot thank you enough for this. 
 
Over the years, TVA developments and the people in and around it have provided the 
intellectual environment that is, in my view, crucial to doing good science: broad 
minded, enquiring, well-read, with a deep knowledge of practical issues and at the 
same time academically sound. I am grateful that over the past years we have been 
able to preserve, renew and extend this environment through our quarterly meetings. 
Therefore, I would like to thank Anjo, Bert, Jan, Leon, Lout, Marc, Meindert, Simon, 
Ton and all the others who contribute to shaping this enriching environment. 
 
There is a long list of people and institutions that I would like to thank for their 
contribution to this thesis. Any that I have forgot to mention, I thank them here and 
ask their forgiveness. 
 
I would like to thank the Erasmus University Rotterdam and the Delft University of 
Technology for providing the facilities that have enabled me to work on my PhD. 
 
I would like to thank the Erasmus Research Institute of Management for facilitating 
and financially supporting the PhD thesis. 
 
I would like to thank my colleagues at the Erasmus University Rotterdam and at the 
Delft University of Technology for their interest and their help. 
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I would like to thank all my students at the Erasmus University Rotterdam and at the 
Delft University of Technology for their interest in my research. Special thanks to 
Ties Arts, my first student graduating with a masters thesis on increasing returns and 
someone who is still interested in this topic, and to Robert Meijer, who delivered a 
valuable contribution to the empirical part of this thesis. 
 
I would like to thank the Goldschmeding Research Center of Economics for 
Increasing Returns of Nyenrode University for supporting the research. I thank the 
members of the research center, especially Dr. Goldschmeding, for the interesting 
discussions and the opportunity they gave me to present my research findings. 
 
I would like to thank all the people in the companies that participated in my research 
for their interest and for the time and effort they spent in testing and filling out my 
questionnaires. You have delivered the single most valuable contribution in 
validating the concepts and measurements of increasing returns. 
 
I would like to thank all the people from USP Marketing Consultancy Rotterdam for 
helping me out with acquiring the survey data for the empirical studies. 
 
I would like to thank Miranda Aldham-Breary for checking my use of the English 
language in this thesis and for improving my English in the process. Miranda, I feel 
that your academic background, combined with the unique style in which you 
suggest language improvements, has contributed not only to the readability of the 
thesis but to the quality of the argumentation as well. Besides, I like working with 
you and I hope we can continue to work together in the future. 
 
I would like to thank all the members of my PhD committee for their willingness to 
be my supervisors, for the time they spent reading the manuscript and for their useful 
comments on the concept version. With some of you the discussions were tough, 
especially on the definitions and use of macro-economic concepts on the firm level. 
These discussions have only confirmed my belief that we may attain great things 
together if we succeed in bridging the gap between economics and management 
science. 
 
I would like to thank all my friends, academic and non-academic, for their enduring 
interest in the project and for their patience and their understanding when I had to tell 
them time and again that “it would be finished somewhat later”.  
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I would like to thank my good friends Özge, Stefan and Sem (in particular for 
sharing his small house with me during summer, enabling me to work quietly) for all 
the emotional support and all the good times we have had together in the past seven 
years. Let’s have a good glass of wine (or juice) to celebrate our friendship. And may 
the good times continue! 
 
I would like to thank my promotor, Harry Commandeur, for the time and effort he 
invested in supervising and guiding the entire process, for making all kinds of 
unexpected connections and for providing all kinds of unforeseen opportunities. But 
most importantly I would like to thank him for his ability to stimulate and motivate 
me to persist with this project while at the same time leaving me considerable 
freedom to determine my own way and explore my own subjects. Harry, I know of 
no-one else who synthesizes these two characteristics as perfectly as you do. 
 
I would like to thank my co-promotor, Fred Langerak, for the incredible amount of 
time and effort he has invested in this project, for being an academic partner and a 
very good friend. I hope that we can write many more papers, and spend many more 
enjoyable hours together! 
 
I would like to thank TVA developments and all the people connected to it, now and 
in the past, for their generous support; first, of course, for providing the lion’s share 
of the financial and facilities support; but most importantly, for providing the 
emotional and intellectual support and a great working environment that kept me 
going over the years. Thank you Anita, Bea, Désiré, Ellen, Marjo, Mieke, Miranda, 
Anjo, Bert, Leon, Marc, Theo and Ton! 
 
Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their continuing support, their unfailing 
belief that I would finish this journey, for their encouragement and their support for 
all the decisions that I took along the way, and, not least, for sharing the house for 
weeks on end with a son who was obsessively, and probably sometimes very 
unsociably, working on this thesis. I can never thank you enough. 
 
 
Erik den Hartigh 
Rotterdam, August 2005 
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“The case of increasing returns has never been properly explored in economic theory 
[…] economists in general shied away from exploring the consequences. However, 
businessmen could never ignore the existence of diminishing costs.” 
 
Nicholas Kaldor, 1981 [1989, p.330] 
 
 
 
 
“In a constant returns economy, the firm is an artificial entity.” 
 
Martin L. Weitzman, 1982, p.791 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis is about increasing returns, positive feedback effects in markets and 
firms.1 We address the reasons for studying increasing returns in the first section of 
this chapter. In the second section we turn to the expected implications of increasing 
returns for market structure, firm behavior and firm performance. On the basis of 
these expected implications, we outline the central problem of this thesis, we give the 
research questions and we address the research approach in section three. We address 
the scientific and managerial contributions aimed at in this thesis in section four. In 
section five we provide an integrative definition of increasing returns that will be 
used throughout the thesis. We discuss the research design in section six. We provide 
insight into the structure of the thesis in section seven. In section eight we provide a 
glossary of some of the most important concepts addressed in this thesis. 
 
1.1 Why study increasing returns? 
The law of diminishing returns is one of the most prominent laws in economics. 
Originally expressed in relation to agriculture by Anderson (1777) and later by 
Malthus (1815) and Ricardo (1815), the law of diminishing returns states that, for an 
economic system, output will (eventually) increase less than proportionally with 
input. The effects of extra input will eventually die out, meaning that negative 
feedback prevails. 
 
It should be noted that economics, being a social science, does not have that many 
laws (Solow, 1985; Commandeur, 1999). Rather, the predicate ‘law’ is reserved for a 
relatively limited number of phenomena, for example Say’s law, Gresham’s law, the 
law of demand and supply, Gossen’s first and second laws. The law of diminishing 
returns meets the four criteria for a relationship to be called a law (Hunt, 1991): (1) it 
is a general condition for economic transformation processes, (2) it has been 
empirically tested and confirmed, (3) it is a theoretically logical phenomenon and (4) 
it is systematically integrated in economic theory. Yet in this thesis, we deal with 
exactly the opposite of diminishing returns, namely with increasing returns. 
                                                          
1 Positive feedback is a term used in systems thinking to describe a response in which 
changing output conditions in the system stimulate further growth in the input. Note that this 
conceptualization of increasing returns as positive feedback effects is different from the 
common economic conceptualization of increasing returns. For further discussion of these 
definition issues, see sections 1.5 and 5.1. 
Introduction 
2 
Generally, there are increasing returns when the output of an economic system 
increases more than proportionally with a rise of input. In other words, effects of 
extra input will be magnified, meaning that positive feedback prevails. 
 
Why would we want to study increasing returns when the law of diminishing returns 
is so strong and prominent? There are four reasons for this. The first is that there is 
growing evidence that increasing returns actually do exist, at least in the relevant 
business domain of firms, see, e.g., Garud & Kumaraswamy (1993), Brynjolfsson & 
Kemerer (1996), Gupta, Jain & Sawhney (1999) and Makadok (1999). While this 
may seem obvious, increasing returns is still by no means an integrated part of 
management theory. 
 
The second reason to study increasing returns is that it is becoming more relevant in 
the increasingly information and knowledge based business environment of today. 
The rising information and knowledge intensity of the business environment is 
expressed in the rising prevalence of the services sector, rising prevalence of 
information products, e.g., software, and the increasing amount of knowledge 
required to configure and execute business processes. The economic characteristics 
of information and knowledge endow them with an inherent possibility of increasing 
returns when used as input factors (Romer, 1986; Glazer, 1991). These 
characteristics do not automatically imply that increasing returns will be present, as 
information and knowledge will always be used in combination with other 
(diminishing returns) input factors, yet they are likely to enlarge increasing returns 
opportunities. 
 
The third reason for studying increasing returns is that it is a very appealing concept 
for individual firms and for the economy as a whole. We put something in and we 
will get progressively more out in return! This sounds like a ‘free lunch’, a 
compelling yet doubtful concept. Yet, if we look more carefully, the presence of 
increasing returns seems to be a precondition for economic growth to occur at all. If 
output always rises just proportionally or less than proportionally to input, where will 
growth of an economic system come from when it cannot be ascribed to exogenous 
factors?2 This kind of reasoning is the basis for endogenous growth theory; see, e.g., 
Romer (1986; 1990b). 
                                                          
2 Exogenous reasons for economic growth, i.e., not incorporated in the model, such as 
population growth or newly discovered natural resources, are unlikely to provide the full 
explanation for differences in growth between different economic systems (Solow, 1957; 
Romer, 1993). 
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The fourth reason is that leading economists over the past 250 years have found the 
topic worthy of study. Starting with the classical economists, we can see forms of 
increasing returns being addressed in the work of Petty (1690), Turgot (1766) and of 
course in the work of Smith (1776). In the neoclassical era we can see Marshall’s 
(1890) struggle with increasing returns, followed in the 1920’s and 1930’s by the 
papers of Sraffa (1926), Young (1928), Robertson (1930) and Hicks (1939). In the 
1950’s to 1970’s, we see it prominently in the work of Kaldor (e.g., 1966, 1972) and 
we find it in some of the work of Arrow (e.g., 1962). In the last few decades it can be 
found in international trade theory, e.g., Helpman & Krugman (1985), in economic 
growth theory, e.g., Romer (1986; 1990b), in industrial organization theory, e.g., 
Farrell & Saloner (1985; 1986), Katz & Shapiro (1985; 1986), in complexity science, 
e.g., Arthur (1988; 1990), Brock & Durlauf (2001) and even in marketing, e.g., 
Gupta, Jain & Sawhney (1999), Dickson, Farris & Verbeke (2001). 
 
Still, despite the growing attention for increasing returns in economics, in complexity 
science and in the management sciences, there are some limitations to the current 
body of knowledge on increasing returns. First, theoretical specifications have been 
fragmented over different theoretical domains. The consequence is that there are 
many definitions of increasing returns, often addressing different mechanisms of 
increasing returns and yet an integrative approach is lacking. Second, empirical 
measurement of increasing returns remains underexposed, especially at the firm 
level. Evidence of increasing returns is often anecdotal and systematic empirical 
research is scarce (David & Greenstein, 1990). Third, relatively little is known about 
the influence of increasing returns on firm performance. Concluding, there are clearly 
reasons for studying increasing returns and there is a need for an integrative 
theoretical specification, for empirical measurement and for research into the 
implications of increasing returns for firm performance. 
 
1.2 Increasing returns, market structure, firm behavior and firm 
performance 
The question Why are some firms more successful than others? is a classic one in the 
strategic management literature (Rumelt, Schendel & Teece, 1994). It is also the 
foundation of the research reported on in this thesis. The reason to pose a variant of 
this classical question yet again is that theory and existing research suggest that the 
presence of increasing returns has important implications for market structure, 
market outcomes and, as a consequence, for the behavior and the performance of 
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firms that are active in those markets, see, e.g., Arthur (1996), Schilling (1998), 
Shapiro & Varian (1999). 
 
Increasing returns, i.e., positive feedback effects, play an important role in many 
markets and firms. In markets, they appear for example in the emergence of fashions 
and fads, e.g., Abrahamson & Rosenkopf (1997), Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer & 
Welch (1992) and in technology adoption and standardization, e.g., Arthur (1989), 
Katz and Shapiro (1985). In firms they appear for example in the production and 
commercialization of information and knowledge intensive products, e.g., John, 
Weiss & Dutta (1999), Shapiro & Varian (1998) and in technological process 
improvements, e.g., Amit (1986), Hatch & Mowery (1998). We will refer to the 
mechanisms causing positive feedback effects in the market as market-based 
mechanisms of increasing returns and to the mechanisms causing positive feedback 
effects in the firm as firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns. 
 
The presence of market-based mechanisms of increasing returns has important 
consequences for market structure (Arthur, 1989; Farrell & Saloner, 1985; 1986; 
Katz & Shapiro, 1985; 1986). Market structure in increasing returns markets is 
characterized by: 
• battles for the technological standard, i.e., competition between multiple 
technology networks 
• winner-take-all situations, i.e., very asymmetric distribution of market 
shares 
• customer lock-in on technological standards, i.e., when the cost of switching 
to another technology – even though it may be technically superior – is too 
large for the switch to take place 
• unpredictability of market behavior, e.g., excess inertia, i.e., stalemates in 
the market, or excess momentum, i.e., explosive growth, in the adoption of 
technologies 
• path dependence, i.e., disproportional influences of historical small events 
and of factors of chance 
• the possibility of market imperfections, i.e., it is not assured that the ‘best’ 
technology will prevail 
 
The presence of firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns has important 
consequences for firm behavior, which is characterized by, for example: 
• decisions regarding the optimal scale of production and the speed of 
extension of this scale 
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• decisions regarding product and process improvements 
• decisions regarding the firm’s value proposition in the market, e.g., cost-
leadership or differentiation strategies 
 
Besides their separate influence on market structure and firm behavior, these market-
based and firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns will likely be related in 
multiple ways: 
• regarding the capabilities the firm needs to understand the consequences of 
increasing returns for market structure and for competitors’ behavior and to 
strategically act upon those consequences 
• regarding the scale and growth of operations the firm can realize as a 
consequence of market outcomes 
• regarding the decisions the firm has to take on investments to be made and 
strategic actions to be taken to exploit acquired advantages 
 
All of these effects together will eventually determine the performance of firms, 
products and technologies (Arthur, 1988; Hill, 1997): 
• sponsoring of new technologies and commercialization of new products will 
become an increasingly risky process 
• product, technology and firm performance will become less predictable 
• product, technology and firm performance may be path dependent, i.e. 
heavily dependent on initial conditions that are often irreversible 
 
Whether all of the consequences for market structure and firm behavior mentioned 
above will be present in increasing returns markets and what the implications are for 
firm performance, is still debated. We aim to deliver a contribution to this debate 
with this thesis. 
 
1.3 Central problem and research approach of the thesis 
1.3.1 Central problem 
Following the reasoning in the previous sections, the central problem dealt with in 
this thesis is: 
 
What is the effect of market-based mechanisms of increasing returns on 
firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns and what is their joint effect 
on firm performance? 
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The following research questions will be addressed. 
1. How can market-based and firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns be 
defined and theoretically specified? 
2. How can market-based and firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns be 
measured? 
3. What is the effect of market-based mechanisms of increasing returns on 
firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns? 
4. What is the joint effect of market-based and firm-based mechanisms of 
increasing returns on firm performance? 
 
1.3.2 Industrial organization approach 
In answering these research questions, we adopt a behavioralist approach to the 
industrial organization theory of the firm. Within this approach, we will adhere to the 
Harvard tradition, allowing for market imperfections and for the influences of firm-
specific behavior. 
 
In 1926, Sraffa predicted that Robinson’s (1933) and Chamberlin’s (1933) theories of 
imperfect competition would be the logical road to fit increasing returns into 
economic theory (Sraffa, 1926). Based on, among others, Robinson’s and 
Chamberlin’s theories of imperfect competition, industrial organization theory 
emerged. The basic assumption of industrial organization theory is that market 
structure influences firm performance through the conduct of the firm. This has 
become known as the structure-conduct-performance paradigm (Bain, 1959). In the 
structuralist approach to industrial organization theory, this assumption is taken to 
the extent that market structure is so constraining on firm conduct that individual 
management action can be virtually ignored (Spanos & Lioukas, 2001). For our 
analysis, the major objection to this approach is that it virtually ignores the increasing 
returns mechanisms that might occur within the firm and the ability of the firm to 
take strategic action. 
 
In response to the limitations of the structuralist approach, a modified industrial 
organization framework gradually emerged, which is referred to as the behavioralist 
approach to industrial organization (Brouwer, 1991). The works of Scherer & Ross 
(1990) and Porter (1980; 1985; 1990; 1996) are exemplar for this approach. 
According to Spanos & Lioukas (2001), Porter’s work differs from the structuralist 
approach in three important ways. First, he follows the strategic management 
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tradition by focusing on firm performance rather than on industry performance. 
Second, he does not regard industry structure as completely exogenous or stable, but 
rather as dynamic and partly subject to being influenced by the firm’s actions. Third, 
he explicitly recognizes the role of firm conduct in influencing performance.  
 
Analyzing increasing returns by making use of the behavioralist industrial 
organization approach therefore enables us to address specifically both market-based 
and firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns. The adoption of the behavioralist 
approach to industrial organization theory also implies that in this thesis we focus on 
firm performance rather than industry performance, that we do not consider industry 
structure to be completely stable and fully exogenous and that we assume that the 
firm can, by its conduct, influence its performance. Hence, this is the theory of the 
firm that we will adopt for the remainder of this thesis. 
 
1.3.3 Analytical framework 
The combination of the central problem and the chosen industrial organization 
approach results in the analytical framework shown in figure 1.1. 
 
Market structure
• market-based mechanisms
of increasing returns
• network effects
• social interaction
effects
Firm conduct
• firm-based mechanisms
of increasing returns
• scale effects
• learning effects
Firm 
performance
• product
performance
• organization
performance
 
Figure 1-1: Analytical framework 
 
This analytical framework is based on the structure-conduct-performance paradigm 
discussed above. We consider market-based mechanisms of increasing returns as 
determinants of market structure and firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns as 
determinants of firm conduct.3 This implies that the market-based mechanisms of 
increasing returns influence firm performance at least partly through the firm-based 
mechanisms of increasing returns. 
                                                          
3 See chapter three for the reasons why. 
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1.4 Contribution of the thesis 
1.4.1 Existing literature streams on increasing returns 
The subject of increasing returns has been addressed in literature from three different 
perspectives, i.e., economics, complexity science and management science. Theories 
have been developed on different mechanisms of increasing returns from each of 
these perspectives. 
 
Historically, theory on increasing returns has mainly been developed in economic 
literature. However, most of the economic research into increasing returns suffers 
from one or more of the following shortcomings: it is generally not integrative, i.e., it 
mainly addresses the firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns, it often makes 
far-reaching abstractions from reality, which often hampers the managerial relevance, 
it is often exclusively theoretical, empirical research is relatively scarce and it does 
little to address the consequences of increasing returns for firm performance. 
 
A promising new literature stream for enriching the theory of increasing returns is 
that of complexity science, especially because complexity science4 literature often 
explicitly incorporates positive feedback as a concept. Similar to the economic 
literature, most of the research into increasing returns in the complexity science 
literature suffers from one or more of the following shortcomings: it is generally not 
integrative, i.e., it mainly addresses the market-based mechanisms of increasing 
returns, it is often little related to management problems, it is often exclusively 
theoretical, empirical research is relatively scarce and it does little to address the 
consequences of increasing returns for firm performance. 
 
In the past decades, many additions to increasing returns theory have been made 
from the management sciences. The management science literature focuses on the 
firm and its interaction with the environment. Still, most of the theory on increasing 
returns in the management literature suffers from one or more of the following 
shortcomings: it is generally not integrative, i.e., it addresses either firm-based 
increasing returns mechanisms or market-based increasing returns mechanisms, but 
it rarely addresses both, it is to a large extent conceptual, empirical research is 
relatively scarce, empirical evidence is mainly anecdotal, i.e., based on case 
examples, and it does little to address the consequences of increasing returns for 
product and firm performance. 
                                                          
4 We follow the terminology used by the Santa Fe Institute (Anderson, Arrow & Pines, 1988) 
for their conference proceedings, i.e., studies in the sciences of complexity. 
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1.4.2 Perspective and aims of this thesis 
In this thesis, we will take a management perspective. As explained in section 1.3, 
the management perspective will be operationalized by taking the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm as a research framework. The structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm enables us to make a connection between the existing literature streams on 
increasing returns, i.e., from complexity science, from economics and from the 
management sciences (see figure 1.2). This connection enables us to overcome the 
shortcomings of the individual literature streams. 
 
EconomicsComplexityscience
Management
science
Market structure
• market-based mechanisms
of increasing returns
• network effects
• social interaction
effects
Firm conduct
• firm-based mechanisms
of increasing returns
• scale effects
• learning effects
Firm 
performance
• product
performance
• organization
performance
 
Figure 1-2: Perspectives used in the thesis 
 
We had four aims in writing this thesis. 
 
The first scientific aim was to contribute to the development of increasing returns 
theory from a management perspective in an integrative way, i.e., by addressing 
market-based and firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns and their 
interrelations. To achieve this aim we made use of existing concepts from the 
economics perspective, the complexity science perspective and the management 
perspective. 
 
The second scientific aim was to develop methods for measuring the market-based 
and firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns. 
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The third scientific aim was to analyze empirically the relationships between market-
based mechanisms of increasing returns and firm-based mechanisms of increasing 
returns and their joint effects on firm performance.  
 
The managerial aim was to provide managers with the building blocks of a 
framework that will enable them to understand the implications of increasing returns 
for the structure of their market, for the behavior of firms in these markets and for 
product and firm performance in these markets. This understanding should enable 
managers to take conscious strategic action upon the consequences of increasing 
returns to increase the performance of their firm and its products. 
 
1.5 A managerial definition of increasing returns 
Taking a management perspective, we searched for a managerial definition of 
increasing returns. Furthermore, because we aimed at contributing to the 
development of increasing returns theory in an integrative way, such a definition had 
to comprise the different mechanisms of increasing returns, i.e., the market-based 
mechanisms and the firm-based mechanisms.  
 
1.5.1 Existing definitions of increasing returns 
When we look at existing increasing returns literature, a widely varying array of 
definitions of increasing returns is available, coming from the economic perspective, 
from the complexity science perspective or from the management perspective. A few 
examples will illustrate this; see also Commandeur (1999). 
 
“The law of Increasing Returns may be worded thus: an increase of labour 
and capital leads generally to improved organisation, which increases the 
efficiency of the work of labour and capital.” (Marshall, 1890, IV, VIII, 2). 
 
“Increasing Returns is a relation between a quantity of effort and sacrifice 
on the one hand, and a quantity of product on the other.” (Marshall, 1890, 
IV, VIII, 2). 
 
“The basic conception of returns in relation to the variation of factors is now 
essentially this: that successive equal additions, or doses, of the variable 
factor, or input, applied to the definite quantity of the factor held constant, 
yield, up to a certain amount of input, successively larger increments of 
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return; further amounts of input yield successively diminishing increments 
of returns.” (Wolfe, 1929, p.580). 
 
“Positive feedbacks in the economy.” (Arthur, 1990, p.80; 1999, p.108). 
 
“Economic processes can be self-reinforcing” (Cowan & Gunby, 1996, 
p.521). 
 
“Increasing Returns are the tendency for that which is ahead to get further 
ahead: for that which loses advantage to lose further advantage. They are 
mechanisms of positive feedback that operate – within markets, businesses, 
and industries – to reinforce that which gains success or aggravate that 
which suffers loss.” (Arthur, 1996, p.100). 
 
“Economists use the phrase increasing returns to refer to this kind of self-
reinforcement. Increasing returns implies that the more successful a firm is 
at getting its technology accepted as a standard, the more successful it will 
become in the future; in an increasing returns world, success begets 
success!” (Hill, 1997, p.9). 
 
“Whatever the reason one gets ahead – acumen, chance, clever strategy – 
increasing returns amplify the advantage. With increasing returns, the 
market at least for a while tilts in favour of the provider that gets out in 
front.” (Teece, 1998, p.58). 
 
“[…] an element of self-enforcement that transcends its historical cause […] 
in escalating it out of proportion (increasing returns).” (Kretschmer, Klimis 
& Choi, 1998, p.S61). 
 
1.5.2 Definitions of the separate mechanisms 
A systematic study of the literature (see chapter three) shows that four generic 
mechanisms can be distinguished that bring about positive feedback effects (cf., 
Arthur, 1988): (1) network effects, (2) social interaction effects, (3) scale effects and 
(4) learning effects.5 Of these mechanisms, social interaction effects and network 
effects are market-based, while scale effects and learning effects are firm-based. For 
                                                          
5 Arthur (1988) mentions four sources of increasing returns: (1) large set-up or fixed costs, (2) 
learning effects, (3) coordination effects and (4) adaptive expectations. 
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each of these four mechanisms it is possible to draw up a definition that is in 
accordance with the dominant definitions that are available in the literature. 
 
Network effects occur when to an economic agent, e.g., a consumer of a firm, the 
utility of using a product or technology becomes larger as its network of users grows 
in size (Farrell & Saloner, 1985; Katz & Shapiro, 1985). The network effect may set 
in motion a positive feedback loop that will cause a product or technology to become 
more prevalent in the market. 
 
Social interaction effects occur when an economic agent’s preference for a product or 
technology is dependent upon the opinions or expectations of other economic agents. 
The social interaction effect may set in motion a positive feedback loop that will 
cause agents to expect that a certain product or technology will become more 
prevalent in the market. 
 
Scale effects occur when there is a positive static relationship between the size of 
output of a firm and its productivity. This is reflected in a downward slope of the 
firm’s average total cost curve (Amit, 1986). Scale effects may bring about a positive 
feedback effect when the firm can convert the cost advantage acquired through large 
production volumes into increasing sales volumes.  
 
Learning effects imply that there is a positive dynamic relationship between the 
firm’s growth of output and its growth of productivity (Kaldor, 1966). This is 
reflected in downward shift of the firm’s average total cost curve (Amit, 1986; Day 
and Montgomery, 1983). Learning effects may bring about a positive feedback effect 
when the firm can convert the cost advantage acquired from productivity growth into 
further output growth. 
 
1.5.3 Towards an integrative definition of increasing returns 
The next step towards an integrative definition of increasing returns is to find the 
common denominator of the definitions of the separate mechanisms. In this case, the 
common denominator is the possibility of each of the mechanisms to bring about a 
positive feedback effect. We therefore follow Arthur (1990) in defining increasing 
returns as: 
  
Positive feedback effects in markets and firms. 
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Note that this definition is different from the common economic definition of 
increasing returns. 
 
The choice of this definition has important implications for what we mean by 
increasing returns, namely that to be able to speak of increasing returns the positive 
feedback loop has to be closed. For firm-based increasing returns this means that 
scale effects and learning effects create potential increasing returns but are not 
increasing returns as such, contrary to the common economic definition. They only 
become so when they are used by the firm in such a way that further cost 
improvements or further productivity growth lead to better product propositions, 
resulting in larger market share and larger production volume. For market-based 
increasing returns it means that network effects and social interaction effects create 
potential increasing returns but not increasing returns as such. They only become so 
when they lead to increased prevalence of products or technologies in the market. 
 
In this thesis we will refer to scale effects, learning effects, network effects and social 
interaction effects as the mechanisms of increasing returns. These mechanisms of 
increasing returns, and the ways in which they cause positive feedback effects, are 
sketched in figure 1.3. 
 
Social
interaction
effects
Scale
effects
Number of
(potential)
customers
Production
volume
Size of the
network
Network
effects
Learning
effects
Market-based mechanisms
of increasing returns
Firm-based mechanisms
of increasing returns
 
Figure 1-3: The mechanisms of increasing returns and their feedback loops 
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1.6 Research design of the thesis 
According to Churchill & Iacobucci (2002) we can distinguish four types of research 
design: exploratory, descriptive, explanatory and predictive. These can be looked 
upon as stages in a continuous process in which exploratory studies are often seen as 
the initial step. This step generates tentative explanations or hypotheses that serve as 
specific guides to descriptive, explanatory or predictive studies. 
 
Descriptive and explanatory research designs have been used in this thesis. First the 
concepts to be studied have been described using a literature study. Subsequently, a 
research model and hypotheses were formulated on the basis of this literature study. 
Finally, the relationships between the concepts, i.e., the testing of hypotheses, were 
explained using three empirical studies. 
 
In the first empirical study, a cross-sectional management survey was conducted 
among 257 Dutch industrial firms to collect primary data. In the second empirical 
study, a cross-sectional management survey was conducted among 36 large Dutch-
based firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and objective financial data 
from these firms’ annual reports were measured.6 In the third empirical study, a firm-
level specification of the Verdoorn law7, measuring the relationship between the 
growth of output and the growth of labor productivity, and a productivity-
performance relationship were analyzed for 118 large Dutch-based firms listed on the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange using objective financial data from these firms’ annual 
reports. 
 
How do these three empirical studies relate to each other? In this thesis, both within-
method and between-method triangulation was used (Jick, 1979). The within-method 
triangulation becomes clear when comparing the first and second empirical studies. 
The surveys in these studies were conducted with different, independent samples, but 
using the same measurement scales of the market-based mechanisms of increasing 
returns. The between-method triangulation becomes clear when comparing the first 
empirical study with the second and third empirical studies. While starting from the 
same basic research model, there are some marked differences in the collection and 
the analysis of the data. First, in the first empirical study we used subjective scales 
for the measurement of the firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns and for the 
                                                          
6 These 36 firms are a subset of the 118 firms from the sample for the third study. 
7 The Verdoorn law (Verdoorn, 1949; Kaldor, 1966) is a linear relation between the growth of 
output and the growth of labor productivity of an economic entity that can be used to measure 
scale and learning effects. 
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measurement firm performance, whereas in the second and third empirical studies we 
used publicly available financial data to do so. Second, for the analysis of the data of 
the first empirical study the research model was estimated using structural equation 
modeling, while for the second and third empirical studies regression analysis was 
used. 
 
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis contains a theoretical and an empirical part (see figure 1.4). The 
theoretical part comprises chapters two, three, four and five. In this part we focus on 
answering the first research question of this thesis, i.e., the definition and theoretical 
specification of the market-based and firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns. 
In chapter two we provide an introduction to the history of thought about increasing 
returns. In chapter three we provide an overview, a typology and a critical assessment 
of the literature on increasing returns to date. In chapter four we develop a theoretical 
specification of the market-based mechanisms of increasing returns, i.e., network 
effects and social interaction effects. This chapter is built mainly on management 
theory complemented with some concepts from complexity science. In chapter five 
we develop a theoretical specification of the firm-based mechanisms of increasing 
returns, i.e., scale effects and learning effects. This chapter is built on management 
theory complemented with economic concepts. 
 
Chapter six is the linch-pin between the theoretical and the empirical part of the 
thesis. In this chapter we provide a generic research model that is based on the 
theoretical specifications of the chapters four and five. From this research model, we 
derive the hypotheses that will be tested in the empirical part of the thesis. Finally, in 
this chapter we address the research designs of the empirical studies used for testing 
these hypotheses. 
 
The empirical part of the thesis comprises chapters seven, eight and nine. In the 
empirical part we focus on answering the second, third and fourth research questions 
of this thesis, i.e., the measurement of the market-based and firm-based mechanisms 
of increasing returns, the relationships between them and their relationship with firm 
performance. Chapter seven contains a report on the results of the first empirical 
study, a management survey among 257 Dutch industrial firms. Chapter eight 
contains a report on the results of the second empirical study, the management survey 
and financial measurement of 36 large Dutch-based firms listed on the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange. Chapter nine contains a report on the results of the third empirical 
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study, the analysis of the Verdoorn law and the productivity-performance relation for 
118 Dutch-based firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. 
 
We conclude the thesis in chapter ten by answering the main problem and the 
research questions, by explaining the limitations of the research, by drawing 
management implications from our findings and by providing suggestions for further 
research. 
 
Ch.1 Introduction
to the study
Ch.3 Literature review
Ch.4 Market-based 
increasing returns
Ch.5 Firm-based
increasing returns
Ch.6 Framework & hypotheses
Ch.7 Research
report first
empirical study
Ch.8 Research 
report second
empirical study
Ch.10 Conclusions
Theoretical
section
Empirical
section
Ch.9 Research
report third
empirical study
Ch.2 Introduction to
increasing returns
 
Figure 1-4: Structure of the thesis 
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1.8 Glossary 
Below we provide a list of concepts and their definition as they have been used 
throughout this thesis. Note that these definitions and meanings may in some cases 
differ from commonly accepted meanings and definitions used in economics, 
complexity science or management science. 
 
Adapter strategy (also: follower strategy): this involves joining the dominant 
technology by acquiring a license for developing products based on this technology. 
This may enable a firm that is not a shaper, i.e., a sponsor of the dominant 
technology, to profit from the potential for scale and learning effects created by the 
dominant technology. 
 
Compatibility means that products or technologies function in harmony with 
complementary products, because they share a common technological infrastructure. 
 
Complementarity means that products or technologies are (meant to be) used together 
and that in this way they have for customers a higher value than when used 
separately. Economically this means that we may expect a positive cross-elasticity of 
demand between these products. 
 
Critical mass means that the technology network is so large that its network value 
outweighs that of competitive technologies or of a possible negative inherent value 
that customers may have towards it.  
 
Economies of scale are related to the cost savings from producing a larger number of 
units of the same product.  
 
Economies of scope are related to the cost savings from producing a variety of 
different products, i.e., it is cheaper to produce different products together in one 
plant than in separate plants. 
 
Economies of sequence are related to cost savings from vertical integration. 
 
Follower strategy: see adapter strategy. 
 
Increasing returns are defined in this thesis as positive feedback effects in markets 
and firms. 
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Increasing returns to scale means that, in a production function, the output rises 
more than proportionally with an increase of all the input factors to the same amount. 
 
Inertia, excess: this refers to a market stalemate in which both suppliers and 
customers wait for others to decide first. This impedes a collective switch from an 
existing technological standard to a possibly superior new standard of technology. 
 
Installed base is a firm’s existing population of (loyal) customers. 
 
Learning effects imply that there is a positive dynamic relationship between the 
firm’s growth of output and its growth of productivity. This is reflected in a 
downward shift of the firm’s short-run average total cost curve, or a movement along 
the firm’s long-run average total cost curve. 
 
Learning effects, autonomous: learning that results from the automatic improvement 
in productivity of input factors as accumulated production increases. It is also 
referred to as learning-by-doing or as the experience curve. 
 
Learning effects, exogenous: learning that results from effects that are external to the 
firm. 
 
Learning effects, induced: learning that results from conscious managerial action to 
improve the productivity of the input factors. 
 
Licensees are firms that do not own property rights to the technology, but instead buy 
the right to use the technology in their products. 
 
Lock-in and lock-out describes a situation in which the cost of switching to another 
technology – even though it may be technically superior – is too large for the switch 
to take place. The existing technology is therefore locked in and the alternative 
technology is locked out. 
 
Momentum, excess: this refers to a situation of explosive growth in which the 
investments of some suppliers and customers lead to massive investments by others. 
The market may quickly lock in to one single, possibly inferior, technological 
standard. 
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Network effects occur when, to an economic agent, e.g., a consumer or a firm, the 
economic utility of using a product or technology increases as its network of users 
grows in size. 
 
Network effects, direct: when a product’s economic utility increases as more 
customers start using it, this is referred to as a direct network effect. 
 
Network effects, indirect: the increase in a product’s economic utility as more 
customers start using complementary products or as more suppliers start offering 
complementary products, is referred to as an indirect network effect. It is also 
referred to by others as a market-mediated network effect or the hardware-software 
paradigm. 
 
Path dependence means that the early history of market shares, often the 
consequence of small events or chance circumstances, can determine to a large extent 
which technology prevails. It is also referred to by others as irreversibility, or non-
ergodicity. 
 
Productivity or labor productivity is defined in this thesis as the ratio between output, 
measured as a firm’s annual added value, and labor input, measured as the annual 
number of hours worked. 
 
Scale effects occur when there is a positive static relationship between the size of 
output of a firm and its productivity. This is reflected in a downward slope of the 
firm’s average total cost curve. Scale effects in our definition comprise economies of 
scale, scope and sequence. 
 
Shaper strategy: this means that a firm sponsors its own proprietary technology and 
strives for dominance of this technology in the market, i.e., the firm wants to shape 
the market. 
 
Social interaction effects occur when an economic agent’s preference for a product or 
technology is dependent upon the opinions or expectations of other economic agents. 
It is also referred to by others as social network effects or social contagion. 
 
Sponsor or technology sponsor: a sponsor is a firm that has property rights to a 
technology and hence is willing to make investments to promote it.  
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Substitutability means that products or technologies are competitive, so that a 
consumer will buy either one product or the other. Economically, this means that we 
may expect a negative cross-elasticity of demand. 
 
Verdoorn law: a long-run linear relationship between the growth of output and the 
growth of labor productivity (Verdoorn, 1949; Kaldor, 1966). We conceptualize this 
relationship at the firm level, as a long-run relationship between the firm’s growth of 
output and the firm’s growth of labor productivity. 
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2. INTRODUCTION TO INCREASING RETURNS 
LITERATURE 
 
The first research question posed in section 1.3 was: How can market-based and 
firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns be theoretically specified and defined? 
In this chapter, we provide a literature background against which this question can be 
answered in chapter four and five. We start in section one with an introduction into 
the history of thought about increasing returns. In the remainder of the chapter, we 
will further address the economic, complexity and management perspectives on 
increasing returns. We address the classical economics view in section two, the 
neoclassical economics view in section three and alternatives and new directions in 
economics in section four. The complexity science perspective is addressed in 
section five and the management perspective is addressed in section six. Throughout 
this chapter we will highlight the contributions of important authors and thereby 
provide a context to understand the theoretical concepts that will be introduced in 
chapters four and five. 
 
Note that this chapter is not framed within the limits of the definitions of increasing 
returns and the research approach as chosen in the first chapter. 
 
2.1 Increasing returns and the history of economic thought 
In the field of economics, the study of returns mechanisms has a long history, going 
back to even before the works of Smith. From the start, the concepts of constant and 
diminishing returns have been firmly established in economics, being important 
cornerstones of (general) equilibrium models. By contrast, the concept of increasing 
returns has received much less attention and has even been looked upon as deviant 
from mainstream economic theory (Buchanan & Yoon, 1994).  
 
We can only guess at the exact reasons as to why economists in the past have been 
hesitant to incorporate increasing returns into mainstream theory. Three obvious 
reasons suggest themselves. The first is that, with the then prevailing state of 
agriculture and manufacturing, diminishing returns were the rule of the day. While 
this might have been true for Malthus (1815), Ricardo (1815) or Marx (1867), the 
argument does not hold for the neo-classical economists and certainly not for modern 
times. The second reason is the difficulty of incorporating increasing returns in 
economic models and of bringing it under mathematical control (Arthur, 1994). This 
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reason may well have held for the early neoclassical economists, like Walras (1874) 
and Marshall (1890), perhaps even for economists until the 1920’s, but given the 
mathematical advance of general equilibrium economics in the 1950’s and 1960’s, it 
is hard to believe that increasing returns might have been ‘too difficult’ for those 
involved. The third and most likely reason is the disturbing implications of allowing 
increasing returns in economic models for market efficiency and equilibrium theory. 
A famous statement in this respect can be found in the work of Hicks (1939). 
Thinking through the implications of allowing for increasing returns in economic 
theory, Hicks concludes that “…the threatened wreckage is that of the greater part of 
general equilibrium theory …” and that the only way to save anything from this 
wreck is to assume “… that the markets confronting most of the firms with which we 
shall be dealing do not differ very greatly from perfectly competitive markets.” 
(Hicks, 1939, p.84). In other words, Hicks let the theoretical assumptions of the neo-
classical paradigm prevail over the empirical relevance of increasing returns. 
Corroborative material is provided by Hahn & Matthews (1964, p.833), who state 
“[…] the reason for the neglect is no doubt the difficulty of fitting increasing returns 
into the prevailing framework of perfect competition and marginal productivity 
factor pricing.” It is well known from science philosophy (e.g., Kuhn, 1962) and 
from scientometric studies (Leydesdorff, 1995; Oomes, 2001) that scientific fields 
can lock in to dominant paradigms. As increasing returns was not part of the 
dominant paradigm, it is no surprise that increasing returns has been effectively 
locked out of economic theory for a long time. 
 
One of the consequences of this lock-out is that economic theory incorporating 
increasing returns is less well developed than would perhaps be desirable. Still, 
throughout the history of economic science, a small but distinct group of economists, 
starting with Smith, has pointed out the relevance of increasing returns. The interest 
in increasing returns issues has been discontinuous, with severe ups and downs in the 
amount of attention it has received (see figure 2.1). We will subsequently discuss this 
history.8  
 
                                                          
8 This section builds on economic history as discussed in Ekelund & Hébert (1997), Screpanti 
& Zamagni (1993) and Buchanan & Yoon (1994). We refer to these works for more in-depth 
analyses of the economists discussed here. 
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Figure 2-1: Chronology of increasing returns interest in economics (adapted from 
Commandeur, 1999) 
 
2.2 The classical economic perspective 
The concept of increasing returns is not new. As with so many economic concepts, 
the roots go back to the work of Smith (1776). In fact, Smith’s famous story of the 
pin factory, where one worker could by himself produce a maximum of ten pins a 
day, but where ten workers who divide the operations between them can produce 
around 48.000 pins, is a classic example of increasing returns.9 Even in the era before 
Adam Smith, in the pre-classical tradition, there is mention of increasing returns 
mechanisms. 
 
To be complete, the history of increasing returns in economics has to start with the 
ancient Greeks. Xenophon recognized that the division of labor was the determinant 
of increases in quantity and quality of goods, more than 2000 years before Adam 
Smith (Ekelund & Hébert, 1997). Plato also recognized specialization and division of 
                                                          
9 Buchanan & Yoon (1994) point out that the pin factory example is misleading because it 
draws attention away from the phenomenon of economy-wide increasing returns and towards 
increasing returns to scale of operation within a single producing unit. It therefore does not do 
justice to the broad implications of Smith’s analysis. Still, for our purpose, i.e., increasing 
returns in relation to the firm, it is a suitable example. 
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labor as a source of efficiency and productivity (Ekelund & Hébert, 1997). Neither 
Xenophon nor Plato however, developed a theory of division of labor.10 
 
While other ancient and medieval ‘economists’ over the ages delivered contributions 
to the foundations of economic thought, e.g., on money, value, prices and demand, 
none of them seem to address issues of increasing returns. An explanation may be 
that throughout most of the ancient past and the middle ages, economic systems were 
small and localized, largely self-sufficient, dominated by land and labor as factors of 
production, and therefore not liable to increasing returns due to trade, economies of 
scale or the advantages of division of labor. 
 
2.2.1 Before Smith 
It is only in the 17th century, during the transition from mercantilism to liberalism, 
that we encounter early economists who address increasing returns issues. The most 
prominent of them is Petty (1690), who laid a positivistic basis for economic 
analysis. He discussed ideas concerning differential returns from different economic 
activities, anticipating the classical economists’ notion that agriculture is a 
diminishing returns activity whereas production aided by capital goods may well be 
increasing returns (Petty, 1690). He also anticipated the classical economists with 
respect to the role played by the division of labor and the relationship between the 
division of labor and the size of the market (Petty, 1690; Screpanti & Zamagni, 
1993). 
 
In a survey of the literature on specialization Yang & Ng (1998) also mention Petty 
(1690) and his observations and remarks on the productivity implications of an 
increased division of labor. They state that before Smith the three basic advantages of 
an increased division of labor, improving the skill of human capital, saving of time 
and effort in changing tasks and facilitating the invention of machinery, had been 
mentioned by Maxwell (1721) and Tucker (1755, 1774). Still, however, their 
contributions remain piecemeal, as they did not systematically study increasing 
returns or embed in a broader theory. 
 
                                                          
10 For the reasons why division of labor is closely connected to increasing returns, see below 
with the discussion of Adam Smith. 
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2.2.2 Smith 
Despite the contributions of his predecessors, Smith can be regarded as the father of 
economic science. With him starts what has become known as the classical school of 
economics. The concept of increasing returns is central to Smith’s work, though it is 
not yet called increasing returns. In fact, Smith’s book, the Wealth of Nations, starts 
with an analysis of the causes of improvement in the productive powers of labor 
(Smith, 1776). 
 
Smith’s central proposition is that division of labor leads to increased wealth. This is 
illustrated by his famous analysis of a pin factory. In Smith’s time, an experienced 
craftsman could, with help of the appropriate capital goods, produce about ten pins a 
day, or, when he did his utmost, certainly not more than twenty. After all, he would 
have to perform all the production steps himself and it is impossible for him to do 
more than one thing at a time. During a visit to a pin factory, Smith observed that the 
ten laborers that worked there could, with help of the same amount of capital goods, 
produce around 48.000 pins a day, or, that production increases disproportional with 
the amount of labor. The ten workers achieved this by dividing the tasks among 
themselves and specializing in performing one task each. Moreover, this 
specialization of labor leads to increased output through an improvement of skill on 
behalf of the workmen, time saving in the production process and the ability to use 
proper and specialized machinery. The implication is that the costs per pin will 
become lower as more pins are produced. In this way, the division of labor is the 
basis of increasing returns, in the sense of both returns to scale as well as learning-
by-doing.11 
 
While this is clear within the boundaries of the pin factory example, there is a 
complicating factor involved in that the possibility to capture these increasing returns 
effects is related to the extent of the market. For example, in a large city it would pay 
to have an industrial bakery, in which twenty workmen could make thousands of 
loaves of bread a day. In a small geographically isolated town, however, such an 
industrial bakery could not exist for lack of demand for bread.12 Consequently, in this 
small town one baker will supply the entire need for bread and the principles of labor 
division cannot be applied. As this also goes for most of the other economic activities 
in the small town, it causes the whole of the small town’s economy to lag behind a 
large city’s economy. Quoting Smith: “As it is the power of exchanging that gives 
                                                          
11 Smith does not call this increasing returns but improvement of productive powers. 
12 Bear in mind that in Smith’s time for many goods is was not customary or not possible to 
transport them over long distances. 
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occasion to the division of labour, so the extent of this division must always be 
limited by the extent of that power or, in other words, by the extent of the market. 
When the market is very small, no person can have any encouragement to dedicate 
himself entirely to one employment […].” (1776, I, III). The implication Smith draws 
from this is that extended specialization and hence gains in wealth can be 
accomplished by increasing the extent of the market. In Smith’s liberal tradition, this 
means opening up internal and external markets, e.g., by the increased buying power 
of the existing market or by (international) trade. 
 
2.2.3 After Smith: Malthus and Ricardo 
Strangely enough, the increasing returns part of Smith’s work did not catch on. Quite 
the contrary, important classical economic theorists like Malthus (1815) and Ricardo 
(1815) strongly stress diminishing returns effects. The limited attention for increasing 
returns phenomena is not surprising when we consider that the classical economists 
still largely lived in an agrarian society in which the industrial sector was still in its 
infancy.13 If a farmer works his land twice as intensively or with twice as many 
people, it is unlikely that it will yield twice as large a crop. 
 
One of the first to identify the principle of diminishing returns was Anderson (1777). 
In a short pamphlet, he describes the mechanisms that, when a country consists of 
land of different quality classes, the land with the highest quality will be cultivated 
first and the land with the lowest quality will only be cultivated when nothing else is 
left. In this way, the marginal agricultural production in this country or region will 
diminish when the population increases and more land is cultivated. Malthus (1815) 
worked out this principle in more detail. 
 
The essential contribution of Ricardo (1815) to the discussion on diminishing returns 
is to have shown that diminishing returns existed at the extensive margin, i.e., the 
same inputs applied to different qualities of land and at the intensive margin, i.e., 
more inputs applied to the same land. Diminishing returns at the extensive margin is 
Ricardo’s view of an automatic result of Malthus’ (1798) famous population 
principle, i.e., that population, when unchecked, increases in geometrical progression 
whereas the food supply cannot possibly increase faster than in arithmetic 
progression. This means that it becomes increasingly necessary to start cultivating 
lesser quality land. This reasoning attributes the principle of diminishing returns to 
                                                          
13 The principles of Taylor (1911) and Ford’s concept of mass production date from the early 
20th century, and were not yet commonplace in the 19th century. 
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the scale of agricultural production. Diminishing returns at the intensive margin is the 
result of the absence of technological progress and learning. This reasoning applies 
the principle of diminishing returns, i.e., descending marginal product, to the 
increased deployment of a single production factor, in this case labor. It is this 
relationship that has become known as the law of diminishing returns. 
 
2.2.4 The difference between Smith and Ricardo 
It is the absence of the possibility of technological progress that makes Ricardo 
essentially the founding father of diminishing returns, whereas Smith is associated 
with increasing returns. Arrow (1979) addresses the division of labor topic as brought 
forward by Smith (1776). From the three effects of the division of labor mentioned 
by Smith, i.e., the effect of practice, minimization of set-up costs and invention of 
better production methods, Arrow places greatest emphasis on the first. It is closely 
intertwined with the second however, because specializing in a certain task leads to 
learning and to the spreading of the learning cost over larger quantities. In this 
connection, there is a possibility for a positive feedback loop, as a specialization due 
to large learning cost leads to an increase in experience, thereby reinforcing the 
reason for specialization. According to Smith, differences in talents are not so much 
the cause, as the effect of the division of labor. Contrary to this point of view is the 
Ricardian viewpoint, in which an entity’s abilities to produce are given. These 
comparative advantages are seen as the cause for the division of labor through 
international trade. It is precisely this view that has dominated economic theory. 
 
2.2.5 Mill 
Ricardo’s work greatly influenced that of Mill (1848). Like Ricardo’s, Mill’s work is 
ingrained with the belief that diminishing returns to agriculture is one of the main 
factors limiting economic growth. Mill also points out that there are diseconomies of 
scale involved in manufacturing. When a manufacturing firm extends its production, 
this will yield economies of scale up to a certain point, after which new investments 
are needed and variable costs will go up; or, where Smith’s analysis of the pin 
factory stops, Mill reasoned further on the consequences of extending production. 
Eventually, the pin factory will have to buy more machines, put more production 
halls into use, hire foremen and managers, create an accounting department, all of 
which will induce average cost to go up after a certain point. Nevertheless, Mill also 
recognizes the existence of increasing returns to the scale of production in 
manufacturing industries, either caused by the benefits of the division of labor, 
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analogous to Smith, or caused by the indivisibilities of capital goods needed to set up 
a manufacturing site. This thinking became the basis for the idea that agriculture was 
subject to diminishing returns, whereas manufacturing was subject to increasing 
returns, and because Mill’s famous Principles of Political Economy (1848) remained 
for a long time the standard textbook of economics, this idea dominated economic 
thought at least until the beginning of the 20th century. 
 
2.3 The neoclassical economic perspective 
With neoclassical economics interest shifted away from economic growth, which had 
been so characteristic for the classical economists, toward the formalization of 
allocation problems and input-output questions. The works of Walras (1874) and 
Marshall (1890) are seminal in this respect. 
 
2.3.1 Walras and general equilibrium theory 
Walras (1874) developed the theory of general economic equilibrium. This theory is 
an intellectual tour de force, which has had enormous impact on the further 
developments of economic theory. General equilibrium theory and its extensions are 
still the dominant paradigm in economic science. The main goal of general 
equilibrium theory was to specify the axioms leading to a stable economic 
equilibrium, deviations from which could only be temporary (Kaldor, 1981). The 
most important of the axioms are: 
• all resources and all the preference schedules are taken as given 
• all technical processes of production are given and they are moreover linear 
and homogeneous 
• there is perfect competition on both the supply and demand side 
• there is no time dimension, decisions to produce and consume are taken 
simultaneously and there is no carry-over of any goods or information to the 
future, or from the past 
• all transactions take place in an equilibrium system of prices, which is 
established before any transactions are made 
 
In the course of economic history, most of these axioms have in some way been 
relaxed. According to Kaldor (1960), however, the model cannot be relaxed with 
respect to changes in technical knowledge, except when perfectly foreseen, with 
respect to the occurrence of economies of scale, i.e., increasing returns or non-
linearity, with respect to the presence of imperfect competition and with respect to 
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changes in consumer preferences. In other words, the Walrasian model, with all its 
extensions added over time, is not very useful when trying to understand the 
economic environment. If the conditions of the model are not met, the economy must 
be in disequilibrium. The theory, however says nothing about disequilibrium. 
 
2.3.2 Marshall 
It was not until Marshall (1890) that neoclassical economists became aware that the 
postulate of increasing returns did not fit the general equilibrium model. Marshall 
made it clear that for the neoclassical model to be valid, i.e., for the payment of input 
factors to equal the value of the output factors, constant returns had to be assumed 
(Buchanan & Yoon, 1994). This was not compatible with the classical hypothesis 
that agriculture was subject to diminishing returns and that in manufacturing 
increasing returns might be present. Therefore, Marshall decided to follow a different 
path. Rather than striving for explanation of general equilibrium of the economy as a 
whole, he tried to explain the partial equilibrium of a specific industry. Following the 
classical economists, Marshall states that the part which nature plays in production 
shows a tendency to diminishing returns, whereas the part which man plays shows a 
tendency to increasing returns. Moreover, according to Marshall, industries can be 
classified as either diminishing returns industries, constant returns industries or 
increasing returns industries. Marshall: “In the more delicate branches of 
manufacturing, where the cost of raw material counts for little and in most of the 
modern transport industries the law of increasing return acts almost unopposed.” 
(1890, IV, VIII, 2). 
 
Like Smith, Marshall views increasing returns as resulting in the first place from 
specialization of people and machines. He adds, however, the aspect of increasing 
returns as related to the cost of physical reproduction. Eventually Marshall arrives at 
two different definitions of increasing returns (1890, IV, VIII, 2). The first, starting 
from the notion of division of labor is: “The law of increasing return may be worded 
thus: an increase of labour and capital leads generally to improved organization, 
which increases the efficiency of the work of the labour and capital”. This first 
approach goes back to the work of Smith (1776). Marshall’s second definition, 
starting from the notion of the scale of production is: “Increasing return is a relation 
between a quantity of effort and sacrifice on the one hand, and a quantity of product 
on the other.” (1890, IV, VIII, 2). This second approach contains a number of 
important notions about increasing returns: 
• it concerns the production function, i.e., the supply side 
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• it is based on scale economies, i.e., increasing returns can only be realized 
under the condition of larger volumes 
• the input-output relation in an industry is the result of a continuous interplay 
between forces of increasing and diminishing returns 
 
Marshall presents these two definitions in the same section of his book. He does not 
seem to sense any disharmony between them, nor does he make an attempt to 
reconcile the two. In other words, while Marshall signals the importance of 
increasing returns, it is difficult for him to provide theoretical soundness.  
 
Still more difficulties arise, because without the assumption of constant or 
diminishing returns the competitive process cannot be dynamically stable. According 
to the theory, increasing returns would automatically result in a monopoly, something 
that Marshall does not observe from reality. Well aware of the limitations of this 
theory and of his own contributions to it, Marshall sighs: “The statical theory of 
equilibrium is only an introduction to economic studies; and it is barely even an 
introduction to the study of progress and development of industries which show a 
tendency to increasing return.” (1890, V, XII, 3). In order for increasing returns to 
remain possible within his neoclassical partial equilibrium model, Marshall invented 
the distinction between internal and external economies. These external economies, 
e.g., locational or communicational externalities that benefit the entire industry, 
Marshall reasons, are much more durable than internal economies that benefit only a 
single firm. Single firms may grow in size and therefore enjoy temporary monopoly 
benefits, but eventually they will run into the limits of their internal economies and 
they will die off. Their growth, however, will have contributed to the aggregate 
volume and therefore to the external economies of the industry that benefit all firms 
in the industry, independent of size. In this way, an industry will not become 
completely and definitively monopolized and increasing returns in the form of 
internal and external economies is compatible with partial equilibrium theory. 
 
Marshall was heavily criticized for his ideas on the classification of industries into 
diminishing, constant and increasing returns, and for his reconciliation on increasing 
returns and partial equilibrium. These criticisms will be discussed below. 
 
2.3.3 Bullock, Clapham and the classification of industries 
Bullock (1902) questions the universal validity of the distinction between 
diminishing returns, constant returns and increasing returns industries. He concludes 
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that diminishing returns and increasing returns result from various contending forces 
and that it is therefore not possible to assign any particular commodity or industry to 
a fixed place in the classification of the laws of increasing and diminishing returns 
because this depends on the strength of the contending forces. Before applying these 
laws to a concrete case, Bullock states, far more serious study has to be made of the 
actual conditions of the industry in question. He proposed replacing the notion of 
laws returns with the notion of the variation of productive forces. To Marshall’s 
credit, in later editions of his book Principles of Economics (1890), he makes 
reference to Bullock’s (1902) article. The discussion started by Bullock was 
continued some two decades later, by Clapham (1922a; 1922b), Pigou (1922) and 
Pigou & Robertson (1924). In an article titled Of empty economic boxes, Clapham 
states that the imaginary boxes of diminishing returns industries, constant returns 
industries and increasing returns industries have no empirical substance and are 
therefore empty. In this discussion Pigou (1922), being a proponent of the 
Marshallian stand, takes the opposite position, asserting that if empirical observations 
did not confirm the theory, this must be due to the bad quality of the statistical 
evidence (Screpanti & Zamagni, 1993). 
 
2.3.4 Sraffa and the Economic Journal discussion 
The problems of reconciling increasing returns and competitive markets that were 
already sensed but not adequately solved by Marshall, became fully exposed with 
Sraffa’s (1926) article The laws of returns under competitive conditions in The 
Economic Journal. Sraffa reasons that to reconcile increasing returns and competitive 
equilibrium, as Marshall does, it is necessary to postulate that economies of scale are 
external to the firm, yet internal to the industry. This is not unlike Marshall’s concept 
of external economies. However, Sraffa criticizes Marshall for not being rigorous 
enough: if there were any economies of scale internal to firms, a firm would be 
encouraged to expand its activities and would eventually become a monopolist. This 
is incompatible with Marshall’s partial equilibrium theory and therefore any internal 
economies must be set aside. So what about Marshall’s external economies? These, 
Sraffa reasons, must also be set aside, because most external economies are not 
limited to a specific industry, but rather apply to multiple industries of the economy 
as a whole, and if there were such economies external to the industry, Marshall’s 
partial equilibrium analysis would be flawed and it would be necessary to follow a 
general-equilibrium approach. The only economies that might be relevant are those 
in between the two extremes of internal and economy-wide economies. Sraffa: 
“Those economies which are external from the point of view of the individual firm, 
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but internal as regards the industry in its aggregate, constitute precisely the class 
which is most seldom to be met with.” (1926, p.540). In other words, Sraffa’s 
criticism implies that Marshall’s theory of competitive equilibrium is either 
contradictory or irrelevant (Screpanti & Zamagni, 1993). 
 
While Hicks (1939), for example, still considered this argument as a reason to 
completely set aside the concept increasing returns, Sraffa took the next step. He 
recognized that increasing returns are de facto important in some industries. His 
conclusion was that: “It is necessary, therefore, to abandon the path of free 
competition and turn in the opposite direction, namely towards monopoly.” (Sraffa, 
1926, p.542). Or, monopolistic structures are not simply market imperfections or 
frictions, but they represent the actual state of things. What is more, it is the theory of 
perfect competition that is not in accordance with reality in at least two important 
respects: “… first, the idea that the competing producers cannot deliberately affect 
market prices and that he may therefore regard it as constant whatever the quality of 
the goods which he individually may throw on the market; second, the idea that each 
competing producer necessarily produces normally in circumstances of individual 
increasing costs.” (Sraffa, 1926, p.542-543). 
 
The solution is therefore to abandon the assumption that buyers are indifferent to 
products from different firms, which means that each firm faces its own, descending, 
demand curve. In fact, Sraffa introduced the concept of monopolistic competition 
years before the seminal works of Chamberlin (1933) and Robinson (1933). In 
monopolistic competition, the firm may operate under decreasing costs of 
production, while at the same time not being able to extend its production 
indefinitely, because to sell the increased quantity of production the firm will 
eventually have to either lower its market prices, or it will run into increased 
marketing expenses. While in hindsight this can perhaps be regarded as a simple 
trade-off between increasing returns to the scale of production and diminishing 
returns to marketing, Sraffa’s insights were certainly revolutionary in 1926. 
 
The discussion on the correctness of Marshall’s theories and the underlying 
assumptions about increasing returns in relation to competitive equilibrium went on 
during the 1920’s and 1930’s in The Economic Journal. In this discussion, Pigou 
(1927) and Robertson (1930) take the Marshallian stand, while Robbins (1928) and 
Sraffa (1930) remain critical. Yet in the end no one seems to come up with viable 
alternative solutions. When the discussion died down at the beginning of the 1930’s, 
increasing returns remained a marginal phenomenon in economic theory. 
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2.3.5 Hicks 
Hicks (1989), in defense of the constant returns to scale assumption, demonstrates 
that while Smith introduces increasing returns in his theory of growth, he implicitly 
falls back into constant returns in his theory of value. When half-finished goods can 
be carried over from period to period, Smith’s cost of production theory of value only 
works if prices remain constant from period to period. Therefore, increasing returns, 
i.e., falling costs and falling prices, become inconceivable. 
 
In the Ricardian view, land is the restrictive factor. This makes for diminishing 
marginal productivity of the variable production factors, applied to the fixed supply 
of land. This, in turn, leads to the general marginal productivity doctrine, i.e., 
production factors are remunerated according to the value of their marginal product. 
Hicks goes further, describing the theories of Marshall, recognizing both increasing 
and diminishing returns to scale and Walras, being pure constant returns to scale. 
This has influenced a major part of what has been done in economic theory to date. 
 
Hicks concludes that there are two persisting traditions in economics: the one so 
impressed by what has been achieved by constant returns to scale analysis that they 
have come to live with the assumption and the other one, to which scale economies 
are so important that they cannot be left aside. These traditions cannot be easily 
reconciled; rather they seem to be suited to different types of problems. At first sight, 
micro-problems seem to require scale economies, whereas for macro-problems it 
might be more convenient to leave them out. According to Hicks, in the field of 
competition of firms in an industry, i.e., industrial organization, the constant returns 
to scale approach has nothing to offer. 
 
2.4 Alternatives and new directions in economics 
The wreckage of economic theory that Hicks (1939) envisioned was avoided, 
because after the 1930’s attention shifted to the analysis of macro-economic 
relationships, under the influence of the theories of Keynes. For this reason and 
because of the rigid formalization of economic theory in the post-war decades, 
resulting in an almost exclusive focus on general equilibrium analysis, the issues 
regarding increasing returns virtually disappeared from the economic agenda. It was 
only kept alive by a small number of non-mainstream economists, of whom Young 
(1928) was the first and Kaldor (1966, 1972, 1985) was the most persistent in his 
criticisms of orthodox economic theory. Further Verdoorn (1949) and Arrow, at least 
in his 1962 article on learning-by-doing, must be mentioned, and then there is the 
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Austrian school, with its emphasis on dynamics and innovation that are difficult to 
reconcile with constant returns and general equilibrium. 
 
2.4.1 Young and the foundations of endogenous growth theory 
During the discussion in The Economic Journal mentioned above, a remarkable 
article by Young (1928) appeared, titled Increasing returns and economic progress. 
The article revives Smith’s (1776) central proposition of the division of labor as the 
source of increasing returns and the relationship of increasing returns with economic 
growth. This was remarkable because the subjects of division of labor and economic 
growth, having been central for the classical economists, had virtually disappeared 
from the stage in the second half of the 19th century. With the article, Young 
reminded his colleagues that the concepts of the division of labor and economic 
growth were fundamentally important. Growth in the neoclassical model had been 
determined by exogenous data, e.g., technical progress, that were outside the scope of 
economic science. As a result of increasing returns, however, growth could be 
determined endogenously and might therefore be progressive and cumulative. 
Young’s (1928) paper may therefore be regarded the starting point of what would 
become known as endogenous growth theory in the 1980’s. 
 
Young’s starting point is Smith’s (1776) famous theorem that the division of labor 
depends on the extent of the market. Young deals with two aspects: the growth of 
indirect or roundabout methods of production and the division of labor among 
industries. He explains what is, in his eyes, Smith’s most important implication: “... 
with the division of labour a group of complex processes is transformed into a 
succession of simpler processes, some of which, at least, lend themselves to the use 
of machinery. In the use of machinery and the adoption of indirect processes there is 
a further division of labour, the economies of which are again limited by the extent of 
the market.” (Young, 1928, p.530). While this can be read in the work of Smith 
(1776), Young makes two additional points. 
• “The first point is that the principal economies which manifest themselves 
in increasing returns are the economies of capitalistic or roundabout 
methods of production.” (1928, p.531). These economies are largely 
identical to the economies of the division of labor between firms or between 
industries. 
• “The second point is that the economies of roundabout methods, even more 
that the economies of other forms of the division of labour, depend upon the 
extent of the market ...” (1928, p.531). With this point, Young wants to 
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make clear that the most important source of realizing these economics of 
roundabout methods is the enlargement of the extent of the market and that 
not too much should be expected from rational reorganizations of 
production processes. 
 
Then follows the essence of Young’s reasoning: “But just what constitutes a large 
market? Not area or population alone, but buying power, the capacity to absorb a 
large annual output of goods.” (1928, p.533). This capacity to buy depends, of 
course, on the capacity to produce: “In an inclusive view, considering the market not 
as an outlet for the products of a particular industry, but as the outlet for goods in 
general, the size of the market is determined and defined by the volume of 
production.” (1928, p.533). In this inclusive sense, the concept market means that 
there must be some sort of balance that the different productive activities must be 
proportioned to each other, i.e., there is a division of labor. This means in turn that 
Smith’s famous theorem can be rewritten as: The division of labor depends in large 
part on the division of labor. Young explains that this is more than a tautology: “It 
means, if I read its significance rightly, that the counter forces which are continually 
defeating the forces that make for economic equilibrium are more pervasive and 
more deeply rooted in the constitution of the modern economic system than we 
commonly realize.” (1928, p533). It means that every advance in the organization of 
production alters the conditions of industrial activity and initiates responses 
elsewhere in the industry. In this way, change may become progressive and 
propagate itself in a cumulative way. 
 
The process of realizing these increasing returns will be progressive and continuous 
but will nevertheless take time. There are a number of obstacles working against 
increasing returns:  
• the ‘human material’ is resistant to change: new trades have to be learnt, 
new habits to be acquired, labor has to be redistributed geographically, 
etcetera 
• the accumulation of the necessary capital takes time and acceleration of this 
accumulation will induce increasing costs 
• the demand for some products is inelastic or quickly becomes so when 
supply increases, meaning that the advantages of increasing returns will 
spread less fast, or will disappear altogether due to increasing problems in 
selling these products 
• there are natural scarcities, limitations and inelasticities in supply, which 
may block the way to securing economies 
Introduction to increasing returns literature 
36 
• the next important step forward is often initially costly and cannot be taken 
until a certain quantum of prospective advantages has accumulated, 
meaning that progress will not be continuous 
 
Yet there are also factors reinforcing increasing returns: 
• discovery of new natural resources 
• growth of scientific knowledge: “The causal connections between the 
growth of industry and the progress of science run in both directions, but on 
which side the preponderant influence lies no one can say.” (1928, p.535) 
• growth of the population 
• firms’ persisting search for new markets 
 
According to Young this last factor leads in the reinforcement of increasing returns. 
It should not be understood as the search for a market to dispose of surplus product, 
i.e., the Marxian point of view, but as finding an outlet for potential products. While 
the search for new markets, i.e., new potential demand, is a diminishing return 
activity, the economies of a new and larger industrial plant will also be enormous. 
Mostly the economies of a new plant to fulfill or serve a new market will be 
substantially larger than the gradual extension of production in an existing plant. 
 
These are, at least, the effects at firm level. According to Young there will be other 
effects: “Although the initial displacement may be considerable and the 
repercussions upon particular industries unfavorable, the enlarging of the market for 
any one commodity, produced under conditions of increasing returns, generates the 
net effect, as I have tried to show, of enlarging the market for other commodities.” 
(1928, p.537). This means that individual firms searching for new markets may 
increase the extent of the market for the whole industry and thereby stimulate further 
division of labor in this industry. 
 
As to the argument that increasing returns at the firm level would lead to a monopoly 
at industry level, Young argues: “But the opposed process, industrial differentiation, 
has been and remains the type of change characteristically associated with the growth 
of production.” (1928, p.537). 
 
In summary, Young makes three main points (1928, p.539). 
• “First, the mechanism of increasing returns is not to be discerned adequately 
by observing the effects of variations in the size of an individual firm or of a 
particular industry, for the progressive division and specialization of 
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industries is an essential part of the process by which increasing returns are 
realized. What is required is that industrial operations be seen as an 
interrelated whole.” 
• “Second, the securing of increasing returns depends upon the progressive 
division of labour and the principal economies of the division of labour, in 
its modern forms, are the economies which are to be had by using labour in 
roundabout or indirect ways.” 
• “Third, the division of labour depends upon the extent of the market, but the 
extent of the market also depends upon the division of labour. In this 
circumstance lies the possibility of economic progress, apart from the 
progress which comes as a result of the new knowledge which men are able 
to gain, whether in pursuit of their economic or of their non-economic 
interests.” 
 
2.4.2 Verdoorn 
In an article in the Italian journal L’Industria (1949) the Dutch economist Verdoorn 
investigated the relationship between the growth of output and the growth of labor 
productivity. He arrived at an empirical regularity, stating that there is a positive 
linear relationship between the growth of output and the growth of labor productivity. 
While the article is not pretentious and seems to have been noticed for the first time 
by Kaldor (1966), it nevertheless has some important implications: How would 
productivity grow with growing output, when exogenous causes of technological 
change are left out of the model? The only way this can happen is when the growth 
of productivity is endogenous, meaning that some form of increasing returns, be it 
division of labor, economies of skills, economies of capital or economies of scale, is 
present in the system. Regarded in this way, the connection to Young’s (1928) article 
becomes immediately obvious. Verdoorn’s (1949) regularity provides, in a way, 
empirical support for the existence of increasing returns and endogenous economic 
growth. 
 
2.4.3 The Austrian School 
The notion of increasing returns as a characteristic of a firm’s cost function is typical 
for the French (Cournot, 1838; Walras, 1874) and English (Jevons, 1871; Marshall, 
1890) traditions of neoclassical theory. As such, we do not find it in the Austrian 
tradition. The label ‘Austrian School’ was first used by opponents of the ideas of 
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Menger. Important representatives of the Austrian school are, besides Menger, Von 
Wieser, Böhm-Bawerk, Von Mises, Schumpeter and Hayek. 
 
The focus of analysis in the Austrian School is not so much on mathematically 
tractable economic maximizing or minimizing behavior, but rather on the study of 
institutions and the conditions of disequilibrum. As such, it has developed into an 
alternative for the dominant neoclassical paradigm. The reason to discuss it here is 
that the school’s methods provide an alternative basis for the analysis of increasing 
returns. 
 
The distinguishing features of the Austrian approach are radical subjectivism and 
methodological individualism. It means taking the individual economic agent and his 
unique knowledge, tastes and opportunities, his interpretations of events and other 
agents’ actions, his expectations about future events and behavior and his alertness to 
new opportunities as the starting point of analysis. Coordination between individuals 
leads to a collective outcome, or institution, e.g. a market or a price. This outcome is 
not defined as a fixed situation in the way neoclassical economics defines the 
outcome of the competitive progress as perfect competition. Rather the Austrian 
approach defines the market as a process. Competition, not in the technical 
neoclassical sense, but in the classical sense of rivalry drives this market process 
down the road of coordination of individual plans (Ekelund & Hébert, 1997). This 
approach is more realistic than the mechanistic neoclassical models. It explicitly 
addresses coordination issues among individuals that form the basis of market-based 
forms of increasing returns, i.e., network effects and self-reinforcing expectations. 
 
2.4.4 Kaldor 
Since the 1950’s, most of non-macro economic science has become locked in to the 
dominant paradigm of general equilibrium economics, as formalized by Samuelson 
(1947), Arrow & Debreu (1954) and Debreu (1959). With the acceptance of this 
paradigm comes the necessary postulate of constant returns to scale (Buchanan & 
Yoon, 1994). Apart from the Austrian School, which has been a separate tradition in 
economics, there has been remarkably little criticism on the dominant paradigm. The 
work of Kaldor (e.g., 1960; 1966; 1972; 1981) is a noteworthy exception.  
 
In a provocative article, titled The irrelevance of equilibrium economics, Kaldor 
(1972) starts explaining that at its purest and most abstract level, the pretences of 
economic equilibrium theory, as formulated by Debreu (1959), are fairly modest. The 
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theory is logically entirely disconnected from its interpretation. It consists of a set of 
theories, logically deducible from precisely formulated assumptions. Unlike most 
scientific theories, where basic assumptions are directly related to observable 
phenomena, the basic assumptions of economic theory are, according to Kaldor, 
either unverifiable, e.g., the maximization of profits and the maximization of utility, 
or directly contradicted by observation, e.g., perfect knowledge and foresight, perfect 
competition and impersonal market relations. 
 
One of these basic assumptions of general equilibrium theory is constant returns to 
scale. Marshall (1890) tried to solve this problem through the use of partial 
equilibrium, i.e., equilibrium in only a part of the economy, and the notion of 
externalities. In this way he could accommodate increasing and diminishing returns. 
Sraffa (1926) proved this to be logically wrong. Therefore, general equilibrium 
economics has always postulated absence of increasing returns, with, as a 
consequence, the neglect of this concept and it consequences for economic theory. 
Kaldor (1981, p.330): “The case of increasing returns has never been properly 
explored in economic theory […] economists in general shied away from exploring 
the consequences. However, businessmen could never ignore the existence of 
diminishing costs. It is on account of the economies of large-scale production that a 
rising market share means success and a falling market share spells trouble.” 
 
In other words, increasing returns can empirically be shown to exist: economies of 
scale are clearly observable, the capital-labor ratio changes with the extent of the 
market and effects of learning-by-doing, i.e., dynamic economies of scale, can be 
observed. These observations have far-reaching consequences, a first of which is that 
the notion of general equilibrium is no longer valid. General equilibrium implies that 
economic forces operate in an environment that is ‘imposed’ on the system, i.e., a set 
of ‘given’ exogenous variables such as Pareto’s tastes and obstacles, preferences of 
individuals and consumers, the production functions and the supply of resources. 
Change in this equilibrium can only be seen as a moving equilibrium, caused by 
autonomous change in these exogenous variables. According to Kaldor, the question 
here is whether such an ‘equilibrium’ is a meaningful notion when increasing returns 
are assumed. 
 
When increasing returns is introduced, the forces making for change are endogenous. 
On this Kaldor (1972, p.93) states: “If one takes an all-inclusive view of the 
economic process, economic activity ultimately consists of the exchange of goods 
against goods; this means that every increase in the supply of commodities enlarges, 
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at least potentially, the market for other commodities.” Thus, the extent of the market 
depends on the division of labor almost as much as the division of labor depends on 
the extent of the market. Myrdal (1957) called this the principle of circular and 
cumulative causation. Kaldor argues that Young’s (1928) reasoning of combining 
Say’s law with Smith’s theorem is not enough in itself to ensure cumulative 
causation. Young’s problem was, according to Kaldor, that he did not have a theory 
of income generation such as supplied by Keynes eight years later. That is why 
Young concentrated on reciprocal demand and supply functions, i.e., roundabout 
methods of production. 
 
Kaldor concludes that it is evident that an important feature of economic systems is 
the coexistence of increasing returns and competition, which is deemed impossible in 
the Walrasian axioms. Kaldor states that the way in which this competition works is 
largely uncharted territory. 
 
2.4.5 Arrow 
An important contribution was made to the theory of increasing returns and 
endogenous growth from an unexpected angle in 1962: in an article by Arrow, one of 
the founding fathers of the mathematical formalization of general equilibrium theory, 
entitled The economic implications of learning by doing. 
 
In the second half of the 1950’s, the studies of Abramowitz (1956) and Solow (1956; 
1957) clearly indicated that technological change plays a dominant role in economic 
growth. According to Arrow (1962), their empirical results do not directly contradict 
the neo-classical production function as the expression of technological knowledge. 
The only thing that has to be added is the obvious fact that knowledge grows over 
time. This addition can be made in two ways: either by incorporating knowledge 
growth as an exogenous variable or by assuming that change in knowledge, i.e., 
learning, is endogenous. Arrow proceeds on the second path, because: “… a view of 
economic growth that depends so heavily on an exogenous variable, let alone one so 
difficult to measure as the quantity of knowledge, is hardly intellectually 
satisfactory.” (1962, p.155). 
 
He therefore assumes the concept of learning-by-doing, which states that learning is 
the product of experience, meaning that learning can only take place during activity. 
Arrow cites a number of empirical examples of the role of experience in increasing 
productivity. 
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• In aeronautical engineering it was found that the number of labor hours per 
airframe was a decreasing function (N-1/3) of the total number of airframes 
previously produced (N). This empirical regularity has become known as the 
learning curve. 
• Verdoorn (see section 2.4.2) applied the principle of the learning curve to 
national output and showed that the productivity of labor increases with 
cumulative output. The estimated progress ratio for European countries was 
measured at about 0.5. 
• The Horndal effect shows a similar phenomenon at firm level. The Horndal 
iron works in Sweden made no new investments and no significant change 
in the production methods for 15 years, yet productivity rose on average by 
2% annually. 
 
Arrow then advances the hypothesis that “… technical change in general can be 
ascribed to experience, that is the very activity of production which gives rise to 
problems for which favorable responses are selected over time.” (1962, p.156). 
Arrow then proceeds with the mathematical modeling, taking cumulative gross 
investment, i.e., the cumulative production of capital goods, as the index of 
experience. Each new machine is capable of changing the environment, so that 
learning will take place with continuing new stimuli. 
 
Arrow recognizes that the model can be extended. The existing model only 
accommodates learning in the capital goods industry, it could be extended to 
accommodate learning that takes place in the use of a capital good once built. 
According to Arrow, the model’s view of learning as only a by-product of production 
might be extended to incorporate learning by education or learning by research. 
Arrow’s model is the first theoretical model to incorporate endogenous learning and 
hence endogenous growth. 
 
2.4.6 Romer and endogenous growth theory 
The theory of endogenous growth is a body of theoretical and empirical work that 
emerged in the 1980’s. It is macro-oriented and therefore different from, but 
complementary to, the study of productivity at the firm level. Lucas (1988), Romer 
(1986; 1990b; 1993; 1994) and Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1992) are important 
proponents of this theory. It differs from neoclassical growth theories, e.g., those of 
Abramowitz (1956) or Solow (1957) in that economic growth is not the result of 
exogenous forces, but rather an endogenous outcome of an economic system (Romer, 
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1994). This endogeneity requires that at least one of the production factors in the 
model shows increasing returns. Romer (1986; 1990b) chooses to include the factor 
knowledge in the production function, because knowledge is non-rival good that may 
have an increasing marginal product. In other words, knowledge causes increasing 
returns, which is the basis for endogenous growth. 
 
The models by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) are both reconciliations of the 
competitive equilibrium model with endogenous technological change. Knowledge is 
regarded as the basic form of capital, in Romer’s case knowledge is seen as physical 
capital, following Arrow (1962) and in Lucas’s case knowledge is seen as human 
capital. In both models, knowledge is regarded as a non-rival good that is not 
excludable. The non-rivalry implies that the application of knowledge is an 
increasing returns activity for the firm. The non-excludability implies that firms 
cannot appropriate the knowledge they develop. Instead, knowledge generates 
spillover effects. The presence of these spillover effects means that from a social 
point of view the application of knowledge is also an increasing returns process. The 
presence of these knowledge spillovers, i.e., externalities, is necessary for the 
existence of the competitive equilibrium. If knowledge is partly or completely 
appropriable, a kind of monopoly or monopolistic competition model will be 
required. To keep the model from ‘exploding’, the production of new knowledge is 
assumed to be a diminishing returns activity. 
 
Romer’s second (1990b) model takes the next step in abandoning the assumption of 
perfect competition. It is a three-sector model, in which the first sector, i.e., the 
research sector, uses human capital and the existing stock of knowledge to produce 
new knowledge. The second sector, i.e., the intermediate goods sector, uses designs 
from the research sector to produce producer durables. A third sector, i.e., the final 
goods sector, uses labor, human capital and producer durables to produce final 
output. This model thus incorporates knowledge as rival inputs, i.e., in the form of 
human capital, and as non-rival inputs, i.e., in the form of the stock of knowledge. 
This non-rivalry again is the source of increasing returns. The stock of knowledge 
enters into production in two different ways. First, new research designs enable the 
production of new producer durables in the intermediate good sector. The benefits 
from this application of knowledge are assumed to be completely excludable, i.e., 
they provide the basis for firms’ market power and monopolistic competition. 
Second, the new research designs increase the total stock of knowledge. The benefits 
from this increase are assumed to be completely non-excludable. 
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With the appearance of endogenous growth models, economic science has reached a 
new stage in development, in which increasing returns and imperfect competition are 
explicitly modeled (Romer, 1994).  
 
2.4.7 New division of labor theory 
While economic growth based on increasing returns due to division of labor is one of 
the oldest ideas in economics, going back to Smith (1776), for a long time there was 
no fully worked out dynamic model along these lines (Romer, 1987). As Houthakker 
(1956, p.182) stated: “Most economists have probably regarded the division of labor, 
in Schumpeter’s words, as an ‘eternal commonplace’, yet there is hardly any part of 
economics that would not be advanced by a further analysis of specialization.”  
 
In recent years, models have been developed that try to explain economic growth 
from increasing returns due to specialization. Two different paths have been 
followed. The first is the macro-modeling path, starting from the Dixit-Stiglitz 
model.14 Krugman (1979) and Ethier (1982) developed this model into the field of 
international trade theory and Romer (1987) developed a model for an economy as a 
whole. 
 
The second path takes the individual as a starting point. Representatives of this path 
include Yang & Borland (1991), Borland & Yang (1992), Ng (1998) and Yang & Ng 
(1998). Following Houthakker (1956), they reason that the division of labor starts 
from the basic indivisibility of the individual. This means that the individual can only 
perform a few activities simultaneously. The larger this number, the higher the 
difficulty of coordinating the activities. This means that, when several activities are 
replaced by a single one, the coordination costs will be lower and there will be larger 
possibilities for acquiring experience in this activity. In other words, reducing the 
number of activities gives rise to increasing returns. These will not be realizable 
however, as long as there is only one individual. In this case, this individual will have 
to perform by himself all the activities necessary to stay alive. As soon as another 
individual appears, specialization becomes possible through trade. Through the 
avoidance of both individuals’ internal coordination costs, the post-trade point will 
be better than either of the pre-trade points. This effect is independent of the relative 
                                                          
14 While the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model is concerned with consumer utility of product 
diversity, it has been re-interpreted by Ethier (1982) as a production function. In this way, the 
Dixit-Stiglitz modeling approach has provided a basis for a wide range of models dealing with 
different forms of diversity. 
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efficiencies of the individuals, i.e., the Ricardian argument. Under the Ricardian 
assumptions the benefit of specialization consists wholly in the utilization of 
comparative advantages, but in the case of Smith’s (1776) reasoning the benefit 
comes mainly from the avoidance of coordination costs by the two individuals. There 
is also a force working in the other direction. Though specialization will result in 
avoidance of individual coordination costs, new coordination costs might appear 
between the individuals. These costs narrow the possibilities for improvement 
through trade and might, in some cases, offset the gains. 
 
In the Yang & Borland (1991) model, every individual chooses his or her level of 
specialization. The aggregate outcome of these individual decisions is the 
endogenously determined division of labor for the economy. At any time, individuals 
make a trade-off: specializing more in the current period generates higher productive 
capacity in future periods because of learning-by-doing and increasing returns. 
However, greater specialization implies that more goods have to be bought from 
others, meaning that a higher level of trade is necessary involving greater transaction 
costs. The existence of the trade-off, combined with the assumption that economies 
of specialization are specific to each individual ensures the existence of a dynamic 
competitive equilibrium. At the macro level, the evolution of the division of labor 
will enlarge the extent of the market, leading to further accumulation of human 
capital, increased trade dependence and endogenous comparative advantage. This in 
turn causes an increasing rate of growth of per capita income, enabling further 
division of labor. 
 
2.5 Complexity science, sociology and social economics 
Complexity science, also known as the study of complex adaptive systems, or CAS, is 
a relatively new scientific paradigm. It has become best known through the people 
working at the Santa Fe Institute, a privately financed interdisciplinary research 
institute entirely devoted to complexity science.15 
 
What is complexity? A citation of Langton (in: Waldrop, 1992, p.293) provides 
insight: “You should look at systems in terms of how they behave instead of how 
they’re made. And when you do, then what you find are the two extremes of order 
                                                          
15 For a popular record of the first years of the Santa Fe Institute and the people working there, 
see Waldrop’s book Complexity: the Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos 
(1992). This book also provides an accessible introduction to several perspectives on 
complexity science. 
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and chaos. It’s a lot like the difference between solids, where atoms are locked into 
place and fluids, where atoms tumble over one another at random. But right in 
between the two extremes, at a kind of abstract phase transition called ‘the edge of 
chaos’, you find complexity: a class of behaviors in which the components of the 
system never quite lock into place, yet never quite dissolve into turbulence, either. 
These are the systems that are both stable enough to store information and yet 
evanescent enough to transmit it. These are the systems that can be organized to 
perform complex computations, to react to the world, to be spontaneous, adaptive 
and alive.” 
 
This way of looking at the world is becoming increasingly popular in a variety of 
scientific fields, such as physics, biology, sociology and economics. The complexity 
approach is especially relevant when studying systems in which complex feedback 
phenomena play an important role. It can be argued that the behavior of many 
economic systems, be it firms, industries, or national or global economic systems, is 
governed by the interplay of positive and negative feedback phenomena. In economic 
terms, the behavior of markets is governed by the interplay between diminishing and 
increasing returns. Economic systems therefore seem especially suitable for the 
complexity approach. 
 
The fundamental differences between the complexity approach and the traditional 
equilibrium approaches when applied to economic phenomena are the level of 
realism and the extent of holism that is built into the models.  
 
With regard to realism, the traditional economic perspectives, e.g., the general 
equilibrium or partial equilibrium models, aim at explaining reality by building 
models that are a simplification of this reality. This is not unlike the Newtonian 
principles in physics. The similarity is not accidental, because the early 19th and 20th 
century economists borrowed heavily from the methods of the natural sciences that 
were popular at the time. Strangely enough, while the natural sciences have gradually 
distanced themselves from these methods and moved to other, more realistic 
explanations of reality, e.g., relativity theory and quantum mechanics in physics or 
evolutionary theory in biology, economic science has been dominated by the 
traditional paradigm until late into the 20th century. Gradually however, new 
methodological paradigms have emerged that include a greater level of realism. The 
Austrian School of economics, with its approach of radical subjectivism and 
methodological individualism has been the most noteworthy deviation from the 
dominant paradigm for a long time. It has greatly influenced evolutionary theories, 
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e.g., Nelson & Winter (1974; 1982), and it may well be argued that the complexity 
approach is in some ways a logical extension of the ‘Austrian’ way of thinking. 
 
With regard to holism, traditional economics either focuses on macro issues or on 
micro issues. The aggregation-disaggregation questions are either ignored or 
assumed to be linearly explicable. For example, in many models, the macro outcomes 
are assumed to be the linear addition of the separate micro behavior of the economic 
agents, e.g., firms or consumers. If we drop this assumption16, the implication is that 
behavior of the system at the macro level cannot be predicted from the behavior of 
the agents at the micro level. This is a disturbing conclusion, which leaves 
economists with severe aggregation-disaggregation problems. With the advance of 
complexity science this point has been made clear once more. The argument focuses 
on what is known as emergence: simple local interactions between economic agents 
on the micro level can cause extremely complex behavioral patterns in the economic 
system at the meso or macro level. Complexity science aims to provide insight into 
these processes of emergence and connect the unique micro behavior of economic 
agents to the broad macro patterns of the economic system, e.g., firms, markets, 
national or global economies.  
 
Within the complexity perspective, the debate is not always so much on increasing 
returns, but rather on the interplay between positive and negative feedback effects. 
Since the Santa Fe Institute’s first proceedings in the field of economics, The 
Economy as an Evolving Complex System (edited by Anderson, Arrow & Pines, 
1988), a large number of contributions have been published in this field. The works 
of Arthur (1989; 1990; 1999), Arthur, Durlauf & Lane (1997), Cowan (1991) and 
Brock & Durlauf (2001) have been seminal in this field. 
 
In a review of the collection of papers in the second economic proceedings of the 
Santa Fe Institute, The Economy as an Evolving Complex System II (edited by 
Arthur, Durlauf & Lane, 1997), Silverberg (1998) asks the question whether the 
Santa Fe Institute and the complex systems approach has succeeded where others, 
                                                          
16 Brock (1988, p.82) provides a number of clues as to how we might get complex dynamics 
from traditional economic models: introduce agents that act as if they discount the future 
relatively heavy; abandon concavity assumptions in preferences and technology; abandon the 
assumption of complete markets; abandon the assumption of price-taking agents; impose 
complex preferences or complex technology; abandon the assumption that the system is in 
equilibrium; admit direct effects of some agents’ actions upon the tastes or technologies of 
others. Each of those adjustments, which do not seem to be too unrealistic, fundamentally 
disrupts the possibility of linear aggregration-disaggregation. 
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e.g., Simon (1969), Day (1982; 1983; 1984) or Nelson & Winter (1974; 1982), have 
had only limited success. He provides several answers. In term of popular 
recognition and the ability to put complexity onto research agendas, the answer is 
affirmative. In terms of publications in the leading mainstream journals the 
penetration is still very limited. In terms of solutions to real-world problems, the 
answer is unclear. Many contributions are computational, i.e., computer simulation 
models, and are more focused on the method of analysis than the relevance for 
reality. Finally, Silverberg states that there seems to be a deep problem in the 
complexity perspective with regard to decision-making reality. On the one hand, 
there is the risk of sliding into an approach of highly abstract theory that is of little 
practical relevance. On the other hand, there is the danger of making such specialized 
predictions under such restrictive, and in practice unverifiable conditions, that it 
becomes impossible to say when the theory would be applicable. 
 
2.5.1 Arthur 
In the 1980’s, mainly through the work of Arthur (e.g., 1988, 1989, 1990), increasing 
returns attracted renewed interest in economics. While the subjects of returns to 
scale, learning-by-doing and endogenous growth have had a long tradition in 
economics, the wider field of increasing returns mechanisms in markets had hardly 
been addressed. Defining increasing returns as positive feedback effects in economics 
(1990) and hence starting from the point of view of complexity science rather then 
from traditional economics, market-based increasing returns form the core of 
Arthur’s analyses.  
 
Arthur (1988) defines increasing returns as originating from four generic sources: 
• large set-up or fixed costs, implying falling unit cost as volume increases 
• learning effects, implying product improvements and or lower costs as 
prevalence increases 
• coordination effects, i.e., the benefits of going along with other economic 
agents 
• adaptive expectations, meaning that increased prevalence will induce further 
prevalence 
 
Further, Arthur states that markets in which these increasing returns mechanisms 
play an important role have four unique properties (Arthur, 1988): 
• multiple equilibria, meaning that different asymptotic market share 
solutions are possible 
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• possible inefficiencies, meaning that it is not determined that the eventual 
solution generates the best possible social benefit 
• lock-in, meaning that once a solution is reached, it is difficult to exit from it 
and that it will be difficult to break in for competing solutions  
• path dependence, meaning that the early history of market share can 
determine which solution prevails 
 
These are exactly the kind of ‘disturbing implications’ that economists had for a long 
time ‘shied away from’ (Kaldor, 1981, p.330). While Arthur, Ermoliev & Kaniovski 
(1984) laid down the methodological basis, it took until 1989 before Arthur’s seminal 
paper Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by historical small 
events was published in a major journal. In his book on the early years of the Santa 
Fe Institute, Waldrop (1992) describes in a vivid manner the difficulties Arthur 
experienced in getting his theories accepted by the mainstream economic journals. 
 
2.5.2 Sociology 
While they are relatively new to economics, mechanisms of direct interaction 
between agents have been studied for a long time in sociology. It had been known 
under the label theory of collective action, e.g., Granovetter (1978), Oliver, Marwell 
& Texeira (1985) and Marwell, Oliver & Prahl (1988), bandwagon effects, e.g., 
Granovetter & Soong (1986), information cascades, e.g., Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer 
& Welch (1992) or network analysis, e.g., Burt (1987; 1992). Gradually this work 
has penetrated into the management sciences, e.g., through Granovetter (1985), 
Gulati (1995; 1998) and Westphal, Gulati & Shortell (1997). The sociological and 
complexity perspectives seem to be gradually merging, into what is called social 
economics.  
 
2.5.3 Social economics 
Social economics is a new emerging field of science that is composed of ideas that 
have been developed before in economics and sociology. In the words of Durlauf & 
Young (2001), social economics explicitly aims at providing new insights into social 
and economic dynamics through the study of the interactions that link individual 
behavior and group outcomes. Representatives of this new direction are among 
others Becker & Murphy (2000), Brock & Durlauf (2001), Durlauf & Young (2001), 
Epstein & Axtell (1996) and Manski (1993). Seminal works in this field are 
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Thorstein Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure Class (1899) and Thomas Schelling’s 
Micromotives and Macrobehavior (1978). 
 
The starting point of social economics is that individuals are directly influenced by 
the choices of others when they take economic decisions. In economics it is typically 
assumed that the behavior of individuals is not directly influenced by the behavior of 
others.17 Of course, in economic terms individuals do influence each other, but 
always indirectly, namely through the price mechanism in the market. The social 
economics approach allows for both direct and indirect interaction between 
individuals and it follows the Austrian School of economics in putting 
methodological individualism at the core of its beliefs. Social economics maintains 
the individuality and the heterogeneity of the agents in the system, i.e., consumers or 
firms, at all times. Allowance for random perturbations in the system is an important 
axiom. Hence, the idea is that agents make their choices individually, either through 
direct interaction or through interaction by market prices, either parallel or in 
sequence, either rational and fully informed or irrational and with incomplete 
information.  
 
The resulting object of study is therefore dynamic, governed by a myriad of positive 
and negative feedback loops and influenced by stochastic events. Its behavior may 
therefore be very complex and often far from steady state (Durlauf & Young, 2001). 
One of the consequences of this approach is that it limits the ability to fully 
characterize the system behavior. Hence, the formal analytical modeling techniques 
in this field are often complemented by the use of computer simulation techniques. 
One of the weaker points of the social economics approach as mentioned by Durlauf 
& Young (2001) is the empirical evidence available as yet. Data often have to be 
obtained using laborious studies charting social networks. In practice, it proves 
difficult to distinguish social interaction effects for unobserved individual effects. 
Most examples supporting social economics models stem from detailed sociological 
research, e.g., natural experiments.18 Most econometric approaches to problems in 
this field suffer from a limited ability to address the heterogeneity of agents and the 
interactions between them. 
 
                                                          
17 The most noteworthy exception to this generalization is game theory, in which direct 
interaction is one of the axioms. 
18 Natural experiments refer to real-world situations that, with some care, may be studied as 
scientific experiments by researchers. 
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2.6 The management sciences 
From the historic description we can conclude that increasing returns is basically 
founded in the economic perspective. The economic perspective mainly focuses on 
the mechanisms of increasing returns that are internal to economic transformation 
systems, i.e., firms, industry sectors or national or global economies, that is on issues 
involving the scale of operations or issues involving learning, knowledge and 
productivity growth. In this perspective, mechanisms of increasing returns that are 
external to economic systems are almost completely ignored. The complexity or 
social economics perspective, that has recently become more popular, is exactly the 
opposite, as here the focus is on the external increasing returns mechanisms, i.e., 
direct behavioral interaction or direct information exchange between agents in 
markets. In turn, in this perspective the internal increasing returns mechanisms are 
largely ignored. 
 
As already quoted above, Kaldor, one of the most prominent critics of the traditional 
general equilibrium models in economics, stated that: “[…] businessmen could never 
ignore the existence of diminishing costs.” (1981, p.330), and neither of course can 
management scientists. Different approaches have been taken in studying increasing 
returns from the management perspective.  
 
2.6.1 Inside-out approaches 
In the resource-based approach, the firm’s resources are assumed to be the most 
important sources of increasing returns. According to Barney (1997, p.142-143), “In 
general, firm resources are all assets, capabilities, competencies, organizational 
processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge and so forth that are controlled by 
a firm and that enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve 
its efficiency and effectiveness.” In his view, the concepts of resources, capabilities 
and competencies are used interchangeably and often in parallel and that any 
philosophical hair-splitting over the differences is not of much help to managers and 
firms. The answers to the questions whether a resource is (1) valuable, (2) rare, (3) 
costly to imitate and (4) exploited by the organization, determine the strength and 
sustainability of the competitive advantage that these resources may entail. And with 
this, the economic performance that the firm is likely to realize compared to its 
competitors. 
 
For the analysis of increasing returns, resources may be regarded as input factors in a 
firm’s transformation function. Put in this way, the resource-based theories 
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qualitatively extend and refine the economic perspective addressing firm-based 
increasing return mechanisms. Representative authors who have explored this path 
are Hill (1997), Hatch & Mowery (1998) and Li & Rajagopalan (1998). Makadok 
(1999) studies inter-firm difference in scale economies and the effects this has on a 
firm’s market share and the evolution of market shares over time. The authors 
representative of the resource-based view have barely addressed the market-based 
increasing returns mechanisms resulting from market interactions. 
 
A relatively recent refinement of the resource-based perspective, that is especially 
applicable in a dynamic context, is the dynamic capabilities perspective.19 In this 
perspective the success of a firm’s products in the market is viewed as resting on (1) 
the firm’s distinctive processes, e.g., learning and knowledge creation capabilities, 
(2) the firm’s specific asset positions, e.g., knowledge base, installed base of existing 
adopters, asset investments or sunk costs and (3) the firm’s evolution paths that it has 
adopted or inherited, e.g., path dependencies or technological opportunities. In this 
approach, the firm’s dynamic capabilities are considered to be the most important 
source of increasing returns. Examples of dynamic capabilities are capabilities to 
organize, e.g., division of labor, to generate and capture value from knowledge 
assets, to make use of static and dynamic scale effects, to be able to sense increasing 
returns opportunities to internalize network effects and social interaction effects and 
to have adequate market strategies with respect to introduction timing, 
standardization, network selection, shaping of network and social interaction effects. 
The dynamic capabilities theory addresses two aspects that are not sufficiently 
highlighted in the resource-based perspective: (1) the shifting character of the 
environment and (2) the key role of strategic management in appropriately adapting, 
integrating and reconfiguring internal and external organizational skills, resources 
and functional competencies toward a changing environment. 
 
Representative authors following this approach to analyze increasing returns issues 
are Helfat (1997), Teece (1998) and Dickson, Farris & Verbeke (2001). Williamson 
(1999) argues that there are still severe problems with the dynamic capabilities view. 
In his view, the dynamic capabilities theory suffers from tautological definitions of 
the key terms and a failure of operationalization. 
 
                                                          
19 Dynamic capabilities are defined as “the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure 
internal and external competences to address rapidly changing environments” (Teece, Pisano 
& Shuen, 1997, p.516). 
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2.6.2 Outside-in approaches 
Emphasizing an outside-in approach, we arrive at an industrial organization theory 
of the firm. As mentioned before in chapter one, Sraffa (1926) predicted that the 
theories of imperfect competition by Robinson (1933) and Chamberlin (1933) would 
be the logical road to fit increasing returns into economic theory. Eventually, these 
theories became the basis for what has become known as the industrial organization 
theory of the firm. In the original, structuralist approach to industrial organization 
theory (e.g., Bain, 1959) market structure was assumed to be so constraining on firm 
conduct that individual management action could be ignored. Many economic studies 
of increasing returns fit in this approach, which in itself falls apart in the Harvard 
and Chicago traditions (Tirole, 1988). Whereas the Harvard tradition stresses 
imperfect competition and the possibility of market failure, the Chicago School 
assumes perfect competition and efficient markets (Brouwer, 1991). Representative 
authors of the Harvard tradition are Farrell & Saloner (1985), Katz & Shapiro (1985; 
1986), Shapiro & Varian (1998; 1999) and Church & Gandal (1992). Authors 
representative of increasing returns analysis in the Chicago tradition20 are, e.g., Dixit 
& Stiglitz (1977) and, more recently, Liebowitz & Margolis (1994; 1995; 1999). A 
characteristic of this approach is that it virtually ignores the firm-based increasing 
returns mechanisms. 
 
The same applies to most dynamic inside-out approaches. Whether under the label of 
Schumpeterian, evolutionary, or ecological, they invariably put emphasis on the 
primate of market forces at the expense of attention for the strategic intent of the 
firm. The works of, e.g., Arthur (1989; 1990; 1996; 1999), Rosenberg (1976), David 
(1985), Granovetter & Soong (1986), Cowan (1991), Redmond (1991), Kirman 
(1993), Cowan & Gunby (1996), Cowan & Cowan & Swann (1997), Dalle (1997), 
Arthur, Holland, LeBaron, Palmer & Tayler (1997), Foray (1997), Cowan & Miller 
(1998) and Clark & Chatterjee (1999) all show the same pattern: they explain only 
market-based increasing returns mechanisms and to do this they use models in which 
the firms in the market are considered as passive entities. 
 
Gradually, a behavioralist approach to industrial organization theory emerged 
(Brouwer, 1991). Contrary to the structuralist approach, it focuses on firm 
performance rather than on industry performance, it does not regard industry 
structure as completely exogenous or stable, but rather as dynamic and partly subject 
to influences by firm actions and it explicitly recognizes the role of firm conduct in 
                                                          
20 That is, insofar as ‘increasing returns study within the Chicago tradition’ is not a 
contradiction in terms. 
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influencing performance (Spanos & Lioukas, 2001). Representative authors that have 
followed this approach in the study of increasing returns are Rohlfs (1974), Farrell & 
Saloner (1986), Matutes & Regibeau (1992), Choi (1994), Katz & Shapiro (1994), 
Economides (1996), Schilling (1998), Kretschmer, Klimis & Choi (1999), Xie & 
Sirbu (1995), Cottrell & Koput (1998), Garud & Kumaraswamy (1993) and Gupta, 
Jain & Sawhney (1999). Analyses of increasing returns based on the behavioralist 
industrial organization approach have addressed firm-based and market-based 
mechanisms of increasing returns. However, most studies have addressed either the 
firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns or the market-based mechanisms of 
increasing returns and not both in an integrated way. 
 
Compared to the long tradition of increasing returns interest in economics, the 
implications of increasing returns for management was scarcely researched until the 
1980’s. Since then, increasing returns has also received wider attention in the 
management sciences. This increase in attention was not accidental, because, in the 
same way as the classical economists in the 18th and 19th century observed a shift 
from a largely agricultural, presumably diminishing returns, economy toward a 
manufacturing, presumably increasing returns, economy, we experienced a shift from 
an industrial, capital and physical labor based economy towards a post-industrial 
information and knowledge based economy.21 Strikingly, researchers now make 
similar inferences about the increasing or diminishing returns characteristics of 
industries as the classical economists did. The only difference is that now the 
manufacturing industries are deemed diminishing returns industries and the IT and 
knowledge industries are deemed increasing returns industries (e.g., Arthur, 1996). 
 
2.6.3 Increasing returns mechanisms in management literature 
Though seldom outspokenly identified as increasing returns, there are nevertheless 
many examples of increasing returns mechanisms described in management 
literature. Examples of such literature in the field of product and technology 
adoption-diffusion processes are Bass (1969) and Mahajan, Muller & Bass (1993). 
Examples in the field of technological standardization processes are Arthur (1990), 
David (1975; 1985), Rosenberg (1976; 1982; 1994), Farrell & Saloner (1985; 1986) 
and Katz & Shapiro (1985; 1986). Examples in the field of repeat buying theory are 
                                                          
21 According to analyses like that of Solow (1957), the larger part of productivity growth 
cannot be explained by the growth of the classical production factors, but instead by 
technological improvement that may be interpreted as knowledge (Solow, 1957; Zegveld, 
2000). 
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Ehrenberg (1972) and Fader & Schmittlein (1993). Examples in the field of 
marketing are Farris, Verbeke, Dickson & Van Nierop (1998) and Dickson, Farris & 
Verbeke (2001). 
 
2.6.4 Product adoption and diffusion 
The diffusion of innovation can be defined as the process by which that innovation is 
communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social 
system (Rogers, 1983). Bass (1969) modeled the diffusion processes of durable 
products. This model is claimed to describe the empirical adoption curve quite well 
for a large number of new products and technological innovations (Bass, Krishnan & 
Jain, 1994). 
 
Gupta, Jain & Sawhney (1999) state that marketing scientists have been slow to 
respond to the growing importance of this phenomenon in new product adoption. 
Traditionally, the product introduction and diffusion literature does not take network 
effects explicitly into account (Bass, 1969; Bass, Krishnan & Jain, 1994; Mahajan, 
Muller & Bass, 1993). However, the classic Bass diffusion model clearly shows 
demand-side scale effects in the first part of the S-curve, reflecting the positive 
feedback effects of innovative and imitative adoption. The Bass model has been 
extended to incorporate tactical management decision variables, such as pricing and 
advertising, e.g., Chatterjee & Eliashberg (1990), Dockner & Jørgenson (1988), 
Horsky & Simon (1983). 
 
The Bass model is concerned with the timing of initial purchase and provides a 
rationale for long-term sales forecasting. Mathematically, the model draws upon 
contagion models from epidemology.22 Bass distinguishes between individuals who 
adopt independently of the decisions of other individuals in the social system, i.e., the 
innovators, and individuals who are influenced in the timing of adoption by the 
pressures of the social system, i.e., the imitators. As more individuals adopt, social 
pressure for imitators increases, which will make them more apt to adopt. 
 
The Bass model thus explicitly incorporates the notion of positive feedback, i.e., 
increasing returns, in the process of innovation diffusion. It is assumed in the model 
that a large part of the target population, the imitators, adopt a product mainly 
because of the social pressure of the people who have already adopted. As more 
                                                          
22 This implies that the Bass model describes the dynamics of the entire population, i.e., 
diffusion, and does not explicitly model the individual’s adoption decision. 
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people adopt, the social pressure increases, which constitutes the positive feedback or 
increasing returns effect, i.e., the part of the S-curve where the second derivative is 
positive. This effect is due to information exchange between adopters and potential 
adopters. Eventually, as the number of potential adopters left decreases, the effect 
dies out, which constitutes a negative feedback or diminishing returns effect, i.e., the 
part of the S-curve where the second derivative is negative. 
 
2.6.5 Technology battles 
Customer choice between competing technologies also has a positive feedback 
dimension. Technologies become more valuable to customers as more customers buy 
and start using products that are based on this technology.23 The value of a telephone 
network increases with the number of subscribers, the value of DVD (Digital 
Versatile Disc) technology increases as more people have DVD players and 
consequently more DVD software becomes available, the value of a game computer 
increases as more children own the same system, enabling them to exchange games. 
 
The presence of network effects has substantial implications for the dynamics of the 
market shares of competing technologies (Arthur, 1989; Katz & Shapiro, 1985, 1986, 
1994; Redmond, 1991).24 Examples of such technology battles are widely cited in the 
literature, e.g., the battle between the QWERTY keyboard layout and alternative 
keyboard configurations, or the VHS versus Betamax battle in the home video 
market. We briefly discuss these below. 
                                                          
23 Following John, Weiss & Dutta (1999, p.79), technology can be defined as “scientific 
knowledge applied to useful purposes”, or “know-how”. They further state that “Positive 
spillovers exist in know-how creation, dissemination, and use.” (1999, p.80). 
24 Two different types of technology competition can be distinguished: (1) sequential, i.e., a 
new technology displaces an earlier technology and (2) simultaneous, i.e., two or more equally 
viable, but incompatible technologies compete for the market (Redmond, 1991). 
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Example: VHS versus Betamax 
 
The battle of the VHS versus Betamax competition in the home video market is first 
mentioned by Katz & Shapiro (1986) and described in detail by Cusumano, 
Mylonadis & Rosenbloom (1992). This story is also widely quoted as a prime 
example of increasing returns and inefficiency in the market (e.g., Arthur, 1990; 
Matutes & Regibeau, 1988; Redmond, 1991; Hill, 1997; Schilling, 1998; Clark & 
Chatterjee, 1999). The history of the videocassette recorder (VCR) furnishes a simple 
example of positive feedback. The VCR market started out with two competing 
formats selling at about the same price: VHS and Betamax. Each format could realize 
increasing returns as its market share increased: large numbers of VHS recorders 
would encourage video outlets to stock pre-recorded tapes in VHS format, thereby 
enhancing the value of owning a VHS recorder and leading more people to buy one. 
The same would, of course, be true for Betamax format players. In this way, a small 
gain in market share would improve the competitive position of one system and help 
it to further increase its lead. Such a market is initially unstable. Both systems were 
introduced at about the same time and so began with roughly equal market shares; 
those shares fluctuated early on because of external circumstance, chance and 
corporate maneuvering. Increasing returns on early gains eventually tilted the 
competition towards VHS: it accumulated enough of an advantage to take virtually 
the entire VCR market. Yet it would have been impossible at the outset of the 
competition to say which system would win, which of the two possible equilibria 
would be selected. Furthermore, if the claim that Betamax was technically superior is 
true, then the market’s choice did not represent the best economic outcome. Again, 
Liebowitz & Margolis (1999) have severely criticized the story, pointing out 
inaccuracies and questioning the implications for market inefficiency. 
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Example: QWERTY 
 
The story of the development of the typewriter keyboard into the now common 
QWERTY configuration was first told by David (1985). It is widely quoted as an 
example of network externalities and market inefficiency, e.g., by Farrell & Saloner 
(1985; 1986) and Arthur (1989; 1990). The point of the story is that the QWERTY 
keyboard configuration was presented more than a century ago to slow typists down, 
because otherwise the hammers of the typewriters would collide. As more and more 
typists became trained to use the QWERTY keyboard and as more and more 
manufacturers of typewriters adopted this standard, the QWERTY keyboard became 
locked in. That is, it was in nobody’s advantage to use another type of keyboard, 
even if this would mean faster typing speeds, because this would require large 
investments in retraining. David’s (1985) conclusion is that, as more efficient 
keyboard configurations have become available, the industry has prematurely 
standardized on a basically inefficient system. The QWERTY story as told by David 
(1985) is criticized heavily and in much detail by Liebowitz & Margolis (1990; 
1999), who claim that (1) the story as told is inaccurate and (2) even if were accurate, 
it does not represent a market inefficiency.  
 
 
Other well-known examples of technology battles are: 
• the MS-DOS versus CP/M versus Apple computer operating system battle in 
the early personal computer market (e.g., Arthur, 1996) 
• the Netscape Navigator versus Microsoft Internet Explorer battle in the 
market for web browsers 
• the gasoline versus diesel engine competition in the early motorcar market 
• the battle between WordPerfect and Microsoft Word in the word processor 
market 
• the battle for dominance in the game console market between Sega, 
Nintendo and Sony (Church & Gandal, 1992) 
• the direct versus alternating current battle (e.g., David & Bunn, 1988) 
• the battle between nuclear reactor technologies in the 1950’s, i.e., cooled by 
gas, light water, heavy water, or liquid sodium (Arthur, 1989) 
• the battle between Microsoft Excel and Lotus 1-2-3 (Brynjolfsson & 
Kemerer, 1996; Shapiro & Varian, 1999) 
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While the accuracy and the validity of the implications can be debated for all of these 
stories, as is done, e.g., by Liebowitz & Margolis (1990; 1994; 1995; 1999), they 
nevertheless provide a body of anecdotal evidence that increasing returns occur in 
technology battles and that they actually influence market structure. 
 
2.6.6 Double jeopardy 
Ehrenberg (1972) observed that brands with higher market shares tend to display 
market advantages relative to small share brands. Ehrenberg explains this building on 
the notion of double jeopardy. High market share brands have two distinct benefits 
compared with small share brands: (1) they have more buyers and, (2) these buyers 
purchase the brand more often than the buyers of the small brand purchase those 
small brands. In other words: higher market penetration and higher purchase 
frequency. Fader & Schmittlein (1993) show that there is a third factor: a greater 
level of repeat purchasing through excess behavioral loyalty for these high share 
brands. This leads to the prediction that high share brands tend to have even higher 
repurchase rates than one might predict on the basis of the common repeat 
purchasing model, used amongst others by Ehrenberg (1972). Fader & Schmittlein 
(1993) show that this cannot reasonably be explained by differences in the emphasis 
placed by different brands on advertising, promotion or price, nor by the market 
responsiveness to these instruments, i.e., increasing or decreasing returns to scale. 
The notions of non-stationary choices, inertia and variety seeking by customers also 
do not account for this effect. In other words, the effect of larger brands having a 
higher repurchase rate is clearly a positive feedback effect. 
 
2.6.7 Positive feedbacks in marketing 
Farris, Verbeke, Dickson & Van Nierop (1998) and Dickson, Farris & Verbeke 
(2001) point out that there are all kinds of positive feedback effects in strategic 
marketing processes. They mention, e.g., economies of scale in R&D investment 
positions, in manufacturing cost structures, in brand equity positions and in network 
asset positions; they mention contagion dynamics, learning-by-doing dynamics and 
all kinds of routines and rules dynamics. A good example of this last feedback effect 
arises when firms set their marketing budgets as a percentage of sales. Farris, 
Verbeke, Dickson & Van Nierop (1998) show that this causes positive feedback 
loops to appear and that even this simple rule causes quite complex market dynamics. 
Dickson, Farris & Verbeke (2001, p.219) define market feedback effects as “a 
recursive relationship between one changing state of nature in a market and another 
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changing state of nature in a market.” Their reasoning is that market dynamics are 
not completely stochastic and exogenous, but rather that there are endogenous 
regularities to it. In this way they arrive at the similar notion of increasing returns as 
brought forward by Arthur (1994). 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter we presented a synopsis of the history of thought on the subject of 
increasing returns. We have seen that increasing returns thinking has a long tradition 
in economics, going back to the roots of classical economic theory. In the 
neoclassical view that was the mainstream of economic theory for most of the 20th 
century, increasing returns was looked upon as an anomaly; however, on the margins 
of economic theory building a handful of economists kept an interest in increasing 
returns going. Nowadays, increasing returns is again getting considerable attention in 
economics, either through returning to the assumptions of classical economic theory 
or through fitting it into the neoclassical paradigm.  
 
In the last decades, complexity science has been looked upon as a new and promising 
perspective from which contributions can be made to increasing returns thinking. 
Today, however, it is still far from being a generally accepted paradigm and it still 
has to prove itself in terms of usefulness to real-world problems. 
 
Finally, in the past decades, increasing returns has gradually become incorporated in 
the management sciences. This increase in attention parallels the increasing 
information and knowledge intensity of business processes and the increasing 
volatility in product and technology diffusion that becomes visible in technology 
battles. There is increasing evidence that increasing returns do exist in markets and 
firms and that increasing returns influence market structure, firm behavior and 
product, technology and firm performance. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The introduction to increasing returns thinking in the previous chapter is used in this 
chapter to provide a basis for a more systematic insight into existing increasing 
returns theory and research. In this chapter, a content analysis is made of 96 
publications on increasing returns. The current state of increasing returns research is 
critically assessed to provide a further justification for the theoretical work and the 
empirical research reported on in this thesis. In section one we present an overview 
of the literature on increasing returns. Then we discuss the findings from the 
literature review. A classification of the literature along the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm will be discussed in section two, the theoretical perspectives 
used in literature will be discussed in section three, the mechanisms and definitions 
of increasing returns addressed in literature will be discussed in section four, the 
research designs used in literature will be discussed in section five and the results 
obtained in increasing returns literature will be discussed in section six. We provide 
conclusions in section seven. 
 
3.1 Systematic literature overview 
A systematic overview of increasing returns literature is provided in table 3.1 
according to five groups of criteria: 
1. classification according to the structure-conduct-performance paradigm 
2. theoretical perspective and approach 
3. mechanisms of increasing returns addressed and definition of increasing 
returns provided or implied 
4. research design used, measurement of increasing returns, level of analysis 
and time dimension of the study 
5. results in terms of influence on market structure and firm performance and 
in terms of management and policy implications25 
 
The structure-conduct-performance paradigm adopted in section 1.3 of this thesis 
was used as the starting point for ordering of the studies presented in table 3.1. Note, 
                                                          
25 The dimensions chosen for the literature review are unique to this study. Literature reviews 
as provided by Gaski (1984) and Cannon & Homburg (2001) have served as sources of 
inspiration. However, since both address empirical studies only, they arrive at different 
dimensions. 
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this table is spread over two pages, the left page covering the first seven columns and 
the right page the last five columns. 
 
Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
Arrow 
(1962) 
Economics Neo-classical 
economics 
Basic 
conditions 
(technical 
develop-
ment) 
Learning effects Changes in know-ledge 
(=learning) underlying 
shifts in the production 
function 
Technical change 
embodied in new capital 
goods; learning means 
that a new capital good 
requires less labor for 
producing the same 
amount of product 
Romer 
(1986) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Endogenous 
growth 
Basic 
conditions 
Increasing 
returns and 
(supply side) 
externalities to 
knowledge 
Increasing marginal 
product of knowledge as 
an input factor in 
production 
Positive spillovers of 
knowledge 
Increasing growth rates 
of productivity 
Romer 
(1990) 
Economics Endogenous 
growth 
Basic 
conditions 
Increasing 
returns to 
technology 
Increases in the stock of 
knowledge improve the 
marginal product of 
human capital used in 
producing new 
knowledge 
Eventually, this causes 
non-convexity in the 
expression for final 
output (consumer goods) 
as a function of the 
primary inputs (human 
capital, labor, capital, 
and knowledge) 
Increasing economic 
growth rates 
Mill (1848) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Classical 
economics 
Structure Scale effects The diminution of labor 
needed as the amount of 
production increases 
Not provided 
Bullock 
(1902) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Neo-classical 
economics 
Structure Scale effects Laws of the variation of 
productive forces: 
- of a given area of land: 
law of diminishing returns
- of a single plant or 
establishment: law of 
economy in organization 
- of an entire industry, 
under static conditions: 
law of varied costs 
- of an entire industry, 
under dynamic 
conditions: laws of 
increasing or decreasing 
cost 
Depends on the 
definition: 
- increasing returns: 
progressively extra 
output when quantities of 
a production factor are 
added to another 
production factor that is 
held constant 
- the decrease of 
average cost as the 
production quantity 
increases 
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Research 
design 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Theoretical 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Meso 
(industry) 
Dynamic Technical change can be ascribe to experience Gross investment is the 
basic agent of technical 
change 
Conceptual 
and 
theoretical 
(with 
empirical 
evidence of 
productivity 
growth rates 
of different 
countries over 
extended 
periods of 
time) 
Macro 
(economy) 
Two-period 
and infinite-
horizon 
models 
Based on the developed model of endogenous 
technological change: 
- growth rates can increase over time 
- the effects of small disturbances can be amplified 
by the actions of private agents 
- large countries may always grow faster than small 
countries 
Not provided 
Theoretical 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Macro 
(economy) 
Infinite-horizon 
model 
1. Growth is driven by technological change that 
arises from intentional investments made by profit-
maximizing agents 
2. The stock of human capital determines the rate of 
growth 
3. In equilibrium, too little human capital is devoted 
to research 
4. Integration into world markets will increase 
national growth rates 
5. Having a large population is not sufficient to 
generate growth 
Not provided 
Conceptual Micro and 
meso 
n.a. 1. Agriculture, mining and extractive industries show 
a tendency to diminishing returns 
2. With manufacturing, the case is different: there 
are many cases is which production is made much 
more effective by being conducted on a large scale, 
because of farther division of labor or a better use of 
indivisibilities of labor and capital 
3. The causes tending to increase the 
productiveness of industry preponderate greatly over 
the one cause which tends to diminish it 
4. The possibilities of extending the size of the 
system of production depends in the first place on 
the extent of the market 
Not provided 
Conceptual Micro and 
meso 
Static and 
dynamic 
1. We cannot coordinate the law of increasing 
returns and the law of economy in organization in 
one single mechanism 
2. Diminishing and increasing returns result from 
various contending forces 
3. It is therefore not possible to assign any particular 
commodity or industry to a fixed place in the 
classification of the laws of increasing and 
diminishing returns, because this depends on the 
strength of the contending forces; before applying 
these laws to a concrete case far more serious study 
has to be made of the actual conditions of the 
industry in question 
4. Constant returns would be the result of an 
accidental equivalence of the various contending 
forces, and is therefore highly unlikely 
Not provided 
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Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
Chapman 
(1908) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Neo-classical 
economics 
Structure Increasing 
returns in 
production and 
consumption 
The formal law of 
increasing returns: if 
factors in production be 
proportionally increased 
by successive 
increments the 
corresponding marginal 
outputs will tend to rise 
Not provided 
Clapham 
(1922) 
Economics Neo-classical 
economics 
Structure Scale effects The increment of product 
due to the increase by a 
unit of the quantity of 
resources occupied in 
producing 
Not provided 
Sraffa 
(1926) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Neo-classical 
economics 
Structure Scale effects Not provided Not provided 
Young 
(1928) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Combination of 
classical and 
neo-classical 
economics 
Structure External 
economies 
(supply-side) 
Economies of division of 
labor, which take the 
form of roundabout 
methods of production, 
i.e., every firm is a 
supplier, but also a 
customer of intermediate 
inputs 
Not provided 
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Research 
design 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Theoretical Micro and 
meso 
Static In production: 
- For production systems of the first order (individual 
businesses): increasing returns are possible, but 
ultimately there will be diminishing returns 
- For production systems of the second order 
(multiple businesses concerned in the production of 
one specific commodity): there will be increasing 
returns due to specialization, but ultimately there will 
be diminishing returns 
In consumption: 
- For consumption systems of the first order (the 
products a person consumes on his own): there will 
be decreasing marginal satisfaction, and ultimately 
decreasing total satisfaction (assuming all products 
have to be consumed) 
- For consumption systems of the second order (the 
products that bring the consumer in touch with other 
consumers, e.g., public goods): total satisfaction of 
both the individual consumer as well as of the 
community as a whole will tend to rise at an 
increasing rate 
Not provided 
Theoretical 
 
 
 
 
Meso n.a. It is not possible to classify industries 
unambiguously into classes ('boxes') of diminishing 
returns, constant returns, or increasing returns 
Not provided 
Theoretical Micro n.a. 1. The laws of diminishing and increasing returns 
originate from forces of profoundly different nature: 
- diminishing returns is related to the use of specific 
factors of production 
- increasing returns is based on the cost structure of 
specific commodities  
2. Increasing returns - as the concepts of Marshall's 
internal and external economies - is incompatible 
with free (perfect) competition 
3. Only the exceptional case of economies which are 
external to the firm but internal to the industry would 
be compatible with free competition 
4. As the theory of free competition differs radically 
from the actual state of things, it is necessary to turn 
to the theory of monopoly for the analysis of 
increasing returns 
Not provided 
Conceptual Meso (with 
links to micro 
and macro) 
Dynamic 1. Increasing returns cannot be discerned 
adequately by observing difference in size of 
individual firms or industries 
2. The securing of increasing returns depends upon 
the progressive division of labor, and the principal 
economies of the division of labor, in its modern 
forms, are the economies which are to be had by 
using labor in roundabout or indirect ways 
3. The division of labor (between firms, between 
industries) depends on the extent of the market as 
much as the extent of the market depends on the 
division of labor 
4. Therefore, the forces that make for economic 
disequilibrium and growth are more deeply rooted in 
the economic system than is commonly thought 
Not provided 
Literature review 
66 
 
Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
Leibenstein 
(1950) 
Economics Neo-classical 
economics 
Structure Network effects 
Interaction 
effects 
External effects on utility 
(as a form on non-
functional demand): 
- bandwagon effect 
(demand for a 
commodity is increased 
due to the fact that 
others are consuming the 
same commodity) 
- snob effect (demand for 
a commodity is 
decreased due to the fact 
that others are 
consuming the same 
commodity) 
- Veblen effect (demand 
for a consumer good is 
increased because it 
bears a higher rather 
than a lower price) 
The slope of the demand 
curve 
Stigler 
(1958) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure Scale effects The downward slope of 
the long-run average 
cost curve 
Optimum firm size is 
determined by the 
survivor technique: firms 
in an industry are 
classified by size, and 
the share of industry 
output coming from each 
class over time is 
calculated; if the share of 
a given class falls, it is 
relatively inefficient 
Farrell & 
Fieldhouse 
(1962) 
 
 
 
Economics Neo-classical 
economics 
Structure Scale effects Non-convex production 
function 
Average total cost 
Rosenberg 
(1976) 
Economics Evolutionary Structure Interaction 
effects 
(technological 
expectations) 
The influence of 
technological 
expectations on the 
pattern of technology 
adoption 
Not provided 
Granovetter 
(1978) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sociology Theory of 
collective 
action 
Structure Network effects 
Interaction 
effects 
The costs and/or benefits 
for an actor of each of 
two alternatives depends 
on how many other 
actors choose which 
alternative 
The threshold: the 
number or proportion of 
others who must make a 
decision before a given 
actor does so 
David 
(1985) 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Technological 
development 
Structure 
(techno-
logical 
standar-
dization) 
System scale 
economies (= 
network effects) 
Overall user costs of a 
typewriter system tend to 
decrease as the system 
gains acceptance relative 
to other systems 
Not provided 
Farrell & 
Saloner 
(1985) 
 
Economics Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure Network effects Customer benefits of 
product standardization 
Increase in customer 
benefits as the number of 
customers increases 
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Research 
design 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Theoretical 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Meso Static 1. If the bandwagon effect is the most significant 
effect, the demand curve is more elastic than it 
would be if external consumption effects would be 
absent 
2. If the snob effect is the predominant effect, the 
demand curve is less elastic than otherwise 
3. If the Veblen effect is the predominant one, the 
demand curve is less elastic than otherwise, and 
some portions of it may even be positively inclined 
4. When the Veblen effect is absent, the demand 
curve will be negatively inclined, regardless of the 
importance of the snob effect in the market 
Not provided 
Analysis of 
optimum size 
of firms, both 
inter-industry 
on a sample 
of 48 
industries, as 
well as intra-
industry for 
the petroleum 
refining 
industry 
Micro and 
meso 
Comparative 
static 
There is customarily a fairly wide range of optimum 
sizes: the long-run marginal and average cost 
curves of the firm are customarily horizontal over a 
long range of sizes 
Not provided 
Empirical 
analysis of 
production 
functions for 
2363 British 
farms 
Micro (firm) Static 1. Major economies of scale with respect to divisible 
inputs are exhausted at relatively low output levels 
(GBP 5000 per annum, in 1953 terms) 
2. When a valid capital measure could be included in 
the analysis, economies of scale would be found to 
persist to much higher output levels 
Not provided 
Conceptual 
 
 
 
 
Micro-meso Dynamic Technological expectations may seriously affect the 
pace of the diffusion process of new and better 
technologies, in the sense that diffusion may be 
slower (or sometimes faster) than optimal 
Entrepreneurs should make 
appraisals of the future pay-
off of innovations 
Theoretical Micro-meso Dynamic 1. Groups with similar average preferences may 
generate very different results, hence it is hazardous 
to infer individual dispositions from aggregate 
outcomes or to assume that behavior was directed 
by ultimately agreed-upon norms 
2. The threshold model explains these paradoxical 
outcomes as the result of aggregation processes: it 
explains that the 'strangeness' often associated with 
collective behavior is not in the heads of actors but 
rather in the dynamics of situations 
Not provided 
Case study 
(QWERTY 
keyboard) 
Meso (market) Dynamic 1. The market outcome is partly governed by 
historical accidents (chance); there is path 
dependence 
2. Market outcomes (technological standardization) 
can become locked-in 
3. The market outcome is not necessarily efficient 
(the 'wrong' technology may become locked-in) 
Not provided 
Theoretical 
(game theory) 
Micro-meso 
(customer-
market) 
Two-period 
game 
There can be inefficient inertia when changing from 
an old technology to a new one, and this problem 
cannot be entirely resolved by communication 
between customers 
Not provided 
Literature review 
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Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
Katz & 
Shapiro 
(1985) 
Economics Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure Network effects Positive consumption 
externalities: the utility 
that a user derives from 
the consumption of a 
good increases with the 
number of other agents 
consuming that good 
The derivative of a 
consumer's value 
function of the network 
size (which is positive) 
Granovetter 
& Soong 
(1986) 
Sociology / 
Economics 
Evolutionary Structure Network & 
interaction 
effects 
Bandwagon effects: 
whether a consumer 
buys is determined in 
part by how many other 
consumers have bought 
Number of adopters 
Katz & 
Shapiro 
(1986) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure Network effects The benefit a consumer 
derives from the use of a 
good depends on the 
number of other 
consumers purchasing 
compatible items 
The derivative of a 
consumer's value 
function of the network 
size (which is positive) 
Arthur 
(1989) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics 
/ 
Complexity 
science 
Ecological Structure 
(techno-
logical 
standar-
dization) 
Network effects 
in adoption of 
competing 
technologies 
The more a technology is 
adopted, the more 
experience is gained with 
it, and the more it is 
improved (which may 
induce further adoption) 
Pay-off of a technology, 
depending (positively) on 
the number of previous 
adopters 
Weil (1989) Economics Development 
economics 
Structure External 
increasing 
returns 
Each agent in the 
economy may choose to 
store or not to store 
knowledge; the more 
knowledge is stored in 
society as a whole, the 
more productive this 
knowledge becomes 
Positive derivative of the 
return on aggregate 
amount of knowledge 
stored  
Arthur 
(1990) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Complexity 
science 
Ecological Structure Scale effects 
Network effects 
Positive feedback in the 
economy 
Not provided 
Literature review 
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Research 
design 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Theoretical Meso Static 1. Consumption externalities lead to demand-side 
economies of scale 
2. Multiple equilibria exist for given cost and utility 
functions 
Firms with good reputations 
or large existing networks 
tend to be against 
compatibility 
Firms with weak reputations 
or small existing networks 
will favor compatibility 
Theoretical Meso Dynamic For many plausible parameter values in the model, 
equilibria are asymptotically unstable, and system 
trajectories consist of cycles that can move, with 
slight parameter changes, via successive 
bifurcations into chaotic dynamics 
Not provided 
Theoretical Meso Dynamic 1. Compatibility tends to be under-supplied in the 
market, but excessive standardization can occur 
2. In the absence of sponsors, the technology 
superior today has a strategic advantage and is 
likely to dominate the market 
3. When one of two rival technologies is sponsored, 
that technology has a strategic advantage and may 
be adopted even if it is inferior 
4. When two competing technologies both are 
sponsored, the technology that will be superior 
tomorrow has a strategic advantage 
A technology sponsor will 
want to ensure that his 
technology is superior 
tomorrow to achieve market 
dominance. To achieve this, 
he may commit to setting 
low prices in the future, e.g. 
by doing investments that 
lower his marginal costs, by 
making the product design 
public, or by advertising that 
prices will be lower in the 
future. 
Theoretical, 
case 
examples 
(QWERTY 
keyboard; 
direct versus 
alternating 
current; 
nuclear 
reactor 
technology 
competition; 
steam versus 
petrol car 
competition) 
Meso (market) Static Properties of technological adoption/selection 
regimes: 
1. Unpredictability of the technology that will be 
selected (multiple possible equilibria) 
2. Inflexibility of the selected technology (lock-in) 
3. Non-ergodicity: small events and chance may 
determine the outcome 
4. Not necessarily path-efficient (a technology with 
inferior long-run potential may be selected) 
1. Firms sponsoring a 
technology may engage in 
penetration pricing 
2. Laissez faire policy is no 
guarantee that the superior 
technology (in the long-run 
sense) will be the one that 
survives 
3. Effective policy depends 
on the nature of the market 
breakdown; alternative 
policy options are assigning 
patent rights to early 
developers, or central-
authority guided 
investments in promising 
but less popular 
technological paths 
Theoretical 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Micro Two-period 
game 
Given enough complementarity between agents, 
external increasing returns may generate multiple 
equilibria 
Not provided 
Theoretical 
with case 
examples 
Meso Dynamic 1. Many possible equilibrium points 
2. The market outcome (equilibrium) may become 
locked in, regardless of the advantages of 
alternatives 
3. Parts of the economy that are resource-based are 
for the most part subject to diminishing returns, parts 
of the economy that are knowledge-based are 
largely subject to increasing returns 
Not provided 
Literature review 
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Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
Cowan 
(1991) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Complexity 
science 
Evolutionary Structure Network effects Increasing returns to 
adoption: for each 
technology the net 
benefit to the next 
adopter increases with 
the number of previous 
adopters of that 
technology 
Payoff of adopter x+1 > 
payoff of adopter x 
Redmond 
(1991) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manage-
ment 
science 
Evolutionary Structure Network effects Self-reinforcement or 
positive feedback: a 
system property that 
tends to amplify or 
extend a trend or 
tendency 
The division of market 
shares between two 
competing technologies 
Yang & 
Borland 
(1991) 
Economics Combination of 
classical 
economics and 
endogenous 
growth theory 
Structure Returns to scale 
Learning-by-
doing 
Internal and external 
economies from the 
division of labor 
(specialization of agents)
At agent level: gains from 
specialization in own 
production against the 
transaction costs of 
trading with other agents 
At market level: the 
growth of per capita 
income over time 
Church & 
Gandal 
(1992) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure Indirect network 
externalities 
(complementary 
products, 
hardware-
software) 
Consumer utility is 
dependent on the 
number of software 
products available for 
their hardware 
Consumer utility levels 
Kirman 
(1993) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Combi-
nation of 
economics 
and 
complexity 
science 
Ecological Structure Externalities Herding or epidemics in 
ant behavior and in 
economic markets 
The proportion of agents 
(ants, economic actors) 
choosing for one of two 
possible alternatives 
Literature review 
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Research 
design 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Theoretical / 
Conceptual 
Meso Dynamic 1. When competing technologies are adopted 
sequentially, if there is uncertainty about the relative 
merits of each, the market will under-supply 
experimentation 
2. A central authority can internalize this externality, 
and raise the expected discount value of a stream of 
adoptions of what seems at first sight an inferior 
technology; this approach is severely limited 
however, because: 
- the forces driving lock-in and facilitating dominance 
of an existing technology are very strong 
- it would take infinite expenditure and infinite 
amount of time to determine in advance which 
technology is eventually the best 
Not provided 
Theoretical 
model, tested 
for Video 
Cassette 
Recorder 
case study 
Meso Dynamic 1. It cannot be determined a priori which of the 
competing technologies will predominate in the 
market 
2. The technology that emerges as dominant is not 
guaranteed to be the 'best' technological solution 
3. Once a technology emerges as dominant, the 
outcome is difficult, if not impossible, to change 
4. Markets may be characterized by extreme 
instability, in which small causes may have large 
and lasting effects on market structure and 
competitive relationships (this is known as a 
bifurcation point) 
Not provided 
Theoretical 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Micro-meso Dynamic Increased division of labor raises labor productivity 
of the agents, which enlarges the extent of the 
market, speeds up the accumulation of human 
capital and raises trade dependence and 
endogenous comparative advantage. This will yield 
higher per capita income, which means that potential 
fur further (endogenous) division of labor emerges. 
Not provided 
Theoretical Micro (firm) Static 1. Multiple equilibria are possible 
2. Standardization of technology will be the 
equilibrium outcome if consumers place a high value 
on variety relative to preferences over hardware 
technologies 
3. The market outcome will entail sub-optimal 
standardization in many cases 
1. Total welfare will be 
increased when a standard 
is imposed 
2. A standards board could 
be a useful mechanism for 
coordinating the 
expectations of software 
firms 
3. Hardware firms will 
increase their prices when 
the number of compatible 
software products increases 
A theoretical 
model is 
made 
explaining ant 
behavior in 
food foraging; 
this model is 
subsequently 
applied to 
economic 
issues 
Meso Dynamic 1. Depending on the parameter values of imitative 
behavior and chance behavior, simple interactive 
behavior of individual agents may result in quite 
complicated dynamics 
2. The choice process is perpetually changing, and 
not converging into a steady state 
Not provided 
Literature review 
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Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
Bartelsman, 
Caballero & 
Lyons 
(1994) 
Economics Neo-classical 
economics 
Structure 
(of the 
industry) 
1. Increasing 
returns to scale 
2. Customer-
driven 
externalities 
3. Supplier-
driven 
externalities 
Returns to scale: 
Relationship between 
growth of industry gross 
production and growth of 
industry inputs 
Externalities: 
Relationship between 
growth of industry gross 
production and other 
industries' (customers or 
suppliers) activity level (= 
their input growth) 
1. Coefficient capturing 
the degree of (internal) 
returns to scale 
2. Coefficient capturing 
customer external effects 
3. Coefficient capturing 
supplier external effects 
Liebowitz & 
Margolis 
(1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure Network effects / 
network 
externalities 
Network effect: the 
circumstance in which 
the net value of an action 
is affected by the number 
of other agents taking 
equivalent actions 
Network externality: 
specific kind of network 
effect in which the 
equilibrium exhibits 
unexploited gains from 
trade regarding network 
participation (i.e., 
network externality is an 
instance of market 
failure) 
Not provided 
Cowan & 
Gunby 
(1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Complexity 
science 
Evolutionary Structure Scale effects 
Learning effects 
Network effects 
Positive feedback or self-
reinforcing effects in the 
economy 
Not provided 
Oulton 
(1996) 
Economics Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure Scale effects 
Supply-side 
externalities 
Growth of output as a 
function of exploitation of 
scale economies and 
(supply-side) 
externalities 
The coefficient relating 
the growth of industry 
output to: 
- the growth of industry 
inputs (scale effects) 
- the growth of aggregate 
manufacturing output 
(externalities) 
Abraham-
son & 
Rosenkopf 
(1997) 
 
 
 
Manage-
ment 
science 
(Social) 
network theory 
Structure 
(I.e., 
structure of 
the 
network) 
Bandwagon 
processes 
(network effects) 
in innovation 
adoption 
As the number of 
adopters of an innovation 
increases, so does its 
profitability, causing 
more potential adopters 
to adopt 
Extent of diffusion of the 
innovation 
Literature review 
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Research 
design 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Empirical 
analysis of 
NBER 4-digit 
productivity 
database for 
537 US 
industries 
 
 
 
 
 
Meso 
(industry) 
Dynamic Short-run: 
1. Moderate internal increasing returns to scale 
2. Positive and significant customer-driven 
externalities 
3. Nonsignificant supplier-driven externalities 
Long-run: 
1. Moderate internal increasing returns to scale 
2. Nonsignificant customer-driven externalities 
3. Positive and significant supplier-driven 
externalities 
Not provided 
Conceptual 
with case 
examples 
Meso n.a. 1. Network effects are pervasive in the economy 
2. However, most of these network effects mainly 
work through prices, and carry no special likelihood 
of market failure 
3. Those network effects that have been modeled as 
transition problems may be valid only in abstract 
settings, and they are as yet without empirical 
support 
4. There is scant evidence of the existence of 
network externalities 
5. The existing models of network externalities arrive 
at a variety of conclusions, yet the models do not tell 
whether these problems are important in the real 
economy 
6. The a priori case for network externalities is 
treacherous and the empirical case has yet to be 
presented 
Not provided 
Case study 
into 
Integrated 
Pest 
Management 
(IPM) in 
agriculture 
Meso Dynamic 1. Economic systems may get trapped away from 
the least-cost equilibrium (as in the IPM case) 
2. This equilibrium is inflexible and the switching 
process is subject to considerable inertia because: 
- a switch to the new technology will involve a period 
of low payoffs 
- there is uncertainty about the possibilities of the 
new technology 
- there is a co-ordination problem with switching, i.e. 
a single farmer switching will incur significantly 
higher costs than when all farmers switch 
- the cost of switching is sufficiently large so that 
small changes in relative advantage (e.g., through 
taxes or subsidies) will not be enough to overcome 
the technological inertia 
3. Therefore, only a crisis situation seems to be able 
to provoke a general switch, and an incremental 
switching process will be difficult to achieve 
A policy maker who wants 
to promote a technology 
switch should focus policy 
interventions to concentrate 
on resource sin such a way 
that they are sufficient to 
overcome inertia in at least 
a part of the system 
Production 
function 
estimation for 
a sample of 
124 
manufactu-
ring industries 
for 9 years 
Meso 
aggregated to 
macro 
Comparative 
static 
1. There is no evidence for increasing returns 
internal to the industry; at industry level returns 
appear to be constant 
2. There is evidence for externalities operating at the 
level of aggregate manufacturing 
3. There is no evidence for externalities generated 
by expansion at the industry sector level 
Not provided 
Simulation 
study 
Micro-meso 
(agent-
network) 
Static 1. Network density influences the extent of 
innovation diffusion 
2. Network structure influences the extent of 
innovation diffusion and structural idiosyncrasies can 
have a major effect 
Both relationships are moderated by the ambiguity 
of the innovation's pay-off to the adopter 
Not provided 
Literature review 
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Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
Arthur, 
Holland, 
LeBaron, 
Palmer & 
Tayler 
(1997) 
Complexity 
science 
Ecological, 
evolutionary 
Structure 
(agent 
heterogen-
eity and 
interdepen-
dence) 
Endogenous 
(mutually 
reinforcing) 
expectations 
Complex market patterns 
(appearance of bubbles 
and crashes) 
1. Price volatility (kurtosis 
of a population of 25 
experiments) 
2. Amount of information 
used by agents for 
making their forecasts 
Choi (1997) Economics Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure Network effects 
and Interaction 
effects 
Network externalities 
create a positive pay-off 
interdependency: the 
more people adopt a 
technology, the more 
valuable it is 
Informational 
externalities: each agent 
benefits from 
observational 
experience, I.e. is able to 
observe other agents' 
decisions and is able to 
learn from their 
consequences 
Number of adopters of 
the technology 
Cowan, 
Cowan & 
Swann 
(1997) 
Complexity 
science 
Ecological, 
evolutionary 
Structure 
(patterns of 
demand) 
Social 
interactions 
between 
consumers 
Consumers' preferences 
are influenced by the 
consumption behavior of 
others: peer groups, 
contrast groups, and 
aspiration groups 
The degree to which 
consumption by an agent 
of type s' makes the 
good attractive to an 
agent of type s 
Dalle 
(1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Complexity 
science 
Evolutionary Structure Externalities 
(local and global)
Network externalities: an 
agent's utility of adopting 
a technology is 
influenced by the number 
of other agents having 
adopted this technology 
The proportion of agents 
having adopted one of 
two possible 
technologies 
Foray 
(1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manage-
ment 
science 
Evolutionary Structure Interaction 
effects 
The positive feedback 
effect of the collective 
dynamics of localized 
(technological) learning 
Not provided 
Literature review 
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Research 
design 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Computer 
simulation 
(artificial 
stock market) 
 
 
Micro-meso 
(agent-
network) 
Dynamic If agents are relatively quick in adapting their 
expectations to new observations of market 
behavior, the market self-organizes into a complex 
regime 
Not provided 
Theoretical 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Micro-meso 
(adopting 
agent - 
market) 
Static 
(sequential 
decisions) 
The interaction of network externalities and 
informational spillovers generates risk aversion and 
herd behavior in the choice of technologies 
Not provided 
Theoretical 
(agent-based 
equations) + 
case 
examples 
 
Micro-meso 
(consumer-
market) 
Dynamic Social interactions influence the patterns of demand 
emerging in the market, and how these patterns 
evolve over time 
Not provided 
Theoretical 
with computer 
simulation 
Meso Static 1. Industries have a technological landscape, I.e., 
they are driven by market forces to different kinds of 
orderly equilibria, with different properties due to the 
differences in agent heterogeneity and (local and 
global) externality parameters 
2. Depending on the existence of local and global 
externalities, three kinds of landscapes are to be 
encountered: 
- diversified technological landscapes (both 
technologies coexisting, non-homogeneously 
distributed over the market) 
- structured technological landscapes (both 
technologies coexisting, distributed in relatively 
homogeneous groups over the landscape) 
- homogeneous technological landscape (virtually 
the whole market has chosen for one technology) 
3. Seemingly odd events (e.g. the appearance of 
technological niches) sometimes obey simple 
mathematical rules 
Public policy implications: 
- public intervention 
becomes much more 
difficult than is usually 
thought 
- there are many ways to 
correct market 
inefficiencies, which are not 
substitutable, and which 
crucially depend on the 
technological landscape 
Case 
examples 
(power 
source for 
motor cars; 
QWERTY 
keyboard; 
alternating 
current; 
nuclear 
power; 
ferrous 
casting; pest 
control 
strategies; 
video 
cassette 
recorder) 
Meso (market) Dynamic 1. Path dependence 
2. Possible inefficiency: 
- persistence of obsolete technology 
- premature standardization of technology 
- excess diversity 
The optimal policy flux 
would be learning from 
technology diversity in the 
early stages, and learning 
from standardization in the 
later stages of market 
evolution 
Literature review 
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Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
Cowan & 
Miller 
(1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Complexity 
science 
Ecological, 
evolutionary 
Structure 
(techno-
logical 
standar-
dization) 
Local 
externalities 
Positive localized 
network externalities 
Agents' pay-off of a 
technology, depending 
on the technology that its 
neighbors have adopted 
Majumdar & 
Venkatara-
man (1998) 
Manage-
ment 
science 
Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure Network effects Network effects is a form 
of increasing returns that 
arise when there is 
interdependence 
between different 
components or members 
of an economic system: 
1. Conversion effect: 
there is operations-
related increasing returns 
in moving from an old 
technology to a new one 
2. Consumption effect: 
there is demand 
interdependence among 
adopters 
3. Imitative effect: 
adopters model their 
behavior after adopters 
perceived to be similar 
Percentage of 
technology adoption as a 
result of the technology 
conversion effect, the 
firms' interdependence of 
consumption effect and 
the firms' imitation effect  
Hellofs & 
Jacobson 
(1999) 
Manage-
ment 
science 
Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure Network effects Positive network 
externalities: customers 
may be (positively) 
affected by the purchase 
behavior of other 
customers when judging 
product quality 
Telephone survey: 
exclusivity ratio 
(percentage of 
respondents preferring 
that few people use the 
same brand divided by 
the percentage of 
respondents preferring 
that a large number of 
people use the same 
brand) 
Experiment: 3 items 
measuring positive and 
negative externalities on 
a five-point scale 
Morrison 
Paul & 
Siegel 
(1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Neo-classical 
economics 
Structure Scale economies 
& agglomeration 
(network) 
externalities 
Shift of the short-run and 
long-run cost curves (the 
relationship between cost 
and output) 
Short-run and long-run 
cost elasticities with 
respect to output 
(internal) and with 
respect to market activity 
levels (external). 
Together these make up 
a total scale economy 
measure. 
Literature review 
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Research 
design 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Theoretical Micro-meso 
(agent-market) 
Static Decentralized behavior of agents with local network 
externalities can lead to the emergence of a 
technical standard, but can also result in a variety of 
other equilibria 
1. Equilibria that exhibit 
technological diversity (non-
standardization) can be 
eliminated by subsidizing 
one of the technologies; the 
height of subsidy needed 
depends on the strength of 
agents' preferences 
2. The key to understanding 
standardization is 
understanding how agents 
behave when the effects of 
positive feedback are 
pulling equally hard in 
opposite directions 
Regression 
analysis of 
technology 
adoption by 
telecommunic
ations firms 
on a number 
of market 
structure 
variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Micro (firm) Comparative 
static 
1. Operations-related increasing returns to scale for 
firms provide strong incentives to convert to a new 
technology from an older one 
2. Market-related increasing returns to scale are 
significant in explaining the differences in adoption 
levels of technologies 
3. The conversion effect is more prominent early in 
technology adoption, while the consumption effect is 
prominent throughout 
Not provided 
Telephone 
survey and 
experiment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Meso Telephone 
survey: 
comparative 
static 
Experiment: 
static 
1. On average, there is a negative effect of market 
share on perceived quality. 
2. However, market share provides a positive signal 
about product quality. 
Firms could use the positive 
signal effect of market 
share on quality to lessen 
the overall negative of 
market share expansion 
created by other 
mechanisms 
Estimation of 
a cost 
function 
model for 
two-digit SIC 
level U.S. 
manufactu-
ring industries 
over the 
period 1959-
1989 
Meso (four-
digit SIC level 
data pooled to 
two-digit SIC 
level, and 
aggregated to 
macro U.S. 
level) 
Dynamic 1. Internal scale economies still prevail in U.S. 
manufacturing 
2. External effects have a (limited) direct effect on 
total scale economies and a (more extensive) 
indirect effect on total scale economies 
3. When external effects are not taken into account, 
the measures of internal scale economies become 
biased by the indirect effect of the external 
measures 
Not provided 
Literature review 
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Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
Wilson 
(2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Neo-classical 
economics 
Structure Scale effects The growth rate of output 
as a function of the cost-
share-weighed growth 
rate of inputs 
A parameter 
representing returns to 
scale: the ratio of 
average to marginal cost 
Woeckener 
(2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Complexity 
science 
Not determined Structure Network effects The utility from the use of 
a good depends 
positively on the total 
number of users of the 
good 
The surplus for becoming 
a member of the network 
depends on a network 
effect strength coefficient 
times the network's 
market share to the 
power of a coefficient 
that determines the 
increase, decrease or 
constancy of the network 
effect 
Brock & 
Durlauf 
(2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Complexity 
science 
Social 
economics 
Structure Interaction 
effects 
The utility or payoff an 
individual receivers from 
a given action depends 
directly on the choices of 
others in the individual's 
reference group, i.e., as 
opposed to dependence 
that occurs through 
intermediation of markets
The social utility 
component of a specific 
choice 
Marshall 
(1890) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Neo-classical 
economics 
Structure & 
conduct 
Scale effects, 
caused by: 
- internal 
economies 
(increase in the 
scale of the 
individual firm) 
- external 
economies 
(economies that 
are the 
consequence of 
the aggregate 
scale of 
production) 
Law of increasing 
returns: An increase of 
labor and capital leads 
generally to an improved 
organization, which 
increases the efficiency 
of the work of labor and 
capital 
Increasing returns is a 
relation between a 
quantity of effort and 
sacrifice on the one 
hand, and a quantity of 
product on the other 
Literature review 
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Research 
design 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Estimation of 
production 
functions on 
the basis of 
the NBER 
productivity 
database 
containing 
annual data 
of 450 
manufactu-
ring industries 
at 4-digit SIC 
level over the 
period 1958 
to 1994 
Meso Dynamic 1. There is essentially no evidence of large 
increasing returns as needed in many of the current 
macro models 
2. With regard to increasing returns, there is 
significant heterogeneity among firms 
3. The often-found result of decreasing returns at the 
2-digit SIC level holds at the 4-digit SIC level as well
4. Durable goods industries have higher returns to 
scale than non-durable goods industries 
Not provided 
Theoretical Meso Dynamic The authors distinguish four cases: 
1. If the systematic basic advantage of a network is 
relatively high, a unique absorbing state exists, and 
every stochastic deviation is eventually locked into 
the network with the systematic advantage 
2. If both the systematic basic advantage and the 
network effect strength are relatively low, the 
stochastic processes are ergodic, i.e., in every 
situation there is a coexistence of networks 
3. if the systematic basic advantage is relatively low 
and the network effects are considerably strong, 
each of the networks can become locked in, and 
there is a strong tendency towards a quick driving 
out of one of the networks 
4. if the systematic basic advantage is relatively low, 
and the network effects are relatively strong, but not 
considerably strong, two locked in networks can 
coexist (when both networks have exceeded 
sufficiently their critical masses, a relatively long-
lasting coexistence becomes probable) 
Not provided 
Theoretical Micro-meso Static 1. Multiple locally stable equilibrium levels of 
average behavior exist when social utility effects are 
large enough and decision making is non co-
operative 
2. A large social multiplier can exist in terms of 
relating small changes in individual utility to large 
equilibrium changes in average behavior 
3. Introduction of a social planner eliminates 
multiplicity of average outcomes, but retains the 
large social multiplier effect 
4. The equilibrium is mathematically equivalent to a 
logistic likelihood function 
Not provided 
Theoretical Micro and 
meso 
n.a. 1. Causes which enable firms to rise quickly, often 
hasten their fall 
2. The increase in the scale of business increases 
rapidly the advantages a firm has over its 
competitors, and lowers the price at which it can 
afford to sell 
3. This firm enjoying scale advantages and one or 
two others would divide between them the whole of 
the branch in which they are engaged 
4. While the part which nature plays in production 
shows a tendency to diminishing return, the part 
which man plays shows a tendency to increasing 
return 
5. The two tendencies toward increasing and 
diminishing returns press constantly against each 
other 
6. There is no general rule that industries which yield 
increasing returns show also rising profits 
Not provided 
Literature review 
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Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
Verdoorn 
(1949) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Neo-classical 
economics 
Structure & 
conduct 
Scale / learning 
effects 
The elasticity of the labor 
productivity with respect 
to the production volume
Linear regression of the 
growth rate of labor 
productivity on the 
growth rate of production 
volume: d(volume/labor) 
= constant + elasticity * 
d(volume) 
Kaldor 
(1966) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Combination of 
classical and 
neo-classical 
economics 
Structure & 
conduct 
Scale / learning 
effects 
Increase in productivity 
as a response to, or as a 
by-product of, the 
increase in total output 
This is due to economies 
of large scale (e.g., 
indivisibilities of 
production factors) 
and/or to learning (e.g., 
Arrow, 1962) 
The Verdoorn (1949) 
relationship (called 
Verdoorn's law by 
Kaldor) 
Kaldor 
(1972) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Combination of 
classical and 
neo-classical 
economics 
Structure & 
conduct 
Scale effects 
Learning effects 
1. Decrease of costs per 
unit of output as plant 
size increases 
2. The breaking up of 
complex processes into 
series of simple 
processes (division of 
labor) 
3. Learning-by-doing: 
advances in productivity 
because of accumulated 
experience 
Not provided 
Literature review 
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Research 
design 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Empirical test 
of the 
elasticity for a 
number of 
countries over 
the periods 
varying from 
1869 to 1938 
and for a 
number of 
industries in 
different 
countries over 
periods 
varying from 
1873 to 1939 
Macro and 
meso 
Dynamic / 
Comparative 
dynamic (pre 
and post 
World War I) 
1. There is a linear relationship between the growth 
rate of labor productivity and the growth rate of 
production volume 
2. The elasticity of labor productivity with respect to 
production volume is over the analyzed periods 
around 0.45, with a lower limit of 0.41 and an upper 
limit of 0.57 
Not provided 
Empirical test 
of Verdoorn's 
law for twelve 
countries over 
the period 
1963-64 
versus 1953-
54 
Macro Dynamic 1. The elasticity coefficient of Verdoorn's law is 
around 0.5 over the analyzed period 
2. Verdoorn's law seems to apply mainly to 
manufacturing industries, and will be more limited 
outside the industrial field (it will not apply in 
agriculture and mining) 
3. This supports the classical contention that 
agriculture and mining are diminishing returns 
industries, whereas manufacturing is an increasing 
returns industry 
4. For the services sector, results are more difficult 
to obtain because of measurement problems 
Not provided 
Conceptual Micro and 
meso 
n.a. 1. Allowing for increasing returns means giving up 
the notion of general equilibrium 
2. Allowing for increasing returns, the forces making 
for continuous change are endogenous 
3. Then, every change in the use of resources 
creates opportunity for further change, meaning that 
the notion of 'optimum' allocation of resources 
becomes meaningless; the distinction between 
resource-creation and resource-allocation, vital to 
equilibrium economics, loses its validity 
4. Given increasing returns, the process of economic 
development can be looked upon as a continued 
process of interaction between demand increases 
which have been induced by increases in supply, 
and increases in supply which have been evoked by 
increases in demand 
5. We have no clear idea of how competition works 
in circumstances where each producer faces a 
limited markets as regards sales and yet a highly 
competitive market as regards price 
Not provided 
Literature review 
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Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
Rohlfs 
(1974) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure & 
conduct 
Network effects The utility that a 
subscriber derives from a 
communications service 
increases as others join 
the system 
1. Positive derivative of 
adopter utility with 
respect to the number of 
adopters 
2. The slope of the 
demand curve 
Teece 
(1980) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manage-
ment 
science 
Transaction 
cost theory 
Structure & 
conduct 
Economies of 
scope 
Economies of scope 
exist when for all outputs 
y1 and y2 the cost of 
joint production is less 
than the cost of 
producing each output 
separately 
c(y1;y2) < c(y1;0) + 
c(0;y2) 
Dolan & 
Jeuland 
(1981) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manage-
ment 
science 
Evolutionary Structure 
(demand 
functions) & 
conduct 
(pricing) 
Learning effects The experience curve The coefficient of the 
correlation between the 
log of accumulated 
volume and the log of 
average cost (called 
experience rate) 
McCombie 
(1985) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Neo-classical 
economics 
Structure & 
conduct 
Dynamic scale 
effects (learning 
effects) 
The relationship between 
the growth of total factor 
productivity (labor 
productivity) and that of 
output (Verdoorn's law) 
1. The elasticity 
coefficient of the 
Verdoorn law 
2. The sum of the 
exponents of a Cobb-
Douglas production 
function 
Literature review 
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Research 
design 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Theoretical Micro-meso Static 1. There are typically multiple equilibria at any given 
price; which equilibrium is selected depends on: 
- the conditions of the static model 
- the initial disequilibrium conditions 
- the disequilibrium adjustment process 
2. The calling pattern between subscribers (uniform 
of non-uniform) influences the nature of the possible 
equilibria and how they are selected: 
- for uniform calling patterns, critical mass is reached 
only through the creation of a large user population 
- for highly non-uniform calling patterns (e.g., small 
groups of people frequently calling each other), 
critical mass may be reached even with very small 
user population 
1. To create critical mass in 
fairly uniformly distributed 
calling patterns, the supplier 
can: 
- give the service free for a 
limited time to a selected 
group of people, that should 
be large enough to achieve 
critical mass 
- start the service with a low 
introductory price; this price 
can then be raised when 
critical mass is achieved 
and the number of users 
increases 
2. To create critical mass in 
non-uniformly distributed 
calling patterns, the supplier 
will need to know the 
communications patterns 
and try to determine 
communities of interest 
groups or self-sufficient 
user groups; on these 
groups specific action can 
be taken, but this requires 
different pricing schemes 
than in the uniform case 
Conceptual 
with empirical 
evidence from 
the petroleum 
industry 
Micro Static 1. Economies of scope do not provide a sufficient 
explanation for multi-product firms 
2. There are two important instances in which multi-
product firms are needed to capture scope 
economies: 
- when the production of two or more products 
depends upon the same proprietary know-how base 
and recurrent exchange is called for 
- when a specialized indivisible asset is a common 
input to the production of two or more products 
If public policy towards the 
business enterprise has 
efficiency as the objective, 
then it is necessary to 
consider transaction costs 
as well as technological 
issues in deriving 
organizational implications 
from industry cost functions 
Theoretical Micro-meso 
(firm-market) 
Dynamic Optimal pricing policy with learning effects leads to 
higher profitability vis-à-vis myopic pricing policy 
For the period of an 
innovating firm's monopoly: 
- skim policy of high initial 
prices followed by lower 
prices is optimal if the 
demand curve is stable 
over time and production 
costs decrease with 
accumulated volume 
- penetration pricing policy 
is optimal if there is a 
relatively high repeat 
purchase rate for non-
durables or if a durable's 
demand is characterized by 
a diffusion process 
Empirical 
testing of both 
the Verdoorn 
law as well as 
a 
conventional 
production 
function for 
20 industries 
(2-digit SIC 
level) in the 
US over the 
period 1963-
1972 
Meso (used as 
an 
approximation 
for micro-level 
production 
function 
statistics; 
reason: 
unavailability 
of statistics for 
the individual 
firm) 
Dynamic 1. The estimation of the Verdoorn law suggests that 
nearly all industries are subject to substantial 
economies of scale. 
2. No evidence was found that these economies of 
scale primarily arise from greater inter-industry 
specialization of production 
3. The estimation of conventional production 
functions suggests either constant returns to scale 
or occasionally very small returns to scale 
4. The estimates are sensitive to the exact error 
structure assumed and provide a warning against 
the uncritical acceptance of a single model 
Not provided 
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Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
Oliver, 
Marwell & 
Texeira 
(1985) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sociology Theory of 
collective 
action 
Structure & 
conduct 
Network effects Accelerating production 
function relating the 
contribution of resources 
to the production level of 
a collective good 
The second derivative of 
the production function 
relating resource 
contributions to the level 
of a collective good 
Farrell & 
Saloner 
(1986) 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure & 
conduct 
Network effects Demand-side economies 
of scale 
The first derivative of 
customer utility with 
respect to the size of the 
network is larger than 0 
Burt (1987) Combi-
nation of 
sociology 
and 
manage-
ment 
science 
Network 
analysis 
Structure & 
conduct 
Interaction 
effects 
Contagion in the diffusion 
of a technological 
innovation (I.e., the 
evaluation of an 
innovation by a potential 
adopter is influenced by 
others who have already 
adopted and with whom 
the potential adopter 
socially interacts); there 
are two alternative 
mechanisms through 
which this can occur: 
- cohesion, i.e., influence 
through direct interaction 
(conversation) between 
adopters 
- structural equivalence, 
i.e., the potential 
adopter's perception of 
which action would be 
proper for an occupant of 
his position in the social 
structure 
Measures of the two 
contagion effects 
obtained by regressing 
the actual month of 
adoption over the 
normative month of 
adoption of the 
innovation by a physician 
Marwell, 
Oliver & 
Prahl 
(1988) 
 
 
 
 
Sociology Theory of 
collective 
action 
Structure & 
conduct 
Network effects 
Interaction 
effects 
An individual's net gain 
from contributing to a 
collective action is 
(positively) dependent on 
the contributions of 
others 
The total payoff from all 
contributions exceeds 
the individual's 
resources/benefits ratio 
Literature review 
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Research 
design 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Theoretical 
with computer 
simulations 
Micro-meso Static 1. With an accelerating (increasing returns) 
production function for the collective good, the start-
up costs create severe feasibility problems for 
collective action 
2. With an accelerating production function, once 
critical mass is reached, this will pay for the start-up 
costs, which will induce widespread collective action
1. With an accelerating 
production function for the 
collective good, a small and 
resourceful core of agents 
can begin contributions 
towards and action that will 
tend to 'explode' and draw 
in the other agents 
2. With an accelerating 
production function, 
contractual solutions 
(coordinating an 
communicating the 
common interest, and 
making all or none 
contracts) are most likely to 
foster mass action 
Theoretical Micro-meso 
(supplier-
market) 
Dynamic When changing from an existing to a new 
technology, allowing for the presence of an installed 
base for the existing technology, there can be 
excess inertia even with complete information. 
Installed base may therefore be a barrier to entry. 
1. Possible strategic action 
for the entrant: product pre-
announcement 
2. Possible strategic action 
for the incumbent: 
predatory pricing (lowering 
prices in face of the threat 
of entry) 
Empirical test 
of theoretical 
models of the 
diffusion of a 
medical drug 
innovation by 
interviews 
among 130 
physicians 
(data by 
Coleman et 
al., 1966) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Micro-meso Static (model 
of physicians 
behavior); 
Dynamic 
(model of 
innovation 
diffusion) 
1. Contagion was not the dominant factor driving the 
medical drug's diffusion 
2. Where contagion occurred, its effect was through 
structural equivalence, not cohesion 
3. Regardless of contagion, adoption was strongly 
determined by a physician's personal preferences 
4. There was no evidence of a physician's network 
position influencing his adoption 
Not provided 
Theoretical 
with computer 
simulations 
Micro-meso Static 1. The overall density of social ties in a group 
improves the prospects for collective action 
2. The centralization of network ties always has a 
positive effect on collective action 
3. The negative effect of costs of using social ties on 
collective action declines as the groups' resource or 
interest heterogeneity increases 
Selectivity is a key concept 
in organizing collective 
action; an organizer 
operating under resource 
constraints will approach 
those agents whose 
contributions are likely to be 
the largest 
Literature review 
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Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
Matutes & 
Regibeau 
(1992) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure & 
conduct 
Network effects Network advantages for 
consumers (i.e., positive 
network effects) that are 
not due to network 
externalities 
Consumers value of 
complementarity 
between goods (= their 
reservation price minus 
the distance between the 
consumer's ideal 
specification of the 
product and the firm's 
version of that 
component 
Choi (1994) Economics Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure: 
technology 
adoption 
(demand 
side) & 
conduct: 
investment 
in 
technology 
(supply 
side) 
Network 
externalities 
1. Forward externality: 
early commitment to a 
technology deprives late 
consumers of an 
opportunity to co-
ordinate efficiently based 
on better information 
2. Backward externality: 
early adopters can be 
stranded inefficiently by 
later users who do not 
take their predecessors' 
preferences into account
Interdependence of 
adopters' payoffs 
Interdependence of 
investors (technology 
sponsors) payoffs 
Katz & 
Shapiro 
(1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manage-
ment 
science 
Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure & 
conduct 
Network effects 
(direct & indirect)
Positive feedback effects Not provided 
Xie & Sirbu 
(1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manage-
ment 
science 
Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure & 
conduct 
Network 
externalities 
Demand externalities: 
the benefit to a consumer 
of a product increases 
with the number of other 
users of the same 
product 
Demand for the product 
is dependent on 
cumulative sales to date 
Literature review 
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Research 
design 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Theoretical Micro-meso 
(firm-market) 
Three-stage 
game 
1. The equilibrium tends to involve socially 
excessive bundling 
2. Mixed bundling strategies tend to increase the 
range of parameters over which socially excessive 
standardization occurs 
1. Firms will choose to 
produce compatible 
components for a wide 
range of parameters, but 
will offer discounts to 
consumers who purchase 
all components from the 
same firm. 
2. The firm's ability to 
exploit the demand shift 
associated with 
compatibility depends 
crucially on the range and 
timing of marketing 
strategies available to firms 
Theoretical 
(game theory) 
Micro-meso 
(firm/customer
-market) 
Two-period 
game 
With network externalities and an option to wait with 
technology adoption the effect of forward externality 
dominates that of backward externality, resulting in a 
bias towards too early adoption by users compared 
to the social optimum 
With network externalities 
and an option to wait with 
investment, the sponsor of 
an emerging technology 
may adopt a less risky 
strategy than the socially 
optimum one, because 
such a strategy may induce 
current customers to defer 
their decisions until the 
uncertainty (of which 
technology becomes the 
standard) is resolved 
Theoretical & 
case 
examples 
Micro-meso 
(firm-market) 
n.a. 1. Multiple equilibria may exist 
2. Equilibrium may become locked in 
3. Equilibrium is not necessarily efficient 
4. Firms with established reputations, well-known 
brand names and ready access to capital have 
competitive advantage 
1. Competitive strategies 
typical for hardware 
suppliers in systems 
markets with network 
externalities: 
- dramatic penetration 
pricing 
- early and visible sunk 
expenditures on software 
- vertical integration to 
ensure access to software 
- building up customer 
beliefs about own system 
and tearing down customer 
beliefs about rival systems 
2. As for now, there is no 
general theory of when 
government intervention is 
preferable to the 
unregulated market 
outcome 
Theoretical 
model with 
numerical 
simulation 
Micro (firm 
and duopoly 
market) 
Comparative 
static 
By agreeing on a common standard, both incumbent 
and entrant may be better off (I.e., compatibility is 
the preferred choice for both entrants and 
incumbents) 
The optimum pricing 
strategy in markets with 
significant positive demand 
externalities is to price low 
(even below cost) initially 
and raise price over time as 
consumer valuation of 
product benefit increases 
with the installed base. 
Literature review 
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Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
Desruelle, 
Gaudet & 
Richelle 
(1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure 
(indirect 
network 
effects) & 
conduct 
(compati-
bility 
decision) 
1. Scale effects 
2. Network 
effects (indirect) 
1. Scale effects: fixed 
costs in production 
2. Network effects: 
customer utility of a good 
is (positively) influenced 
by the number of 
complementary goods 
available 
1. Scale effects: not 
provided 
2. Network effects: the 
derivative of customer 
utility with respect to the 
consumption of 
complementary goods 
Econo-
mides 
(1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure 
(macro- 
approach of 
the 
problem) & 
conduct 
(micro- 
approach of 
the 
problem) 
Network effects The value of a unit of a 
good increases with the 
(expected) number of 
units sold 
Consumers' willingness 
to pay for a good 
(demand function) 
Westphal, 
Gulati & 
Shortell 
(1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sociology / 
Manage-
ment 
Science 
Institutional 
perspective/ 
network 
perspective 
Structure & 
conduct 
Network / 
interaction 
effects 
Increased diffusion of an 
innovation leads to larger 
social legitimacy for new 
adopters, inducing them 
to adopt 
Conformity (of hospitals) 
to the typical pattern of 
TQM adoption 
Fingleton & 
McCombie 
(1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Neo-classical 
economics 
Structure & 
conduct 
Dynamic scale 
effects (learning 
effects) 
The relationship between 
the growth of total factor 
productivity (labor 
productivity) and that of 
output (Verdoorn's law) 
The elasticity coefficient 
of the Verdoorn law 
Harris & 
Lau (1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Neo-classical 
economics 
Structure & 
conduct 
Dynamic scale 
effects (learning 
effects) 
The relationship between 
the growth of total factor 
productivity (labor and 
capital productivity) and 
that of output (Verdoorn's 
law) 
The elasticity coefficient 
of the Verdoorn law 
Literature review 
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Research 
design 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Theoretical Micro-meso 
(firm-market) 
Static 1. The combination of complementarity between 
components and fixed costs in the production of the 
components results in (indirect) network effects 
2. The presence of fixed cost in the production of 
complementary components alongside with 
consumers' desires for variety may result in an 
equilibrium where complementary goods for one or 
both systems in the market are not supplied 
3. When the indirect network effect is small, a 
symmetric equilibrium may result, independent of 
the size of the fixed costs 
4. When fixed costs are important, compatibility of 
systems may be beneficial to consumers and be 
welfare improving 
Not provided 
Theoretical 
(game theory) 
Meso (macro-
approach, 
starting with 
market 
structure) 
Micro (micro-
approach, 
starting with 
firms or 
consumers) 
1. Static 
2. Two-period 
1. In the presence of network externalities, perfect 
competition will lead to 
- multiple equilibria 
- market inefficiency 
2. There is no guarantee that the highest joint profit 
standard will be adopted 
3. Under incompatibility, residual demand facing 
firms is more elastic than under compatibility 
4. Market entry of new firms has two effects: the 
competition effect and the network effect 
5. When firms and consumers interact in more than 
one period, history matters 
1. Network externalities 
cannot be claimed as a 
reason in favor of a 
monopoly market structure 
2. Compatibility is a 
strategic decision 
3. Under incompatibility, 
firms will choose to set 
lower prices 
4. When the network effect 
is strong enough in relation 
to the competitive effect, an 
innovator-monopolist will 
invite competitors to enter 
the market and even 
subsidizes them on the 
margin to increase 
production 
Empirical 
study into the 
timing of 
adoption of 
Total quality 
Management 
by 2712 
hospitals over 
the period 
1985-1993, 
including the 
network 
structure in 
which they 
are active 
Micro Static 1. Early adopters are mainly motivated by the 
organizational efficiency gains of innovation (TQM) 
adoption, and they are therefore more likely to 
customize TQM practices to the organization's 
unique needs and capabilities 
2. Later adopters, experiencing normative pressure 
to adopt legitimated TQM practices are more likely 
to mimic the normative model or definition of TQM 
adoption implemented in other hospitals 
3. More intense network ties decreases conformity 
to normative TQM adoption for early adopters, and 
increases conformity for late adopters 
4. Conformity to normative TQM adoption is 
negatively associated with organizational efficiency 
benefits, and positively associated with 
organizational legitimacy benefits from adoption 
Not provided 
Empirical 
testing of the 
Verdoorn law 
(static as well 
as dynamic) 
for 178 
regions in 13 
European 
countries over 
the period 
1979 to 1989 
Meso Dynamic 
(growth rates 
1979-1989), 
Static (cross-
section 1979) 
1. A highly significant Verdoorn coefficient of 0.575 
was found for the dynamic model; this suggests the 
presence of substantial increasing returns to scale 
2. The estimates of the Verdoorn coefficient for the 
static model were found to be either not significantly 
different from zero or to be small, with typical values 
of around 0.10; this implies constant or very small 
increasing returns to scale 
Not provided 
Empirical 
testing of the 
Verdoorn law 
for up to 13 
industries in 
10 UK 
regions over 
the period 
1968-1991 
Meso Dynamic 
(model 
incorporates 
both short-run, 
which is an 
approximation 
for the static 
model, and 
long-run) 
1. Overall, the returns to scale are on average 
greater than one, and thus the Verdoorn coefficient 
significantly exceeds zero 
2. There is considerable variation in the long-run 
output elasticity coefficients between different 
regions and between different industries 
Not provided 
Literature review 
90 
 
Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
Schilling 
(1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manage-
ment 
science 
Combination of 
Resource-
based theory 
and Industrial 
organization 
theory 
Structure & 
conduct 
Network effects Increasing returns to 
adoption, which can be 
split into two categories: 
- the more a technology 
is used, the more it is 
improved 
- the benefit a consumer 
derives from a good 
depends on the number 
of other consumers 
purchasing similar items 
Likelihood of 
technological lock-out 
Teece 
(1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manage-
ment 
science 
From 
Resource-
based theory 
to Dynamic 
Capabilities 
theory 
Structure & 
Conduct 
Scale effects 
Learning effects 
Network effects 
Mechanisms of positive 
feedback that reinforce 
the winners and 
challenge the losers 
Not provided 
Arthur 
(1999) 
Combi-
nation of 
economics 
and 
complexity 
science 
Ecological, 
evolutionary 
Structure & 
conduct 
Self-reinforcing 
expectations 
Positive feedback in the 
economy 
Not provided 
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Research 
design 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Conceptual Micro (firm) Dynamic The author provides a number of propositions: 
1. Failure to invest in continuous learning will 
increase the likelihood of technological lock-out 
2a. In industries characterized by network 
externalities, an insufficient installed base will 
increase the likelihood of technological lock-out 
2b. Later entry increases the likelihood of an 
insufficient installed base, which increases the 
likelihood of technological lock-out 
3a. A lack of complementary goods will increase the 
likelihood of technological lock-out 
3b. The strength of the relationship between the lack 
of complementary goods and technological lock-out 
will be increased by the presence of network effects 
4a. Timing of entry will have a U-shaped relationship 
with the likelihood of lock-out: entering very early or 
very late will increase the likelihood of lock-out 
4b. The strength of the relationship between late 
entry and technological lock-out will be increased by 
network externalities and low entry barriers 
4c. The strength of the relationship between very 
early entry and technological lock-out will be 
weakened by the degree of improvement the 
technology offers over previous technologies 
5. Under conditions of an existing dominant design, 
the likelihood of technological lock-out is positively 
related to the existence and degree of effectiveness 
of competitor patents protecting the dominant design
6. Under conditions of an existing dominant design, 
failure to invest in continuous learning will increase 
the likelihood of technological lock-out 
1. Firms should invest in 
core capabilities and 
absorptive capacity to 
reduce the probability of 
technological lock-out, i.e., 
this investment may be a 
source of sustained 
competitive advantage 
2. The firm needs to employ 
marketing, distribution, and 
pricing tactics that will 
rapidly deploy the 
technology, even if this 
means forfeiting returns in 
the short term, i.e., rapidly 
building installed base and 
encourage or sponsor 
availability of 
complementary goods 
3. If the technology has a 
clear advantage to 
consumers, entering the 
market early gives the 
entrant a path dependent 
advantage 
4. When the technology is 
ambiguous or consumer 
expectations are unclear, it 
may be in the firm's interest 
to wait 
5. A firm wishing to enter a 
very new or emerging 
market can improve its 
chances of technology 
acceptance by investing in 
consumer education 
6. The firm must possess 
core capabilities for 
producing or quickly 
developing technology to 
consumer expectations 
7. A firm with a very fast 
development process can 
take advantage of both first 
and second mover 
advantage 
Conceptual Micro (firm) n.a. 1. Winner-take-all markets, in which the winner need 
not be the pioneer and need not have the best 
product 
2. Heightened pay-off associated with getting 
introduction timing right and with organizing 
sufficient resources when the opportunity opens up 
3. Style of competition is like casino gambling 
4. Superior technology alone is not enough 
5. Combination with complementary assets is 
needed 
6. There is little pay-off to penny pinching and high 
pay-off to rapidly sensing and seizing opportunities 
Firms need to develop 
dynamic capabilities to 
sense and seize new 
opportunities, and to 
reconfigure and protect 
knowledge assets, 
competencies, 
complementary assets and 
technologies to achieve 
sustainable competitive 
advantage 
Conceptual 
 
 
 
 
 
Micro-meso Dynamic Economic patterns seldom fall into the simple 
homogeneous equilibria of standard economics, but 
instead are ever changing, showing perpetually 
novel behavior and emergent phenomena 
Not provided 
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Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
John, 
Weiss & 
Dutta 
(1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manage-
ment 
science 
Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure & 
conduct 
Self-regeneration 
and externalities 
of know-how 
1. Know-how 
development as a 
positive feedback 
process 
2. Externalities are 
spillovers in know-how 
creations, dissemination, 
and use 
Not provided 
Kretschmer, 
Klimis & 
Choi (1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manage-
ment 
science / 
Sociology 
Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure & 
conduct 
Network effects 
Interaction 
effects 
Self-enforcement effects 
that transcend their 
historical cause, either in 
contradicting it (social 
contagion) or in 
escalating it out of 
proportion (increasing 
returns) 
Not provided 
Antinolfi, 
Kleister & 
Shell (2001) 
Economics Endogenous 
growth 
Structure & 
conduct (of 
economic 
system) 
Returns to scale 
with respect to 
technology as an 
input factor 
Degree of homogeneity 
of the production function
Lambda (= the degree of 
homogeneity of the 
production function) 
Dickson, 
Farris & 
Verbeke 
(2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manage-
ment 
science 
Systems 
thinking 
Structure & 
conduct 
1. Scale effects 
2. Learning 
effects 
3. Network 
effects 
4. Self-
reinforcing 
expectations 
Positive feedback 
effects: 
- asset position 
advantages (scale 
effects & network effects)
- learning dynamics 
(learning effects & self-
reinforcing expectations) 
1. Asset position 
advantages: average 
cost consequences of 
fixed cost investments in 
distribution, R&D, brand 
equity, customer service 
2. Learning dynamics: 
not provided 
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Research 
design 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Conceptual Micro (firm) n.a. Authors provide 6 features of technology-intensive 
markets: 
1. Cost structure of products: high fixed, low variable 
costs 
2. Know-how is not easily tradable 
3. Diversity of technologies 
4. Network compatibility 
5. Demand-side increasing returns 
6. Importance of technology expectations (pace of 
development, significance of improvements, 
uncertainty of advances) 
Authors propose four fields 
in which important 
marketing decisions have to 
be taken: 
1. Vertical positioning (from 
upstream, e.g. selling or 
licensing know-how, to 
downstream, e.g. operating 
a service bureau) 
2. Product design (platform 
or product strategy; 
modular or optimized 
designs) 
3. Transfer right 
management (selling or 
licensing know-how; pricing 
of this transfer) 
4. Migration decisions 
(overlapping of product 
generation, backward 
compatibility decisions, 
setting pace and 
expectations of change) 
Conceptual 
with some 
examples 
Meso 
(industry) and 
micro (firm) 
n.a. 1. There is oversupply of potential candidates for 
goods in the industry, generating a selection 
problem 
2. The quality of goods in the industry is highly 
uncertain 
3. Consumers of goods in the industry form 
networks 
4. Demand for goods in the industry reverses in 
cyclic ways 
Authors provide six 
management 
recommendations: 
1. Be early 
2. Attract suppliers 
3. Influence expectations 
4. Upgrade customer base 
5. Reciprocate trust 
6. Create social institutions 
Authors also provide two 
broad strategic alternatives: 
1. Try to push for increasing 
returns directly 
2. Try to ride the waves as 
they come 
Theoretical + 
graphic 
analysis 
 
Macro 
(economy) 
Dynamic Increasing returns leads to an instable steady state; 
it causes bifurcation, or multiple possible steady 
states 
Not provided 
Theoretical 
(systems 
analysis / 
feedback 
analysis) 
Micro-meso 
(firm-market) 
Dynamic Positive feedback effects create permanent change 
and growth: the evolution of economic systems and 
markets 
Understanding feedback 
effects that dominate 
market evolution and 
development is useful for 
managers in three ways: 
- it helps them forecast the 
directions in which markets 
are likely to evolve 
- it helps managers 
appreciate the nature and 
degree of uncertainty and 
risk in a particular market's 
evolution path 
- it may reveal latent 
feedback loops that 
managers can influence 
and foster 
Literature review 
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Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
Thornton & 
Thompson 
(2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Neo-classical 
economics 
Structure & 
conduct 
Learning effects Productivity growth as a 
consequence of on-the-
job learning, internal 
(within-firm) knowledge 
spillovers, and external 
(between firms) 
knowledge spillovers 
The influence of the 
different forms of 
experience (I.e., the 
result of earning effects) 
on the log of the labor 
requirements to build a 
ship 
Gandal 
(1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manage-
ment 
science 
Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure & 
perfor-
mance 
Network effects 
(indirect) 
The value of a product or 
service increases in the 
number of consumers 
that use compatible 
products or services 
Price levels 
Bryn-
jolfsson & 
Kemerer 
(1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manage-
ment 
science 
Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure 
(installed 
base and 
product 
attributes 
are 
considered 
as 'given') & 
perfor-
mance (list 
price as an 
indicator) 
Network 
externalities 
Relationship between the 
list price of a software 
package and its installed 
base 
Coefficient relating the 
natural log of the 
inflation-adjusted list 
price for the product with 
the percentage of the 
installed base by this 
product 
Clark & 
Chatterjee 
(1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manage-
ment 
science 
Evolutionary Structure 
(techno-
logical 
standar-
dization) & 
perfor-
mance 
(relative 
market 
share of 
product) 
Network effects The utility a consumer 
receives from a product 
is affected by whether 
other consumers are 
using the same product 
(i.e. are members of the 
same network) 
Relative attractiveness of 
a product for a consumer 
depending on inherent 
utility and the value of 
the network  
Smith 
(1776) 
 
 
 
Economics Classical 
economics 
Conduct Scale / learning 
effects 
The improvement in the 
productive powers of 
labor as an effect of the 
division of labor 
Not provided 
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Research 
design 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Estimation of 
production 
functions for 
25 shipyards 
that built 
Liberty Ships 
during World 
War II 
Micro Dynamic 1. Learning spillovers across product and across 
yards were a significant source of growth in 
productivity, and may well have been more 
important than conventional learning effects 
2. The size of the learning externalities across yards 
were quite small 
3. Authors conclude that learning spillovers help 
firms grow, but the market failures introduced by 
learning externalities may be modest 
4. Findings also suggest that knowledge spillovers 
may be determined more by the nature of the 
technology than by the nature of competition 
Not provided 
Empirical 
analysis of 
the 
spreadsheet 
and database 
management 
system 
markets 
(1989-1991) 
Meso (market) Comparative 
static 
1. The personal computer software market exhibits 
complementary network externalities 
2. Firms whose software products are compatible 
with the dominant standard will charge a higher price 
than firms whose products offer compatibility with a 
smaller set of complementary application programs 
Not provided 
Empirical: 
econometric 
analysis of 
the 
spreadsheet 
market 
Meso 
(industry) 
Dynamic 1. Network externalities significantly increased the 
price of spreadsheet products: 1% increase in 
installed base leads to 0.75% increase in price 
2. Products which adhered to the dominant 
standard, Lotus menu tree, commanded prices 
which were higher by an average of 46% 
1. For vendors, it is 
advantageous to achieve a 
significant share of the 
market quickly, e.g. through 
penetration pricing 
2. Vendors who want to 
control standards should 
consider licensing their 
technology 
3. Entry into the software 
market is likely to be more 
successful when there is a 
major change in platform 
because of inertia from 
network benefits 
Computer 
simulation 
Meso 
(industry) 
Dynamic The more important network effects are in the 
market: 
1. the more likely it is that a single product will 
dominate the market 
2. the less of an advantage there is to product 
improvement relative to capturing initial market 
share 
3. the more likely it is that an inferior product can 
dominate the market if it captures a sufficient 
number of early buyers 
1. Managers have to 
identify the degree of 
network effects in their 
market 
2. Capturing initial market 
share is all-important; first-
mover advantages are likely 
to be particularly strong 
3. Penetration style 
marketing strategies are 
likely to be useful 
4. Focus on fast 
introduction of 'good 
enough' products 
5. Credible investments in 
network assets or 
reputation may convince 
early adopters 
6. Focus on appealing to 
early adopters, who may 
act as opinion leaders 
7. Managers must analyze 
the actual decision process 
customers use in 
purchasing their product 
Conceptual Micro n.a. 1. The division of labor is carried furthest in those 
countries which enjoy the highest degree of industry 
and improvement 
2. The extent of division of labor is limited by the 
extent of the market 
Not provided 
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Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
Duchatelet 
(1982) 
Economics Neo-classical 
economics 
Conduct Scale effects 
Learning effects 
Increasing returns to 
scale in production or 
decreasing cost of 
production as a 
consequence of learning 
from past mistakes 
The firm has a loss 
function, and builds a 
sample of the past 
differences between its 
actual decision and 
reality; the 'loss' 
therefore decreases with 
experience 
Amit (1986) Manage-
ment 
science 
Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Conduct 
(strategy) 
The experience 
curve and the 
factors that 
underlie it: 
1. Scale effects 
2. Learning 
effects 
1. Increasing returns to 
scale (scale effect): cost 
declines that occur as a 
result of movement along 
a given long-run average 
cost curve 
2. Learning effect: cost 
declines that occur over 
time, reflected by a 
movement of the long-
run average cost curve 
The decline of the 
average total cost with 
production rate (scale 
effect) or with cumulative 
production (learning 
effect) 
There is a measurement 
problem when both 
effects occur at the same 
time 
Argote, 
Beckman & 
Epple 
(1990) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manage-
ment 
science 
Neo-classical 
economics 
Conduct Learning effects Increase in the rate of 
output when cumulative 
production grows that are 
not due to increased 
inputs of labor and 
capital, or to increasing 
exploitation of economies 
of scale, or to the 
passage of time 
1. Increase in the rate of 
output due to the rise of 
cumulative production 
2. Increase in the rate of 
output due to the growth 
of knowledge stock 
Herbig 
(1991) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Complexity 
science 
Catastrophe 
theory 
Conduct 
(adoption) 
Bandwagon 
effects 
The increase in the 
pressure for innovation 
adoption to a firm as a 
result of the increasing 
number of adoptions 
within the firm's industry 
The magnitude of the 
discontinuity of the 
change between the 
states not adopted to 
adopted 
Bikhchan-
dani, 
Hirschleifer 
& Welch 
(1992) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sociology Ecological, 
evolutionary 
Conduct 
(agent 
behavior) 
Information 
cascades 
(localized 
conformity; 
effects of social 
interaction on 
aggregate 
behavior) 
The decision of an 
individual to adopt is 
positively dependent on 
previous individuals' 
adoption decisions, 
because of sanctions on 
deviants, positive pay-off 
externalities, conformity 
preference, or 
communication 
Number of adopters of 
behavior (custom, fad, 
fashion, product, or 
technology) 
Literature review 
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Research 
design 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Theoretical 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Micro (firm) Dynamic Even in the presence of a constant returns to scale 
technology and incomplete information, increasing 
returns to scale in production can emerge as a sole 
consequence of learning-by-doing 
Not provided 
Theoretical 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Micro (firm) Dynamic 1. Competitive advantage through cost leadership 
can only be obtained in the presence of learning 
2. In the presence of decreasing returns to scale, 
part or all of the cost advantages obtained by riding 
down the experience curve may be offset by 
increases in production costs  
Firms must carefully identify 
the sources of cost decline 
and must use adequate 
estimation techniques to 
measure the experience 
effect 
Estimation of 
production 
functions for 
16 shipyards 
that built 
Liberty Ships 
during World 
War II 
Micro 
(aggregated to 
meso) 
Dynamic 1. The conventional measure of learning, cumulative 
output, significantly overstates the persistence of 
learning 
2. Knowledge stock is a better measure of learning, 
because it allows both growth of knowledge as well 
as knowledge depreciation 
3. The analysis shows that knowledge acquired 
through production depreciates rapidly 
1. A strategy of adopting 
high output levels initially, 
followed by lower levels 
may be effective to increase 
productivity if learning is 
related to cumulative 
output. It is not necessarily 
preferable if learning is 
related to (depreciating) 
knowledge 
2. Failure to allow for 
depreciation of knowledge 
may result in production 
cost forecasts that have 
systematic errors 
Conceptual Micro Dynamic The discontinuity of change of a firm (I.e., the 
bandwagon pressure) is a function of the number of 
possible adopters in the firm's industry and the 
essentiality of innovation adoption to the firm 
The model: 
- provides managers (of an 
innovation supplier) with a 
different understanding and 
prediction of the cumulative 
adoption curve 
- enables managers to 
better segment the market 
and target potential 
customers (making a 
difference between earlier 
and later adopters) 
Theoretical + 
case 
examples 
Micro-meso 
(agent-
network) 
Static 1. Rapid spread of new behaviors (customs, fads, 
fashions, products, technologies) 
2. Mass behavior is systematically fragile and 
idiosyncratic: small shocks can lead to large shifts in 
behavior 
3. Multiple equilibria may exist 
4. The 'wrong' cascade may occur (in the sense that 
all individuals do not adopt the behavior) 
5. The fragility of cascades also means that they can 
be easily reversed by individuals, opinion leaders, or 
outsiders 
1. When introducing an 
innovation, one should 
focus on persuading early 
leaders, who act as fashion 
or opinion leaders 
2. Release of public 
information can break 
incorrect cascades 
Literature review 
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Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
Besen & 
Farrell 
(1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Conduct 
(strategy) 
Network effects Demand-side economies 
of scale 
Standardization of 
technology 
Hill (1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manage-
ment 
science 
Resource-
based theory 
Conduct Network effects The value to a customer 
of owning a product is an 
increasing function of the 
availability of compatible 
products 
Not provided 
Li & 
Rajago-
palan 
(1998) 
Manage-
ment 
science 
Resource-
based theory 
Conduct Learning effects Cumulative knowledge 
level as a linear 
combination of 
cumulative production 
volume (autonomous 
learning) and cumulative 
investment in process 
improvement efforts 
(induced learning) 
Unit production cost 
(which is decreasing in 
cumulative knowledge) 
Klette 
(1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Neo-classical 
economics 
Conduct 
(scale 
exploitation)
Scale effects Increasing returns to 
scale 
The elasticity of scale of 
production 
Literature review 
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Research 
design 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Case 
examples 
(MS DOS; 
IBM 
mainframes; 
VHS versus 
Betamax 
video; 
QWERTY 
keyboard; 
Color 
television, FM 
stereo, High-
definition 
television) 
Micro Static 1. Markets are 'tippy' (= unstable) 
2. A single winning standard will dominate the 
market 
3. Expectations about the ultimate size of the 
network are crucial 
4. History matters (= path dependence) 
5. Firms that prevail in the standards battle can 
expect very large returns 
Tactics for fighting a 
standards battle: 
1. Building an early lead 
2. Attracting the suppliers of 
complements 
3. Product pre-
announcements 
4. Price commitments 
5. Deciding whether to 
establish technology as a 
proprietary standard, join a 
rival's network, or offer 
technology to rivals as a 
proposed industry standard 
Case 
examples 
Micro-meso 
(firm-market) 
n.a. 1. Technology standardization 
2. Lock-in effects 
3. Possible inefficiency 
Authors provide a table of 
benefits, costs, and risks 
attached to four strategic 
options for increasing 
returns markets: licensing, 
strategic alliances, product 
diversification, and 
aggressive positioning 
Authors also provide a table 
of main features and 
contingencies attached to 
four competitive strategies 
for increasing returns 
markets: aggressive sole 
provider, passive multiple 
licensing, aggressive 
multiple licensing, and 
selective partnering 
Theoretical 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Micro (firm) Dynamic Not provided Not provided 
Econometric 
analysis of 
Norwegian 
manufactu-
ring firms 
from 14 
different 
industry 
groups (1980-
1990) 
Meso (5-digit 
SIC code 
industry level) 
level 
aggregated 
from micro 
(firm) level 
data 
Comparative 
static 
Increasing returns to scale is not a widespread 
phenomenon in Norwegian manufacturing. 
The average firm in most industries seems to face 
constant or moderately decreasing returns to scale. 
However, scale coefficients vary substantially within 
each of the industries analyzed: the differences 
between scale coefficients within industries are three 
times as large as the differences between industries.
Not provided 
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Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
Shapiro & 
Varian 
(1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Conduct Network effects Network effects: 
consumers play high 
value on compatibility 
Not provided 
Mitchell 
(2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Evolutionary Conduct Scale, scope, 
and learning 
effects 
Increasing productivity of 
the firm (learning about 
technology) and its 
influence of the scope of 
the firm's activities 
Parameters in the 
production function: 
1. A parameter 
representing scale 
economies 
2. A learning parameter, 
representing a better 
organization of inputs 
Economies of scope are 
measured as the 
increase of output as 
inputs are spread over a 
larger set of tasks 
Literature review 
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Research 
design 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Conceptual 
with some 
case 
examples 
(Railroad 
systems, 
AC/DC 
power, Color 
television) 
Micro (firm) n.a. 1. Incompatibilities can arise almost by accident, yet 
persist for many years 
2. Network markets tend to tip towards the leading 
player 
3. Consumer expectations can easily become self-
fulfilling in standards battles 
4. First-mover advantage can be overcome by 
superior technology if the performance advantage is 
sufficient and users are not overly entrenched 
5. Adoption of a new technology can be painfully 
slow 
6. Victory in standards wars often requires building 
an alliance 
7. A dominant position in one generation of 
technology does not necessarily translate into 
dominance in the next generation of technology 
1. A firm's ability 
successfully to wage a 
standards war depends on 
7 key assets: 
- control over an installed 
base of users 
- intellectual property rights 
- ability to innovate 
- first-mover advantages 
- manufacturing capabilities 
- strength in complements 
- brand name and 
reputation 
2. Strategy and tactics 
lessons: 
- assemble allies (support 
from consumers, suppliers 
of complements, 
competitors) 
- pre-emption (penetration 
pricing, rapid design cycles, 
early deals with pivotal 
customers) 
- managing customer 
expectations (aggressive 
marketing, making early 
announcements, make 
commitments visible) 
3. When you have won, do 
not rest easy: 
- keep developing the 
product, even if that means 
sacrificing backward 
compatibility) 
- offer customers a 
migration path (e.g. by 
incorporating competitive 
ideas into updates) 
- maintain a healthy market 
for complementary products 
- compete with your own 
installed base 
- protect your position 
- leverage your installed 
base into new markets 
4. When you fall behind: 
- do not apply survival 
pricing 
- connect to the dominant 
technology (e.g. through 
adapters or converters) 
Theoretical 
modeling, the 
predictions of 
the theoretical 
model are 
tested against 
firm 
diversification 
data 
Micro Dynamic 1. The scope of the firm is limited by the increasing 
difficulty of tasks and the firm's limited ability to focus 
on a wide variety of disparate production techniques
2. The authors' model explains some facts about the 
scope of firms: 
- why there is so much diversification into related 
fields 
- why firms that are more diversified tend to be 
larger, not only overall, but also at every activity they 
are involved with 
- why there is a learning curve, in the sense that 
average costs are non-increasing over the lifetime of 
a firm 
- why firm size, growth, and growth rate variability 
show stochastic properties 
Not provided 
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Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
De Liso, 
Filatrella & 
Weaver 
(2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Endogenous 
growth 
Conduct 1. Division of 
labor 
2. Learning-by-
doing 
The link between returns 
and output (a result of 
the sources division of 
labor and learning-by-
doing 
Output-output elasticity 
Hatch & 
Mowery 
(1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manage-
ment 
science 
Capability 
approach 
Conduct & 
perfor-
mance 
Learning effects Improvement in process 
performance as process-
specific knowledge 
increases, as a 
consequence of 
cumulative production 
volume or cumulative 
engineering 
Density of defects per 
square centimeter 
Garud & 
Kumara-
swamy 
(1993) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manage-
ment 
science 
Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure, 
conduct & 
perfor-
mance 
Network effects The benefits a user 
derives from a product 
increase as others use 
compatible products 
Not provided 
Arthur 
(1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics 
/ 
Complexity 
science 
Ecological Structure 
(of market), 
conduct (of 
firms) & 
perfor-
mance (of 
firms and/or 
technolo-
gies) 
1. Scale effects 
(large up-front 
costs) 
2. Network 
effects 
3. Customer 
groove-in 
1. The tendency for that 
which is ahead to get 
further ahead, for that 
which loses advantage to 
lose further advantage 
2. Mechanisms of 
positive feedback that 
operate - within markets, 
businesses and 
industries - to reinforce 
that which gains success 
or aggravate that which 
suffers loss 
Not provided 
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Research 
design 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Theoretical Micro Dynamic 1. Endogenously created increasing returns can 
emerge because of: 
- division of labor 
- learning-by-doing of individuals 
- learning-by-doing of the organization 
2. Individual learning-by-doing is limited by individual 
capabilities  
3. Division of labor and organizational learning-by-
doing is limited by the extent of the market 
Not provided 
Survey on the 
manufactu-
ring 
performance 
of semi-
conductor 
firms 
Micro (firm) Dynamic 1. The learning curve is a product of deliberate 
activities intended to improve yields and reduce 
costs, rather than the incidental by-product of 
production volume 
2. Characteristics of learning for new processes 
differ significantly from those for mature processes 
3. The ability of firms to develop, introduce, and 
expand production with new processes is one of the 
most important firm-specific capabilities for 
competition in the semiconductor industry 
Reallocation of engineering 
talent away from problem 
solving on mature 
processes to ‘debugging’ of 
new manufacturing 
processes 
Case study 
(SUN 
Microsystems 
1982-1989) 
Micro-meso 
(firm-market) 
Dynamic Authors provide a table of the structural facets of 
competition contingent on: 
1. Competitive market or monopoly market 
2. Integrated system manufacturers or specialized 
component manufacturers 
Authors provide a table of competitive dynamics in 
network industries, regarding system attributes, firm 
strategies, and sources of sustainable advantage, 
contingent on: 
1. unconnected closed networks or connected open 
networks 
 
1. In connected open 
networks markets an open 
systems strategy with 
liberal licensing as followed 
by SUN may be very 
successful 
2. Firms competing in these 
markets must question the 
conventional wisdom of 
restricting access to 
proprietary technologies 
and discouraging multi-
system compatibility 
Case 
examples (PC 
operating 
systems 
CP/M versus 
MS-DOS 
versus 
Macintosh 
Micro-meso 
(firm-market) 
n.a. 1. Because of increasing returns in knowledge-
based industries, markets tend to become a 'casino 
of technology' 
2. Market instability 
3. Multiple potential outcomes 
4. Unpredictability 
5. Lock-in 
6. Possible predominance of an inferior product 
7. Fat profits for the winner 
For firms: 
1. Competition becomes 
like gambling, the art of 
competing is primarily a 
psychological one 
2. Superb product or 
technology, technical 
expertise, hitting the market 
first, deep pockets, will, and 
courage remain important 
but count for only a limited 
degree 
3. Firms cannot optimize, 
they can only adapt in a 
pro-active way 
4. Managers have to 
understand the rules of 
increasing returns markets 
For policy makers: 
1. Do not penalize success 
(short-term monopoly is a 
reward for innovation) 
2. Do not allow head starts 
for the privileged 
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Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
Cottrell & 
Koput 
(1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manage-
ment 
science 
Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure, 
conduct & 
perfor-
mance 
Indirect network 
externalities 
(complementary 
products, 
hardware-
software) 
The effect of software 
availability on hardware 
valuation 
The value (price) of the 
hardware to which the 
software is 
complementary 
Ades & 
Glaeser 
(1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Endogenous 
growth 
Structure 
(extent of 
the market), 
conduct 
(speciali-
zation) & 
perfor-
mance 
(growth) 
1. Investment in 
fixed cost 
technologies 
2. Division of 
labor 
3. Learning-by-
doing 
Positive connection 
between initial GDP and 
GDP growth 
The coefficient of the 
correlation between initial 
GDP and GDP growth 
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Research 
design 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Case study 
with statistical 
estimation 
Meso 
(industry) 
Dynamic 1. A single computer platform is likely to dominate 
the industry 
2. Software development decisions influence which 
hardware design eventually dominates 
3. Network externalities (for customers) attach to the 
software, and the effect on hardware will be to make 
the platform generic 
3. Externalities (for suppliers) in hardware are 
largely determined by the sunk investments software 
suppliers have to make in knowledge needed to 
develop software applications for specific platforms 
4. There is a positive relationship between software 
variety and price, because in the initial stages of 
adoption, software variety serves as a signal of 
platform quality 
5. Computer software and hardware markets are 
subject to significant interaction effects 
1. Software products must 
be developed for use on a 
computer platform 
2. There are different 
development strategies: 
- device-dependent 
strategies: developing 
software for a single 
platform, usually the 
largest, or expected largest 
- device-independent 
strategies: developing 
software independently of a 
platform and then 
generating executable code 
for the specific platforms 
Empirical 
analysis of 
1. cross-
country data 
on population 
and per 
capita GDP of 
poorer 
countries 
2. Data on 
U.S. states in 
the 19th 
century 
Macro 
(economy) 
1. Static 
2. 
Comparative 
static 
1. The extent of the market determines division of 
labor, which in turn determines growth 
2.The learning-by-doing model is rejected 
Openness stimulates 
economic growth, therefore 
protectionism is doubtful 
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Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
Gupta, Jain 
& Sawhney 
(1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manage-
ment 
science 
Industrial 
Organization 
theory 
Structure, 
conduct & 
perfor-
mance 
Network effects 
(indirect) 
The usefulness of a 
technology product for an 
end-user depends on the 
availability of 
complementary software 
products and services 
The probability of 
choosing a product 
(hardware) as depending 
on the levels of software 
attributes available for 
this product 
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Research 
design 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Conjoint 
study, Delphi 
procedure 
and 
simulation 
study in the 
digital 
television 
market 
Meso Conjoint 
study: static 
Delphi 
procedure: 
static 
Simulation 
study: 
dynamic 
Industry-specific findings: 
- division of market shares is asymmetrical, but not 
winner-take-all 
- niche products may still be attractive in terms of 
revenue and profitability 
- assuming full availability of complementary 
products would dangerously overestimate the sales 
and extent of transition to digital television 
- there is a market segment for digital television, also 
if it does not become a mass market 
- the initial adoption of digital television is sensitive 
to the availability of content, rather than to the price 
level 
Industry-specific findings: 
Complementor firms are 
likely to: 
- initially offer movies in 
digital format 
- be reluctant to offer other 
types of content until 
cumulative adoption 
exceeds 5% 
- increase their offer of all 
kinds of content as 
cumulative adoption grows 
- be less willing to offer all 
types of content beyond 
10% cumulative adoption 
(i.e., they will specialize) 
 
General findings: 
The research framework 
used in this article may 
benefit supplier in market 
where indirect network 
effects are important. They 
should: 
1. identify directly 
competing hardware 
technologies 
2. identify the 
complementary software 
and the complementors 
3. survey customers to 
identify relevant hardware 
and software attributes 
4. calibrate customer 
response function and 
complementor response 
functions 
5. set up a simulation model 
and conduct sensitivity 
analysis 
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Author 
(year) 
Theoretical 
perspec-
tive 
Approach Position in 
Structure-
Conduct-
Perfor-
mance 
model 
Mechanisms of 
increasing 
returns 
addressed 
Definition of increasing 
returns 
Measurement of 
increasing returns 
Makadok 
(1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manage-
ment 
science 
Resource-
based theory 
Structure, 
conduct & 
perfor-
mance 
Scale effects Economies of scale is 
the marginal 
improvement in efficiency 
that a firm experiences 
as it incrementally 
increases its size 
Firms that have higher 
economies of scale will 
subsequently gain 
market share 
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Research 
design 
Level of 
analysis 
Time 
dimension 
Influence on market structure and product or 
business performance 
Management and policy 
implications 
Based on a 
sample of 
1299 different 
Money 
Market 
Mutual Funds 
in an 87-
month period, 
a two-step 
procedure 
was followed: 
1. A test for 
inter-firm 
differences in 
scale 
economies 
using Chow 
tests 
2. A test for 
the effect of 
inter-firm 
differences in 
scale 
economies on 
subsequent 
market share 
and on the 
evolution of 
market 
shares over 
time 
Micro (firm) Dynamic 1. Scale economies exist industry-wide 
2. There are inter-firm differences in scale 
economies 
3. These inter-firm differences have a significant 
effect on the distribution of market shares (i.e., firms 
with higher scale economies gain market share) 
4. This effect diminishes as firms age, because other 
firms imitate their capabilities 
5. In the Money Market Mutual Funds industry, this 
erosion of capabilities is gradual process 
The relevance of the 
strategic perspective of 
either building and 
defending sustainable 
competitive advantage 
(industrial organization, 
resource-based theory) or 
focusing on a series of 
small very temporary 
advantages 
(hypercompetition) depends 
on the rate of imitation of 
capabilities 
Table 3.1: Systematic overview of the increasing returns literature 
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The primary key to the above table is the classification according to the structure-
conduct-performance paradigm that serves as the basic modeling framework of this 
thesis. The order of discussion is as follows: 
1. basic conditions 
2. structure 
3. structure-conduct 
4. structure-performance 
5. conduct 
6. conduct-performance 
7. structure-conduct-performance  
 
Note that other than for the ordering of the table, the assumptions, definitions and 
research approach adopted in chapter one have not been imposed ex-ante on this 
literature review. Rather, the literature review is taken as a means of verifying or 
falsifying the value of these assumptions, definitions and research approach. 
 
The secondary key to the table is the chronological date of publication. Our aim with 
this table is to provide a representative inventory and review of the existing theory 
and research on increasing returns. Inevitably there are some limitations to the scope 
of this review. First, a number of scientific fields in which increasing returns have 
not received attention were excluded from the analysis, e.g., international trade 
theory, economic geography and labor market economics. Second, only primary 
sources were included in the review while secondary sources, e.g., overview articles 
or comments on the writings of the classical economists, were excluded. Third, the 
selection is based only on contributions that have appeared in, or were referred to 
from, the leading economic, complexity and management journals. 
 
3.2 Classification of the literature according to the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm 
The first criterion according to which the literature was reviewed was the 
contribution of every study according to the structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm that was chosen as the central framework of this thesis. Every study was 
classified according to whether it deals with market structure, with firm behavior, or 
with firm performance, or with any of the relationships between market structure, 
firm behavior and firm performance. 
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Almost half (41) of the 96 studies assessed deal exclusively with market structure, 
almost one third (29) deal with market structure and firm conduct and only a small 
minority (10) deal with firm performance issues, i.e., with the relationship between 
structure and performance (3), with the relationship between conduct and 
performance (1) or with the relationships between structure, conduct and 
performance (6). See table 3.2 below. 
 
Basic 
conditions 
Structure Structure-
Conduct 
Structure-
Performance
Conduct Conduct-
Performance
Structure-
Conduct-
Performance 
3 41 29 3 13 1 6 
Table 3.2: Numbers of studies classified according to the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm 
 
3.3 Perspectives on increasing returns in literature 
We subsequently assessed and classified the studies on increasing returns by date of 
appearance and by the theoretical perspective taken, i.e., by the literature stream in 
which the study is embedded: economics, complexity science, sociology or social 
economics, or management science. We also classified the studies according to the 
approach that was taken within this theoretical perspective. See table 3.3 below. 
Within management this regards the specific theory of the firm that is chosen in the 
study, e.g., resource-based, dynamic capabilities, or industrial organization. Within 
economics this regards the distinction between, e.g., classical economics, neo-
classical economics or endogenous growth theory. Within complexity it regards the 
distinction between, e.g., social network theory and evolutionary economics. 
 
Period: 
Perspective: 
< 1899 1900-
1949 
1950-
1979 
1980-
1989 
> 1990 Total 
Economic 
perspective 
3 6 8 11 26 54 
Complexity 
science or social 
economics 
perspective 
- - 1 5 15 21 
Management 
perspective 
- - - 4 25 29 
Total 3 6 9 17# 61# 96# 
 
# NB the numbers of studies for the different perspectives do not always add up to the totals, 
because some of the studies involve more than one perspective 
Table 3.3: Numbers of studies in literature review according to perspective 
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From the analysis we find the following: first, judged by the increasing numbers of 
publications over time, increasing returns is receiving increasing attention in general, 
second, while increasing returns has been an issue in economics for a long time, 
interest from the complexity science perspective and from the management 
perspective is relatively recent.  
 
3.4 Mechanisms addressed and definitions provided in literature 
We analyzed the studies on increasing returns according to the mechanisms of 
increasing returns that they addressed and according to the definition of increasing 
returns they provided. Doing this, we took either the general definition of increasing 
returns that was provided or the definition of the specific mechanisms of increasing 
returns that were addressed in the study. A difficulty was that many of the analyzed 
studies do not explicitly state that they deliver a contribution to the literature on 
increasing returns and that it was often not specified with which aspect of increasing 
returns the study deals. Given the definition of increasing returns provided in section 
1.5, it became clear that studies that addressed one or more of the four mechanisms 
of increasing returns: network effects, social interaction effects, scale effects and 
learning effects had to be included in the literature review. 
 
From this analysis we draw four conclusions. First, most studies focus exclusively on 
either the firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns (33) or on the market-based 
mechanisms of increasing returns (53). Second, only a small minority of the studies 
(10) addresses both the firm-based and the market-based mechanisms of increasing 
returns. Third, from the review, a clear distinction becomes visible between market-
based and firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns. Fourth, a large variety of 
definitions of increasing returns can be detected. There are two reasons for this 
variety. The first reason is that different studies address different singular 
mechanisms of increasing returns. Therefore studies on scale effects define and 
measure increasing returns in terms of scale effects and studies on network effects 
define and measure increasing returns in terms of network effects. The second reason 
is that there are large differences in definition and measurement even within the same 
aspect. This seems mostly due to researchers studying the same aspect of increasing 
returns from different perspectives or taking different approaches. 
 
Subsequently, we performed a crosscheck of the mechanisms of increasing returns 
that were addressed and the perspective that was taken in the study (see section 1.4 
and also section 3.3 above). It is noteworthy that studies that take an economics 
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perspective seem to be primarily concerned with the mechanisms of increasing 
returns that are internal to economic transformation systems, e.g., firms, industry 
sectors or national or global economies. This involves issues related to the scale and 
scope of operations or issues related to dynamic scale effects, learning and 
knowledge and productivity growth. In our terms, this means that they are primarily 
concerned with the firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns. It is also 
noteworthy that studies that take a complexity, sociological or social economics 
perspective seem to concentrate on mechanisms of increasing returns that are 
external to economic systems. This involves issues related to behavioral interaction 
between agents in markets, e.g., network effects or demand-side scale effects, or 
issues related to information exchange between agents in markets, e.g., social 
network effects or social interaction effects. In our terms, this involves the market-
based mechanisms of increasing returns. Finally, studies that take a management 
perspective address either the market-based mechanisms of increasing returns or the 
firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns, but rarely both at the same time. 
 
On this basis we think that the basic assumption we made in section 1.3 is justified, 
namely that from the management perspective, network effects and social interaction 
effects may be conceptualized as reflecting market structure and scale effects and 
learning effects as reflecting firm conduct. 
 
3.5 Research designs used in literature 
Next, we analyzed the research design used for the increasing returns studies. 
Specifically we addressed: 
• the way increasing returns was measured in the study 
• the way the research was conducted, i.e., whether is was conceptual or 
empirical or both, which method was used and, when relevant, which 
sample size was addressed 
• the level of analysis of the research model, i.e., micro (firm), meso 
(industry) or macro (country/international), or any combination of these 
• the time dimension of the research model, i.e., static, dynamic, some 
intermediary form or some combination of these 
 
From this analysis we conclude that there is a large variety in the ways increasing 
returns is measured. This is, again, due to the fact that different studies address 
different mechanisms of increasing returns, but it is also due to the fact that the 
definitions of increasing returns vary widely, even if they relate to the same aspect. 
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Further, we find that two thirds of the studies (64) are either involved with 
conceptual analysis or with theoretical modeling. Of these 64 studies, 45 are 
exclusively conceptual or theoretical, 11 also involve case examples, but not case 
studies (!), and 8 involve computer or numerical simulation. Finally, of the remaining 
32 empirical studies, 7 are case study designs and 25 involve hypothesis testing 
through econometric estimation. 
 
3.6 Results obtained in literature 
We finally analyzed the studies according to the most important results presented in 
terms of (1) the influence of increasing returns on market structure and/or on firm 
performance and (2) the management and/or policy implications derived. 
 
The conclusions are that: 
• more than half of the studies (53) do not provide any results in terms of 
management or policy implications 
• the studies that do provide management or policy implications yield a large 
variety of results regarding the influence of increasing returns on market 
structure and/or on product and firm performance  
 
3.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter we presented a systematic review of the existing literature on 
increasing returns. From this review we find that integrative approaches to increasing 
returns, i.e., involving both firm-based and market-based mechanisms of increasing 
returns, are relatively rare, that empirical research into increasing returns is relatively 
limited in comparison to the theoretical and conceptual research and that empirical 
research into the consequences of increasing returns for firm performance is 
extremely scarce, with any available evidence being mainly anecdotal. 
 
We may therefore conclude that: 
• the literature can be classified according to the four main mechanisms of 
increasing returns that were distinguished (cf., Arthur, 1988), namely: 
network effects, social interaction effects, scale effects and learning effects 
• from a management perspective, network effects and social interaction 
effects may be considered to be part of market structure and scale effects 
and learning effects may be considered to be part of firm conduct 
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• research on increasing returns addressing market structure, firm conduct and 
firm performance in one study is scarce and this subject is therefore worthy 
of study 
• studies addressing the firm performance implications of increasing returns 
are scarce and this subject is therefore worthy of study 
• different streams of increasing returns literature coexist, based on different 
basic perspectives taken and we may therefore adhere to the management 
perspective using the industrial organization approach as chosen in section 
1.3 
• integrative approaches to increasing returns, i.e., involving both the firm-
based and the market-based mechanisms of increasing returns are relatively 
scarce and this subject is therefore worthy of study 
• the number of empirical contributions to increasing returns literature is 
relatively limited, at about one third of the total, in comparison to the 
number of theoretical and conceptual contributions, at about two thirds of 
the total, and this number is therefore worthy of extension 
 
The contribution of our research to the existing body of knowledge will therefore be 
threefold. First, we will develop an integrative approach to increasing returns, i.e., 
integrating market-based and firm-based increasing returns. Second, we will measure 
the mechanisms of increasing returns and empirically test the relations between them. 
Third, we will systematically investigate the consequences of increasing returns for 
firm performance. We conclude that our research design, in which the market-based 
mechanisms of increasing returns, i.e., market structure, influence the firm-based 
mechanisms of increasing returns, i.e., firm conduct, which in turn influence firm 
performance, provides a sound basis for such a contribution. In the next chapters we 
will discuss the market-based mechanisms of increasing returns and the firm-based 
mechanisms of increasing returns, respectively. 
  
 
Market-based increasing returns 
117 
4. MARKET-BASED INCREASING RETURNS 
 
The market structure mechanisms of increasing returns are dealt with in this chapter. 
Specifically, in this chapter the market-based mechanisms of increasing returns, i.e., 
network effects and social interaction effects, the conditions influencing these effects 
and the consequences of the market-based mechanisms for market structure, i.e., how 
they cause a market potential for scale and learning effects, are discussed. 
 
In addressing the market-based mechanisms of increasing returns in this chapter, we 
provide the first part of the answer to the first research question: How can market-
based and firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns be theoretically specified 
and defined? and we provide a partial content validation for the second research 
question: How can market-based and firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns 
be measured? 
 
The main thrust of the argument in this chapter is that economic agents do not take 
their decisions in isolation. Their decisions are mutually dependent, causing positive 
or negative externalities. From the literature analysis presented in chapter three, we 
concluded that the two dominant forms of these externalities are network effects and 
social interactions effects. In sections one and two we provide the definitions and 
theoretical conceptualizations of these effects. We address the conditions that 
influence the occurrence and the intensity of these effects in section three. We 
address the consequences of network effects and social interaction effects for market 
outcomes in section four. A rationale of how these market outcomes cause a potential 
for scale and learning effects is provided in section five. Conclusions are given in 
section six. 
 
4.1 Network effects 
4.1.1 Defining network effects 
A first mechanism of market-based increasing returns is network effects. The 
phenomenon of network effects has attracted a lot of attention in recent years, both in 
economics and in management science, see, e.g., Arthur (1989), Farrell & Saloner 
(1985; 1986; 1992), Katz & Shapiro (1985; 1986; 1994), Liebowitz & Margolis 
(1994; 1999), Rosenberg (1982), Shapiro & Varian (1998; 1999). Network effects 
are sometimes also referred to as network externalities, increasing returns to 
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adoption, or demand-side increasing returns (to scale).26 Here, we use the term 
network effects.  
 
Network effects occur when the economic utility of using a product becomes larger 
as its network grows in size (Farrell & Saloner, 1985; Katz and Shapiro, 1985). 
Network size is determined by the number of suppliers and users of products based 
on a common technological standard.27 Network size appears to be very important in 
modern information and knowledge intensive markets28, such as the markets for 
software programs, cellular phones and internet applications. More classical 
examples of products where network effects played an important part are the 
telegraph, telex and telephone. The fax machine also belongs to this category. To cite 
Kelly (1997, p.142): “Consider the first modern fax machine that rolled off the 
conveyor belt around 1965. Despite millions of dollars spent on its R&D, it was 
worth nothing. Zero. The second fax machine to roll off immediately made the first 
one worth something. There was someone to fax to. Because fax machines are linked 
into a network, each additional fax machine sliding down the chute increases the 
value of all the fax machines operating before it.” 
 
4.1.2 Direct network effects 
When a product’s economic utility increases as more customers start using it, this is 
referred to as direct network effects (Farrell & Saloner, 1985; Katz & Shapiro, 1985). 
Because the standardized product provides access to the larger network for all 
customers, both existing and new ones, utility for every customer rises as the network 
grows in size. 
 
For example, consider a utility function in which the utility (U) of a product to a user 
(i) is dependent on the number of other users of this product: 
                                                          
26 Formally, there is a distinction between the concepts of network effects and network 
externalities, in the sense that network effects are a general consequence of network size, and 
network externalities entice the notion of market inefficiency (see Katz & Shapiro, 1994; 
Liebowitz & Margolis, 1994). See also section 4.4.7. 
27 Two different types of technological networks can be distinguished (Liebowitz & Margolis, 
1994; Katz & Shapiro, 1994): (1) literal networks, in which participants are literally, i.e., 
physically, connected to each other, e.g., the telephone network, the cable television network 
and (2) metaphorical or virtual networks, in which there are no physical connections, e.g., the 
network of Apple computers users or the network of Ford motorcar owners. 
28 The kind of product and the information and technology intensity of a product are expected 
conditions for network effects and social interaction effects to emerge. See section 4.3.4 for 
further discussion. 
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Ui = a + b * (number of other users) (b>0) 
 
The utility of the first user is: 
 
U1 = a + b * (0 other users) 
 
The utility of the second user is: 
 
U2 = a + b * (1 other user) 
 
Or, in general: 
 
Ui = a + b * (i-1) 
 
Now, because of the network effect, the total utility after two adopters is not U1 + U2, 
but rather 2 * U2 
 
Therefore: 
 
Utotal = i * (a + b * (i-1)) = ai + bi2 – bi 
 
Here, the i2 term represents the positive feedback effect. As the utility of every 
customer in the network continues to rise, it becomes more attractive for prospective 
customers to join this network. This means that the network grows in size, thereby 
further increasing the utility for every customer. Therefore, network effects may 
easily cause positive feedback in the market. 
 
The same mechanism makes it unattractive for customers to leave the network. Apart 
from financial investments made in the product or the technology and apart from the 
investments made in learning to use the product or technology, a move to a newer, 
smaller network would simply mean a reduction of the network benefits.  
 
It can even be shown that customers who have a negative autonomous valuation of 
the product, in the above example that would mean that a < 0, or who have a higher 
autonomous valuation of a competing product, may eventually be persuaded to buy 
into the network, simply because the network benefits outweigh the negative 
autonomous valuation (Arthur, 1989). For example many people complain about the 
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quality of Microsoft software, justly or unjustly. Some people even have a negative 
autonomous valuation of it and would probably be inclined not to buy it if the 
decision depended purely on their own judgment. However, as the network around 
Microsoft software is very large, the network benefits are also huge and often easily 
outweigh any negative autonomous valuation. 
 
4.1.3 Indirect network effects 
Network effects are also present when products are used in combination with 
complementary products based on the same technological standard. The increase in a 
product’s economic utility as more customers start using complementary products or 
as more suppliers start offering complementary products, is referred to as indirect or 
market-mediated network effects (Farrell & Saloner, 1985; Katz & Shapiro, 1985). 
29Sometimes it is called the hardware-software paradigm (Katz & Shapiro, 1985), 
after the markets where the most typical examples of indirect network effects can be 
found. The market for computer hardware and the software for it or the market for 
DVD players and the DVD movies available for them (cf., Katz and Shapiro, 1994) 
provide good examples. 
 
With a growing number of customers who have bought hardware, it becomes more 
attractive for other customers to do the same, i.e., direct network effects. As the 
market extends, it therefore becomes more attractive for suppliers to start selling 
complementary products such as software and peripheral equipment, i.e., indirect 
network effects, and because they extend the original hardware’s functionality, it 
becomes more appealing for potential customers to buy these complementary 
products, which in turn increases the demand for the original hardware. Assuming 
positive network effects, no matter where we step in to this line of reasoning, we 
always end up with the positive feedback loop of extending markets for hardware and 
software. This is a reason why, in the market for personal computers, a very large 
and dominant network emerged around Microsoft and Intel products, which became 
known as the ‘Wintel’ standard. 
 
                                                          
29 Farrell & Saloner (1985) and Katz & Shapiro (1985) also mention a larger second-hand 
market and better quality and availability of the post purchase service, respectively, as network 
effects. In our definition these are included in the indirect network effects. 
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4.1.4 The double network effect 
Until now we have considered the network effect as depending on the number of 
customers who buy (adopt) products based on a common technological standard. 
Customers in this case may be consumers or firms that are either the end-user or the 
trader of the product. However, firms also have another role, namely that of producer 
of goods and services. In this role, they use product technology30 as the basis for the 
goods or services they produce.31 At the level of adoption of technologies by firms, 
there is also a network effect.  
 
It can be defined analogously to the product network effect, i.e., the economic utility 
to a firm of employing a technology becomes larger as its network grows in size. 
Network size is determined by the number of adopters of a technology. These 
adopters may be either sponsors or licensees. According to Katz & Shapiro (1986), a 
sponsor is a firm that has property rights to a technology and hence is willing to 
make investments to promote it. Licensees are firms that do not own property rights 
to the technology, but instead buy the right to use the technology in their products.32 
 
Analogously to direct and indirect product network effects, there are direct and 
indirect technology network effects. The direct technology network refers to the 
number of sponsors and licensees of a specific technology. The indirect technology 
network effect refers to the number of sponsors and licensees of complementary 
technologies. Computer processor technology, e.g., Intel Pentium or AMD Athlon, 
and computer operating system technology, e.g., Windows XP or Apple OS X, are 
examples of complementary technologies in the computer industry. Optical 
technology, e.g., lenses, and image registration technology, e.g., CCD sensors, 
celluloid film or videotape, are examples complementary technologies in the 
photographic and video imaging industry. 
                                                          
30 Besides product technology, i.e., the technology that goes into the product, firms use process 
technology, i.e., the technology determining the way products and services are produced. Here, 
we limit ourselves to product technology, although analogous reasoning may apply to process 
technology. 
31 Many service providers seem to have great difficulty thinking in terms of ‘technology’ when 
it comes to services. This is one of the reasons for limiting the sample of the first empirical 
study (see chapter seven) to industrial firms. Nevertheless, it can be argued that producing 
services also requires product and process technology; although with services it may be more 
difficult and sometimes even impossible to distinguish product and process. 
32 We can distinguish between proprietary technology, i.e., technology that is owned by some 
economic entity, that is possibly protected by patents, and of which licenses can be bought and 
sold and open source technology, i.e., technology that is common property, either because 
patent protection has expired or because the sponsors choose deliberately not to exercise their 
property rights. 
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It is important to realize that the product and technology network effects are closely 
related. The more customers adopt products based on a specific technology, the more 
suppliers will be inclined to also adopt this technology, e.g., by buying a license from 
the technology sponsor. This enlarges the network, which means that there is 
increased competition, driving down prices and increasing product variety. This 
causes increased attractiveness of the network, thereby stimulating adoption of 
products by customers and adoption of the technology by suppliers. The technology 
network effect reinforces the product network effect and vice versa. 
 
The distinction between the product and technology level of network effects is 
sometimes referred to as competition within the market and competition for the 
market, respectively (Besen & Farrell, 1994). 
 
4.2 Social interaction effects 
4.2.1 Defining social interaction effects 
A second mechanism of market-based increasing returns is social interaction effects, 
also known as social network effects (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1997), or social 
contagion (Burt, 1987; Kretschmer, Klimis & Choi, 1999). Social interaction effects 
occur when a customer’s purchase intention, or a supplier’s supply intention, is 
dependent on the opinions or expectations of other (potential) customers and 
suppliers. We refer to interdependence of opinions as information exchange and to 
interdependence of expectations as self-reinforcing expectations.  
 
The essential difference between network effects and social interaction effects is that 
while the former is associated with the economic utility as a result of actual growth in 
network size, the latter is associated with perceived network importance as a result of 
information exchange and formation of expectations (Kretschmer, Klimis & Choi, 
1999). 
 
4.2.2 Information exchange 
As stated above, we refer to social interdependence of customers’ and suppliers’ 
opinions as information exchange. Information exchange effects mainly occur with 
high-involvement products that are relatively unknown, the quality of which cannot 
be assessed before purchase and with products of which the purchase entails a large 
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network risk.33 With the purchase of products such as computers or cellular phones, 
customers buy into a technological network of compatible products. If the technology 
life cycle of this network is very short, or if the network does not develop into the 
market standard, the customer’s investment is lost. To assess the risks of investing in 
such a technological network, customers search for information by consulting 
opinion leaders and existing product users before they buy the product. This 
information search behavior generates interaction, i.e., information exchange, 
between customers. Arthur & Lane (1993) refer to this interaction as information 
contagion. It is more probable that a customer will find favorable information about a 
product with a large market share than about a product with a small market share. 
Customers perceive the purchase of the former product to be less risky and will be 
more inclined to buy it. Consequently the market share of this product increases, 
increasingly at the expense of the small market share product. In this way 
information exchange causes positive feedback effects in market shares. 
 
Apart from product-specific information exchange, customers also exchange non-
product-related information. Feick & Price (1987) refer to the person who supplies 
this kind of information to other customers as market mavens (Feick & Price, 1987). 
Market mavens are defined as “individuals who have information about many kinds 
of products, places to shop and other facets of markets and initiate discussions with 
consumers and respond to requests from consumers for market information” (Feick 
& Price, 1987, p.85). In particular in the case of network technologies, where the 
complete network of complementary products rather than a single product is at stake, 
the influence of the market maven on the purchase intentions of other customers can 
be substantial. 
 
4.2.3 Self-reinforcing expectations 
Furthermore, customers have an interest in investing in products that are compatible 
to a long-living technology network that is widely supported and recognized as a 
market standard. To assess the risk of investing in a technological network, 
customers form expectations about the size of competing networks (Katz & Shapiro, 
1985). This expected size is dependent on the number of suppliers and customers 
who have already invested in this network, or will do so in the future. When a 
substantial number of suppliers and customers expect that a particular network will 
dominate the market, they will be more inclined to invest in this network. As a result 
                                                          
33 This may be an economic network risk, e.g., the risk of buying into the wrong technology, or 
a social network risk, e.g., the risk of buying into the wrong fashion style or social group. 
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the size of the network will increase, reinforcing the expectations of customers and 
thereby attracting even more customers, and because of these self-reinforcing 
expectations, there is a high probability that eventually this network will indeed 
dominate the market. 
 
4.2.4 The double social interaction effect 
Analogous to the discussion in section 4.1.4, two levels of social interaction effects 
can be distinguished: the product level and the technology level. At the product level 
there is information exchange and the formation of expectations between customers 
and between customers and suppliers regarding the adoption of products based on a 
common technology standard. 
 
At the technology level, we are dealing with mutual influences between different 
kinds of suppliers, i.e., technology sponsors, technology licensees and those who 
have not yet decided34, regarding the adoption of technologies that form the basis of 
goods and services produced. When investment in such technologies entails a large 
network risk, i.e., a risk of investing in a network that does not become the dominant 
network, suppliers who have not adopted yet will try to assess that risk by looking 
around to see which other well-known suppliers are sponsoring these technologies 
and which well-known suppliers have adopted these technologies.35 On the basis of 
this information, suppliers may show mimetic behavior. As Westphal, Gulati & 
Shortell (1997, p.372) state: “[…] communication ties could help disseminate 
information about legitimate forms of innovative adoption, while also possibly 
increasing normative pressure to conform to those practices.” 
 
Like customers, suppliers also form expectations about the potential size of 
competing technology networks. On the basis of these expectations they decide to 
either invest or to announce that they are committed to investing in a technology. 
They do this by co-sponsoring, by buying licenses, or by announcing or developing 
new products based on this technology. These commitments reinforce the 
expectations of other suppliers, increasing the pressure for them to make a choice 
whether or not to commit themselves to investing. When large enough quantities of 
                                                          
34 These strategies are also referred to as, respectively, shaper, follower and reserving the right 
to play (Hagel, 1996; Coyne & Subramaniam, 1996). See also section 5.5. 
35 Suppliers can adopt a technology either by buying a license or by starting to use an open 
source technology. 
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important suppliers have committed themselves, the expectations regarding which 
network will dominate the market may become self-reinforcing. 
 
Analogous to product and technology level network effects, the product and 
technology level social interaction effects will be mutually reinforcing. 
 
4.3 Extent of network and social interaction effects 
Following the structure-conduct-performance paradigm that was adopted as the 
basic modeling framework of this thesis, an important question is: Under what 
circumstances can we expect network effects and social interaction effects to occur, 
and under what circumstances do network effects and social interaction effects lead 
to the market outcomes sketched in the previous section? In other words: What are 
the basic conditions affecting the extent of network and social interaction effects? 
These basic conditions can be derived from the literature on increasing returns and 
from the lists of market conditions provided by Scherer & Ross (1990) and Carlton & 
Perloff (2000). With respect to the market structure mechanisms of increasing 
returns, the most important influencing conditions are: the marginal gains of network 
size, the degree of conformity and individuality of customers, the degree and 
structure of the economic interdependence in the market, the nature of the product 
and the technology and the characteristics of the product or technology as indicated 
by complementarity or substitution and compatibility. These will be discussed below. 
 
4.3.1 Marginal gains of network size 
The scope of network and social interaction effects is limited by the marginal 
economic gains of network size. That is the additional economic utility of adding one 
extra adopter to the network. Usually, these marginal gains are assumed to be 
positive up to the point where the entire market is satisfied. Liebowitz & Margolis 
(1994) argue, however that we may very well conceive of a point at which the 
marginal economic benefits of increasing the number of adopters are exhausted, e.g., 
by crowding of the network or by customer preferences for more heterogeneity (Katz 
& Shapiro, 1994; Hellofs & Jacobson, 1999). Further, while many technologies 
require critical mass, they may not be helped by further participation beyond that 
level. Where marginal gains of network size are exhaustible at network sizes that are 
small relative to the market, there is no impediment to the coexistence of multiple 
networks (Liebowitz & Margolis, 1994, p.141). 
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4.3.2 Conformity and individuality 
Kretschmer, Klimis & Choi (1999) point out that networks are characterized by two 
competing psychological drives. The first is that of conformity, which means that 
there are positive marginal social gains of an increase in network size. This is also 
known as the bandwagon effect (Leibenstein, 1950). The second is that of 
individuality, which causes negative marginal social gains in response to an increase 
in network size. This is also known as the snob effect (Leibenstein, 1950). 
 
The characteristics of the customer population may therefore be an important 
accelerator or limiter of social interaction effects. As most modern consumer markets 
are characterized by increasing heterogeneity of consumer behavior (Van Asseldonk, 
1998), we would expect that customer individuality is a limiting factor to network 
size. If everybody wants to be different and unique, network size would be close to 
unity. Still, this is apparently not the case in many technology networks. The caveat 
lies in the distinction between the product and the technology. At the level of the 
technology, there is clearly a drive for conformity, i.e., we buy a ‘Wintel’ computer 
because we want to be able to connect easily to others and to the market for 
complementary products. At the level of the product, however, there is clearly a drive 
for individuality, i.e., based on the ‘Wintel’ standard, the choice of different computer 
models and features is larger than ever.  
 
4.3.3 Degree and structure of economic and social interdependence 
Another important aspect of the network and social interaction effect is the degree 
and the structure of economic and social interdependence between economic agents, 
customers as well as suppliers. Abrahamson & Rosenkopf (1997) show that the 
structure of the social network is an important determinant of the extent of innovation 
diffusion. They show first that a network with a higher density results in a higher 
extent of diffusion of an innovation, i.e., more agents within the network eventually 
adopt this innovation. Second, perhaps even more interesting, they show that network 
idiosyncrasies, i.e., the location of agents in the network who form a boundary 
between the fully connected network core and a not fully connected network 
periphery, can have a large influence on the extent of innovation diffusion.  
 
Different forms of connections between economic agents can be distinguished in 
markets. First, there is the interaction between suppliers and customers. These 
interactions involve the buying or selling of products in exchange for money, the 
after-sales service trajectory and communication in the sense of information 
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provision, advertising, promotions, signaling. Second, there are the mutual 
interactions between suppliers. These involve interactions between technology 
sponsors, e.g., head-on competition, coalition forming, R&D alliances or joint 
ventures, interactions between sponsors and licensees, e.g., buying or selling of 
licenses, commitments to investing in technology, commitments to develop products 
or provide services based on this technology and interactions between sponsors and 
firms that have not decided yet, e.g., signaling or manipulation of expectations. 
Third, there are the mutual interactions between consumers. These involve direct 
interactions through the products in the network, e.g., connecting computers, 
exchanging files, communicating by phone, fax, email, newsgroups, chat sessions or 
internet search, information exchange behavior, e.g., information search, opinion 
leadership, role models or word of mouth and, finally, formation of expectations. 
 
An important aspect of the structure of social and economic networks is whether they 
are local or global (Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer & Welch, 1992; Redmond, 1991). A 
global network effect means that consumers are influenced in their adoption decision 
by the behavior of other consumers in the entire market. As an example, they would 
base a decision to buy a ‘Wintel’ or an Apple computer system on the proportions of 
the total world market for ‘Wintel’, respectively Apple. Most theoretical models 
incorporating network effects are limited to the global network effect. They assume 
that consumers are all identical and that they have perfect information on the size of 
the network in the market. Most theoretical models incorporating network effects 
assume that network effects have a global scope and that consumers have 
information about the size of competing technological networks in the market. This 
kind of ‘perfect information’ will not always be present in practice. 
 
While global network effects may have an important influence on a product’s utility 
and on a consumer’s decisions to purchase, consumers are also known to be 
embedded in a social structure that can influence their behavior to a large extent 
(Redmond, 1991; Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1997). Consumers are more heavily 
influenced by their direct social environment. For example, while the global network 
effect will make it more efficient to work with a ‘Wintel’ computer, a consumer may 
choose an Apple computer if he is heavily embedded in the graphical sector, where 
the majority uses Apple computers. Small pockets or niches in the market may appear 
or be able to sustain themselves because of localized network and social interaction 
effects (Redmond, 1991). 
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4.3.4 Nature of product 
The nature of the product and/or technology has a number of dimensions. The first is 
whether we are dealing with a consumer product or an industrial product. A 
consumer product means that it is used by the end-user, i.e., the consumer, while an 
industrial product is used by a firm as a means of production. This distinction is quite 
different from the product-technology level distinction in sections 4.1.4 and 4.2.4. 
Here we are still at the product level. The implication of the consumer-industrial 
distinction is not unequivocal. On the one hand it might be suggested that industrial 
buyers are more rational, which could lead us to expect that in industrial markets 
network effects might be more important than social interaction effects. On the other 
hand, when facing uncertain pay-offs in choosing a product, will not industrial 
customers be inclined to collect more information and be more aware of the market 
expectations regarding the success of new technologies? Therefore, we might also 
expect the social interaction effects to be more important than the network effect. 
 
The second dimension is whether it is a tangible or an intangible product. The 
degree of tangibility may be used as an indication of the possibility to assess the 
quality of the product beforehand. That is, tangibility provides a clue as to whether 
we are dealing with a search good or an experience good. Of a search good, e.g., a 
computer, the quality can be determined in advance, of an experience good, e.g., 
software, this is not the case. Therefore, for intangible goods, the uncertainty is much 
higher and we would expect social interaction effects to be more important than 
network effects. 
 
The third dimension, durability versus non-durability, tells us something about the 
probability that a network effect or a social interaction effect will occur. If a product 
is durable, the customer will likely make a larger investment than if it non-durable, 
both in terms of the initial buying price as well as in terms of learning to use the 
product. It is therefore likely that the network of other customers using the same 
product or compatible products based on the same technology and the network of 
customers and suppliers of complementary products will become a more important 
issue in the adoption decision. Likewise, as the investment is higher, the buying risk 
rises and customers will be more inclined to adopt on the basis of information they 
have got from others or on the basis of expectations about the value, the extent and 
the durability of the technology network. 
 
The fourth dimension is technology intensity of the product. Technology intensity is 
related to uncertainty (Arthur & Lane, 1993), because the market outcome, i.e., 
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which technology will be selected and corner the market, is uncertain. Investing in a 
product based on a technology that will become locked out means an effective loss of 
the investment.  
 
The fifth dimension involves the nature of the technology. According to Arthur 
(1990; 1996), high-technology products are simply more likely to be compatible to a 
network of users. Examples of what we normally understand as high-tech are 
computers, software, portable telephones, fax machines, etc.36 It is no coincidence 
that empirical research on increasing returns is mostly focused on computer hardware 
(Tegarden, Hatfield & Echols, 1999), computer software (Brynjolfsson & Kemerer, 
1996; Gandal, 1995), computer software-hardware (Church & Gandal, 1992; Cottrell 
& Koput, 1998; Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1993), digital television (Gupta, Jain & 
Sawhney, 1999) or telecommunications (Majumdar & Venkataraman, 1998).  
 
4.3.5 Complementarity 
Complementarity means that products are (meant to be) used together and that in this 
way they have a higher value for customers than when used separately. Formally, 
complementarity is represented by a positive cross-elasticity of demand, i.e., when 
products A and B are compatible, the demand for product B will increase with an 
increase in demand for product A. Examples are a computer and a printer, a video 
recorder and video tapes, a CD player and CD’s. Complementarity can be product-
related or technology-related. Examples of complementary technologies are the 
Microsoft Windows computer operating system technology and the Intel Pentium 
computer processor technology for computers, the machine operation technology and 
a machine’s numerical control technology for industrial machines. 
 
Complementarity of products is a necessary condition for indirect network effects to 
exist. Technology complementarity will further extend the possibilities for indirect 
network effects. Product and technological complementarity will lead to more 
extensive technology networks and therefore more need for, and opportunities for, 
information exchange between customers.  
 
                                                          
36 The designation high-tech does not seem quite appropriate to characterize these 
technologies. While high-tech is common terminology, it means very different things to 
different people. Most people would characterize computers as high-tech, but fax machines by 
now as low-tech. Yet these technologies share a more important characteristic, namely that 
they can be connected in networks. Therefore we would rather talk about network 
technologies. 
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4.3.6 Substitutability 
Substitution means that products are competitive, so that a consumer will have either 
one product or the other. Formally, this is represented by a negative cross-elasticity 
of demand. That is, when products A and B are substitutes, the demand for product B 
will decrease with an increase of demand for product A. Examples are a Hewlett-
Packard computer and a Dell computer, a Philips CD player and a Sony CD player. 
Substitution can also be product-related or technology-related. Examples of 
technologies that are substitutes are Microsoft Windows and Apple or Linux computer 
operating system technology, Intel Pentium and AMD Athlon computer processor 
technology. 
 
Technologies that are substitutes will likely cause a technology battle, either parallel 
or sequential. A technology battle will enhance uncertainty in the market, so that the 
influence of expectations, i.e., social interaction effects, on behavior, i.e., network 
effects, will be larger. When products are substitutes, this may generate moderate 
uncertainty among buyers about which product to adopt. However, the risk for 
customers of buying a wrong product is much smaller than the risk of buying into the 
wrong technology. When a customer buys into a losing technology, any product 
based on this technology may become worthless. When a customer buys into the 
winning technology, any product based on this technology benefits from the same 
technology network size.  
 
4.3.7 Compatibility 
Compatibility is necessary to allow products to function in harmony with 
complementary products. It can be ensured by standardization of the technological 
infrastructure (Farrell & Saloner, 1992). For example, a customer can only benefit 
from the continuously growing network of Internet-users and content providers if 
there is a common protocol for communication through the Internet. Therefore, 
compatibility is one of the most important conditions for a technology network to 
materialize and therefore one of most important conditions for network effects and 
social interaction effects to be present. 
 
We may conclude that the strength of network effects and social interaction effects 
may be higher or lower depending on the marginal gains of the network, the 
conformity or individuality of the customers, the degree and structure of 
interdependence in the network, the nature of the product and the complementarity, 
substitutability and compatibility of the product. In the case of social interaction 
Market-based increasing returns 
131 
effects it is even conceivable that a completely negative information cascade will 
emerge. Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer & Welch (1992) refer to this as a down cascade. 
This means that negative information about a product or a technology is amplified by 
the social network, which may ultimately result in the product or technology not 
being adopted. Such down cascades fall outside the scope of our research, however, 
and have therefore not been incorporated in the operationalization of social 
interaction effects in chapters seven and eight. 
 
4.4 Influence of network effects and social interaction effects on market 
outcomes 
We have referred earlier to network effects and social interaction effects as related to 
the market structure aspect of our research framework. The main reason to do this is 
because the presence of network effects and social interaction effects may have large 
consequences for market outcomes, i.e., factors such as the speed of diffusion of 
products and technologies, the dynamics of the market shares of different competing 
products or technologies and the predictability of market outcomes (Arthur, 1989; 
1996).  
 
4.4.1 Technology battles 
In general the market structure will take the form of a competition between different 
technologies, generally referred to as a ‘technology battle’. Such a technology battle 
may take different forms that can be distinguished on two dimensions, see figure 4.1. 
On the first dimension a technology battle may either be parallel, i.e., a competition 
between two or more equivalent technologies (see Farrell & Saloner, 1985; 1986), or 
sequential, i.e., a competition between an old, i.e., existing, incumbent, and a new 
technology, see Arthur (1989), David (1985) or Katz & Shapiro (1985; 1986). On the 
second dimension, a technology battle may either be evolutionary, i.e., when the new 
technology is backward compatible, or revolutionary, i.e., when the new technology 
is not backward compatible, see Shapiro & Varian (1999). Based on these two 
dimensions, many different kinds of technology battles are possible. Of course, in 
completely parallel battles there is no old technology and there is nothing for the new 
technologies to be backward compatible to, hence the blank part in the upper left-
hand corner of figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4-1: Dimensions of technology battles 
 
Arthur (1989) mentions four properties of such technology battles:  
1. the market will eventually be dominated by one of the technologies, which 
means that there are multiple possible equilibria in the market and it is ex 
ante unpredictable which equilibrium will be selected; this is called non-
predictability or winner-take-all 
2. the winning technology will be locked in; this is called inflexibility 
3. it is possible that a sub-optimal technology will be selected; this is called 
inefficiency 
4. the end result may be determined by historical small events; this is called 
path dependence or non-ergodicity 
 
More properties have been added by others, e.g., excess inertia (Farrell & Saloner, 
1985; 1986), excess momentum (Katz & Shapiro, 1986) and competition on the 
network level (Den Hartigh & Langerak, 2001). These properties will be discussed 
below. Although many of these issues are still debated (see also section 2.6.5) it has 
become clear from both the theoretical and the empirical body of research that the 
presence of network effects and social interactions effects in markets can have severe 
consequences for adoption and diffusion of technologies and thereby also for the 
adoption and diffusion of products based on these technologies. 
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4.4.2 Competition at network level 
A first consequence of the occurrence of network and social interaction effects, 
implicit in most theoretical and empirical literature, but seldom explicitly mentioned, 
is that competition shifts from the product level to the network level (Den Hartigh & 
Langerak, 2001). As a result of this shift, features like high product quality, low 
prices, ownership or patents, or exclusive rights on technology are just an ‘entrance 
fee’ for competitive success. The network dimensions of competition, such as the 
availability of complementary products, compatibility of these products, size of the 
network or installed base and customer expectations with regard to network growth, 
are more important for competitive dominance (Shapiro & Varian, 1999). In other 
words, competition takes place on both the product and the network level. However, 
many firms have not yet incorporated both levels into their competitive strategy. For 
example, in the battle for the home video standard between VHS and Betamax that 
was described in section 2.6.5, Sony still competed on technical product quality and 
exclusive rights on technology.37 In contrast JVC, the first supplier of the VHS 
system, took network effects into account. By providing licenses for VHS technology 
to other suppliers and by strongly stimulating the availability of complementary 
products, i.e., video movies, JVC created a strong network effect around the VHS 
system that still dominates the home video market today. 
 
The network dimension of competition may become so important that any possible 
market inefficiencies at the product level may hardly matter. Customers might be 
prepared to accept lower quality on the product level if compensated by advantages 
on the network level. For example, in the home video market the VHS technology’s 
image quality was supposed to be inferior to that of Betamax, i.e., at the product 
level, yet customers favored VHS because VHS-compatible movies were more widely 
available at video rental shops, i.e., at the network level. Suppliers often try to win 
the battle on the network level at the expense of losses on the product level. For 
example, both Microsoft and Netscape have been striving to dominate the Internet 
software market, i.e., at the network level, by offering their Internet browser software 
free of charge, i.e., at the product level. 
 
Firms participating in the competitive battle between technologies have to take the 
aspects of network competition explicitly into account, e.g., availability of 
                                                          
37 Liebowitz & Margolis (1994; 1999) argue that the claims for the technical superiority of the 
Betamax system were unjust, and that in fact VHS technology was qualitatively better. The 
discussion on this point has reached a deadlock. An extensive description of the case is given 
by Cusumano, Mylonadis & Rosenbloom (1992). 
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complementary products, compatibility of these products, size of the network or 
installed base, customer expectations with regard to the growth of the network 
(Shapiro & Varian, 1999). Product dimensions, such as high quality, low prices, or 
exclusive ownership of patents are just a ‘green fee’ for participation in this 
competitive battle.  
 
4.4.3 Multiple possible equilibria 
A second consequence of network and social interaction effects is that a battle for the 
technological standard occurs in the market, of which the outcome is not ex ante 
predictable (Shapiro & Varian, 1999). Instead of balanced equilibria, we see markets 
where the winner, be it a technology or the firm that sponsors it, takes the entire 
market or almost the entire market. Well-known examples are, again, the home video 
market, i.e., the VHS-format, computer operating systems, i.e., Microsoft Windows, 
and web browsers, i.e., Microsoft Internet Explorer. Standardization of technology is 
not only attractive for customers, but is also attractive for the supplier who sets the 
technological standard. Customers profit from standardization of technology through 
the compatibility of products. They act in their own interest by choosing products 
based on the most prevailing technology. Customers who have made their purchase 
will not easily switch to another technology, because of the investments and learning 
costs made to adopt this technology. Therefore, the firm that sets the technological 
standard may expect a rapidly growing group of loyal customers. This installed base 
enables the firm to profit optimally from scale and learning effects in its own 
development, production and marketing processes. 
 
The mutually reinforcing consequences of network and social interaction often lead 
to a very asymmetrical distribution of market shares (Arthur, 1996). Often, the 
winner takes all and the loser gets nothing. An example of winner-take-all is 
Microsoft Windows, which dominates the market for computer operating systems. An 
example of loser gets nothing was Sony’s Betamax technology after having lost the 
VHS-Betamax battle in the home video market. Firms losing the battle for the 
technological standard will either withdraw from the market or become late followers 
of the winning technological standard. Other well-known examples of battles for the 
technological standard are the personal computer standard, Apple versus MS-DOS, 
the word processor standard, WordPerfect versus Microsoft Word, Internet browser 
software, Microsoft Internet Explorer versus Netscape Navigator, digital cellular 
communication technology, GSM versus CDMA and the digital multimedia standard. 
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4.4.4 Lock-in 
Lock-in describes a situation in which the cost of switching to another technology, 
even though it may be technically superior, is too large for the switch to take place. 
In the parallel case of technology battle this means that as one of the technologies 
gains an edge over the other, it may become increasingly popular and therefore 
eventually corner the market. The higher its pay-off, the more likely it will become 
locked in and the more likely any rival technology will become locked out. In the 
sequential case of technology battle there may also be a lock-in of the existing 
technology. When a new and better technology comes to the market, it may take a 
long time for this new technology to gain an edge over the old one. Or it may not 
happen at all. Arthur (1989) provides the following, simplified, example of a lock-in 
situation (see also figure 4.2): 
 
UA = utility of technology A 
UB = utility of technology B 
iA = number of adopters of technology A 
iB = number of adopters of technology B 
 
UA = f (iA) = 10 + 0,1iA 
UB = f (iB) = 4 + 0,3iB 
 
Number of adoptions
Pay-off
Technology A
Technology B
 
Figure 4-2: Arthur's (1989) example of a lock-in situation 
 
Without foresight and discounting of pay-offs and without one technology being 
sponsored more than the other, rational agents will adopt technology A. In this case 
Market-based increasing returns 
136 
technology A that is chosen at the outset will become locked in. Of course, this is 
without counting future pay-offs. Future pay-offs determine the alternative first 
chosen, depending on height of the pay-off, discount rate, time horizon and degree of 
uncertainty. It might be conceived that, when alternative A has been adopted a 
number of times, alternative B appears to have more future potential. If the difference 
in future potential between alternatives A and B is large enough to offset the pay-offs 
from adoption of alternative A, the next adopter i might switch to alternative B. 
 
Under assumptions of rationality and certainty, the alternative with the highest 
discounted pay-off will be chosen, of course dependent on time horizon and discount 
rate. When the discount rate is high, an alternative will be chosen that has a relatively 
high pay-off in the short term. This alternative may well become locked in as it is 
most often adopted. Another alternative will only be adopted if its discounted future 
pay-off more than offsets the sum of the discounted future pay-off of the alternative 
chosen at the outset and the accumulated pay-off of this alternative due to the number 
of adoptions to date. This depends on how fast in time a certain alternative is 
adopted. If adoption is very slow, a changeover to another alternative might well take 
place. If adoption is very fast, the alternative is more likely to become locked in. 
 
A consequence of this self-reinforcing process is that once a network becomes 
dominant, customers and suppliers are locked in to it. This means that compared to 
new alternative technologies the network and the social interaction effects of the 
dominant technology are so large that customers and suppliers are not prepared to 
make the necessary investments to switch networks. In other words, the market will 
be ‘frozen’ in this particular technological standard and a newer and better 
technology will find it extremely difficult to break in. Here also, the debate goes 
whether this represents market failure or inefficiency. From the manager’s 
perspective, this discussion may not be that productive and it may suffice to observe 
that it may be very difficult to enter the market with a new technology when the 
existing technology still has the advantage of a large installed base. 
 
Once a solution is reached, it can be extremely difficult to exit from and difficult to 
break in for competing solutions. Lock-in of a technology therefore becomes a 
serious barrier to entry for firms that are sponsors of or hold licenses to the locked 
out technology. This is of course very attractive for firms sponsoring or having 
licenses to the locked in technology, because it creates a kind of monopoly situation, 
enabling these firms to appropriate monopoly rents. 
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4.4.5 Excess inertia and excess momentum 
The interplay between network and social interaction effects has important 
consequences for the development pattern in the market. In the battle for the 
technological standard the subjective expectations that suppliers and customers have 
of market outcomes, i.e., which standard will eventually dominate the market, play 
an important part. Suppliers’ and customers’ expectations depend on (1) the installed 
base and, (2) the expected behavior of other customers and suppliers. All these 
expectations are mutually dependent and adaptive, which means that they constantly 
change when new information becomes available. The dynamics of customers’ and 
suppliers’ expectations can cause extremely complex or even chaotic market patterns 
(Hommes, 1995). These patterns are difficult to interpret, virtually unpredictable and 
therefore hard to manage.  
 
The uncertainty about market developments may cause a market stalemate, i.e., 
excess inertia, in which both suppliers and customers wait for others to decide first 
(Farrell & Saloner, 1985; 1986). This impedes a collective switch from an existing 
technological standard to a possibly superior new standard of technology. This may 
result in none of the competing technologies ‘taking off’. Alternatively, it may cause 
a situation of explosive growth, i.e., excess momentum, in which the investments of 
some suppliers and customers lead to massive investments on behalf of others. 
Ultimately, the market may quickly lock in to a technological standard, which, at that 
time, is possibly still inferior (Farrell & Saloner, 1985; 1986). 
 
Here, the concept of critical mass is of importance. Critical mass is reached when, 
for the individual adopting agent, the network effect is so large that it always 
outweighs a possible negative inherent valuation of a technology. As soon as a 
technological network reaches critical mass in the perception of customers and 
suppliers, they expect that this network will dominate or at least maintain itself in the 
market, causing it to become a relatively safe network to invest in. When a customer 
or a supplier decides to make this investment by purchasing or introducing a product, 
the network increases and with it the probability that it will eventually dominate the 
market. This induces other customers and suppliers to invest in the network, which 
sets a positive feedback process in motion. Katz & Shapiro (1994) state that, because 
of the strong positive feedback elements of the network effect, technology 
competition is prone to ‘tipping’, which is the tendency for one technology to 
achieve ever-increasing popularity once it has gained an initial edge. 
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4.4.6 Path dependence 
Path dependence means that the early history of market shares, often the consequence 
of small events or chance circumstances, can determine to a large extent which 
solution prevails (Arthur, 1989). It is also referred to as irreversibility, or non-
ergodicity. 
 
The mutual influence of the network effects and social interaction effects leads to 
irregular movements in the market. Although these movements are unpredictable, 
they are in retrospect characterized by path dependence (Arthur, 1989). Path 
dependence means that very small differences in starting conditions may have far-
reaching consequences with regard to the final market outcomes; because of path 
dependence, a small initial competitive advantage may increase continuously. 
Conversely, firms that incur small early disadvantages may find themselves 
increasingly disadvantaged with respect to their competitors.  
 
An example of path dependence is Microsoft’s position in the market of personal 
computer operating systems. In the early 1980s Microsoft became the supplier of the 
operating system for IBM PC’s, MS-DOS, almost by coincidence. Owing to the 
strong network and social interaction effects in the PC-market, an IBM PC with an 
MS-DOS operating system became the market standard. In the rapidly growing PC-
market an increasing number of MS-DOS copies were sold, which enabled Microsoft 
to realize enormous scale and learning effects. This enabled them continuously to 
improve existing product versions and to develop new ones. Thus, improved MS-
DOS versions remained the standard operating system for most PC’s, until they were 
replaced by Microsoft Windows. Moreover, because of the complementary nature of 
the products Microsoft has built a dominant position in the markets for word-
processing, spreadsheet, database, presentation and internet browsing software. 
Microsoft has become the largest software firm in the world by optimally capitalizing 
on the different mechanisms of increasing returns, a typical example of how a small 
initial advantage was continuously reinforced by smart management under conditions 
of increasing returns. 
 
4.4.7 Market imperfections and inefficiency? 
The consequences of network effects and social interaction effects for market 
behavior and market outcomes are regarded by some as market imperfections or 
market inefficiencies, e.g., Arthur (1989), Farrell & Saloner (1985; 1986), Katz & 
Shapiro (1985; 1986). Katz & Shapiro (1986) find the following results: 
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• compatibility tends to be under-supplied by the market, but excessive 
standardization can occur 
• in the absence of sponsors, the technology superior today has a strategic 
advantage and is likely to dominate the market 
• when one of two rival technologies is sponsored, that technology has a 
strategic advantage and may be adopted even if it is inferior 
• when two competing technologies both are sponsored, the technology that 
will be superior tomorrow has a strategic advantage 
 
All these consequences are instances of market imperfections. From an economic 
perspective this is sometimes seen as a problem. The market does not seem to work 
so perfectly as the general, or even the partial, equilibrium models want us to believe. 
This is nothing new, it was already recognized by Marshall at the end of the 19th 
century (1890, book IV, chapter 13 and Appendix H): “If one technology is 
inherently better than the other (according to measures of economic welfare), but has 
‘bad luck’ in gaining early adherents, the eventual market outcome may not be of 
maximum possible benefit.” 
 
Still, the conclusion that market-based increasing returns may cause market 
imperfections or inefficiencies is the cause of a fierce debate between proponents and 
critics of increasing returns. The argument of the proponents is that increasing returns 
is pervasive in at least an important part of modern economic systems and that this 
severely impacts the efficiency of the market (e.g., Arthur, 1989). 
 
The critics argue that increasing returns mechanisms, where they do exist, are limited 
to very special cases and that by implication they do not significantly impact the 
general equilibrium model, e.g., Liebowitz & Margolis (1994; 1995; 1999). 
Liebowitz’ & Margolis’ (1994) approach is to distinguish network effects and 
network externalities. They define network effects as “The circumstance in which the 
net value of an action […] is affected by the number of agents taking equivalent 
actions […]” (1994, p.135). Network externalities they define as “[…] a specific kind 
of network effect in which the equilibrium exhibits unexploited gains from trade 
regarding network participation.” They then proceed to eventually conclude: 
“Although network effects are pervasive in the economy, we see scant evidence of 
the existence of network externalities.” (1994, p.149). 
 
Liebowitz & Margolis (1995) follow the same kind of approach with respect to path 
dependence. They distinguish between three degrees of path dependence. The first 
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one is omnipresent, but does not imply inefficiency. The second one occurs because 
of imperfect information, which leads to decisions that may seem inefficient in 
retrospect but that were efficient at that time given the available information when 
they were taken. The third one leads to outcomes that are inefficient but may be 
remediable. Liebowitz & Margolis (1995) define only this third degree path 
dependence as really inefficient and they conclude that it is extremely rare. 
 
While this discussion has its merits, we will not continue these arguments here. 
Rather, we adhere to our chosen management perspective, which implies that we deal 
here with network effects, social interaction effects and path dependence as we 
defined them, not with network externalities or third degree path dependence as 
Liebowitz & Margolis (1994, 1995, 1999) define them. We conclude that network 
effects and social interaction effects can have major impact on market behavior and 
market outcomes and that this creates opportunities for firms to extend their 
production, realize scale and learning effects and eventually appropriate economic 
rents. Assuming a managerial point of view, it would indeed be naïve to assume 
perfect markets. Rather, firms would prefer to have imperfect markets to be able to 
appropriate economic rents. The question then becomes: How can the firm act 
strategically in such a way to maximize these rents? 
 
Here also, the opinions diverge, as can be shown in, e.g., the case of Microsoft. 
Some, e.g., Liebowitz & Margolis (1999) argue that the market is efficient and that 
Microsoft has just been smart enough to seize the right opportunities. They argue that 
new alternatives like Linux are becoming available that will endanger Microsoft’s 
future position. Thus, the market will do its work and government or courts should 
not intervene. Others argue that the markets works imperfectly, that Microsoft has 
made misuse of these market imperfections by blocking competition and new 
entrants and that therefore the government or the courts should intervene. 
 
4.5 The market potential for scale and learning effects 
The market outcomes due to the presence of network effects and social interaction 
effects have important consequences for firms operating in these markets. We may 
conceptualize these market outcomes as creating a market potential, that individual 
firms may either exploit or not. 
 
There are multiple ways in which the market outcomes discussed in the previous 
section can create such a market potential. First, the competition at the network level 
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creates a market potential beyond that of the single product. Firms can offer products 
in the market that are complementary to the products of other firms, e.g., a firm 
providing printers that are complementary to another firm’s computers. The success 
of the main product will rub off on the success of the complementary product, thus 
creating a potential for realizing scale effects. Firms can also offer in the market an 
entire range of their own complementary products, e.g., a firm providing printers, 
inkjet cartridges and inkjet paper. This may create a potential for firms to realize 
economies of scope (see section 5.2.2). 
 
Second, the winner-take-all effect means that the potential market for products based 
on the winning technology may be very large. This creates the possibility to realize 
the largest scale of production for the products based on this technology, enabling 
scale effects. Conversely, the potential market for a product based on the loosing 
technology will be very small.  
 
Third, the lock-in effect makes that a market potential may be very durable, enabling 
subsequent scale effects and enabling the optimal exploitation of learning effects. 
Once customers have made their purchase, they will not easily switch to another 
technology, because of the investments and learning costs related to this specific 
technology (Arthur, 1989). Therefore the supplier sponsoring this dominant 
technology (shaper) may expect a rapidly growing group of loyal customers (the 
installed base). The suppliers who acquire licenses (followers) may also expect a 
large group of potential customers for the product they supply on the basis of this 
technology. Conversely, the potential market for products based on the technology 
that is locked out may be very small and unlikely to improve. 
 
Fourth, excess inertia means that the market potential for the old technology may 
remain high while that for the new technology may not come off. Conversely, excess 
momentum means that not only the scale of production for products based on the 
technology can be quickly increased, enabling scale effects, but that also the 
cumulative production of these products increases fast, enabling learning effects. 
 
Fifth, path dependence may influence the market potential in the sense that a very 
small initial advantage may result in a very large potential for scale and learning 
effects, or vice versa. 
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4.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter we looked at the market-based mechanisms of increasing returns and 
their consequences, defining them as determinants of the market structure aspect of 
the structure-conduct-performance paradigm. 
 
The market-based mechanisms of increasing returns are network effects and social 
interaction effects. Both network effects and social interaction effects possess the 
characteristic of generating positive feedbacks in technology and product adoption. 
We conclude that important influencing conditions of the extent of this positive 
feedback effect in the market are the degree and structure of economic and social 
interdependence, i.e., the structure of the network, the nature of the product, 
complementarity, substitutability and compatibility of the product and the 
technology.  
 
We also conclude that the presence of network effects and social interaction effects 
has important consequences for the dynamics and outcomes of the market and will 
create a potential for scale and learning effects in the market that individual firms 
may realize. In the market, a technology battle emerges, that has at least five distinct 
properties: (1) competition takes place on the network level, not on the product level, 
(2) there are multiple possible equilibrium outcomes of the competitive process, (3) 
the market can lock in to a technology, (4) there can be excess inertia or excess 
momentum in the market and (5) the market can be path dependent. The implication 
is that a certain degree of market inefficiency may emerge. We conclude that the 
properties of the technology battle will create a market potential for scale and 
learning effects that may enable firms to extend the scale of their production, thereby 
realizing scale and learning effects and eventually appropriate monopoly rents. The 
scale and learning effects and the ways in which firms can realize these scale and 
learning effects and boost their performance will be discussed in chapter five. 
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5. FIRM-BASED INCREASING RETURNS 
 
In this chapter we deal with the firm behavior part of increasing returns. Specifically 
we address the firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns, i.e., scale effects and 
learning effects, the conditions influencing these effects, the ways firms can realize 
the potential for scale and learning effects and the ways firms can exploit scale and 
learning effects to enhance their performance. 
 
In addressing the firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns in this chapter, we 
provide the second part of the answer to the first research question: How can market-
based and firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns be theoretically specified 
and defined? and we provide a partial content validation for the second research 
question: How can market-based and firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns 
be measured? 
 
The main thrust of this chapter is that the presence of the market-based mechanisms 
of increasing returns will cause a market potential for scale and learning effects and 
that firms can realize this potential in various ways. The way in which firms realize 
scale effects and learning effects represents the firm conduct aspect of the chosen 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm. Only by realizing the potential for scale 
and learning effects do firms close the positive feedback loop, and can we speak of 
increasing returns. 
 
We concluded from the literature analysis (chapter three), that the two dominant 
mechanisms of firm-based increasing returns are scale effects and learning effects. 
Before we discuss these, we start this chapter by clarifying the distinction between 
increasing returns and increasing returns to scale in section one. We then proceed in 
sections two and three with the definitions and theoretical conceptualizations of the 
firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns. The conditions that influence the 
occurrence and the intensity of these effects are addressed in section four. The way in 
which firms can realize scale and learning effects, i.e., how they can internalize the 
market potential for scale and learning effects, is discussed in section five. In section 
six we address the way in which firms can exploit the realized scale and learning 
effects to close the positive feedback loop and how firms can increase their product 
and organizational performance. Conclusions are given in section seven. 
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5.1 Increasing returns and increasing returns to scale 
Before we proceed with the discussion of the mechanisms of firm-based increasing 
returns, i.e. scale effects and learning effects, we address some definition issues 
about what we mean by firm-based increasing returns, relative to the economic 
conventions of increasing returns and increasing returns to scale. 
 
An economic system, e.g., a country, a firm or a business unit, may be regarded as a 
set of transformation processes. Input is everything that is put into the process, e.g., 
land, labor, capital or data, and output is everything that comes out of the process, 
e.g., goods, services, information or knowledge. A function can be drawn which 
relates the input factors to the output factors. This transformation function is typically 
an S-shaped curve (see figure 5.1).38 To the right of the inflection point39, output rises 
less than proportionally with input. Here we talk in general about firm-based 
diminishing returns. To the left of the point of inflection, output rises more than 
proportionally with input. This is what we refer to in general as firm-based 
increasing returns. 
 
                                                          
38 Mathematically this is a third degree equation of the form Y = aX + bX2 - cX3, in which Y is 
the collection of outputs and X is the collection of inputs. 
39 An inflection point is the point at which the derivative function reaches an extreme value 
(Chiang, 1984). In this case, starting from the origin, the derivative function keeps increasing 
until the inflection point is reached, after which it decreases. The inflection point is therefore 
the extreme value of the derivative function. Wolfe (1929) refers to this as the point of 
diminishing incremental return. 
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Input
Output
Range to exploit
firm-based 
increasing returns
Range to exploit
firm-based 
diminishing returns
Inflection point
 
Figure 5-1: Typical transformation function 
 
This terminology may cause confusion though, as in economic literature two forms 
of increasing returns are distinguished. The first is referred to as increasing returns to 
scale, the second as increasing returns. In the economic literature, these terms are 
quite precisely defined. 
 
5.1.1 Increasing returns to scale 
In the economic convention, we speak of increasing returns to scale when the 
outputs rise more than proportionally with an increase of all the input factors to the 
same amount. See figure 5.2. For example, if output Y = f (L, K), i.e., there are two 
input factors Labor (L) and Capital (K), we have increasing returns to scale if Y = f 
(a*L, a*K) is larger than a*Y = f (L, K), when a>1. Increasing returns to scale is 
therefore a characteristic of the production process. 
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Increasing returns to scale in
input factors L and K
Inputs: L and K,
assuming L=a*K
Output (Y)
Diminishing returns to scale in
input factors L and K
Output (Y)
Inputs: L and K,
assuming L=a*K
 
Figure 5-2: Returns to scale 
 
More formally, if the general formulation of a firm’s transformation function is Y = f 
(L, K), then we have increasing returns to scale if the second derivative of this 
transformation function with respect to the whole bundle of input factors is positive 
(see table 5.1). 
 
 First derivative of the 
transformation function 
Second derivative of the 
transformation function 
Diminishing returns to 
scale 
d(Y)/d(L, K) > 0 d2(Y)/d(L, K)2 < 0 
Constant returns to 
scale 
d(Y)/d(L, K) > 0 d2(Y)/d(L, K)2 = 0 
Increasing returns to 
scale 
d(Y)/d(L, K) > 0 d2(Y)/d(L, K)2 > 0 
Table 5.1: Returns to scale 
 
It is important to note that the economic definition of increasing returns to scale 
forms the basis of, but is not exactly equal to, our definition of firm-based 
mechanisms of increasing returns, i.e., scale and learning effects, as provided in this 
thesis; see also sections 5.2 and 5.3. 
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5.1.2 Increasing returns 
If only one of the input factors is increased, while the other ones are held constant, 
we are dealing with the marginal product of the varying input factor. The marginal 
product is the extra output from adding one more unit of this input factor; see figure 
5.3. For example, if output Y = f (L, K), the marginal product of factor L is equal to 
the partial derivative of Y to L: ∂Y/∂L. This is also denoted as MPL(L, K). The 
marginal product is increasing if dMPL/dL > 0. Economically, this is called 
increasing returns, increasing returns to the margin, or, most correctly, increasing 
returns to input factor L. Increasing returns in this definition is therefore a 
characteristic of an input factor. 
 
Input L,
assuming K remains constant
Output (Y)
Increasing marginal productivity
of input factor L
Input L,
assuming K remains constant
Output (Y)
Decreasing marginal productivity
of input factor L
 
Figure 5-3: Marginal productivity 
 
It is important to note that the definition of increasing returns as increasing marginal 
productivity is not the definition of firm-based increasing returns that we adopt in 
this thesis.  
 
We therefore proceed in the next sections with the mechanisms of firm-based 
increasing returns, i.e., scale effects and learning effects, as they are used in this 
thesis. 
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5.2 Scale effects 
5.2.1 Defining scale effects 
The first and most widely known mechanism of firm-based increasing returns is 
scale effects. Scale effects are closely related to, but more broadly defined than 
increasing returns to scale (see section 5.1.1). Scale effects occur when there is a 
positive static relationship between the size of output of the firm and its productivity. 
This is the productivity of the entire bundle of input factors, regardless of any shifts 
in the composition of this bundle. This productivity can be measured in units and is 
then reflected in an upward slope of the production function. When this productivity 
is measured in financial terms it is reflected in the downward slope of the firm’s 
average total cost curve.40 See figure 5.4. 
 
Output at time t
(in Euro)
Average total cost
at time t (in Euro)
average total cost curve
 
Figure 5-4: Average Total Cost curve 
 
A distinction can be made between scale effects with respect to fixed costs and 
variable costs. Scale effects with respect to fixed costs mean that the fixed costs of 
the input factors are spread over as large an output as possible. In other words, the 
larger the number of products, the smaller the average fixed cost. The realization of 
scale effects with respect to fixed costs is often considered the most important driver 
of competitive advantage (Scherer & Ross, 1990). Scale effects with respect to 
variable costs means that the variable costs will be reduced as a consequence of the 
                                                          
40 Note that this function has financial terms on the horizontal and the vertical axes. 
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extended scale of production, e.g., because the input factors embedded in the product 
may become cheaper when bought in larger quantities.  
 
Note that the scale effect in the transformation process itself is not increasing returns 
as we defined it in section 1.5, or, stronger, that it is in fact diminishing returns: the 
incremental scale advantage becomes smaller as output rises; see also our figure 5.8 
and Scherer & Ross (1990). Nevertheless, scale advantages are a powerful 
mechanism of firm-based increasing returns. The firm can use the cost advantage to 
lower the market prices of its products, which, under conditions, will lead to higher 
sales.41 The firm may also improve the value proposition to its customers, with 
heterogeneous but substitutable products, which produces similar effects, or it may 
use a combination of lower prices and improved value proposition. In both cases, the 
result will be larger sales, which in turn requires larger production volumes, which 
result in even stronger scale effects. This means that scale effects, when properly 
exploited may result in positive feedback in the firm. 
 
5.2.2 Economies of scale, scope and sequence 
Often a distinction is made between economies of scale42 and economies of scope. 
Economies of scale are related to the number of units of the same product produced, 
i.e., it is cheaper to produce more units of the same product. Economies of scope are 
related to the variety of different products produced, i.e., it is cheaper to produce 
different products together in one plant than separately (Scherer & Ross, 1990). 
Whereas economies of scale refer to lower direct, i.e., product-specific and indirect 
average costs as the number of units of the same product produced increases, 
economies of scope refer to lower indirect, i.e., plant-specific or firm-specific 
overhead costs, average costs as the number of different products increases (Scherer 
& Ross, 1990). 
 
In economic terms, both economies of scale and economies of scope mean that the 
cost function is sub-additive (Tirole, 1988), i.e.: 
 
C(q1) + C(q2) > C(q1+q2) 
 
                                                          
41 These conditions are (1) sufficient market demand, (2) sufficient price elasticity, i.e., the 
price elasticity of demand has to be smaller than –1 and (3) improvement of the firm’s 
competitive position, i.e., if it can reduce prices by 5%, but the competition can reduce prices 
by 10%, the firm will likely not gain much. 
42 Note that economies of scale is defined differently here than scale effects in section 5.2.1. 
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Here, C stands for cost, q1 stands for the quantity of product 1 and q2 stands for the 
quantity of product 2. 
 
This means that it is cheaper to produce the products together than separately. The 
formula holds both when q1 and q2 are the same, homogeneous products, i.e., 
economies of scale, as when q1 and q2 are different products, i.e., economies of 
scope. 
 
Spulber (1993, p.544) adds a third kind of economies, namely economies of 
sequence. These are related to cost savings from vertical integration. In formal terms: 
 
CU(x) + CD(q,x) > C(q) 
 
Where CU is the cost of the upstream firm, x is a vector of intermediate inputs, CD is 
the cost of the downstream firm, q is the quantity of final product and C is the cost of 
the vertically integrated firm. 
 
It is clear that in terms of cost functions, economies of scale, economies of scope and 
economies of sequences can be quite precisely defined. In management practice, 
however, it may be much more difficult to distinguish between these economies. For 
example: Does the necessity of appointing another executive manager spring from 
the increased scale of production, from the increased variety of production, or from 
the increase of vertical integration? It is plausible that it will be a bit of all three. 
There are many examples of costs that firms have to make to sustain their operations, 
but that do not uniquely vary with the scale of production of a single product, neither 
with the number of different products, nor with the vertical integration, but rather, 
more holistically, with the firm’s entire scale of operations. We will therefore in our 
further analysis choose to concentrate on scale effects as defined in section 5.2.1, 
which refer exactly to this broad relationship between costs and size of output. 
 
5.3 Learning effects 
5.3.1 Defining learning effects 
A second mechanism of firm-based increasing returns is learning effects. This means 
that there is a positive dynamic relationship between the growth of output and the 
growth of productivity (Amit, 1986; Kaldor, 1966). 
 
Firm-based increasing returns 
151 
We can distinguish between scale and learning effects by taking the concept of static 
and dynamic production functions. A change of scale would mean a movement along 
the static production function. This is what firms routinely do on a day-to-day basis: 
as output varies they use just a little bit less or a little bit more of their existing input 
factors.43 Learning, i.e., a change of knowledge would mean a shift of the static 
production function. In the long run, a line could be drawn through the static-run 
production functions, yielding the dynamic production function. 
 
Again, when we measure productivity in financial terms, we are dealing with cost 
functions rather than production functions. Learning effects are reflected in the 
downward shift of the firm’s short-term average total cost function or in the 
downward slope of the firm’s long-term average total cost function (Amit, 1986).44 
See figures 5.5 and 5.6. 
 
Output at time t
(in Euro)
Average total cost
at time t (in Euro)
ATC1
ATC2
 
Figure 5-5: Learning effects as the downward shift of the short-run Average Total 
Cost curve 
 
                                                          
43 Note that the time frame is important here: in the longer run, there will always be a 
combination of scale and learning effects. 
44 Note that both curves have financial terms on the horizontal and the vertical axes. 
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Cumulative output from t=1 to t=n
(in Euro)
Average total cost
(in Euro)
Long-run average total cost curve
 
Figure 5-6: Learning effects as the downward slope of the long-run Average Total 
Cost curve 
 
Learning results in a more efficient use of the input factors.45 In other words, the 
same output can be produced with less input, independent of the scale of production 
at that specific moment, i.e., independent of scale effects. Learning may take place in 
different forms. According to Levy (1965) it may be the result of conscious 
managerial action, i.e., planned or induced learning, of unexpectedly acquired 
external information, i.e., random or exogenous learning, or it may be the result of 
automatic improvements as employees become more familiar with their tasks, i.e., 
autonomous learning. 
 
5.3.2 Induced learning effects 
Induced learning results from conscious managerial action to improve the 
productivity of the input factors (Levy, 1965; Li & Rajagopalan, 1998). This can take 
a number of forms: 
• improved process efficiency because of conscious process (re)design or 
improvement through industrial engineering or process R&D, or because of 
meticulous process planning 
                                                          
45 Note that learning does not just affect labor, but that it affects the entire bundle of 
production factors. 
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• improved skill, improved efforts or improved intelligence of labor, because 
of formal training, the hiring of better qualified employees or the selection 
of the right employees for the jobs that suit them 
• changing the mix of input factors used for a specific transformation process, 
i.e., radical innovation as defined by Zegveld (2000) 
 
5.3.3 Exogenous learning effects 
Exogenous learning results from causes that are external to the firm. They include: 
• external economies as, e.g., progress in general schooling and education of 
employees, increased availability of labor potential of the desired quality 
and size (see, e.g., Verdoorn, 1952). 
• externalities that are the consequence of knowledge spillovers (see, e.g., 
Romer, 1986; Thornton & Thompson, 2001). 
• exogenous technological change. Technological change may affect the 
quality of the product, the methods of organizing production and the quality 
and/or prices of the capital goods and materials used (see, e.g., Kennedy, 
1971). Technological change may be regarded as exogenous or endogenous. 
Neo-classical growth models usually assume technological change takes 
place outside the economic system. The technological change is therefore 
exogenous, but influences the economic system by a stream of innovations 
that become available ‘out of the blue’ and that are reflected in better ways 
of organizing production or in improved quality of capital goods (see, e.g. 
Solow, 1957). 
 
5.3.4 Autonomous learning effects 
Autonomous learning effects involve the automatic improvement in productivity of 
input factors as accumulated production increases. It is often referred to as learning-
by-doing (after Arrow, 1962), or as the experience curve (Dolan & Jeuland, 1981; 
Day & Montgomery, 1983; Alberts, 1989).  
 
In Arrow’s (1962) view, learning is a product of experience, or learning-by-doing, 
which means that (1) the level of productivity is a function of cumulative output and 
(2) productivity grows faster the faster output expands. In other words, learning 
effects cause productivity to rise in response to, or as a by-product of, the increase in 
total output. Actually it goes back to an observation made by Smith (1776, I, I) that: 
“This great increase of the quantity of work, which, in consequence of the division of 
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labour, the same number of people are capable of performing, is owing to three 
different circumstances; first, to the increase of dexterity in every particular 
workman; secondly to the saving of time which is commonly lost in passing from 
one species of work to another; and lastly, to the invention of a great number of 
machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work of 
many.” 
 
The circumstances one and three mentioned by Smith are in fact autonomous 
learning effects. In dedicating labor to one simple task, the workman learns to 
perform this task at the highest level of efficiency. In other words, by performing the 
same task more often, the efficiency of labor itself increases. Moreover, when 
according to Smith the whole attention of the laborer is directed towards that single 
task, he is much more likely to discover easier ways, better methods and improved 
machines. 
 
We see here the two essential effects of autonomous learning: (1) increased 
efficiency of doing the original task and (2) increased knowledge of how to structure 
the transformation process. 
 
The first effect relates to the idea of the learning curve, which measures the fall of 
cost, as employees get more dexterous in their jobs. The learning curve is 
conceptually distinguished for the experience curve. Whereas the learning curve 
usually refers only to labor costs and reflects a kind of short-run learning-by-doing 
(Hall & Howell, 1985), the experience curve typically involves total cost and also 
includes technological innovation as a result of experience (Day & Montgomery, 
1983; Albert, 1989). 
 
That brings us to the second effect, which is known as endogenous technological 
change, e.g., Romer (1986, 1990b). Whereas exogenous technological change comes 
as it were ‘out of the blue’, endogenous technological change takes place within the 
economic system. It is reflected in the improvement of either labor or capital due to 
increasing returns to knowledge application (Romer, 1986, 1990b; Lucas, 1988). The 
basic thrust is that economic transformation processes generate new information and 
knowledge as additional output. This additional information and knowledge output 
may subsequently be used as additional input in the process to develop new products 
or improve existing ones. A good example is the market for cellular communication 
networks. The installation of such networks is an activity in which considerable 
learning effects occur. Each installed network generates new knowledge for 
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improving both the future efficiency, i.e., lower costs, and the future effectiveness, 
i.e., higher quality, of the network installation process. Consequently firms that have 
installed large numbers of such networks are creating a growing information and 
knowledge edge over firms that have installed fewer networks. 
 
5.3.5 The relation between scale effects and learning effects 
The contention that learning effects cause productivity to rise in response to, or as a 
by-product of, the increase in total output is, in fact, nothing else than the famous 
dictum of Smith (1776) that the returns per unit of labor depend on the extent of 
specialization and division of labor. In Smith’s vision, the larger the extent of the 
market, the more specialization becomes possible, the higher the productivity. Kaldor 
(1966) states that Smith (1776) as well as Marshall (1890) and Young (1928) stress 
the interplay of static and dynamic factors that cause returns to increase. Greater 
division of labor is not only a scale factor; it also generates improvements of skill and 
know-how that we refer to as learning effects. Kaldor (1966, p.288): “We cannot 
isolate the influence of economies of large-scale production due to indivisibilities of 
various kinds and which are in principle reversible, from such changes in technology 
associated with a process of expansion which are not reversible.” We can therefore 
conclude that increasing volumes of output cause both scale and learning effects, that 
these effects are intimately related and that they may therefore be difficult to 
disentangle.  
 
5.4 Extent of scale and learning effects 
Both scale and learning effects are influenced by factors that determine the extent to 
which they can be realized. We will discuss the most important influencing factors of 
scale effects and of learning effects below, then we will turn to the influence of 
information and knowledge intensity on the extent of scale and learning effects.  
 
5.4.1 Extent of scale effects 
A proxy often used for cost structure is the ratio between fixed cost and variable cost. 
With high fixed and low variable cost, the average cost curve runs extremely steep. 
Even assuming the absence of scale effects with respect to the variable cost, this 
means that with growing production the firm will realize large scale effects. See 
figure 5.7. 
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Output (in Euro)
Average total cost
(in Euro)
Output (in Euro)
Average total cost
(in Euro)
High fixed costs,
Low variable costs
Low fixed costs,
High variable costs
 
Figure 5-7: Scale effects for different ratios between fixed and variable costs 
 
The cost structure of a product is a reflection of the composition of the bundle of 
input factors used to produce this product and of the way the firm is able to adapt the 
cost of those factors. First, different input factors have different cost structures, e.g., 
information and knowledge intensive products are often characterized by high fixed 
(development) costs and low variable costs. These variable costs might even decrease 
with larger production volumes (Shapiro & Varian, 1998).46 Computer programs are 
a good example of products that have such a cost structure. These products require 
high development cost, but very low reproduction and distribution costs, use of the 
Internet can reduce the costs of reproduction and distribution to almost zero. The 
consequence of such a cost structure is that the average total cost curve will descend 
steeply as the production volume increases. Such a cost structure offers large 
possibilities for gathering scale advantages (see section 5.2.1). Conversely, 
intermediate inputs such as materials often involve low fixed costs, e.g., maybe only 
the wages of the purchaser, and high variable costs.  
 
Second, the firm may be able to adapt the cost structure of an input factor. It might 
e.g. hire employees for longer periods, treating labor as fixed cost, but it might also 
                                                          
46 Products from capital and physical labor-intensive business processes often exhibit 
increasing variable cost with increasing production volumes. This causes the familiar U-
shaped form of the average cost curve. 
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reward its employees on the basis of hours worked or units produced, treating labor 
as a variable cost. 
 
There are a number of inherent limitations to scale effects. We mention five of the 
most important ones; although this enumeration not be exhaustive (see also Scherer 
& Ross, 1990). First, when output volume becomes very large, the extra cost 
advantage of extending production by one unit becomes trivial. This holds true for 
even the most skewed ratio between fixed and variable costs. See figure 5.8. 
 
Output 
(in Euro)
Average total cost
(in Euro)
O1 O2 O3 O4
ATC1
ATC2
ATC3
ATC4
O2-/-O1 = O4-/-O3
 
Figure 5-8: Limit of the scale effect 
 
When output volume becomes very large, scale effects on variable costs may no 
longer hold. While the move from smaller volumes to larger volumes may deliver 
large rebates with purchasing, effectively reducing the price, the move to still larger 
volumes may put such a demand strain on the market that it may in effect raise prices 
instead of lowering them. 
 
Second, new investments will be needed eventually, e.g., when a plant is at 
maximum capacity, and this imposes a limit on further realization of scale effects on 
this plant’s output. A new plant will have to be built to extend production, which may 
also realize scale effects up to its maximum capacity, but not any further. We may 
argue that the second plant may use the same canteen, the same personnel or 
Firm-based increasing returns 
158 
accounting department, etcetera, and that this may enable further scale effects, but we 
may also argue the opposite, namely that a two-plant operation may not require less, 
but more overhead. This brings us to the next point. 
 
Third, as the firm grows bigger, firm coordination costs will rise. Lines of 
communication become longer and the firm will need more layers of management. 
This not only increases cost, it also makes the organization less agile, which is a huge 
problem when the firm operates in unpredictable and volatile environments. Many of 
the envisaged scale advantages of big mergers do not materialize, exactly because of 
this effect. 
 
Fourth, firms will run into the limits of the extent of the market, i.e., the maximum 
number of products that can ultimately be sold profitably in the market. In many 
markets the cost for delivering products to the customer or for marketing will rise as 
physical distance increases, e.g., when a firm has a plant in The Netherlands, it will 
likely focus first on the Dutch market. As it starts to open up new markets that are 
further away, there may come a point at which the extra gains from opening up a 
market and selling products no longer outweigh the marketing and distribution cost 
involved. It will be clear that this is different for different firms and for different 
products. Firms like, e.g., Heineken and Coca-Cola seem to be able to market and 
distribute their products to the most desolate place on earth, because even there the 
local market for their products is large enough.  
 
The impact of physical distance is strongly diminishing with the spread of the 
Internet. The Internet makes it possible to market and sell products worldwide 
through one website, instead of a network of thousands of local stores. The Internet 
makes distribution of information products, e.g., software or music, more efficient, 
reducing the variable costs of distribution for these products to almost zero. This 
significantly increases the extent of the market, though there are still limits. Even 
software that is given away ultimately runs into the limit of the number of possible 
users, i.e., the number of people who have a computer at their disposal. 
 
Fifth, customers tend to become increasingly heterogeneous in their buying behavior. 
They demand more product variety, more customization and the suppliers of 
products are offering this. This individualization and customization of products and 
services causes a loss of potential economies of scale (Van Asseldonk, 1998). Firms 
hope to overcome the loss of economies of scale by increasing their economies of 
scope, i.e., they hope that offering larger variety will enable them to charge higher 
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prices, so that total output in terms of turnover increases. Yet often the extra cost of 
customizing products, i.e. the cost of complexity, or diminishing returns to scope, 
more than offsets the advantages gained. 
 
Concluding, at some point, diseconomies of scale will arise, overpowering the scale 
effects. Scherer & Ross (1990, p.104): “… whenever increasing doses of variable 
inputs (…) are used in combination with some fixed input, sooner or later 
diminishing marginal returns take hold.” This makes that average cost will eventually 
rise, creating the familiar U-shaped cost curve. Scherer & Ross (1990, p.102) 
observe that “Realisation of scale economies is subject to diminishing returns.” This 
is a very important observation, reflecting the core of our argument that scale effects 
are actually different from increasing returns. Only if the firm has the capabilities to 
exploit the scale effects and put them to use may the result become increasing 
returns, or the closing of the positive feedback loop.  
 
5.4.2 Extent of learning effects 
The extent of induced learning effects is limited by three factors. First, there is an end 
to better designing and planning of processes. Eventually, the cost and effort of 
improving the process beyond a certain level will become so high that the marginal 
benefits will decrease. This is especially visible in the realm of planning. Industrial 
processes can be optimized for efficient use of input factors by careful process 
planning. For example, the waiting time for a newly ordered car may easily be two 
months. The car factory however needs only one day to assemble it and, including 
subassemblies and transport, the total operation time is less than a week. The 
operational process is optimized for efficiency. The rest of the time the order for the 
new car is held until it can be fitted into this optimal production planning. This 
procedure works fine as long as the competitors cannot do it any faster and as long as 
the customers are willing to wait for their cars. In a lot of industries however, 
customers are no longer willing to wait and there may be a competitor who can 
deliver faster. In such industries, the planning required to meet customer wishes on 
the one hand and to attain optimal process efficiency at the other, will cost so much 
and need so much effort, that it nullifies any gain in process efficiency. In this case, 
the combined efficiency of planning and operations is no better than that of a craft 
process, where nothing is planned and nothing is optimized for efficiency (see also 
Van Asseldonk, 1988). 
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Second, there is a limit to the improvement of skills and intelligence to be gained by 
training or by hiring of better employees. Here also, the cost and effort spent in 
training people will eventually cancel out the improvements made possible. This may 
be because there are limits to the absorptive capacity of people, or because the firm 
runs into the limits of efficiency improvement. For example, when efficiency is 
already very high, compared to other firms in the industry, it may not pay to put a lot 
of effort into training people in order to achieve a further efficiency improvement of 
0.1%. The hiring of better people may also run into limits, either because it takes too 
much management time and effort to find exactly the right people, or because the 
concessions that have to be made to these exactly right people, e.g., by paying them 
high salaries, will cancel out the expected gains. 
 
Third there are limits to shifts that can be made in the mix of input factors used in 
transformation processes. The substitution of capital for labor is a classical 
explanation of the increase of labor productivity (see, e.g., Salter, 1960; Kennedy, 
1971). The obvious limits to this are, firstly, that this kind of substitution may not 
always result in productivity improvement. A well-known case is the enormous 
investments made in information technology in the past decades, that made Solow 
(1987) remark: “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity 
statistics”. As second limit is that some activities simply do not lend themselves to 
execution by a machine, or when they do this machine would be prohibitively 
expensive. An example is the hype around flexible production automation and 
robotics in the 1980’s. These super-expensive machines often failed significantly to 
improve efficiency, because the bottleneck was not in the machine, but in the 
organization of the production process around it, as became painfully clear from the 
success of the much simpler Japanese production techniques (see, e.g., Womack, 
Jones & Roos, 1990). 
 
The limits to the extent of exogenous learning effects are different from those to 
induced learning. For the pay-offs of external improvement of skills and education of 
employees much the same argument holds as for the second limit to induced learning 
effects. The big difference is in the bearing of the cost of these improvements. These 
costs are to a large part not incurred by the individual firm, but rather by the society 
of which the firm is a part. Therefore, there will be limits to these effects, but these 
limits will become visible only at the level of society. Of course, when society has 
made a choice in this matter, the consequences of that choice automatically provide 
the limit for the individual firm, e.g., if society chooses for everyone to have 
theoretical education, rather than learning a craft, a firm will run into limits when it 
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wants to hire craftsmen. The same kind of reasoning applies to the limits of 
knowledge spillovers and the limits of exogenous technological change. 
 
The limits to the extent of autonomous learning effects can be divided into two 
groups: the limits to the learning curve and the limits to endogenous technological 
change. First, analogous to the arguments on the limits of scale effects, the firm may 
run into the limits of the extent of the market. This may limit the growth of 
cumulative output, especially for durable goods. When a market is saturated, it may 
be much more difficult to increase cumulative output than in a market that is 
growing. Further, an important limit to the learning effect is that it will eventually die 
out. After a certain level of cumulative output, the marginal gains of learning will 
become very small. Or even worse, in dedicating all their energy to a single task, 
employees may eventually become bored with it and productivity might even fall.  
 
The limits to endogenous technological change are more problematic. The concept of 
knowledge as a by-product of transformation processes, that may be used to improve 
the efficiency of subsequent processes, is an important point, not only from the 
management perspective, but also from the economics perspective. The fact that 
knowledge may be generating a positive feedback loop means that there may be 
virtually no limits to the growth that is a consequence of the application of this 
knowledge. While we can easily spot the limits of scale effects, of induced learning, 
of exogenous learning and of improved efficiency because of autonomous learning, 
we cannot so easily spot the limits of the positive feedback loop caused by 
knowledge. It is in this positive feedback loop that we see most clearly the increasing 
returns potential of learning effects. 
 
5.4.3 Information and knowledge intensity 
One of the most important conditions influencing the presence and extent of scale 
and learning effects is the rising information and knowledge intensity of products and 
business processes.47 This is expressed in the rising prevalence of the information 
                                                          
47 Two points should be made here, that are important but that fall outside the scope of this 
thesis. The first point regards the definitions of and conceptual distinctions between 
information and knowledge. Information has been defined by Shapiro & Varian (1999, p.3) as 
“Anything that can be digitized – encoded as a stream of bits – is information.” Glazer (1991, 
p.2) defines information as “data that have been organized or given structure – that is, placed 
in a context – and thus endowed with meaning.” (italics Glazer). He adds however “though the 
definition of ‘information’ given is familiar within the literature, the notion of exactly what 
constitutes ‘information’ is by no means clear.” The same problem we encounter when trying 
to define knowledge. Here we follow Grant (1996, p.110) who states “What is knowledge? 
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services sector, the rising prevalence of information goods, e.g., software and the 
rising knowledge required to configure and improve business processes.  
 
Information and knowledge have characteristics that differ from those of normal 
economic goods (Romer, 1986, 1990a, 1990b, 1994; Glazer, 1991; Shapiro & 
Varian, 1999). A normal economic good is divisible, rival (scarce), excludable 
(appropriable) and has diminishing returns to use. Information and knowledge differ 
from the normal economic good on some of these characteristics. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
Since this question has intrigued some of the world’s greatest thinkers from Plato to Popper 
without the emergence of a clear consensus, this is not an arena in which I choose to compete.” 
(italics Grant). Nonaka (1994) distinguishes two dimensions of knowledge. The first 
dimension is codifyability. On this dimension we can distinguish two forms of knowledge, 
implicit (or tacit) and explicit (see also Polanyi, 1966). Explicit, i.e., codified or codyfiable, 
knowledge can be transmitted in formal symbols and hence becomes information. Implicit, 
i.e., tacit, knowledge cannot be formalized and is therefore difficult to communicate. The 
second dimension is interactivity. Knowledge is first initiated within individuals, but it is 
organizationally amplified. That is, knowledge is a consequence of interaction and as such it 
becomes an emergent property of a knowledge creating community, e.g., a firm. The 
consequence of treating knowledge as an interaction factor is that it cannot be treated as a 
normal factor of production. Unlike information, which is explicit and not dependent on 
interaction, and hence can be compiled in an ‘information good’, implicit knowledge cannot be 
bought or sold completely separate from the entities, e.g., labor, capital or products, in which it 
is embedded or completely separate from the context, i.e., the interaction pattern within the 
firm, in which it is embedded. Knowledge may therefore be regarded as a resource, that exists, 
can be accumulated and can be used at the firm level, but not as a factor of production that can 
be traded in factor market. 
The second point is the issue of information and knowledge intensity. The word ‘intensity’ 
implies the ability to measure the extent to which products and processes are based on or 
consist of information and knowledge. How to measure something that we cannot properly 
define? Economists have found ways round this problem. One way is to define information 
goods. Such a good can be either a list of symbolic instructions (Romer, 1990) or a physical 
medium, e.g., a book, a CD or a video tape, containing this list of symbolic instructions 
(Romer, 1990; Shapiro & Varian, 1999). Another way round is to consider the information or 
knowledge to be embedded in the firm’s products and services. Glazer (1991, p.5) proposes to 
calculate information intensity as follows: “a firm is information intensive to the degree that its 
products and operations are based on the information collected and processed as part of 
exchanges along the value chain.” John, Weiss & Dutta (1999, p.79) phrase it as follows: 
“Also termed ‘know-how’ this definition captures the scientific knowledge embodied in a 
product’s functionality, as well as manufacturing and sales knowledge. Products (and services) 
are therefore manifestations of know-how.” The third way round is to calculate the value of 
information or knowledge. Glazer (1991) proposes to calculate the value of information as the 
sum of (1) the, given the availability of information, larger revenues from subsequent 
transactions (2) the, given the availability of information, lower costs of subsequent 
transactions, and (3) the revenues from the marketing and sales of information itself. Based on 
Zegveld (2000), Zegveld & Den Hartigh (2002) propose to calculate the value of knowledge 
from the consequences of its productivity, i.e., they measure a firm’s knowledge by calculating 
the Solow (1957) residual at the firm level. 
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Indivisibility: information and knowledge will often, though not always, be 
indivisible. That means that a certain ‘amount’ of it is needed before it can be 
productively applied, e.g., while half of a heap of stones is just half the number of 
stones, learning half of the alphabet will not enable a person to read half a book. 
However, while indivisibility may be a common characteristic of information and 
knowledge, it is not one that distinguishes it uniquely from other commodities, e.g., a 
car can be considered an economic good, but half a car will not get me to my 
destination. In production environments it will often be necessary to make large 
investments in plants and machinery before the firm can even start assembling the 
first product. These plants and machines also represent indivisibilities. The 
implication of indivisibilities is important however, because they influence the cost 
structure of products: high fixed costs, low marginal costs. The unique property of 
information and knowledge is that these marginal costs will often approach zero 
(Shapiro & Varian, 1999). This brings us to non-rivalry. 
 
Non-rivalry, or non-scarcity, is the essential characteristic of information and 
knowledge (Romer, 1990a). It is defined as: “A good is non-rival if consumption of 
additional units of the good involves zero marginal social costs of production” 
(Nicholson, 1989, p.727). Non-rival goods can be accumulated without bounds 
(Romer, 1990a). Non-rival goods can be used repeatedly in the process because they 
are not depleted in the production process, as are labor and capital (Romer, 1990a; 
Glazer, 1991). Non-rival goods can be used simultaneously by different economic 
entities. For a normal economic good, if one person possesses it, someone else 
cannot possess the same good. Two people cannot simultaneously own the same car. 
If one person has certain information however, another person can possess the same 
information at the same time. Romer (1990a) shows that if there are non-rival goods 
that have productive value, output will increase more than proportionally with an 
increase of all the inputs. Romer (1990a, p.98): 
 
“If R denotes the set of rival inputs, N the set of non-rival inputs and F (R, 
N) denotes output, then for integer values of λ, 
 
F (λR, λN) > F (λR, N) = λ F (R, N) 
 
This means that in the large, the elasticity of output with respect to inputs is 
greater than 1 and that the function F (·) is not concave.”  
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In other words, Romer links non-rivalry directly to the existence of increasing 
returns. While this non-rivalry is true for existing information and knowledge at a 
specific moment in time, information and knowledge may in practice be very time-
sensitive (Glazer & Weiss, 1993). This means that information and knowledge 
probably can still be accumulated and replicated at zero marginal costs, but that after 
some time they will have no productive value. 
 
Excludability, or appropriability, or exclusivity is defined as: “A good is exclusive if 
it is relatively easy to exclude individuals from benefiting from the good once it is 
produced” (Nicholson, 1989, p.727). Information and knowledge are often not 
perfectly excludable. That is, ownership can be exercised, e.g., by patents, copyrights 
or copy protection, but it cannot be perfectly exercised. Sometimes, information and 
knowledge are regarded as public goods, i.e. that they are to a large extent non-
excludable and exhibit a natural externality. While this may be true for ‘common 
knowledge’, it cannot be a general property of newly developed knowledge. Romer 
(1990a) states that because technological advance comes from things that people do, 
these people must see a benefit somewhere to their actions. These benefits consist of 
monopoly rents that can only be enjoyed because the information and knowledge 
developed are at least partially excludable. Still, it is difficult to protect information 
and knowledge from others. Patents for example give a temporary form of 
ownership, but also imply complete disclosure of the information, which means that 
competitors can easily copy it and use it with some minor changes to their own 
advantage. Knowledge and information are therefore known to generate spillover 
effects.  
 
Information and knowledge are often self-generative (Glazer, 1991), which means 
that new relevant information and knowledge may emerge from the business process 
as additional output besides the normal output of products and services. The use of 
information and knowledge may therefore lead to improvement of existing 
information and knowledge and to the acquisition of new information and 
knowledge, which Arrow (1962) refers to as learning. The improved or newly 
generated information and knowledge can be subsequently used as an input factor in 
the process. This causes information and knowledge accumulation. 
 
The abovementioned economic characteristics of information and knowledge endow 
them with the possibility of an inherent increasing marginal productivity when used 
as input factors. Indivisibility and especially non-rivalry make for the unique cost 
structure of product and processes characterized by high fixed costs and very low 
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marginal costs. As we saw in section 5.4.1 such a cost structure causes large scale 
effects. The partial excludability aspect makes for two different effects. On the one 
hand, the excludability can result in large benefits, because the rents will be 
monopoly rents, but the replication costs of information or knowledge will be close 
to zero. This means that extending production becomes very lucrative, as can be 
seen, e.g., in the software market or the market for popular music. On the other hand, 
the fact that information and knowledge are often not completely excludable causes 
spillovers that may be regarded as a source of exogenous learning. The self-
generating aspect of information and knowledge means that information and 
knowledge do not exhibit decreasing returns to use, but will often increase in value 
the more they are used. This means that information and knowledge are the engines 
that keep autonomous learning effects and endogenous technological change going. 
 
We may conclude that the information and knowledge intensity of products and 
processes is an important cause of firm-based increasing returns. This does not 
automatically imply that increasing returns will be realized in the production of 
goods and service, as information and knowledge will always be used in combination 
with other input factors that have diminishing marginal productivity, but it certainly 
enlarges increasing returns opportunities. 
 
Let us return to the general transformation function we showed in figure 5.1. The 
position of the point of inflection is determined by the characteristics of the input 
factors. The input factors capital and physical labor are mostly characterized by 
diminishing marginal productivity. This means that after a certain point deploying 
extra capital and physical labor will show diminishing returns. Contrary to capital 
and physical labor, the input factors information and knowledge are mostly 
characterized by increasing marginal productivity. This means that firm-based 
increasing returns will be more pervasive than firm-based diminishing returns in 
information and knowledge intensive processes. This pervasiveness of firm-based 
increasing returns is a consequence of the economic characteristics of information 
and knowledge mentioned above. In summary, the ratio between information and 
knowledge as input factors and capital and physical labor as input factors, determines 
the extent to which diminishing returns, or increasing returns occur in the business 
process, i.e., it determines the position of the point of inflection in the transformation 
function.  
 
Prevailing economic logic considers capital and physical labor to be the most 
important input factors in the business process. Following this logic the point of 
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inflection in the transformation function is located towards the lower left corner (see 
the left side of figure 5.9). After a short interval of increasing returns, the diminishing 
marginal productivity of capital and physical labor will cause diminishing returns, or 
a less than proportionate output of products and services. This implies that the range 
within which increasing returns can be exploited is rather small. The logic of 
increasing returns considers information and knowledge to be the most important 
input factors of the business process. Consistent with this logic the point of inflection 
in the transformation function is located to the upper right corner (see the right side 
of figure 5.9). This means that the range in which increasing returns can be exploited 
is much larger in these information and knowledge intensive processes than in 
business processes that are capital and physical labor intensive.  
 
Input
Output
Range to exploit
firm-based 
increasing returns
Range to exploit
firm-based 
diminishing returns
Inflection point
Information and knowledge 
intensive process
Input
Output
Range to exploit
firm-based 
increasing returns
Range to exploit
firm-based 
diminishing returns
Inflection point
Capital and labor 
intensive process
 
Figure 5-9: The shape of the transformation function for capital and labor intensive 
processes versus information and knowledge intensive processes 
 
5.5 Firm strategies for internalizing the potential for scale and learning 
effects 
In section 4.5 we argued that the presence of market-based increasing returns 
determines the potential for scale and learning effects. Individual firms may 
internalize this potential in various ways, i.e., by (1) making the right strategic 
choices, (2) fighting the battle for the technological standard, (3) influencing 
customers’ and competitors’ expectations, (4) avoiding lock-out situations, (5) 
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shaping network competition and (6) exploiting the installed base. These will be 
discussed below. 
 
5.5.1 Making the right strategic choices: shaper, follower or reserving the right to 
play 
A firm can to some extent choose the market in which it wants to operate. This 
means that the firm can choose a market in which market-based increasing returns 
are likely to be present. Once the firm operates in such a market, however, it cannot 
fully determine the market outcomes. As an individual firm, it likely cannot 
completely control technology battles, because it will be impossible to predict 
accurately the scope of network effects and social interaction effects and the 
consequences thereof. Moreover, there will likely be an element of chance playing a 
role. A firm can also, to a certain extent, determine the firm-based increasing returns 
intensity of its own products and processes; needless to say that this will not be easy, 
as it may involve a reconsideration of the core activities and the business concept. In 
other words, there is a strong element of path dependence in both the markets in 
which the firm competes and in the firm’s core business. Even when it is in theory 
possible to change these, many firms will choose not to. 
 
Still, to be successful in a market where network and social interaction effects are 
present and with products and processes that have large potential scale and learning 
effects play an important role, firms can follow different strategies. While firm 
strategies are also path dependent, they are much less fixed than markets and core 
activities and they may change between business cycles. Therefore, choice of 
strategic approach will in a certain market, and with certain core activities, influence 
firm performance. Firms may follow three increasing returns strategies in such 
circumstances. The first two, shaper and follower, are mentioned by Hagel (1996), 
the third, reserving the right to play, is mentioned by Coyne & Subramaniam (1996). 
 
First, firms can choose to follow a shaper strategy by sponsoring their own 
proprietary technology that will generate high returns if it becomes dominant in the 
market (Besen & Farrell, 1994; Shapiro & Varian, 1999). These firms therefore enjoy 
the largest potential for scale and learning effects for the products based on this 
technology. However, such a strategy is both costly and risky, which means that only 
a few firms can afford to develop and implement such a strategy.  
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Second, firms can choose to follow an adapter, or follower, strategy (Besen & 
Farrell, 1994; Hagel, 1996). Such a strategy involves joining the dominant 
technology by acquiring a license for developing products based on this technology. 
In a situation where the firm is not a sponsor of the dominant technology, it may 
nevertheless profit from the potential for scale and learning effects created by the 
dominant technology. Not by competing with the dominant product or technology, 
i.e., not by focusing on substitution, but by: 
• offering a product or technology that is compatible with the dominant 
product or technology allows the firm to make a connection to the dominant 
technology network (Brynjolfsson & Kemerer, 1996; Gandal, 1995). In this 
way, these firms can capitalize on direct network effects and in this way 
exploit the potential for scale and learning effects created by the dominant 
technology. 
• offering products or technologies that are complementary to, i.e., are used 
together with, the dominant product or technology (Katz and Shapiro, 
1986). In this way these firms may capitalize on indirect network effects. 
 
For firms following an adapter strategy the asymmetrical division of market shares 
implies that the potential for scale and learning effects is smaller than for shapers. 
Moreover, for these firms the decision which group of suppliers to join is essential to 
avoid a lock-out situation, i.e., a situation in which the technology that the firm has 
invested in or committed to does not become the market standard.  
 
Third, to avoid such a lock-out situation, firms can choose to postpone the decision to 
commit themselves to a technology network until it becomes clear which technology 
network will dominate the market. This strategy of reserving the right to play means 
that firms do all that is necessary to create or keep open opportunities in order to 
acquire a favorable position at a later stage (Coyne & Subramaniam, 1996). This is 
not unlike a real options approach to strategy, see, e.g., Amram & Kulatilaka (1999). 
 
5.5.2 Fighting the battle for the technological standard 
Firms often engage in battles for the technological standards that frequently occur in 
increasing returns markets (Shapiro & Varian, 1998; 1999). An important question 
managers have to ask themselves is in what way their firm should participate in the 
battle for the technological standard. They can do this by sponsoring a technology, 
either by themselves or by forming a coalition of firms adhering to the same 
technology. Winning such a battle requires enormous R&D and marketing 
Firm-based increasing returns 
169 
expenditures to develop the technology and to build critical mass. This means that 
for most firms it will be financially impossible to fight this battle in more than one 
market. In other words, financial constraints often force firms that want to set a 
technological standard to adopt a focus strategy, i.e., focusing on a limited target 
market. 
 
It is imperative to build critical mass as fast as possible to successfully implement 
such a focus strategy. This makes customers more confident in the firm’s product and 
technology and it makes the technology more attractive for suppliers of 
complementary products. It is not necessary to be the first to reach the market, but 
rather to be the first to reach critical mass through the reduction of market 
penetration time. The crucial management question is: When to enter the market? On 
the one hand, being firs to market is a high-risk strategy, especially in markets that 
develop irregularly (Schilling, 1998). The firm might end up making huge 
investments in what later turns out to be a losing technology. On the other hand, not 
being first to market entails the risk of being too late. A competitor may already have 
created enough critical mass to set his technology as the market standard. The risk 
that a competitor has already set a technological standard may be reduced by 
shortening the market penetration time, or time to critical mass, of the firm’s own 
technology. Nevertheless, engaging in a battle for a technological standard in a single 
market remains a high-risk activity. The focus strategy may yield high returns where 
winner takes all, but it may also result in huge losses where loser gets nothing. 
 
An alternative strategy is not to engage in the battle for the technological standard, 
but to become an early follower of the winning technology. In this case, the bulk of 
the investments in technology development and critical mass building are left to the 
firm that sets the standard. The follower may enter the market by simply buying a 
license. This strategy allows the firm to compete in multiple markets simultaneously. 
Such a strategy reduces the financial risks, but will also yield more modest returns. 
 
5.5.3 Influencing expectations 
Whether critical mass is reached is highly dependent on the behavior and 
expectations of suppliers, both competitors and suppliers of complementary products, 
and customers in the market due to social interaction effects. Management can take 
these social interaction effects for granted, but it is also possible to stimulate and 
steer social interaction effects in the market. This is often referred to as expectations 
management (Shapiro & Varian, 1998). Examples of expectations management are 
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time pacing48, product pre-announcements, limited product rollouts, working with 
pre-launch versions of products, e.g., the beta releases in the software industry, and 
generating free publicity around products. 
 
5.5.4 Avoiding lock-out situations 
Information and knowledge intensive markets are often locked in to the technology 
of the dominant network. This implies that firms that did not invest in this 
technology are locked out (Schilling, 1998). It is often not possible to predict if and 
when such a lock-out situation will occur. When a firm stays behind, it will find itself 
constantly adapting. It is caught up in a back fight. When a firm finds itself in such a 
situation, the most sensible thing for its management to do is to regard the 
investments made in the locked-out technology as sunk costs and take the loss. This 
is for example what Philips did when its joint venture with Lucent Technologies in 
the cellular phone market turned out to be a failure. In practice however, it is difficult 
for managers to write off large investments as sunk costs. Often they decide further 
to develop the locked-out technology, reasoning that in this way at least some of the 
investment may be recovered. This reasoning is not unlike that of the casino gambler 
who keeps on gambling just to earn back the money already lost. 
 
Limiting the damage of lock-out situations by timely taking financial losses is of 
great importance. It saves crucial resources that can be deployed to find a profitable 
connection with the dominant technological network. The resources saved can also 
be used to break into a locked-in market with a new technology. However, breaking 
into a market with a locked-in technology may be very difficult, because the locked-
in technology has the advantage of a large installed base, which means that it enjoys 
strong network and social interaction effects. Breaking into a locked-in market 
requires a sufficient number of customers, competitors and suppliers of 
complementary products willing to invest in the new technology to build critical 
mass. To convince customers to switch to the new technology, it must offer them a 
considerably better value proposition (Farrell & Saloner, 1986). To convince 
suppliers to switch to the new technology, it must offer them a considerably better 
market potential than the locked-in technology. Building sufficient critical mass for 
the new technology requires substantial resources. Therefore, firms that try to break 
into a locked-in market need ‘deep pockets’. On balance, the result may be increasing 
                                                          
48 Time-pacing means setting the rhythm of your market, e.g., the rhythm with new products or 
new technologies are introduced (see Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998). 
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returns to adoption of the new technology, but possibly at the cost of a diminishing 
return to investment. 
 
5.5.5 Competition on the network level 
A lock-out situation may occur because managers keep thinking on the product level, 
while the real competitive battle in the market takes place on the network level. High 
product quality, attractive design and low prices are just the ‘green fee’ for 
competing on the network level, but provide no guarantee for a competitive 
advantage. Managers may endanger investments on the product level by not 
explicitly taking the network level into account. An example is the word processing 
software that was claimed to be superior on the product level, i.e., WordPerfect, but 
which acquired only a small market share because it was not fully compatible with 
the dominant network of word processing software, i.e., Microsoft Word. 
 
5.5.6 Exploiting the installed base 
As stated before, network competition is not so much a matter of being first to 
market but rather of being first to critical mass. This also means that all costs until 
critical mass is reached may be regarded as fixed costs, i.e., costs that have to be 
made in any case to sell successfully the firm’s products in the market. As with other 
fixed costs, once incurred, the name of the game is to sell as many products as 
possible to recover them. Or, once a technological network has reached critical mass, 
it becomes important to exploit the installed base of customers. This can be realized 
either by cross-selling complementary products or by offering low-priced upgrades to 
existing customers. A well-known example of cross selling is the Acrobat Reader 
software, which is offered free of charge by Adobe to stimulate the sales of its 
complementary Acrobat software. Offering incomplete freeware programs to 
stimulate sales of the full-specs version is another example of cross selling. Adobe 
for example offers Adobe Photoshop Elements, a downgraded version of Adobe 
Photoshop, free of charge with complementary products such as scanners, to 
stimulate the sales of the full Adobe Photoshop program. Managers have to be aware 
that offering products free of charge helps building critical mass, but does not 
contribute directly to profits. To apply cross selling effectively, it has to contribute to 
the sales of complementary products or to the realization of other strategic or tactical 
goals. An example of the latter is Microsoft and Netscape offering free Internet 
browser software with the intention of creating the dominant technological network 
in this market (Shapiro & Varian, 1998). 
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5.6 Realizing and exploiting the potential for scale and learning effects  
5.6.1 Closing the positive feedback loop 
The fact that a firm has internalized (part of) the potential for scale and learning 
effects does not automatically mean that it will actually be able to exploit scale and 
learning effects and therefore realize higher firm performance, unless there is a 
natural monopoly.49 The capability to exploit the potential for scale and learning 
effects is therefore an important determinant of firm performance.  
 
As stated before, scale effects and learning effects do not automatically mean that 
positive feedback in the firm, i.e., increasing returns, is present and certainly do not 
translate automatically into firm performance. Scale and learning effects only 
translate into increasing returns when the positive feedback loop is closed, i.e., if the 
productivity benefits acquired are optimally exploited by management. In this way, 
scale and learning effects are part of the firm conduct aspect of the structure-
conduct-performance paradigm (see figure 5.10). 
 
                                                          
49 Natural monopolies exist when the minimum effective scale of a firm is very large in 
relation to the size of the market (Scherer & Ross, 1990), or, in other words, the firm’s average 
total cost curve diminishes over the total range of output of the industry (Nicholson, 1989). In 
such a situation the presence of scale and learning effects enable one firm to ‘naturally’ corner 
the market. The early neoclassical economists (Walras, 1874; Marshall, 1890) thought that the 
presence of increasing returns to scale would automatically result in a monopoly. While this 
may be true in the pure economic analytical sense, it is not true from the management 
perspective. The fact that a firm enjoys larger scale or learning effects does not automatically 
imply that it will acquire a durable competitive advantage. Rather, other capabilities of firms, 
such as clever marketing, clever distribution strategies, or clever operating in the technology 
battle, will play an important role in acquiring competitive advantage. Therefore, natural 
monopolies may be much scarcer than the neo-classical economists thought. Examples are the 
electricity industry, the telecom industry, the postal services or the railway operations that 
have long been thought to be natural monopolies, but in which multiple firms are well able to 
operate without one of them automatically cornering the market (see also Nicholson, 1989). 
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Figure 5-10: The realization of scale and learning effects 
 
The growth of a firms’ output over time causes productivity improvements through 
scale effects and autonomous learning effects. At the same time firms can realize 
productivity improvements as the result of induced and exogenous learning effects. 
Firms can use these productivity gains to increase their output by stimulating 
additional market-demand for their products. This can be done in a number of ways.  
 
The first is to further capitalize on the strategies firms use for internalizing the 
potential for scale and learning effects. For example, firms can further capitalize on 
their shaper strategy by selling licenses, protecting their acquired position, leveraging 
the installed base into new markets and offering customers migration paths to new 
and updated products (Shapiro & Varian, 1999). Firms can further capitalize on their 
adapter strategy by exploiting the potential of scale and learning effects through 
maintaining a healthy market for complementary products or technologies. 
 
The second way for firms to exploit the potential for scale and learning effects is by 
pursuing a generic competitive strategy as described by, e.g., Porter (1980, 1985) or 
Van Asseldonk (1998). In such strategies, the productivity gain from scale and 
learning effects is used to win market share by: (1) offering products at lower prices 
than competitors for equivalent benefits, i.e., a volume-efficiency strategy or by: (2) 
providing customers with unique benefits at higher prices than competitors, i.e., a 
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volume-differentiation strategy. Either one of these strategies allows productivity 
gains and growth of output to cause a positive feedback loop because the additional 
demand results in a higher market share, higher output growth and hence higher 
productivity growth. 
 
5.6.2 Generic strategies for value creation 
Firms can choose from three dominant value drivers for shaping their generic 
strategies to create value, i.e., volume, efficiency and differentiation (Van Asseldonk, 
1998). 
 
Volume: Some firms choose volume as the dominant driver for value creation. Such 
firms often focus on strong autonomous growth, often operate in growing markets 
and strive to grow faster than the market. This strategy is reflected in statements such 
as: “Our strategy is to grow by 25% per year.” With volume as the dominant driver, 
such firms manage operational efficiency and product differentiation within the 
context of their aspired volume growth.  
 
Efficiency: Other firms select efficiency as their dominant driver of value creation. 
Their strategic objective is to improve productivity by certain percentages every year. 
Quite often these firms compete in stagnating markets; they compete with other firms 
on operational excellence by investing in automation and mechanization. These firms 
try to maintain or increase their market share by offering lower prices than 
competitors. These firms create their value for the larger part by improving their cost 
structure. 
 
Differentiation: Lastly there are firms that select differentiation as their dominant 
driver of value creation. These firms emphasize product development and branding. 
They introduce new products with a higher added value either by improving product 
quality or by investing in a brand image and brand leadership. Such firms often try to 
build a broad assortment of products to serve various segments in the markets in 
which they operate. 
 
It is possible to combine the different value drivers into multiple strategies for value 
creation. When producing high volumes (volume) of standardized products 
(efficiency) a firm hopes to take advantage of economies of scale and of experience 
curve effects. When producing high volumes (volume) of differentiated products 
(differentiation) a firm hopes to provide superior value for multiple market segments 
Firm-based increasing returns 
175 
or even for individual customers. Combinations of efficiency with differentiation or 
volume with efficiency and differentiation are difficult to implement due to the 
potential for conflict between cost minimization and the additional cost of value-
added differentiation. 
 
The most dominant generic strategies according to Porter (1980) are the cost-
leadership strategy (volume-efficiency), the differentiation strategy (volume-
differentiation) and the focus strategy (efficiency or differentiation focused on niche 
markets). Firms may pursue a cost-leadership strategy with low-priced products or 
they may pursue a differentiation strategy by using the cost advantage to offset the 
cost required to improve their product proposition.  
 
A volume-efficiency or focus-efficiency strategy requires a no-frills product that is 
produced at a relatively low cost and made available to a very large customer base. 
The cost advantage is used to win market share by pricing the product lower than 
competing products. By winning market share and producing higher volumes of 
products firms hope to take even more advantage of economies of scale and 
experience curve effects. The cost advantage may also be used to invest in 
organization-wide process improvements, thereby reducing cost even further. 
Maintaining an efficiency strategy hence requires a continuous search for cost 
reductions in all aspects of the business. The associated distribution strategy is to 
obtain the most extensive distribution possible. Promotional strategies often involve 
trying to make a virtue out of low cost product features. To be successful a volume-
efficiency strategy requires building up a considerable market share advantage and 
preferential access to raw materials, components, labor, or some other important 
input. Without these advantages competitors can easily mimic an efficiency strategy. 
Successful implementation also benefits from process engineering skills, products 
designed for ease of manufacture, sustained access to inexpensive capital, close 
supervision of labor, tight cost control and incentives based on quantitative targets 
 
A volume-differentiation or focus-differentiation strategy uses productivity gains to 
create a product that is perceived to be unique. The unique features or benefits should 
provide superior value for customers. It is through this creation of superior value for 
customers that firms win market share. By winning market share and producing 
higher volumes of products firms take even more advantage of economies of scale 
and learning effects, and because customers see the product as unrivalled and 
unequalled, the price elasticity of demand tends to be reduced and customers tend to 
be more loyal. This enables firms to adopt a premium pricing strategy. Besides, 
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learning-by-doing may result in product improvements, thereby better tailoring 
products to specific customer needs and realizing superior customer value relative to 
other firms. To maintain this strategy firms should also have strong research and 
development skills, strong product engineering skills, strong creativity skills, good 
cooperation with distribution channels, strong marketing skills, incentives based 
largely on subjective measures, be able to communicate the importance of the 
differentiating product characteristics, stress continuous improvement and innovation 
and attract highly skilled and creative people.  
 
The strategies of volume-efficiency and volume-differentiation will be rewarded with 
a rise of market share, provided of course that the competition is unable to do the 
same. This is important because market share is a major determinant of net profit 
(Szymanski, Bharadway & Varadarajan, 1993). The exact size and duration of 
superior performance depends on whether the price reduction is smaller than the cost 
advantage that creates efficiency and whether the price premium offsets the 
additional costs associated with the differentiating product features. Implementation 
of either strategy will nevertheless strengthen the positive relationship between 
productivity growth and performance growth. 
 
5.6.3 Relationship of the exploitation of the potential with firm performance 
The exploitation of scale and learning effects will become manifest in firm 
performance because output, prices and costs are known determinants of firm 
performance. By realizing scale and learning effects, the volume-efficient firm 
achieves a higher output with a better unit margin and prices lower than those of 
competitors and the volume-differentiated firm achieves a higher output with a better 
unit margin and prices higher than those of its competitors. Thus both strategies 
improve firm performance versus the performance of competing firms that do not 
realize scale and learning effects to the same extent. 
 
Firms can realize product performance from the realization of scale and learning 
effects by embedding the realized economies of scale and learning effects in their 
product strategy. Managers can improve customer satisfaction and acceptance by 
improving on product quality and innovativeness and/or by lowering product prices. 
This will raise sales and extend the firm’s market share. 
 
Firms can realize organizational performance through the realization of scale and 
learning effects. The realization of scale effects is not necessarily restricted to 
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specific products but may enable a firm to realize economies of scope (Teece, 1980). 
The realization of learning effects allows firms to realize product and process 
improvements and spread best practices throughout the organization.  
 
5.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter we looked at the firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns and the 
way the firm uses these mechanisms to improve its performance as the firm conduct 
aspect of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm. 
 
The firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns are scale effects and learning 
effects. Scale effects are defined broadly, to incorporate economies of scale, scope 
and sequence and to be clearly distinguished from the economic conventions of 
increasing returns and increasing returns to scale. Learning effects are also defined 
broadly to incorporate induced, exogenous and autonomous learning effects, the last 
being divided into learning-by-doing and endogenous technological change. Scale 
and learning effects only become increasing returns in our definition when they are 
specifically used by the firm to generate even larger scale and learning effects, in 
other words, when the firm is able to close the positive feedback loop. Without 
intentional action by the firm, scale and learning effects will eventually die out and 
hence will not cause increasing returns. Besides intentional firm action, the 
information and knowledge intensity of products and processes are the most 
important conditions influencing the extent of scale and learning effects. 
 
Following the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, firm-based increasing 
returns are the result of the firm’s internalization of market potential for scale and 
learning effects and the subsequent realization of this potential. The extent to which 
firms are able to do so is influenced by the strategic choices they make, e.g., whether 
they choose a shaper strategy, a follower strategy or a reserving the right to play 
strategy. Firm performance is the result of the firm’s exploitation of scale and 
learning effects. Firms can do this by using the well-known generic competitive 
strategies. 
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6. FRAMEWORK & HYPOTHESES 
 
This chapter is the linch-pin between the theoretical part of the thesis, consisting of 
chapters two, three, four and five and the reports of the research projects in chapters 
seven, eight and nine. In section one of this chapter we present a research framework 
that is based on the chosen structure-conduct-performance paradigm adopted in 
chapter one, on the justification provided by the literature study of chapters two and 
three and on the conceptualizations of market-based and firm-based increasing 
returns derived from chapters four and five. On the basis of this research framework, 
the research hypotheses will be formulated in section two. These hypotheses will be 
empirically tested in three empirical studies, the research designs of which are 
discussed in section three. Measurement issues are addressed in section four and 
conclusions are provided in section five. 
 
6.1.1 Conceptual framework 
The analytical framework chosen for this thesis is the structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm. According to this paradigm, market structure influences firm performance 
through the mediating effect of firm conduct (Bain, 1959). 
 
The structure-conduct-performance paradigm has been used in chapter four and five 
to classify the market-based and firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns. We 
consider market-based mechanisms of increasing returns, i.e., network effects and 
social interaction effects, as indicators of market structure and firm-based 
mechanisms of increasing returns, i.e., scale effects and learning effects, as indicators 
of firm conduct. This implies that the market-based mechanisms of increasing returns 
are hypothesized to influence firm performance through the firm-based mechanisms 
of increasing returns. The hypothesized relationships resulting from this reasoning 
are shown in figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6-1: General research framework and hypotheses 
 
This conceptual framework reveals several relationships. First, social interaction 
effects are hypothesized to have a positive effect on network effects. Second, 
network effects and social interaction effects are hypothesized to have a positive 
effect on the firm’s potential for scale and learning effects. Third, the firm’s potential 
for scale and learning effects is hypothesized to have a positive impact on its 
realization of these effects. Fourth, realization of scale and learning effects is 
hypothesized to have a positive effect on product performance. Fifth, the realization 
of scale and learning effects is hypothesized to have a positive influence on 
organizational performance. Sixth, product performance is hypothesized to affect 
positively organizational performance. We will subsequently discuss these 
hypotheses. 
 
6.2 Research hypotheses 
6.2.1 The effect of social interaction effects on network effects 
Social interaction effects were defined in terms of information exchange and the 
formation of expectations that occur when customers and suppliers face social and 
economic network risks. Through social interactions customers and suppliers try to 
reduce these risks, by interpreting other customers’ and suppliers’ opinions and 
preferences. For individual customers, the formation of opinions and preferences will 
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likely precede their actual behavior (Katz & Shapiro, 1986; Rosenberg, 1976). The 
actual behavior of customers subsequently causes the network effect, because the 
economic value of the network increases as more customers adopt a product based on 
the same technology. Therefore we hypothesize that: 
 
(H1) the larger the social interaction effects, the larger the network effects  
 
Note that the assumption underlying this hypothesis is that social interaction effects 
are defined as the social aspect of network effects, i.e., a larger social network will 
have a positive influence on the willingness to adopt a product. Therefore the 
hypothesis is that the influence of social interaction effects on network effects will be 
positive. This is in accordance with the way social interaction effects are 
operationalized in chapters seven and eight. The hypothesis does not account for 
social interaction effects that take the form of vicious circles. In the terminology of 
Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer & Welch (1992, p.998) our social interaction effects 
therefore reflect an up cascade, but not a down cascade. 
 
6.2.2 The effect of network effects and social interaction effects on the potential for 
scale and learning effects 
The presence of network effects and social interaction effects make it more attractive 
for customers to buy products based on a particular technological standard. It also 
makes it more attractive for suppliers to adopt this technology and to offer 
compatible products. The presence of network effects and social interaction effects 
will therefore cause a technology standards battle with an a priori uncertain outcome.  
 
This standards battle is likely to be won by only one of the competing technologies, 
i.e., there are multiple possible equilibria (Farrell & Saloner, 1985; 1986; Katz & 
Shapiro, 1985; 1986; Arthur, 1989; Besen & Farrell, 1994). The winning technology 
will dominate the market, which means that the potential market for products based 
on this technology is very large. In other words, there will be a large potential for 
scale and learning effects in the market due to the expected scale of production for 
the products based on the winning technology.  
 
The standards battle also means that competition will take place at the level of the 
technology network. This enables firms to offer products or technologies that are 
compatible with and complementary to the dominant technology, resulting in a 
potential for scale and learning effects for those firms. 
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A further consequence of network effects and social interaction effects is the 
possibility for a technology to gain popularity very fast once it has gained an initial 
edge in the market (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1997; Katz & Shapiro, 1994; Besen 
& Farrell, 1994). This is due to excess momentum and path dependence. The fast-
increasing popularity means that not only the scale of production for products based 
on the technology can be quickly increased, enabling scale effects, but also that the 
cumulative production of these products increases fast, enabling learning effects.  
 
Once customers have made their purchase, they will not easily switch to another 
technology, because of the investments and learning costs related to this specific 
technology (Arthur, 1989). This is due to lock-in and excess inertia. These effects 
may benefit a dominant incumbent technology by creating entry barriers in the 
market. Firms may therefore expect a stable group of customers that will remain 
loyal to the dominant technology. In other words, there is a market potential for scale 
and learning effects for the product based on the dominant technology. Therefore we 
hypothesize: 
 
(H2) the larger the (a) network effects and (b) social interaction effects, 
the larger the potential for scale and learning effects  
 
6.2.3 The effect of the potential for scale and learning effects on the realization of 
scale and learning effects 
The fact that there are multiple equilibria in the market and that there is a very 
asymmetric distribution of market shares, creating a potential for scale and learning 
effects, does not automatically mean that all individual firms will be able to 
internalize this potential. On the contrary, in a winner-take-all market there is only 
one winner and many losers. To be successful in increasing returns markets, firms 
can follow different strategies. They can choose to follow a shaper strategy by 
developing an own proprietary technology to appropriate all the returns (Besen & 
Farrell, 1994; Hagel, 1996; Shapiro & Varian, 1999). However, such a strategy is 
both costly and risky, which means that only a few firms can afford to develop and 
implement it. An alternative, known as an adapter, or follower, strategy, is to join 
the winning technology by acquiring a license for developing products based on this 
technology (Hagel, 1996).  
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By choosing either a shaper or a follower strategy firms are able to internalize the 
potential for scale and learning effects. Furthering our argument, presented in section 
6.2.2, they can make use of the different market outcomes. 
• As a shaper they are the main sponsor of a technology and when their 
technology becomes dominant they will internalize a large part of the 
potential for scale and learning effects in the market. Conversely, the 
potential for scale and learning effects for shaper firms that sponsor a 
loosing technology will be very small. 
• Due to the competition at network level (see above), even firms that are not 
shapers may enjoy a potential for scale and learning effects. By choosing a 
follower strategy, such firms are able to internalize part of the potential for 
scale and learning effects from the dominant technology network by selling 
compatible and complementary products or technologies. 
• Due to excess momentum and path dependence both a shaper firm 
sponsoring a dominant technology and a follower firm acquiring a license 
for this technology may expect a rapidly growing group of customers. In 
this way, they internalize part of the market potential for scale and leaning 
effects.  
• Due to excess inertia and lock-in both a shaper firm sponsoring a dominant 
technology and a follower firm acquiring a license for this technology may 
expect a stable group of customers loyal to the dominant technology. In this 
way, they internalize part of the market potential for scale and leaning 
effects. 
 
Therefore we hypothesize: 
 
(H3) the larger the potential for scale and learning effects, the higher the 
realization of scale and learning effects  
 
6.2.4 The effect of the realization of scale and learning effects on product and 
organizational performance 
As previously explained, scale and learning effects only become positive feedback 
mechanisms, i.e., increasing returns, when they are embedded in the firm’s 
competitive strategy aimed at making optimal use of the acquired efficiency gain 
(Amit, 1986; Day & Montgomery, 1983). Firms may use the realized efficiency gain 
in different ways, for example for the pursuit of a cost-leadership strategy with low-
priced products, or for the pursuit of a differentiation strategy with products that 
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deliver superior customer value. Either way, such a strategy will improve product 
performance versus the performance of products of competitors that do not realize 
scale and learning effects to the same extent. Besides, learning-by-doing may result 
in product improvements, thereby better tailoring products to specific customer needs 
and realizing superior customer value relative to other firms. Thus we hypothesize 
that: 
 
(H4) the higher the realization of scale and learning effects, the higher the 
level of product performance  
 
Analogous to the effect on product performance, realizing scale and learning effects 
may cause positive feedback in the firm when used for achieving organization-wide 
process improvements (Hatch & Mowery, 1998). Through better efficiency and 
higher effectiveness, these improvements result in better market outcomes in terms of 
sales growth, market share (Makadok, 1999) and new products. This in turn causes 
higher operational cash flows, higher profits and better returns on investment. Hence 
we hypothesize that: 
 
(H5) the higher the realization of scale and learning effects, the higher the 
level of organizational performance  
 
For many firms organizational performance is, to a large extent, determined by the 
performance of a few primary products, i.e., products with a high market share. The 
rationale is that there is a positive relationship between the market shares of the 
firm’s primary products and organizational performance. Market share as an 
antecedent of organizational performance is consistent with the profitability models 
proposed in numerous empirical studies; see Capon, Farley & Hoenig (1990) for an 
overview. The relationship is grounded in: (1) efficiency theory, i.e., the cost 
efficiencies for firms with higher market shares through a downward sloping cost 
experience curve, (2) market power theory, i.e., firms with higher market shares 
exercising market power to set prices, obtain inputs at lower costs and extract 
concessions from channel members and (3) product assessment theory, i.e., 
customers use market share as a signal for product quality and a product’s 
widespread acceptance as an indicator of superior quality. Although the 
organizational performance impact of primary products may not hold universally, a 
meta-analysis performed by Szymanski, Bharadwaj & Varadarajan (1993) reveals 
that on average market share has a significant and positive effect on organizational 
performance. That primary products with high market shares are typically more 
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profitable than those with lower market shares is also one of the more robust findings 
from the PIMS-project (Buzzell & Gale, 1987). Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
 
(H6) the higher the level of product performance, the higher the level of 
organizational performance  
 
An indication of which hypothesis is tested in which empirical study, is provided in 
section 6.3, table 6.2. 
 
6.3 Research design 
According to Churchill & Iacobucci (2002) we can distinguish four types of research 
design: exploratory, descriptive, explanatory and predictive. These can be looked 
upon as stages in a continuous process (Churchill & Iacobucci, 2002) in which 
exploratory studies are often seen as the initial step. This step generates tentative 
explanations or hypotheses that serve as specific guides to descriptive, explanatory or 
predictive studies. 
 
Descriptive and explanatory research designs have been used in this thesis. First the 
concepts to be studied have been described using literature study. A research model 
and hypotheses have been formulated on the basis of these preliminary ideas. 
Subsequently, the relationships between the concepts, i.e., the testing of hypotheses, 
have been explained by means of three empirical studies. 
 
6.3.1 First empirical study 
In the first empirical study, a cross-sectional management survey among 257 Dutch 
industrial firms was conducted to collect primary data. The survey method is 
especially appropriate to address ‘what’ type research questions (Yin, 1994). As this 
type of question is put forward in the central problem of this thesis and in the 
research questions, it is appropriate to use the survey method in the testing phase of 
this thesis. A possible drawback of the cross-sectional survey method is that cause 
and effect are measured at the same time, which means that we should be careful in 
drawing conclusions about causal relationships. This can be overcome by a firm 
theoretical grounding of the hypothesized relationships. The main argument for 
applying the cross-sectional survey method is that it enables the detection of 
differences between industries. This is especially important because information and 
knowledge intensive industries and industries with high economic and social 
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interdependence are expected to be more increasing returns sensitive than industries 
with low information and knowledge intensity and low economic and social 
interdependence. The first empirical study will address the complete conceptual 
framework. See figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6-2: Research framework first empirical study 
 
6.3.2 Second empirical study 
The second empirical study was another cross-sectional management survey, this 
time among 36 large Dutch based firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, 
combined with objective measurement of these firms’ financial data. The sample for 
this study was a subset of the sample that was used for the third empirical study. This 
study focused on collecting subjective data on the market-based mechanisms of 
increasing returns through the survey and on measuring the firm-based mechanisms 
of increasing returns and firm performance by objective financial data. Analogous to 
the first empirical study, the second one also addressed the market structure, the firm 
conduct and the firm performance parts of the generic research framework, all 
measured over a period of five years. This makes for a comparative static research 
design, which enables us to draw causal inferences about the hypothesized 
relationships, albeit still with some care. This empirical study was focused on the 
relationship between network and social interaction effects, between network effects 
and the potential for scale and learning effects, between the potential and the 
realization of scale and learning effects and between the realization of scale and 
learning effects and firm performance. See figure 6.3. 
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Figure 6-3: Research framework second empirical study 
 
6.3.3 Third empirical study 
In the third study, an analysis of the Verdoorn law and of the productivity-
performance relationship was conducted for 118 large Dutch-based firms listed on 
the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. The data of the firm-based mechanisms of 
increasing returns and firm performance were based on existing objective data 
sources, i.e., financial data derived from annual reports. This study specifically 
addressed the firm conduct and firm performance parts of the generic research 
framework. It focused on the relationship between the potential and the realization of 
scale and learning effects and on the consequences of the realization of scale and 
learning effects for firm performance. The analysis was dynamic, enabling causal 
inferences about the hypothesized relationships of the research model. See figure 6.4. 
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Figure 6-4: Research framework third empirical study 
 
6.3.4 Relations between the studies 
To discuss how these three studies are related, we will use the concept of 
triangulation, which is defined by Jick (1979)50 as the combination of multiple 
methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon. There are generally two kinds 
of triangulation: between-methods and within-method. Between-methods 
triangulation is used for cross-validation when two or more distinct methods are 
found to be congruent and yield comparable data. Within-method triangulation uses 
multiple techniques within a given method to collect and interpret data. As Jick 
(1979, p.603) states: “[…] ‘within-method’ triangulation essentially involves cross-
checking for internal consistency or reliability while ‘between-method’ triangulation 
tests the degree of external validity.” 
 
Both within-method and between-method triangulation are present in this thesis. The 
within-method triangulation becomes clear by comparing the first and second 
empirical studies. In the survey part of both studies, the scales used to measure 
market-based forms or increasing returns are essentially the same, though in the 
second survey study they are converted to comparative static measures. The two 
survey studies addressed different, independent samples. The sample for the first 
study was a random selection of Dutch firms in industrial and information 
technology industries. The sample for the second study consisted of Dutch firms 
listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and comprised a broader array of industries 
than the first survey study. In this way, the two studies could be used to crosscheck 
                                                          
50 Jick (1979) quotes this definition from Norman K. Denzin (1978, p.291), The Research Act 
– 2nd edition, New York, McGraw-Hill. 
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for internal consistency of the scales and reliability of the measurement of the 
market-based increasing returns mechanisms. 
  
The between-method aspects become clear by comparing the first empirical study 
with the third empirical study. While starting from the same basic research model, 
there are some marked differences in the collection and analysis of the data: 
• in the first study the research design was static, whereas that of the third was 
dynamic 
• in the first study we used subjective scales for the measures of the firm-
based forms of increasing returns and firm performance, whereas in the 
third study we used publicly available financial data to do so 
• for the analysis of the response on the first survey study, the research model 
was estimated using structural equation modeling; regression analysis was 
used for estimating the relationships in the third study 
 
Thus, the first and the third study can be used to crosscheck for the firm-based 
increasing returns mechanisms and for the implications on firm performance. 
Together, the second and third empirical studies can be used to cross-validate the 
results of the first empirical study. 
 
We may conclude that on a continuum of triangulation design from primitive and 
simple to complex and holistic (Jick, 1979) our thesis is somewhere in the middle. In 
this thesis we try to strike a balance between on the one hand testing the reliability of 
the measures and the hypothesized model relationships and on the other searching for 
external validation of these measures and relationships. 
 
6.3.5 Summary research design and hypotheses addressed 
The tables 6.1 and 6.2 below summarize the research designs of the different studies 
and the hypotheses addressed in each. 
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Study: First empirical study: 
cross-sectional 
management survey 
(chapter 7) 
Second empirical 
study:  
management survey 
and financial 
measurements  
(chapter 8) 
Third empirical 
study:  
Verdoorn law and 
productivity-
performance analysis 
(chapter 9) 
Aspects of 
research model 
addressed 
- Market-based 
  mechanisms  
- Firm-based 
  mechanisms 
- Product 
  performance 
- Organizational 
  performance) 
- Market-based 
  mechanisms  
- Firm-based 
  mechanisms 
- Firm  
  performance 
- Firm-based  
  mechanisms 
- Firm  
  performance 
 
Data collected Primary data 
(telephone survey) 
Primary data  
(mail survey) and 
secondary data 
(publicly available 
financial data) 
Secondary data 
(publicly available 
financial data) 
Measurement Subjective, 
perceptional data 
Subjective perceptional 
data and objective 
financial data 
Objective financial data 
Level of analysis Micro (firm) Micro (firm) Micro (firm) and meso 
(collection of firms) 
Time dimension Static Comparative static Dynamic 
Table 6.1: Overview of the research designs of the empirical studies 
 
Study: 
 
 
Research hypotheses: 
First 
empirical 
study 
(chapter 7) 
Second 
empirical 
study 
(chapter 8) 
Third 
empirical 
study 
(chapter9) 
H1 The larger the social interaction effects, 
the larger the network effects X X  
H2a The larger the network effects, the larger 
the potential for scale and learning 
effects 
X X  
H2b The larger the social interaction effects, 
the larger the potential for scale and 
learning effects 
X X  
H3 The larger the potential for scale and 
learning effects, the higher the realization 
of scale and learning effects 
X X X 
H4 The higher the realization of scale and 
learning effects, the higher the level of 
product performance 
X   
H5 The higher the realization of scale and 
learning effects, the higher the level of 
organizational performance 
X X X 
H6 The higher the level of product 
performance, the higher the level of 
organizational performance 
X   
Table 6.2: Overview of which of the research hypotheses are addressed in which 
empirical studies 
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6.4 Measurement 
6.4.1 Measurement of network and social interaction effects 
Our conceptualization of network effects and social interaction effects in chapter four 
was based on individual customers’ or firms’ assessments of technology network 
pay-offs, information exchange behavior and expectations formation behavior. This 
implies that network and social interaction effects should preferably be directly 
measured from the perspective of these agents, i.e., from the perspective of 
customers and suppliers. Measuring perceptions involves asking suppliers and 
customers directly about their product and technology adoption decisions. This can 
be done in different ways.  
 
The first possibility is to conduct a field survey, e.g., by mail, by telephone, through 
the internet or by face-to-face interviews. The field survey is the approach we chose 
for the first and second empirical studies. For the first study we chose to conduct a 
telephone survey, for the second study we chose to conduct a mail survey. The 
survey provided us with data on managers’ perceptions of the situation in a specific 
market. As the empirical research on increasing returns is relatively limited however, 
we found that only in two existing empirical studies was the survey method used to 
obtain a direct measurement of network and/or social interaction effects. The first 
one is the study of Hellofs & Jacobson (1999, p.21), who asked respondents by 
telephone to indicate that “When purchasing [product category name] would you (1) 
prefer that a large number of people used the same brand as you, (2) prefer that a 
very few other people purchased the same brand as you, or (3) be indifferent to the 
number of people purchasing the same brand as you?” Because this study focused on 
specific product categories, we concluded that its measurements could not be used to 
fit our survey. The second study is that of Schilling (2002); it provides items on 
availability of complementary products, i.e., indirect network effects in our 
definition. This study appeared only when our survey was already in the data 
gathering stage; therefore the measures developed in this study could not be 
incorporated in our survey. 
 
The second possibility is to conduct an experiment, e.g., a laboratory or field 
experiment or a conjoint measurement. We did not follow this approach, but we did 
conduct a literature analysis to see whether measurements that were used in studies 
following such an approach could be adapted for use in our survey. We know 
currently of three studies where direct measurement of network effects was done 
using an experimental research design. The first is again the study of Hellofs & 
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Jacobson (1999), where subjects in the experiment had to answer to three items on a 
five-point scale that intend to measure positive or negative externalities. The 
experiment in their study is used as a validation/replication of results obtained by a 
model based on indirect measurement of network effects. The study focuses on 
externalities generated by brand. The second study is that of Gupta, Jain & Sawhney 
(1999), who performed a conjoint analysis to validate their proposed consumer 
response model. The conjoint analysis measured consumers’ valuation of different 
product attributes, both hardware and software related, but limited to the market for 
digital television. The consumer response model measures indirect network effects 
only. The model thus generated provides a basis for doing a computer simulation. 
The specific focus of these first two studies prevented us from using the developed 
measurements for our purpose. The third is a study of Srinivasan, Lilien & 
Rangaswamy (2004), who used academic experts and MBA students to rate the 
degree of direct and indirect network externalities for different categories of products 
on a scale of (1) no network externalities, to (7) very high network externalities. This 
way of measurement presupposes knowledge of the concept of network externalities 
on behalf of respondents, something we could not expect in our sample of 
respondents. We therefore concluded that we could not use these measurements for 
our study. 
 
We concluded that, for our purpose, no scales were available for measuring the 
constructs of network effects, social interaction effects and market consequences and 
we therefore had to develop new scales. Srinivasan, Lilien & Rangaswamy (2004) 
confirm this conclusion. The development and validation of our newly developed 
scales will be discussed in chapters seven and eight. 
 
6.4.2 Measurement of scale and learning effects 
In chapter five we conceptualized scale effects and learning effects. We now turn to 
the question of how to measure scale and learning effects. Measurement of scale and 
learning effects can follow objective or subjective approaches. 
 
First, we can use a subjective approach to the measurement of scale and learning 
effects. This can be done by conducting a field survey asking representatives of the 
firm to give their opinion on the potential and the realization of scale and learning 
effects within their firm. This is the approach followed in the first empirical study. 
The development and validation of these measures is discussed in chapter seven.  
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Second, we can measure objectively the immediate consequences of scale and 
learning effects, i.e., the rise or fall of firm productivity, conforming to our 
definitions of scale and learning effects in sections 5.2 and 5.3, respectively. This is 
the approach that we use in the second and third empirical study. The realization of 
scale and learning effects means that a firm needs fewer inputs with respect to 
outputs. In economic terms, this means a rise in the marginal productivity of the 
combination of input factors. The main advantage of this approach is that scale and 
learning effects can be measured by objective and publicly available data. The 
development and validation of these measures is discussed in chapters eight and nine. 
 
Third, we can chart objectively firms’ average total cost curves. As we saw in 
sections 5.2 and 5.3, charting the firm’s average total cost curve at any specific 
moment allows us to measure potential scale effects and charting the shifts of the 
firm’s average total cost curve allows us to measure potential learning effects. 
Charting firms’ average total cost curves causes a measurement problem, as we have 
to know the ratio between a firm’s fixed costs and a firm’s variable costs. These data 
are generally not publicly available. Of course we could ask representatives of firms 
to provide such data. This runs into the limitation, however, that firms’ 
representatives are generally unwilling to share detailed information on their costs 
structures and, even it they would be willing to do so, it might be a practical 
impossibility for them to provide it. While the distinction between fixed and variable 
cost is conceptually straightforward and may even be calculated for a simple and 
clearly defined business process, it is unclear at the aggregate firm level which 
portion of costs should be regarded as ‘fixed’ and which as ‘variable’. The 
limitations might be overcome by conducting research on a small scale, diving 
deeply into the peculiarities of the individual firm, e.g., by conducting a case study. 
This approach does not fit with the aimed contributions of this thesis however.51 
 
Fourth, we can chart objectively firms’ experience curves to measure learning effects 
or, optionally, we can chart firms’ learning curves to measure the specific part of 
learning effect that has to do with increasing the efficiency of doing the original task. 
Charting firms’ experience curves or learning curves causes fewer problems, as the 
only thing we have to do is measure the development of average total cost over time. 
This has been done many times, since Wright (1936) first observed that the number 
of labor hours needed for the production of an airframe was a decreasing function of 
                                                          
51 Furthermore, applying methods that make us enter the ‘black box’ only makes sense when 
first the input-output relation has been validly demonstrated, i.e., by not entering the black 
box. This means creating large cross-sectional data sets. 
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the total number of airframes of the same type produced (see also Arrow, 1962) and 
since the appearance of the Boston Consulting Group report Perspectives on 
experience in 1972 (Day & Montgomery, 1983). The way of measuring the 
experience curve has usually been to test whether the log of average cost (AC) at time 
t is a linear downward sloping function of the log of cumulative volume units (V) at 
time t (Dolan & Jeuland, 1981; Day & Montgomery, 1983): 
 
Log AC(t) = a – b * log V(t) 
 
The difference between the experience curve and the learning curve is that while the 
latter reflects only the increasing efficiency of labor with respect to the original task, 
the former reflects all cost components and also includes all innovations, i.e., 
endogenous technological change, of the task. Therefore, the experience curve 
reflects our concept of learning effects much better than the learning curve. The 
experience curve, when applied at the firm level, i.e., not at the process or at the 
product level, incorporates induced and exogenous learning effects, autonomous 
learning effects and scale effects (see also Day & Montgomery, 1983; Hall & 
Howell, 1985). Induced and exogenous learning effects are reflected in the parameter 
a, whereas autonomous learning effects and scale effects are reflected in the 
parameter b. Without diving deeply into the ‘black box’, however, it is virtually 
impossible to distinguish between the cost savings caused by autonomous learning 
effects and those caused by scale effects. Therefore we did not follow this approach. 
 
6.4.3 Measurement of firm performance 
In view of our conceptualization of scale effects and learning effects, it is useful to 
distinguish between product performance and organizational performance. There are 
three reasons to measure product performance as well as organizational performance. 
The first is to measure the consequences of market-based increasing returns. While 
these effects are mainly about the dominance of product technologies, we have to 
bear in mind that customers buy products, not technologies. In other words, the 
success of the firm in either sponsoring a product technology or getting the most out 
of a license to this product technology is measured through the success or failure of 
the firm’s products based on this product technology. 
 
The second reason is that firm-based increasing returns are partly related to the 
number of products and/or the value of the output of specific products. This is 
especially true for the economies of scale part of scale effects and for the learning 
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curve part of autonomous learning effects. As previously explained, scale and 
learning effects only cause positive feedback loops when they are embedded in the 
firm’s competitive strategy aimed at making optimal use of the acquired efficiency 
gain (Alberts, 1989). Firms may use the realized efficiency gain in different ways. 
First, they may pursue a cost-leadership strategy with low-priced products. Second, 
they may decide to use the cost advantage to offset the cost required to improve 
product quality to pursue a differentiation strategy. Either way, such a strategy will 
improve product performance versus the performance of products of competitors that 
do not realize scale and learning effects to the same extent. Besides, learning-by-
doing may result in product improvements, thereby better tailoring products to 
specific customer needs and realizing superior customer value relative to other firms. 
 
Third, for many firms organizational performance is, to a large extent, determined by 
the performance of a few primary products, as described in section 6.2.4.  
 
Measuring organizational performance alongside product performance is important 
because organizational performance directly measures the economies of scope and 
economies of sequence parts of scale effects and all but the learning curve parts of 
learning effects. Apart from the effects on product performance, the realization of 
scale and learning effects may cause positive feedback loops when they are used for 
pursuing economies of scope (Teece, 1980) and sequence (Spulber, 1993) and for 
organization-wide product and process improvements (Hatch & Mowery, 1998). 
Achieving economies of scope and sequence and organization-wide product and 
process improvements will result in better organizational performance in terms of 
sales growth, market share, new products, operational cash flows, profits and return 
on investment. 
 
Organizational and product performance can be measured in different ways, either by 
measurement of objective performance data that are publicly available or supplied by 
representatives of the firm, or by measurement of the subjective opinions of 
knowledgeable persons. Subjective measures of organizational performance are 
frequently used in strategy research and have been shown to be reliable and valid 
(Dess & Robinson, 1994). 
 
Product performance and organizational performance were measured using the 
subjective opinions of representatives of the firm in the first empirical study. The 
development and validation of these measures is described in chapter seven. In the 
second and third empirical studies, organizational performance was measured using 
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publicly available objective performance data. The development and validation of 
these measures is described in chapters eight and nine. 
 
6.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter we presented the general research framework used in this thesis based 
on the structure-conduct-performance paradigm and the conceptualizations of the 
market-based and firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns from chapters four 
and five. On the basis of this research framework, hypotheses have been derived that 
will be tested in three empirical studies, described in chapters seven, eight and nine. 
The research hypotheses are shown in table 6.3, along with which hypotheses are 
tested in which empirical study. 
 
Study: 
 
 
Research hypotheses: 
First 
empirical 
study 
(chapter 7) 
Second 
empirical 
study 
(chapter 8) 
Third 
empirical 
study 
(chapter9) 
H1 The larger the social interaction effects, 
the larger the network effects X X  
H2a The larger the network effects, the larger 
the potential for scale and learning 
effects 
X X  
H2b The larger the social interaction effects, 
the larger the potential for scale and 
learning effects 
X X  
H3 The larger the potential for scale and 
learning effects, the higher the realization 
of scale and learning effects 
X X X 
H4 The higher the realization of scale and 
learning effects, the higher the level of 
product performance 
X   
H5 The higher the realization of scale and 
learning effects, the higher the level of 
organizational performance 
X X X 
H6 The higher the level of product 
performance, the higher the level of 
organizational performance 
X   
Table 6.3: Overview of the research hypotheses 
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7. REPORT FIRST EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
The research process and the results of the first empirical study of this thesis, a cross-
sectional management survey among managers of 257 Dutch manufacturing firms, 
are reported on in this chapter. 
 
The development of the measures for this survey will be described along the steps 
‘for developing better measures of marketing constructs’ as suggested by Churchill 
(1979), namely (1) specify the domain of the construct, (2) generate a sample of 
items, (3) collect data, (4) purify the measure, (5) collect data, (6) assess the 
reliability of the measure, (7) assess the validity of the measure and (8) develop a 
norm. Steps 1 through 4 are addressed in section one. Step 5 is addressed in section 
two. Steps 6 through 8 are addressed in section three. 
 
The research hypotheses formulated in section 6.2 are tested in section four. We 
report on additional tests of the model in section five. Conclusions are provided in 
section six. 
 
7.1 Development of the measures 
7.1.1 Specifying the domain of the constructs 
The first step, specifying the domain of each of the constructs was done in the 
theoretical part of the thesis. In chapter four it was determined that there are two 
market-based increasing returns mechanisms, namely network effects and social 
interaction effects We initially regarded these two mechanisms as separate 
constructs. According to the theoretical specification of network effects provided in 
chapter four, the measurement of network effects should at least address the 
following aspects: 
• measurements of direct and of indirect network effects 
• measurements at the product level and at the technology level 
• measurements of the demand side effect, i.e., customers, and of the supply 
side effect, i.e., suppliers 
 
Similarly, the measurement of social interaction effects should at least address the 
following items: 
• measurements of information contagion and of self-reinforcing expectations 
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• measurements at the product level and at the technology level 
• measurements of the demand side effect, i.e., customers, and of the supply 
side effect, i.e., suppliers 
 
In chapter five it was determined that there are two firm-based mechanisms of 
increasing returns, namely scale effects and learning effects. We initially regarded 
these two mechanisms as separate constructs. According to the theoretical 
specification of scale and learning effects provided in chapter five, an explicit 
distinction should be made between the potential for scale and learning effects and 
the realization of scale and learning effects.  
 
It was further determined, see chapters four and five, that there are a number of 
elements that could possibly influence the market-based mechanisms of increasing 
returns, the firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns, or the relationships 
between these. These elements are: complementarity, compatibility, substitution, 
path dependence, lock-in, market predictability, i.e., excess momentum or excess 
inertia, and knowledge intensity. The measurements of complementarity, 
compatibility and substitution should at least address the product and the technology 
level. 
 
Finally, to research the implications of increasing returns for performance, measures 
have to be developed for the constructs of product performance and organizational 
performance. 
 
7.1.2 Generating a sample of items 
Step two in Churchill’s (1979) procedure is generating a sample of items. As the 
amount of systematic empirical research into increasing returns is relatively limited, 
we found that for our purpose no existing measurement scales were available to 
measure the constructs of network effects, social interaction effects, scale effects and 
learning effects as we conceptualized them in chapters four and five. Consequently, 
these scales had to be newly developed. The same was true for the constructs of 
complementarity, compatibility, substitution, path dependence, lock-in, market 
predictability and knowledge intensity. Consequently, an initial pool of items was 
generated for each of these constructs, based on a literature search and on the 
theoretical specification of chapters four and five. 
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Regarding the construct of product performance, we adapted ten items from Griffin 
& Page (1996). These items comprise and extend the product performance measures 
that have been suggested in the increasing returns literature, e.g., price, quality and 
the price-quality ratio (Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1993; Gandal, 1995; Brynjolfsson & 
Kemerer, 1996; Cottrell & Koput, 1998; Hatch & Mowery, 1998), margins (Garud & 
Kumaraswamy, 1993), volume growth (Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1993; Gupta, Jain 
& Sawhney, 1999) and customer utility (Gupta, Jain & Sawhney, 1999). 
 
Regarding the construct of organizational performance we adapted seven items from 
Naman & Slevin (1993) and Slater & Narver (1994). These items comprise and 
extend the organizational performance measures that have been suggested in the 
increasing returns literature, e.g., market share (Redmond, 1991; Garud & 
Kumaraswamy, 1993; Clark & Chatterjee, 1999; Makadok, 1999), profits and 
revenues (Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1993; Arthur, 1996). 
 
7.1.3 Collecting data and purifying the measures 
Step three in the Churchill (1979) procedure is collecting initial data to pre-test and 
purify the measures. We pre-tested the questionnaire in three phases: (1) face-to-face 
interviews with five academics and ten managers, (2) a test survey among 21 
managers enabling the testing of substantive validity of the constructs (Gerbing & 
Anderson, 1991) and (3) face-to-face interviews with five academics and five 
managers. In each stage, participants identified items that were confusing, tasks that 
were difficult to respond to and any other problems they encountered when filling out 
the questionnaire. During and after each stage, as step four in the Churchill (1979) 
procedure, we revised or eliminated problematic items and developed new ones.  
 
The major adjustments during and after the first stage focused on the elimination of 
problematic items and on the development of new items. The most noteworthy 
adjustment took place within the constructs of scale effects and learning effects. 
Initially, we had generated a pool of 13 items for measuring scale effects and an 
equal number of items for measuring learning effects, each item reflecting a specific 
cost aspect. From the interviews with managers it turned out that they were unable to 
differentiate between the different cost aspects of scale effects and learning effects. 
Moreover, they found it to be very difficult to differentiate between scale effects and 
learning effects.52 It was therefore decided to reduce the measurement of scale effects 
                                                          
52 This should not come as a surprise, because, as argued in section 6.4, it is very difficult in 
practice to disentangle scale effects and learning effects. 
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to two items, reflecting scale effects on fixed and variable costs and to reduce the 
measurement of learning effects to a single item. At this stage we envisaged making 
a single three-item construct reflecting scale and learning effects. The participating 
managers reported no problems in distinguishing between the potential for scale and 
learning effects and the realization of scale and learning effects. Hence, this 
distinction was kept. 
 
The test survey in the second stage used a sampling frame of 2936 Dutch 
manufacturing firms with more than 20 employees in the specified industry sectors 
(see table 7.1). Through a telephone pre-survey of 185 randomly selected firms, 60 
firms were identified with a knowledgeable marketing manager in a position to 
generalize about patterns of behavior related to the content of inquiry. These 60 
marketing managers were sent a standardized questionnaire by mail. In answering the 
questions we asked the respondents to focus on their primary product in their 
principal served market segment. Our efforts yielded 21 usable responses, or a usable 
response rate of 35.0%. 
 
After the analysis of the test survey results, a number of important adjustments were 
made. First, we decided to use seven-point Likert scales instead of five-point scales 
for all major constructs to improve variance in answers. Second, we carefully 
examined whether the order in which questions were put had any effect on the 
answering patters. Where this was the case, the order was adjusted. Third, a number 
of control questions requiring respondents to provide detailed market share data on 
products and technologies were deleted because of high non-response. Fourth, the 
number of items to measure network effects and social interaction effects were 
reduced from 16 to 8 items each as respondents reported that these questions were 
tedious and they resorted to repeating answering patterns. We achieved this reduction 
by not longer asking respondents to answer questions on network effects and social 
interaction effects from their own and from the customer’s perspective, but only from 
their own perspective. A test for unidimensionality (Steenkamp & Van Trijp, 1991) 
using principal axis factoring with an eigenvalue of 1.0 and factor loadings of 0.40 as 
the cut-off points showed that respondents had indeed perceived the questions from 
their own perspective and from the customer’s perspective as being quite similar. 
 
During the third stage the adjustments were much smaller, indicating the 
improvement made after the previous stages. The instructions for filling out the 
questionnaire were improved, the formulations of the questions were fine-tuned to 
prevent possible misunderstandings and the questionnaire layout was optimized. By 
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the end of the third phase of pre-testing the participants reported no concerns. The 
questionnaire was therefore ready for final administration. 
 
In the final version of the questionnaire all constructs, except for knowledge 
intensity, were measured using multiple items and using seven-point Likert scales 
anchored by (1) strongly disagree and (7) strongly agree. Social interaction effects 
and network effects were each measured using eight items. The potential for scale 
effects and learning effects was measured using three items. The realization of scale 
and learning effects was also measured using three items. Complementarity and 
compatibility were each measured using two items, market predictability was 
measured using three items and substitution, path dependence and lock-in and were 
each measured using four items. Knowledge intensity was measured using three 
items, using seven point semantic differential scales. Product performance was 
measured using ten items adapted from Griffin & Page (1996) and organizational 
performance was measured using seven comparative items adapted from Naman and 
Slevin (1993) and Slater & Narver (1994). The scale items used in the final 
questionnaire are shown in Appendix I. 
 
7.2 Sample and data description 
Step five in the Churchill (1979) procedure, the collection of data, was done through 
a survey directed at managers of manufacturing firms, i.e., firms that supply tangible 
products to their customers. The sampling frame for this survey consisted of 2934 
Dutch manufacturing initial firms with more than 25 employees in a number of 
specified industry sectors (see table 7.1). The identification data of these firms were 
derived from the REACH database.53 
 
Using a telephone pre-survey among firms randomly drawn from the sampling 
frame, 998 were identified with a knowledgeable marketing manager in a position to 
generalize about patterns of behavior related to the content of inquiry. To ensure the 
suitability of the marketing managers we adopted a self-assessment of their 
knowledgeability through the telephone calls. In this telephone pre-survey, the firms’ 
identification data were also checked. It turned out that from the computer services 
and IT agencies contacted, and classified in the database as performing 
manufacturing activities, that around 40% reported performing no manufacturing 
activities. Hence, we corrected the sampling frame by removing these firms (see 
table 7.1). 
                                                          
53 Research and Analysis of Companies in Holland, Bureau van Dijk (2001). 
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Industry 
Initial 
sampling 
frame  
(2934 firms) 
Corrected 
sampling frame 
(2661 firms) 
Research 
sample  
(257 firms) 
Manufacturing of:  
- Metal products 27.5% 30.3% 31.9% 
- Machinery 26.8% 29.6% 33.9% 
- Office machinery and computers 0.8% 0.9% 0.4% 
- Electrical machinery and supplies 3.9% 4.3% 3.1% 
- Audio, video and telecommunication  2.1% 2.4% 1.2% 
- Medical instruments 6.0% 6.6% 6.2% 
- Cars, trucks and trailers 4.4% 4.8% 5.1% 
- Transport (not cars, trucks or trailers) 5.2% 5.7% 5.1% 
- Computer services and IT agencies 23.3% 15.4% 13.1% 
sum 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 7.1: Sample for the first empirical study 
 
Of the 998 identified knowledgeable marketing managers, 283 (28.4%) were willing 
to cooperate with the research. These 283 marketing managers were interviewed by 
phone using the standardized questionnaire discussed in the previous section. In 
answering the questions we asked the respondents to focus on their primary product 
in their principal served market segment. Our efforts yielded 257 usable responses, or 
a usable response rate of 25.8%.  
 
To check the representativeness of the research sample, we performed a chi-square 
analysis of the industry response distribution (Weinberg & Abramowitz, 2002). This 
analysis checks the null-hypothesis that the distribution of the research sample is 
equal to the distribution of the (corrected) sampling frame. With a significance level 
of p<0.05, our analysis showed that the null-hypothesis is not rejected (χ2=6.066, 
df=8). Therefore we conclude that the sample of firms is representative for the total 
population. 
 
A routine check for respondent bias using one-way ANOVA indicated that no 
significant differences existed in the mean responses on the main constructs across 
respondents with different levels of education and different durations of employment. 
Moreover, no industry and firm size effects existed in the mean responses on the 
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main constructs.54 Only the constructs of market predictability and knowledge 
intensity showed significant differences, reflecting a problem of the reliability of 
these scales (see further section 7.3). 
 
A time-trend extrapolation procedure was used to test for non-response bias 
(Armstrong & Overton, 1977). We divided the data set into quartiles based on the 
number of minutes it took to complete the questionnaire. The underlying rationale is 
that slow respondents are more similar to non-respondents than fast respondents. In 
comparing fast (1st quartile) and slow (4th quartile) respondents, no significant 
differences emerged in the mean responses on most of the constructs. Only on the 
construct of product performance was a significant difference detected between the 
first and the fourth quartiles. A more in-depth analysis into this construct however 
showed that no clear trend could be detected in the answering patterns.  
 
Together these results suggest that respondent, industry, firm and non-response bias 
were not a major problem. Sample characteristics are shown in tables 7.2, 7.3 and 
7.4. 
 
Number of employees firm Frequency Percent Valid 
percent 
<= 25 10 3,9% 4,0% 
26-50 72 28,0% 28,7% 
51-100 68 26,5% 27,1% 
101-200 40 15,6% 15,9% 
>200 61 23,7% 24,3% 
Missing 6 2,3%  
sum 257 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 7.2: Sample characteristics: number of employees 
                                                          
54 That is remarkable, because we expected that industry characteristics would have a major 
influence (see, e.g., Economides, 1996). 
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Respondent duration of employment 
relation 
Frequency Percent Valid 
percent 
1 year or less 39 15,2% 15,2% 
1-2 years 33 12,8% 12,9% 
2-5 years 50 19,5% 19,5% 
5-10 years 53 20,6% 20,7% 
10-20 years 52 20,2% 20,3% 
More than 20 years 29 11,3% 11,3% 
Missing 1 0,4%  
sum 257  100,0% 
Table 7.3: Sample characteristics: respondent duration of employment 
 
Respondent education 
Frequency Percent Valid 
percent 
University education 49 19,1% 19,3% 
Higher vocational education 135 52,5% 53,1% 
Intermediate vocational education 35 13,6% 13,8% 
Other 35 13,6% 13,8% 
Missing 3 1,2%  
sum 257  100,0% 
Table 7.4: Sample characteristics: respondent education 
 
7.3 Validation of the measures 
Steps six, seven and eight in the Churchill (1979) procedure involve validating the 
measures and establishing the final measures. We discuss two main aspects of 
validity, content validity and construct validity (Churchill & Iacobucci, 2002; 
Kerlinger, 1986; Churchill, 1979). Content validity focuses on the adequacy with 
which the domain of the characteristic is captured by the measure (Churchill & 
Iacobucci, 2002, p.408). It is typically assured by deriving the measures from a 
thorough literature research and by doing thorough pre-tests of the measures. Content 
validity has been addressed in section 7.1. Construct validity is directly concerned 
with the question what the instrument is measuring (Churchill & Iacobucci, 2002, 
p.409). The different aspects of construct validity, i.e., unidimensionality, reliability, 
within-method convergent validity and discriminant validity (Churchill & Iacobucci, 
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2002; Steenkamp & Van Trijp, 1991; Kerlinger, 1986; Churchill, 1979) will be 
discussed below. Each of these aspects is a necessary condition for a construct to be 
valid. 
 
7.3.1 Unidimensionality 
To assess the unidimensionality of the scales, we computed the inter-item 
correlations and corrected item-to-total correlations for each item, taking one 
subscale at a time (Steenkamp & Van Trijp, 1991). We eliminated three items from 
the product performance construct and one item from the market predictability 
construct for which these correlations were not significant. The dimensionality of 
each purified scale was explored with maximum likelihood factoring using an 
eigenvalue of 1.0 and factor loadings of 0.30 as the cut-off points. This resulted in 
the purified measures shown in table 7.5. 
 
Unidimensionality of 
the scales 
No. of 
items 
deleted 
No. of 
items 
remai-
ning 
Lowest 
item-to-
total 
correlation 
Eigen- 
value 
(ML 
factoring) 
Variance 
explained 
Network effects products 0 4 0.48 2.29 44.3% 
Network effects 
technologies  
0 4 0.62 2.79 59.9% 
Social interaction effects 
products 
0 4 0.59 2.61 53.7% 
Social interaction effects 
technologies 
0 4 0.67 2.86 62.2% 
Potential for scale and 
learning effects 
0 3 0.28 1.69 38.1% 
Realization of scale and 
learning effects 
0 3 0.32 1.99 57.1% 
Product performance 3 7 0.29 2.43 29.3% 
Organizational 
performance 
0 7 0.62 4.37 56.1% 
Substitution effects 0 4 0.42 2.12 40.0% 
Lock-in effects 0 4 0.53 2.39 47.4% 
Path dependence 0 4 0.47 2.44 49.7% 
Market predictability 1 2 0.31 n.a. n.a. 
Product complementarity 
and compatibility 
0 2 0.34 n.a. n.a. 
Technology 
complementarity and 
compatibility 
0 2 0.45 n.a. n.a. 
Knowledge intensity of 
product 
0 3 0.25 1.40 20.2% 
Table 7.5: Unidimensionality of the scales 
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The unidimensionality of each purified scale was subsequently tested by estimating 
confirmatory factor models using maximum likelihood estimation in LISREL 8.3 
(Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1999), following Steenkamp & Van Trijp (1991). We chose to 
estimate five models to be able to fit the constraints of a five-to-one ratio of sample 
size to parameter estimates (Baumgartner & Homburg, 1996). Following Kumar & 
Dillon (1987), Steenkamp & Van Trijp (1991) state that the overall fit of the model 
provides the necessary and sufficient information to determine the unidimensionality. 
We examined the values of the standardized residuals to identify misspecifications of 
the measurement models. This resulted in a re-specification of the constructs 
regarding network effects and social interactions effects, into an integral second-
order measurement model. In table 7.6 the results of this integral second-order 
measurement model are presented. The second-order measurement model for 
network effects comprised network effects on the product level and network effects 
on the technology level. Similarly, the second-order measurement model for social 
interaction effects comprises social interaction effects at the product level and social 
interaction effects at the technology level. The first-order constructs for network 
effects at the product level, network effects at the technology level, social interaction 
effects at the product level and social interaction effects at the technology level 
remained as in the statistical analysis. However, these first-order constructs have now 
been estimated on the basis of the integral second-order measurement model. 
 
The LISREL analysis also resulted in a re-specification of the constructs of 
substitution and lock-in effects. For both it was established that instead of 4-item 
constructs they should be split into two 2-item constructs, reflecting the product level 
and the technological level, respectively. Further, the re-specification in LISREL 
resulted in one item being deleted from the construct of path dependence, three items 
being deleted from the product performance construct and one item being deleted 
from the knowledge intensity of product construct. The schematic compositions of 
the corrected constructs are shown in figures 7.1 through 7.5. The results of the five 
measurement models are shown in the corresponding tables 7.6 through 7.10. 
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Social 
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Network 
effects
First-order constructsSecond-order constructs
 
Figure 7-1: Measurement model 1 - second-order network effects and second-order 
social interaction effects 
 
Measurement 
model 1 
No. of 
items 
deleted 
No. of 
items 
remaining 
Lowest t-
value 
Average 
variance 
extracted 
Composite 
reliability 
Network effects 
products 
0 4 7.20 46.0% 0.77 
Network effects 
technologies 
0 4 6.91 66.1% 0.89 
Social interaction 
effects products 
0 4 7.32 52.0% 0.81 
Social interaction 
effect technologies 
0 4 4.19 62.4% 0.87 
Network effects 
(second-order) 
0 2 5.08 43.3% 0.60 
Social interaction 
effects (second- 
order) 
0 2 3.66 71.6% 0.83 
 
Evaluation of the model: χ2/df= 1.76; GFI= 0.90; NFI= 0.91; NNFI= 0.93; CFI= 0.95; IFI= 0.95; 
RMSEA= 0.070 
Table 7.6: LISREL estimates of measurement model 1 
 
Report first empirical study 
208 
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Potential for scale effects on variable costs
Potential for learning effects
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scale and 
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scale and 
learning effects
Realization of scale effects on fixed costs
Realization of scale effects on variable costs
Realization of learning effects
 
Figure 7-2: Measurement model 2 - potential and realization of scale and learning 
effects 
 
Measurement 
model 2 
No. of 
items 
deleted 
No. of 
items 
remaining 
Lowest t-
value 
Average 
variance 
extracted 
Composite 
reliability 
Potential for scale 
and learning 
effects 
0 3 4.58 37.3% 0.62 
Realization of 
scale and learning 
effects 
0 3 5.07 56.5% 0.77 
 
Evaluation of the model: χ2/df= 0.80; GFI= 0.99; NFI= 0.99; NNFI= 1.00; CFI= 1.00; IFI= 1.00; 
RMSEA= 0.000 
Table 7.7: LISREL estimates of measurement model 2 
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Figure 7-3: Measurement model 3 - product performance and organizational 
performance 
 
Measurement 
model 3 
No. of 
items 
deleted 
No. of 
items 
remaining 
Lowest t-
value 
Average 
variance 
extracted 
Composite 
reliability 
Product 
performance 
3 4 6.87 43.8% 0.76 
Organizational 
performance 
0 7 8.97 54.7% 0.89 
 
Evaluation of the model: χ2/df= 1.34; GFI= 0.95; NFI= 0.95; NNFI= 0.98; CFI= 0.99; IFI= 0.99; 
RMSEA= 0.046 
Table 7.8: LISREL estimates of measurement model 3 
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Figure 7-4: Measurement model 4 - product substitution, technology substitution, 
lock-in and path dependence 
 
Measurement 
model 4 
No. of 
items 
deleted 
No. of 
items 
remaining 
Lowest t-
value 
Average 
variance 
extracted 
Composite 
reliability 
Substitution effects 
product 
0 2 7.13 47.6% 0.64 
Substitution effects 
technology 
0 2 9.18 65.9% 0.79 
Lock-in effects 2 2 6.39 58.2% 0.73 
Path dependence 1 3 8.23 60.4% 0.82 
 
Evaluation of the model: χ2/df= 1.43; GFI= 0.96; NFI= 0.94; NNFI= 0.96; CFI= 0.98; IFI= 0.98; 
RMSEA= 0.049 
Table 7.9: LISREL estimates of measurement model 4 
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Figure 7-5: Measurement model 5 - market predictability, product complementarity 
and compatibility, technology complementarity and compatibility, and knowledge 
intensity of the product 
 
Measurement 
model 5 
No. of 
items 
deleted 
No. of 
items 
remaining 
Lowest t-
value 
Average 
variance 
extracted 
Composite 
reliability 
Market 
predictability 
0 2 2.17 48.1% 0.63 
Product 
complementarity 
and compatibility 
0 2 4.29 41.1% 0.58 
Technology 
complementarity 
and compatibility 
0 2 2.90 54.4% 0.68 
Knowledge 
intensity of product 
1 2 3.01 37.2% 0.52 
 
Evaluation of the model: χ2/df= 1.37; GFI= 0.97; NFI= 0.84; NNFI= 0.87; CFI= 0.93; IFI= 0.94; 
RMSEA= 0.052 
Table 7.10: LISREL estimates of measurement model 5 
 
As can be seen from the tables 7.6 through 7.10, the fits of the measurement models 
1, 2, 3 and 4 are good, meeting the required 0.90 threshold values of the absolute, 
i.e., GFI and NFI and incremental, i.e., NNFI, CFI and IFI fit indices. Model 5 does 
not meet the threshold value for the NFI and NNFI fit indices, indicating possible 
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problems with the dimensionality of the constructs market predictability, product 
complementarity and compatibility, technological complementarity and compatibility 
and knowledge intensity of the product. 
 
The parsimonious fit measure of the chi-square value divided by the number of 
degrees of freedom was below the recommended level of 2.0 and the root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA) was below the recommended 0.08 level for 
each of the models. 
 
7.3.2 Reliability 
The most commonly used way to assess the reliability of a scale is to compute the 
coefficient alpha, or Cronbach alpha. According to Peter (1979) this is a useful and 
usable approach to assessing the reliability of measurement scales. We explored the 
reliability of each purified, unidimensional scale by computing the reliability 
coefficient. See table 7.11 below. 
 
Reliability of the scales No. of 
items 
Lowest 
item-to-
total 
correlation# 
Cronbach 
alpha 
Eigen- 
value 
(ML 
factoring) 
Variance 
explained 
Network effects products 4 0.48 0.75 2.29 44.3% 
Network effects 
technologies  
4 0.62 0.80 2.79 59.9% 
Social interaction effects 
products 
4 0.59 0.82 2.61 53.7% 
Social interaction effects 
technologies 
4 0.67 0.87 2.86 62.2% 
Potential of scale and 
learning effects 
3 0.28 0.60 1.69 38.1% 
Realization of scale and 
learning effects 
3 0.32 0.73 1.99 57.1% 
Product performance 4 0.43 0.74 2.25 42.8% 
Organizational 
performance 
7 0.62 0.90 4.37 56.1% 
Substitution effects 
product 
2 0.41 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Substitution effects 
technology 
2 0.65 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Lock-in effects 2 0.56 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Path dependence 3 0.52    
Market predictability 2 0.31 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
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Reliability of the scales No. of 
items 
Lowest 
item-to-
total 
correlation# 
Cronbach 
alpha 
Eigen- 
value 
(ML 
factoring) 
Variance 
explained 
Product complementarity 
and compatibility 
2 0.34 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Technology 
complementarity and 
compatibility 
2 0.45 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Knowledge intensity of 
product 
2 0.19 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
# For the two-item scales the figure provided is the inter-item correlation 
Table 7.11: Reliability of the scales 
 
The values of the Cronbach alpha for the different constructs indicate that for the 
multi-item constructs, with the exception of the potential for scale and learning 
effects, the reliability is adequate. In view of the early stage of survey research into 
increasing returns, see the argumentation in chapter three, the Cronbach alpha value 
for the construct potential for scale and learning effects is just acceptable. The 
computation of the Cronbach alpha is not meaningful for the two-item scales. The 
item-to-total correlation for the construct knowledge intensity of the product 
indicates that there may be a problem regarding this construct. 
 
7.3.3 Within-method convergent validity 
Convergent validity of the scales was investigated by estimating five confirmatory 
factor models using maximum likelihood estimation in LISREL 8.3 (Jöreskog & 
Sörbom, 1999). For the models and the results, see section 7.3.1. Steenkamp & Van 
Trijp (1991) provide three conditions for convergent validity, namely (1) that the 
factor coefficients for all the items of a construct should be significant, (2) that the 
correlation between the item and the construct should exceed 0.50 and (3) that the 
overall fit of the measurement model should be acceptable.  
 
Assessing measurement models 1 through 5, the first condition is met for all items on 
all constructs, i.e., each item loaded significantly (t>2.0) on its corresponding latent 
construct. 
 
The second condition is met for all items in measurement model 1, addressing 
product and technological network effects and product and technological social 
interaction effects. This condition was not met for measurement model 2, addressing 
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the potential for scale and learning effects and the realization of scale and learning 
effects. There was one item with a correlation of 0.33 for the construct potential for 
scale and learning effects, and there was one item with a correlation of 0.32 for the 
construct realization of scale and learning effects. In both cases the low-correlating 
item was the item on learning effects. The low correlations indicate a possible 
problem with the convergent validity of these scales. For measurement model 3, on 
product performance and organizational performance, all items met the condition. 
With measurement model 4, the second condition was met for all items. In 
measurement model 5 the market predictability scale had one item with a correlation 
of 0.49, the technological complementarity and compatibility scale had one item with 
a correlation of 0.44 and the knowledge intensity of the product scale had one item 
with a correlation of 0.42. 
 
Regarding the third condition, the overall fit, models 1 through 4 all have acceptable 
fit (see tables 7.6 through 7.9). Model 5, reflecting the constructs of market 
predictability, product complementarity and compatibility, technological 
complementarity and compatibility and knowledge intensity of the product has a fit 
that is below the recommended 0.90 thresholds on the NFI (0.84) and NNFI (0.87) fit 
indices, indicating a possible problem with the convergent validity of these 
constructs. 
 
7.3.4 Discriminant validity 
Discriminant validity among the scales was assessed in two steps. First, we estimated 
a two-factor model for each possible pair of scales. Discriminant validity was 
indicated when the variance-extracted estimates for the two scales exceed the square 
of the correlation between them (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988). The results revealed that 
without exception the assessment supported the discriminant validity of the scales.  
 
Second, we examined for every measurement model, the chi-square difference 
between the original models and similar models in which the correlations among the 
latent constructs were constrained to 1 (Bagozzi & Phillips, 1982, p.476). A 
significantly lower value of the chi-square of the constrained model indicates that the 
latent constructs are not perfectly correlated and that discriminant validity is 
achieved. The results shown in table 7.12 indicate that discriminant validity is 
achieved for all of the scales. 
 
 
Report first empirical study 
215 
Discriminant 
validity 
Model with trait 
correlations 
constrained to unity 
Unconstrained 
model 
Chi-square difference# 
 χ2 df χ2 df ∆χ2 ∆df 
Model 1 (second-
order constructs) 
118.95 77 134.05 76 15.10*** 1 
Model 1 (first-order 
constructs) 
340.16 81 114.41 75 225.75*** 6 
Model 2 81.88 6 4.01 5 77.87*** 1 
Model 3 194.07 37 48.07 36 146.07*** 1 
Model 4 275.15 27 29.98 21 245.17*** 6 
Model 5 70.85 20 19.18 14 51.67*** 6 
# Significance at 5% level is indicated by *, at 1% level by **, at 0.1% level by *** 
Table 7.12: Discriminant validity of the scales 
 
7.3.5 Conclusions on construct validity 
Together the results of the tests for unidimensionality, reliability, convergent validity 
and discriminant validity provided evidence of the validity of the scales. A summary 
of the results is provided in table 7.13. 
 
Conclusions on construct 
validity 
Content 
validity 
Unidi-
mensio-
nality 
Relia-
bility 
Within-
method 
conver-
gent 
validity 
Discrimi-
nant 
validity 
Network effects products OK OK OK OK OK 
Network effects technologies  OK OK OK OK OK 
Social interaction effects 
products 
OK OK OK OK OK 
Social interaction effects 
technologies 
OK OK OK OK OK 
Network effects (second-order 
construct) 
OK OK OK OK OK 
Social interaction effects 
(second-order construct) 
OK OK OK OK OK 
Potential for scale and learning 
effects 
OK OK Just 
accep-
table 
Possible 
problem 
OK 
Realization of scale and 
learning effects 
OK OK OK Possible 
problem 
OK 
Product performance OK OK OK OK OK 
Organizational performance OK OK OK OK OK 
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Conclusions on construct 
validity 
Content 
validity 
Unidi-
mensio-
nality 
Relia-
bility 
Within-
method 
conver-
gent 
validity 
Discrimi-
nant 
validity 
Substitution effects product OK OK OK OK OK 
Substitution effects technology OK OK OK OK OK 
Lock-in effects OK OK OK OK OK 
Path dependence OK OK OK OK OK 
Market predictability OK Possible 
problem 
OK Possible 
problem 
OK 
Product complementarity and 
compatibility 
OK Possible 
problem 
OK OK OK 
Technology complementarity 
and compatibility 
OK Possible 
problem 
OK Possible 
problem 
OK 
Knowledge intensity of product OK Possible 
problem 
Possible 
problem 
Possible 
problem 
OK 
Table 7.13: Conclusions on the validity of the scales 
 
From these results we can conclude the following. There is enough evidence for the 
validity of the first-order and the second-order constructs of network effects and 
social interaction effects. Network effects and social interaction effects may therefore 
each be conceptualized as second-order constructs. 
 
As argued in section 7.1.3, we restricted the measurement of the constructs of the 
potential and the realization of scale and learning effects to three items each for 
practical measurement reasons.55 Moreover, we decided to join scale and learning 
effects in one measure and instead make a distinction between the potential and the 
realization because this fitted better with respondents’ experiences. The joining of 
scale and learning effects may very well be the cause of the problems with the 
convergent validity of these scales. It may very well be that, although managers 
report that they are in practice unable to differentiate between scale effects and 
learning effects, they will still provide a different subjective answer when confronted 
with the questionnaire. To check on the correctness of our assumption, we analyzed 
the possibility of removing the items measuring learning effects from the constructs 
potential for scale and learning effects and realization of scale and learning effects. 
Our analysis showed that the fit of this alternative measurement model was much 
lower than that of the current model (χ2/df=9.96; GFI=0.98; NFI=0.97; NNFI=0.82; 
                                                          
55 We argued in section 6.4 that although in theory scale effects and learning effects are 
different concepts, it is in management practice very difficult to distinguish between them. 
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CFI=0.97; IFI=0.97; RMSEA=0.199). We therefore decided to keep the current 
measurement model. 
 
The validity analyses provided enough evidence to support the validity of the 
constructs of product performance and organizational performance. The same is true 
for the constructs of substitution effects, both at the product and the technology level, 
for lock-in effects and for path dependence. With respect to the validity of the 
constructs of market predictability, product complementarity and compatibility, 
technological complementarity and compatibility and knowledge intensity of 
products we need to be careful. The fit of the measurement model indicates possible 
problems with both the unidimensionality and the convergent validity of the 
constructs. Correlations between the items and the constructs below 0.50 indicated 
further problems with convergent validity for the market predictability scale, the 
technological complementarity and compatibility scale and the knowledge intensity 
of the product scale. There is also an indication of a possible problem with scale 
reliability for the construct knowledge intensity of the product. Alternative model 
specifications did not result in better fitting measurement models. We therefore 
conclude that the constructs of market predictability, product complementarity and 
compatibility and technological complementarity and compatibility may be applied 
only with the utmost care. 
 
 Network 
effects 
Social 
interaction 
effects 
Potential for 
scale and 
learning effects 
Realization of 
scale and 
learning effects 
Product 
performance 
Social 
interaction 
effects 
0.734**     
Potential for 
scale and 
learning effects 
0.223** 0.173*    
Realization of 
scale and 
learning effects 
0.161* 0.155* 0.334**   
Product 
performance 
0.167** 0.163* 0.171** 0.186**  
Organizational 
performance 
0.133* 0.126 0.095 0.183** 0.337** 
# Significance at 5% level is indicated by *, at 1% level by ** 
Table 7.14: Correlations between the main constructs 
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Provided with this evidence the constructs were formed by averaging the responses 
to each item in a particular scale. The correlations between the main constructs are 
given in table 7.14. 
7.4 Results of testing the research hypotheses 
7.4.1 Research model and hypotheses 
The hypotheses were tested using causal modeling with LISREL 8.3 (Jöreskog & 
Sörbom, 1999). As our sample size was not sufficiently large to obtain a combined 
measurement and structural equation model, we used the constructs created for the 
estimation of the measurement model to obtain a structural equation model with a 
favorable ratio between our sample size and the number of parameters to be 
estimated (Baumgartner & Homburg, 1996). The discussion of the results is 
organized around the hypothesized relationships shown in figure 7.6. 
 
Social
interaction
effects
Network
effects
Potential 
for scale and 
learning effects
Realization 
of scale and 
learning effects
Product 
performance
Organization 
performance
H1
H5
H4
H6
H3
H2a
H2b
 
Figure 7-6: Research framework and hypotheses of the first empirical study 
 
The analysis resulted in a good fit to the data (χ2/df=1.53; GFI=0.98; AGFI=0.95; 
NFI=0.95; NNFI=0.96; CFI=0.98; IFI=0.98; RMSEA=0.049). The unstandardized 
estimates and t-values associated with the direct effects are presented in table 7.15. 
The unstandardized estimates and t-values associated with the indirect and total 
effects are presented in table 7.16. 
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Path to: 
 
 
Path from: 
Network 
effects 
Potential for 
scale and 
learning 
effects 
Realization 
of scale and 
learning 
effects 
Product 
perfor-
mance 
Organi-
zational 
perfor-
mance 
Social 
interaction 
effects 
0.71 
(16.12) 
0.03 
(0.29) 
   
Network 
effects 
 0.19 
(2.13) 
   
Potential for 
scale and 
learning 
effects 
  0.27 
(4.12) 
  
Realization 
of scale and 
learning 
effects 
   0.15 
(2.75) 
0.10 
(1.99) 
Product 
performance 
    0.30 
(5.01) 
 
Evaluation of the model: χ2/df= 1.53; GFI= 0.98; AGFI= 0.95; NFI= 0.95; NNFI= 0.96; CFI= 
0.98; IFI= 0.98; RMSEA= 0.049 
 
Note: T-values above 1.96 (p<0.05) are shown in bold. 
Table 7.15: LISREL path model direct effects 
 
7.4.2 The relationship between social interaction effects and network effects 
The findings support H1, because social interaction effects have a positive significant 
(p<0.05) direct effect on network effects (b=0.71). This finding is consistent with 
previous theoretical evidence that suggests that social interaction effects enhance the 
creation of network effects (Katz & Shapiro, 1986).  
 
7.4.3 The relationship between social interaction effects and network effects and the 
potential for scale and learning effects 
The results support H2a, because network effects have a positive and significant direct 
effect on the potential for scale and learning (b=0.19) effects.  
 
The results, shown in tables 7.15 and 7.16, also reveal that social interaction effects 
do not have a significant direct effect on the potential for scale and learning effects 
(b=0.03).  This means that we found no support for H2b. However, social interaction 
effects do have a significant and positive indirect effect on the potential for scale and 
learning effects (b=0.16), through the positive and significant effect of social 
interaction effects on network effects.  
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Together these direct and indirect effects show that social interaction effects and 
network effects are a significant factor in creating a potential for scale and learning 
effects. 
 
Path to: 
 
Network 
effects 
Potential for 
scale 
 and learning 
effects 
Realization of 
scale and 
learning 
effects 
 
Product 
performance 
 
Organiza-
tional 
performance 
Path 
from: 
 Total Indi-
rect 
To-
tal 
Indi-
rect 
To-
tal 
Indi-
rect 
To-
tal 
Indi-
rect 
To-
tal 
Social 
interac-
tion 
effects 
 0.71 
(16.12) 
0.14 
(2.11) 
0.16 
(2.70) 
0.04 
(2.26) 
0.04 
(2.26) 
0.01 
(1.74) 
0.01 
(1.74) 
0.01 
(1.75) 
0.01 
(1.75) 
Network 
effects 
   0.19 
(2.13) 
0.05 
(1.89) 
0.05 
(1.89) 
0.01 
(1.56) 
0.01 
(1.56) 
0.01 
(1.57) 
0.01 
(1.57) 
Potential 
for scale 
and 
learning 
effects 
     0.27 
(4.12) 
0.04 
(2.29) 
0.04 
(2.29) 
0.04 
(2.31) 
0.04 
(2.31) 
Realiza-
tion of 
scale 
and 
learning 
effects 
       0.15 
(2.75) 
0.04 
(2.41) 
0.14 
(2.79) 
Product 
perfor-
mance 
         0.30 
(5.01) 
Note: T-values above 1.96 (p<0.05) are shown in bold. 
Table 7.16: LISREL path model indirect and total effects 
 
7.4.4 The relationship between the potential for scale and learning effects and the 
realization of scale and learning effects 
The results support H3, because the potential for scale and learning effects has a 
significant and positive direct effect (b=0.27) on the realization of scale and learning 
effects. This finding is consistent with literature that illustrates that firms can exploit 
the potential for scale and learning effects through the pursuit of increasing returns 
strategies (Besen & Farrell, 1994), e.g., shaper, follower or reserving the right to 
play. 
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7.4.5 The relationship between the realization of scale and learning effects and 
product performance 
The findings provide support for H4, because the realization of scale and learning 
effects has a positive and significant effect on product performance (b=0.15). These 
findings confirm prior research that suggests that the realization of scale and learning 
effects are the most important drivers for competitive advantage and hence superior 
product performance (Scherer & Ross, 1990). 
 
7.4.6 The relationship between the realization of scale and learning effects and 
organizational performance 
The results support H5, because the realization of scale and learning effects has a 
significant and positive direct effect on organizational performance (b=0.10). This 
result confirms previous findings that show that scale and learning effects have a 
positive effect on organizational performance (Hatch & Mowery, 1999; Makadok, 
1999). The results shown in table 7.16 also reveal that the realization of scale and 
learning effects has a positive and significant indirect effect (b=0.04) on 
organizational performance. 
 
7.4.7 The relationship between product performance and organizational 
performance 
The results provide support for H6, because product performance has a significant 
and positive (b=0.30) effect on organizational performance. This finding is 
consistent with prior empirical research that has demonstrated the importance of 
primary product performance for organizational performance (Szymanski, Bharadwaj 
& Varadarajan, 1993).  
 
7.5 Additional tests of the model 
We performed two additional tests for the research model discussed above. One, we 
estimated an alternative research model, in which direct relations between social 
interaction effects and network effects and product and organizational performance 
were incorporated and we tested whether the fit of this alternative model was better 
than that of the original model. Two, we checked the stability of the original model 
by testing for possible moderating effects of complementarity, compatibility, 
substitution, path dependence, lock-in, market predictability and knowledge 
intensity. 
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7.5.1 Testing an alternative research model 
The results of the model discussed above clearly show that product and 
organizational performance are achieved in markets where social interaction effects 
and network effects are present only through the recognition and the use by the firm 
of scale and learning effects. This can be seen in table 7.16 because the total effects 
of social interaction effects and of network effects on product performance and 
organizational performance are all nonsignificant. While in line with our theory and 
hypotheses this is nevertheless a finding that requires more attention. To check 
whether this finding is not a result of a misspecification of our model, we estimated 
an alternative model that includes the relationship between the market-based 
increasing returns mechanisms, representing market structure in the industrial 
organization framework and product and organizational performance, representing 
firm performance in the industrial organization framework. See figure 7.7. 
 
Social
interaction
effects
Network
effects
Potential 
for scale and 
learning effects
Realization 
of scale and 
learning effects
Product 
performance
Organization 
performance
H1
H5
H4
H6
H3
H2a
H2b
 
Figure 7-7: Alternative research model 
 
This analysis also resulted in a good fit to the data (χ2/df=1.50; GFI=0.99; 
AGFI=0.95; NFI=0.98; NNFI=0.97; CFI=0.99; IFI=0.99; RMSEA=0.047). The 
unstandardized estimates and t-values associated with the direct effects are presented 
in table 7.17. The unstandardized estimates and t-values associated with the indirect 
and total effects are presented in table 7.18. The difference in degrees of freedom 
between the original and the alternative model is ∆df=4 and the difference in chi-
square between the original model and the alternative model is ∆χ2=6.25, which is 
below the threshold value of χ2=9.49 (p<0.05). We therefore conclude that the 
alternative model is not significantly better than the original model. 
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Table 7.17 reveals that in this alternative model specification the direct effects of 
social interaction effects and network effects on product and organizational 
performance are all nonsignificant. The same is true for the indirect effects, as is 
revealed in table 7.18. The result is that, with the exception of the relationship 
between social interaction effects and product performance, also the total effects are 
nonsignificant. This adds confidence to our finding that product and organizational 
performance can be achieved in markets where social interaction effects and network 
effects are present only through the recognition and the use by the firm of scale and 
learning effects. The existence of a relationship between social interaction effects and 
product performance, the total effect being made significant by the addition of a 
nonsignificant direct and a nonsignificant indirect effect, indicates that there is some 
influence from the market-based mechanisms of increasing returns on firm 
performance, but that this influence is certainly not dominant and that it is much 
weaker than the influence of the firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns. 
 
Path to: 
 
 
Path from: 
Network 
effects 
Potential for 
scale and 
learning 
effects 
Realization 
of scale and 
learning 
effects 
Product 
perfor-
mance 
Organi-
zational 
perfor-
mance 
Social 
interaction 
effects 
0.71 
(16.12) 
0.03 
(0.29) 
 0.07 
(0.98) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
Network 
effects 
 0.19 
(2.13) 
 0.05 
(0.67) 
0.06 
(0.94) 
Potential for 
scale and 
learning 
effects 
  0.27 
(4.12) 
  
Realization 
of scale and 
learning 
effects 
   0.12 
(2.38) 
0.09 
(1.80) 
Product 
performance 
    0.29 
(4.80) 
 
Evaluation of the model: χ2/df= 1.50; GFI= 0.99; AGFI= 0.95; NFI= 0.98; NNFI= 0.97; CFI= 
0.99; IFI= 0.99; RMSEA= 0.047 
 
Note: T-values above 1.96 (p<0.05) are shown in bold. 
Table 7.17: Alternative LISREL path model direct effects 
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Path to: 
 
Network 
effects 
Potential for 
scale 
 and learning 
effects 
Realization of 
scale and 
learning 
effects 
 
Product 
performance 
 
Organiza-
tional 
performance 
Path 
from: 
 Total Indi-
rect 
To-
tal 
Indi-
rect 
To-
tal 
Indi-
rect 
To-
tal 
Indi-
rect 
To-
tal 
Social 
interac-
tion 
effects 
 0.71 
(16.12) 
0.14 
(2.11) 
0.16 
(2.70) 
0.04 
(2.26) 
0.04 
(2.26) 
0.04 
(0.77) 
0.11 
(2.26) 
0.08 
(1.61) 
0.08 
(1.75) 
Network 
effects 
   0.19 
(2.13) 
0.05 
(1.89) 
0.05 
(1.89) 
0.01 
(1.48) 
0.06 
(0.75) 
0.02 
(0.94) 
0.08 
(1.19) 
Potential 
for scale 
and 
learning 
effects 
     0.27 
(4.12) 
0.03 
(2.06) 
0.03 
(2.06) 
0.03 
(2.11) 
0.03 
(2.11) 
Realiza-
tion of 
scale 
and 
learning 
effects 
       0.12 
(2.38) 
0.04 
(2.13) 
0.12 
(2.46) 
Product 
perfor-
mance 
         0.29 
(4.80) 
Note: T-values above 1.96 (p<0.05) are shown in bold. 
Table 7.18: Alternative LISREL path model indirect and total effects 
 
7.5.2 Testing model stability 
We used the following procedure to test the stability of the original research model 
for the following variables: substitution effects product, substitution effects 
technology, lock-in effects, path dependence, market predictability, product 
complementarity and compatibility, technology complementarity and compatibility 
and knowledge intensity of the product. We split the sample into two subgroups for 
the test variables using the median as the split-up point. The path model used to test 
the hypotheses 1 through 6 was estimated for each subgroup. See figure 7.8.  
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effects
Network
effects
Potential 
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Product 
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performance
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Technology substitution
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Product substitution
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and compatibility
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Figure 7-8: Testing the stability of the research model 
 
We conducted a pair-wise comparison of the estimated parameters between the two 
subgroups. More specifically, the pair-wise comparisons were based on the chi-
square-difference (∆χ2) between two models: 
1. the first model constrained the parameters to be equal, i.e., it was an 
equality-constraint model, in which the relationships, on which the 
moderating variable was hypothesized to have its effect, are constrained to 
be equal across the subgroups 
2. the second model left the parameters free to covary, i.e., it was a free model, 
in which the relationships, on which the moderating variable is hypothesized 
to have its effect, are allowed to be different across the subgroups  
 
The significance of the chi-square difference between the two models was used as a 
test for the equality of the parameters, i.e., whether the equality-constraint model 
produced a better fit than the free model. When a significant chi-square difference 
was found in a model with two or more relationships on which the moderating 
variable was hypothesized to have its effect, this result was further explored by 
checking the chi-square difference for each of the individual relationships.  
 
The discussion in the next three sections is set up according to the tested 
characteristics, i.e., technology characteristics, product characteristics and market 
characteristics. 
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7.5.3 Model stability for technology characteristics 
The technology characteristics tested were technology substitutability and technology 
complementarity and compatibility. To test for the influence of these variables on the 
main relations, the free model allowed a comparison between the two subgroups on 
(1) the relationship between social interaction effects and network effects, (2) the 
relationship between network effects and the potential for scale and learning effects, 
(3) the relationship between social interaction effects and the potential for scale and 
learning effects, and (4) the relationship between the potential and the realization of 
scale and learning effects.  
 
The chi-square difference statistics for the constraint and free models and the 
unstandardized estimates for the different subgroups of the free models are shown in 
table 7.19. 
 
Test 
variable 
 
Con-
straint 
model 
Free 
model 
Chi-
square 
diffe-
rence# 
Free model estimates@ 
 χ2 df χ2 df ∆χ2 ∆ 
df 
Group Relationship 
(dependent = 
independent) 
Esti-
mate 
t-value 
Techno-
logy 
substitu-
tion 
 
48.09 33 38.01 29 10.08 
(*) 
4 High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
N=I 
N=I 
SLPOT=N 
SLPOT=N 
SLPOT=I 
SLPOT=I 
SLUSE=SLPOT 
SLUSE=SLPOT 
0.71 
0.62 
0.14 
0.28 
0.17 
0.01 
0.26 
0.22 
13.90 
11.74 
1.12 
2.08 
1.31 
0.10 
3.52 
2.82 
48.09 33 39.95 32 8.14 
(**) 
1 High 
Low 
N=I 
N=I 
0.71 
0.62 
13.90 
11.74 
48.09 33 47.95 32 0.14 1 High 
Low 
SLPOT=N 
SLPOT=N 
0.22 
0.20 
2.28 
2.08 
48.09 33 47.75 32 0.34 1 High 
Low 
SLPOT=I 
SLPOT=I 
0.10 
0.08 
1.09 
0.81 
Further 
analysis 
of 
techno-
logy 
substitu-
tion 
48.09 33 47.02 32 1.07 1 High 
Low 
SLUSE=SLPOT 
SLUSE=SLPOT 
0.26 
0.22 
3.47 
2.88 
Techno-
logy 
comple-
mentarity 
and 
compati-
bility 
35.48 33 32.04 29 3.44 4 High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
N=I 
N=I 
SLPOT=N 
SLPOT=N 
SLPOT=I 
SLPOT=I 
SLUSE=SLPOT 
SLUSE=SLPOT 
0.71 
0.70 
0.24 
-0.07 
-0.01 
0.28 
0.28 
0.20 
11.61 
11.17 
1.57 
-0.46 
-0.05 
1.78 
3.17 
2.22 
 
# Significance at 5% level is indicated by *, at 1% level by **, at 0.1% level by *** 
 
@ In this table the constructs are abbreviated as follows: 
I = social interaction effects 
N = network effects 
SLPOT = potential for scale and learning effects 
SLUSE = realization of scale and learning effects 
Table 7.19: Stability tests of technology characteristics on LISREL path model 
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The first pair-wise comparison was between low and high technological substitution 
effects. The chi-square difference (10.08) between the constraint model and the free 
model was significant on the p<0.05 level, indicating that the model is not stable for 
variations in technological substitution (see table 7.19). A further analysis of this 
influence revealed that technological substitution effects only significantly and 
positively influence the relationship between social interaction effects and network 
effects (∆χ2=8.14, p<0.01) but do not significantly influence the other relationships 
(see table 7.19). We therefore conclude that only the relation between social 
interaction effects and network effects is unstable for variations in technological 
substitution. The most likely explanation for this is that when technologies are 
substitutes, it will increase uncertainty among buyers about which technology will 
eventually dominate the market. The risk of buying into the wrong technology will 
therefore be high. In view of this uncertainty it is likely that the influence of 
information exchange and expectations, i.e., social interaction effects, on behavior, 
i.e., network effects, will be larger. 
 
The second pair-wise comparison was made between low and high technological 
complementarity and compatibility. The chi-square difference (3.44) between the 
constraint and the free model was nonsignificant, which means that the model is 
stable for variations in technological complementarity and compatibility. We recall 
from section 7.3 that there were some possible problems with the unidimensionality 
and the convergent validity of the technological complementarity and compatibility 
construct. We cannot therefore draw a definitive conclusion about the stability of the 
model for this variable. The model may be stable for variations in technology 
complementarity and compatibility, or the construct may not reflect adequately the 
compatibility and complementarity of the technologies. 
 
7.5.4 Model stability for product characteristics 
The product characteristics tested were product substitutability, product 
complementarity and compatibility and knowledge intensity of the product. To test 
for the influence of these variables on the main model relations, the free model 
allowed a comparison between the two subgroups on (1) the relationship between 
social interaction effects and network effects, (2) the relationship between network 
effects and the potential for scale and learning effects, (3) the relationship between 
social interaction effects and the potential for scale and learning effects, and (4) the 
relationship between the potential and the realization of scale and learning effects.  
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The chi-square difference statistics for the constraint and free models and the 
unstandardized estimates for the different subgroups of the free models are shown in 
table 7.20. 
 
Test 
variable 
 
Con-
straint 
model 
Free 
model 
Chi-
square 
diffe-
rence# 
Free model estimates@ 
 χ2 df χ2 df ∆χ2 ∆ 
df 
Group Relationship 
(dependent = 
independent) 
Esti-
mate 
t-value 
Product 
substi-
tution 
51.14 33 47.61 29 3.65 4 High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
N=I 
N=I 
SLPOT=N 
SLPOT=N 
SLPOT=I 
SLPOT=I 
SLUSE=SLPOT 
SLUSE=SLPOT 
0.71 
0.71 
0.18 
0.20 
0.02 
0.02 
0.32 
0.24 
14.80 
15.69 
1.47 
1.58 
0.20 
0.19 
4.66 
3.55 
Product 
comple-
mentarity 
and 
compati-
bility 
74.53 33 63.83 29 10.70 
(*) 
4 High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
N=I 
N=I 
SLPOT=N 
SLPOT=N 
SLPOT=I 
SLPOT=I 
SLUSE=SLPOT 
SLUSE=SLPOT 
0.71 
0.64 
0.02 
0.13 
0.19 
0.03 
0.22 
0.15 
15.01 
12.64 
0.12 
0.93 
1.59 
0.23 
3.03 
1.86 
74.53 33 68.22 32 6.31 
(*) 
1 High 
Low 
N=I 
N=I 
0.71 
0.64 
15.01 
12.64 
74.53 33 73.35 32 0.18 1 High 
Low 
SLPOT=N 
SLPOT=N 
0.12 
0.07 
1.20 
0.72 
74.53 33 72.92 32 1.61 1 High 
Low 
SLPOT=I 
SLPOT=I 
0.12 
0.07 
1.33 
0.76 
Further 
analysis 
of 
product 
comple-
mentarity 
and 
compati-
bility 
74.53 33 71.74 32 2.79 1 High 
Low 
SLUSE=SLPOT 
SLUSE=SLPOT 
0.22 
0.15 
2.98 
1.92 
Know-
ledge 
intensity 
of 
product 
34.73 33 27.78 29 6.95 4 High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
N=I 
N=I 
SLPOT=N 
SLPOT=N 
SLPOT=I 
SLPOT=I 
SLUSE=SLPOT 
SLUSE=SLPOT 
0.70 
0.72 
0.20 
0.11 
-0.03 
0.16 
0.25 
0.25 
15.46 
15.19 
1.82 
0.81 
-0.26 
1.16 
3.50 
3.72 
 
# Significance at 5% level is indicated by *, at 1% level by **, at 0.1% level by *** 
 
@ In this table the constructs are abbreviated as follows: 
I = social interaction effects 
N = network effects 
SLPOT = potential for scale and learning effects 
SLUSE = realization of scale and learning effects 
Table 7.20: Stability tests of product characteristics on LISREL path model 
 
The first pair-wise comparison was between low and high product substitution 
effects. The chi-square difference (3.65) between the constraint and the free model 
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was nonsignificant, which means the model is stable for variations in product 
substitution effects. 
 
The second pair-wise comparison was between low and high product 
complementarity and compatibility. The chi-square difference (10.70) between the 
constraint and the free model was significant on the p<0.05 level, indicating that the 
model is not stable for variations in product complementarity and compatibility (see 
table 7.20). A further analysis of this influence revealed that product 
complementarity and compatibility significantly and positively influence the 
relationship between social interaction effects and network effects (∆χ2=6.31, 
p<0.05) but do not significantly influence the other relationships (see table 7.20). We 
therefore conclude that only the relation between social interaction effects and 
network effects is unstable for variations in product complementarity and 
compatibility. The most likely explanation for this is that product complementarity 
and compatibility will increase the pay-off for customers if they behave, i.e., network 
effects, according to the dominant opinion or expectation, i.e., social interaction 
effects. We recall from section 7.3 that there were some possible problems with the 
unidimensionality and the convergent validity of the product complementarity and 
compatibility construct. We cannot therefore draw a definitive conclusion about the 
stability of the model for this variable. The model may be stable for variations in 
product complementarity and compatibility, or the construct may not adequately 
reflect the compatibility and complementarity of the products. 
 
The third pair-wise comparison was between low and high knowledge intensity of 
products. The free model allowed a comparison between the two subgroups on the 
relationship between the potential and the realization of scale and learning effects 
(see table 7.20). The chi-square difference (∆χ2=-0.02) between the constraint and 
the free model was negligible and therefore nonsignificant, which means that the 
model is stable for variations in knowledge intensity of products. We concluded in 
section 7.3 that, in view of possible problems with unidimensionality, reliability and 
convergent validity of the knowledge intensity of the product construct, the usability 
of this construct is doubtful. We cannot therefore draw a definitive conclusion about 
whether the model is stable for variations in knowledge intensity of products or that 
the absence of influence is the result of the inadequacy of the construct. 
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7.5.5 Model stability for market characteristics 
The market characteristics tested were lock-in, market predictability and path 
dependence. To test for the influence of these variables on the main model relations, 
the free model allowed a comparison between the two subgroups on (1) the 
relationship between social interaction effects and network effects, (2) the 
relationship between network effects and the potential for scale and learning effects, 
and (3) the relationship between social interaction effects and the potential for scale 
and learning effects. The chi-square difference statistics for the constraint and free 
models and the unstandardized estimates for the different subgroups of the free 
models are shown in table 7.21. 
 
Test 
variable 
 
Con-
straint 
model 
Free 
model 
Chi-
square 
diffe-
rence# 
Free model estimates@ 
 χ2 df χ2 df ∆χ2 ∆ 
df 
Group Relationship 
(dependent = 
independent) 
Esti-
mate 
t-value 
Lock-in 36.07 33 35.54 30 0.53 3 High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
N=I 
N=I 
SLPOT=N 
SLPOT=N 
SLPOT=I 
SLPOT=I 
0.67 
0.66 
0.16 
0.28 
0.13 
0.02 
13.34 
11.78 
1.33 
2.05 
1.14 
0.15 
Market 
predicta-
bility 
37.78 33 34.01 30 3.77 3 High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
N=I 
N=I 
SLPOT=N 
SLPOT=N 
SLPOT=I 
SLPOT=I 
0.73 
0.69 
0.14 
0.21 
0.09 
-0.02 
15.70 
14.88 
1.13 
1.72 
0.73 
-0.13 
Path 
depen-
dence 
 
46.19 33 42.79 30 3.40 3 High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
N=I 
N=I 
SLPOT=N 
SLPOT=N 
SLPOT=I 
SLPOT=I 
0.72 
0.69 
0.30 
0.04 
-0.07 
0.17 
15.95 
13.83 
2.49 
0.29 
-0.64 
1.36 
 
# Significance at 5% level is indicated by *, at 1% level by **, at 0.1% level by *** 
 
@ In this table the constructs are abbreviated as follows: 
I = social interaction effects 
N = network effects 
SLPOT = potential for scale and learning effects 
SLUSE = realization of scale and learning effects 
Table 7.21: Stability tests of market characteristics on LISREL path model 
 
The first pair-wise comparison was between low and high lock-in effects. The chi-
square difference (0.53) between the constraint and the free model was 
nonsignificant, which means that the model is stable for variations in lock-in effects. 
 
The second pair-wise comparison was made between low and high market 
predictability. Here, the chi-square difference (∆χ2=3.77) between the constraint and 
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the free model was nonsignificant, which means that the model was stable for 
variations in market predictability. We recall from section 7.3 that there may be some 
problems with the unidimensionality and the convergent validity of the market 
predictability construct. We cannot therefore draw a definitive conclusion about the 
reason for the model stability for variations in market predictability. This may be 
because market predictability does not influence the model, or because the construct 
does not adequately reflect the (un)predictability of the market. 
 
The third pair-wise comparison was made between low and high path dependence. In 
this case, the chi-square difference (∆χ2=3.40) between the constraint and the free 
model was nonsignificant, which means that the model is stable for variations in path 
dependence. 
 
7.6 Conclusions 
We may conclude the following with respect to the cross-sectional management 
survey among managers of 257 Dutch manufacturing firms. 
 
As no existing measures were available on the main constructs, these had to be 
developed. Four new constructs were developed to measure the market-based 
mechanisms of increasing returns, i.e., social interaction effects at the product level, 
social interaction effects at the technology level, network effects at the product level 
and network effects at the technology level. A further analysis showed that social 
interaction effects at the product level and social interaction effects at the technology 
level belong to the second-order construct social interaction effects and that network 
effects at the product level and network effects at the technology level belong to the 
second-order construct network effects. All of these constructs proved to be valid 
measurements. 
 
Two new constructs were developed to measure the firm-based mechanisms of 
increasing returns, i.e., the potential for scale and learning effects and the realization 
of scale and learning effects. For practical measurement reasons no distinction was 
made between scale effects and learning effects, which may be the cause of a 
possible problem with the convergent validity of these constructs. We conclude that 
the measurement model for scale and learning effects should be further explored and 
that it is recommended to try and measure scale and learning effects objectively.56 
 
                                                          
56 This will be done in chapters eight and nine. 
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Eight new constructs were developed for measuring effects that could be expected to 
moderate the main model relationships, i.e., substitution effects on the product level, 
substitution effects on the technology level, lock-in effects, path dependence, market 
predictability, product complementarity and compatibility, technological 
complementarity and compatibility and knowledge intensity of products. The 
measurement models for substitution effects, lock-in effects and path dependence 
were proven to be valid. The measurement models for market predictability, product 
complementarity and compatibility, technological complementarity and compatibility 
and knowledge intensity of products showed possible problems with 
unidimensionality and convergent validity and should therefore be used with care. 
 
The developed constructs were used to test the hypotheses of the research model, to 
do a test for an alternative model and to do tests for the stability of the model. The 
results of the testing of the research hypotheses are summarized in table 7.22 below. 
 
Research hypotheses: Result: 
H1 The larger the social interaction effects, the larger the network 
effects 
Supported 
H2a The larger the network effects, the larger the potential for scale 
and learning effects 
Supported 
H2b The larger the social interaction effects, the larger the potential for 
scale and learning effects 
Not supported# 
H3 The larger the potential for scale and learning effects, the higher 
the realization of scale and learning effects 
Supported 
H4 The higher the realization of scale and learning effects, the higher 
the level of product performance 
Supported 
H5 The higher the realization of scale and learning effects, the higher 
the level of organizational performance 
Supported 
H6 The higher the level of product performance, the higher the level of 
organizational performance 
Supported 
# There is, however, an indirect influence of social interaction effects on the potential for 
scale and learning effects through the support of hypotheses H1 and H2a  
Table 7.22: Results on the research hypotheses 
 
The most noticeable result is that firm performance is achieved in a market where 
market-based mechanisms of increasing returns are present only through the firm-
based mechanisms of increasing returns. Specifically, product and organizational 
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performance are achieved in markets where social interaction effects and network 
effects are present only through internalization of the potential for scale and learning 
effects and the subsequent realization of scale and learning effects by the firm.  
 
A test of an alternative model, incorporating direct effects from the market-based 
mechanisms of increasing returns on firm performance, showed that this influence is 
very weak compared to the influence through the firm-based mechanisms. 
 
Tests for the stability of the model showed that model is generally stable for 
variations in product substitution effects, technology substitution effects, lock-in 
effects, path dependence, market predictability, product complementarity and 
compatibility, technology complementarity and compatibility and knowledge 
intensity of the product. Only the relation between social interaction effects and 
network effects is influenced by technology substitution and by product 
complementarity and compatibility.  
 
The stability of the model for all these variables means that the model relations hold 
for a much wider range of product, technology and market characteristics than is 
usually assumed in literature. Usually, increasing returns is associated with 
knowledge intensive products in highly turbulent markets with locked-in customers 
and high path dependence. Our results indicate that this may be too limited a view on 
increasing returns. We should be careful, however, because in view of the possible 
problems with the unidimensionality and convergent validity of the measurement 
models for technological complementarity and compatibility, product 
complementarity and compatibility, market predictability and knowledge intensity of 
products, no definitive conclusions can be drawn on whether the model is stable for 
the variations in these variables, or that the constructs for these variables are not 
sufficiently robust. 
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8. REPORT SECOND EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
In this chapter we report on the research process and the results of the second 
empirical study, consisting of a cross-sectional management survey among managers 
of 36 firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange combined with a measurement 
of these firms’ financial data. This study differs from the first empirical study in that 
its timeframe was comparative static instead of static, in that it uses different 
measures for the firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns and in that it addresses 
a different research sample. 
 
In this chapter we start in section one by describing the development of the measures. 
We continue in section two with a description of the process of data collection and 
describing the research sample. In section three we address the validation of the 
subjective measures and in section four we address the validation of the objective 
measures. In section five we report on the results of this empirical study, i.e., on the 
testing of the hypotheses. We provide conclusions in section six. 
 
8.1 Development of the measures 
The time frame of this study is comparative static, i.e., comparing the situation at the 
time with the situation of five years earlier, whereas the first empirical study was 
static, i.e., only considering the situation at the time. This meant that the measures of 
the different mechanisms of increasing returns had to be adjusted to accommodate 
the comparative static timeframe. The period of analysis was taken from 1995 until 
2000, i.e., including the annual results from the year 2000, but not from 2001 because 
these were not yet available for all firms when the questionnaire was sent out. 
 
The domain specification for the measures was done in the theoretical part of this 
thesis. The two market-based increasing returns mechanisms were theoretically 
specified in chapter four while the firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns were 
theoretically specified in chapter five. 
 
8.1.1 Measuring social interaction effects, network effects and market dominance 
We chose to adapt the measures of social interaction effects and network effects 
developed for the first empirical study for measuring social interaction effects and 
network effects in a comparative static timeframe. We may recall from the previous 
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chapter that the validity of these measures was good. A re-test of these measures for 
a different research sample may further enhance their validity (see section 8.3). For 
measuring market dominance, i.e., the potential for scale and learning effects, we 
chose to adapt a 3-item measure that was also used in the questionnaire of the first 
empirical analysis and that asked about the increasing dominance of a technology, a 
product or a supplier in the market.57 
 
Initially, the items measuring social interaction effects, network effects and 
technological dominance were kept semantically equal. The only difference with the 
measurement in the first empirical study was that every item had a double instead of 
a single seven-point Likert scale. On the first scale the respondent was expected to 
judge the current situation, on the second scale the respondent was expected to judge 
the situation of about five to ten years ago. This way of questioning was chosen to 
get an adequate picture of the changes in the period between roughly 1995 and the 
time of the questionnaire, i.e., 2001. 
 
Following the Churchill (1979) procedure we collected initial data to pre-test and 
purify the measures. We pre-tested the questionnaire with 5 academics and 5 
practitioners. All participants were asked to identify items that were confusing, tasks 
that were difficult to respond to and any other problems they encountered when 
filling out the questionnaire. 
 
The major concern of all the participants was the double scale on the items 
measuring social interaction effects, network effects and market dominance. The 
practitioners reported problems with the workload and boredom of filling out every 
item on two scales. The academics reported possible risks with self-enforced 
correlations between the first and the second scales. 
 
It was therefore decided to reduce the items measuring social interaction effects, 
network effects and market dominance to a single seven-item Likert scale, asking 
respondents to indicate the changes in the past five to ten years on each of these 
items. This implied a slight change in the formulation of the questions, from static, as 
in the first empirical study, to comparative dynamic.  
 
                                                          
57 This measure was a part of the questionnaire used in the first empirical study but was not 
used in the analysis of the first empirical study. In the pre-test phase of the first empirical 
study, the measure was judged to be satisfactory by academics and practitioners. 
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After this change, the academics reported some problems with understanding the 
questions on social interaction effects and network effects. As a result of this 
feedback the formulation of the questions was slightly adjusted. The academics also 
signaled that, according to the theory of increasing returns, market dominance is best 
measured by the item on the dominance of a technology in the market rather than by 
the items on product or supplier dominance in the market. As a result, these two 
items were deleted and market dominance was measured on a single item. After this 
adjustment neither the practitioners nor the academics reported any further concerns 
and the questionnaire was therefore ready for final administration. The scale items 
used in the final questionnaire are shown in Appendix II. 
 
8.1.2 Measuring scale effects and learning effects 
We chose to follow a different approach for measuring scale and learning effects. 
Instead of using subjective constructs, we chose to measure scale and learning effects 
using publicly available financial data. As separate data on scale effects and learning 
effects are not publicly available, we decided, as in the previous empirical study, to 
develop a single measure to measure scale and learning effects. According to the 
theoretical specification of scale and learning effects provided in chapter five, an 
explicit distinction should be made between the potential for scale and learning 
effects and the realization of scale and learning effects. 
 
The potential for scale and learning effects was measured by the firm’s average 
growth rate in output over the period of analysis. The realization of scale and 
learning effects was measured by the firm’s average growth rate in productivity over 
the period of analysis. We therefore needed clear concepts of measuring the change 
in output and of measuring the change in productivity. As productivity change means 
a change in the ratio of the volume of output to the volume of the inputs, we need 
measurements of outputs and inputs. For each of these, there are two questions to be 
answered: (1) Will the measurement be in units or in monetary terms? (2) Which 
correlator will be chosen for the measurement? 
 
8.1.3 Measurement in physical or monetary units 
First is the issue of what to measure: physical units or monetary units. Production 
functions are usually measured in physical units on both axes, i.e., units of output 
versus units of input. Cost functions are usually measured in a mixed way, i.e., units 
of output versus monetary measurement of cost. Both ways of measurement are used 
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in the literature for learning and experience curves. Theoretically, there is no 
difference between these two ways of measuring because “… a production 
technology is always identically represented by either a production function or the 
corresponding cost function” (Chung, 1994, p.104).  
 
Taking a management perspective, initially a complete measurement in money terms, 
i.e., measuring both outputs and inputs in money terms, rather than in quantities, 
seems to be preferable. The manager gains nothing by increased unit output, if it 
reduces turnover or profit level; also nothing is gained by a reduction in unit input, 
e.g., less employees, if this increases employment cost. Regarding productivity, 
money is eventually the most important variable for managers. To quote Salter 
(1960, p.3): “Businessmen – despite what they say at productivity congresses – are 
interested in prices, costs, and profits, and to them increasing productivity is simply 
one means of reducing labor costs.” The well-known counter-argument is that 
measurement in monetary terms means units*prices and, since prices are 
competitively determined, this measurement implicitly includes competition and 
market forces (Marshall, 1890). For managers, however, this is not undesirable per 
se, because they always deal with the interaction between their firm and the market 
forces. 
 
For measuring output, measurement in monetary units has a large advantage over 
measurement in physical units. For firms or industries with strongly diversified 
outputs it is in principle impossible to measure physical units of output at the firm 
level. What is the unit output of a large diversified firm, e.g., AKZO Nobel, DSM, 
Philips or Royal Dutch/Shell? This question is fundamentally unanswerable at the 
firm level, unless the firm happens to deal in a very limited scope of plain 
commodities. We will therefore measure output in monetary terms, because this 
enables us to make comparisons across firms. 
 
This problem of physical or monetary measurement is less severe for measuring 
inputs if we limit the productivity measurement to labor productivity, as is done in 
the next section.58 A homogenous measure can be taken for labor input, e.g., number 
of employees, number of full time equivalents of employees or hours worked. Hours 
worked means the total number of hours worked added over all employees of a firm. 
 
                                                          
58 Although, when we want to have a single measure combining different classes of inputs, 
measurement in money terms could be preferable, just as with the measurement of outputs. 
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8.1.4 Correlators for measuring output and input 
The second issue is about the correlator chosen to measure output and input. For 
output, when measurement in monetary terms is chosen, there are still different 
possible correlators. The most important ones are turnover and added value. Of 
these, turnover comes closest to indices of volume of gross output that are often used 
in productivity analyses at the industry or country level. The turnover measure, 
however, suffers from the problem that, when a firm produces intermediate goods 
that are sold within the firm for further processing, the gross output figure results in 
an overstatement of true gross output of the firm (cf., Kennedy, 1971). Another 
problem of the turnover approach is that insourcing or outsourcing of activities by 
firms may distort productivity statistics. For example, when a firm outsources an 
activity, this will show in a reduction of the number of employees, but not 
necessarily in the turnover figures, e.g., when outsourcing the internal IT department. 
 
Added value, i.e., turnover minus all external cost, does not suffer from these 
shortcomings. Turnover is an indicator of the value that the firm’s products generate 
for customers, in comparison to the products of other suppliers. The external cost the 
firm has to pay to its suppliers is an indicator of the part of this value that is created 
by the firm’s suppliers. Turnover minus the external cost is therefore an indicator of 
the part of the customer value that is created by the firm. The added value measure 
also conforms to what is customary in other productivity studies. We therefore use 
the average growth rate of added value over the period 1995-2000 for measuring the 
potential for scale and learning effects. 
 
A partial productivity index can be derived for any input by dividing the index of 
volume of output by an index of the volume of that specific input. We may choose to 
include either labor, i.e., measuring labor productivity, capital, i.e., measuring capital 
productivity, or a combination of a number of inputs, i.e., measuring multi-factor 
productivity. We chose to measure labor productivity for this study. Labor as an input 
is customarily expressed in number of employees, number of full-time-equivalent 
employees or in hours worked. Measuring full-time-equivalent employees is 
preferred over just measuring the normal number of employees, because the full-
time-equivalent measurement corrects for the increasing numbers of part-time jobs. 
Measuring hours worked is to be preferred over full-time-equivalent employees 
because it corrects for the general tendency that exists, at least in the Netherlands, for 
employees to work less hours per week today than they did five years ago. We 
therefore measured labor inputs in number of hours worked.  
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Productivity in this study can then be defined as the ratio between output and input, 
where output is measured as added value and input is measured as hours worked. We 
used the average growth rate of productivity for the period 1995-2000 as a measure 
of the realization of scale and learning effects. 
 
8.1.5 Measuring firm performance 
We chose to use an objective measureme based on publicly available financial data 
for measuring firm performance. Firm performance was therefore measured by the 
firm’s average growth rate in net profit over the period 1995-2000. 
 
8.2 Sample and data description 
The data for this study were collected from two different sources. The data on social 
interaction effects, network effects and market dominance were collected through a 
mail questionnaire, whereas the data on the potential and realization of scale and 
learning effects and the data on firm performance were collected from publicly 
available data sources, i.e., the firms’ annual reports. 
 
The sampling frame for this study consisted of 131 firms listed on the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange over the period 1983-2002.59 Of these 131, we chose the ones that 
were listed in 2001 and we eliminated firms that had not been listed for six years, to 
ensure that we had the data points from 1995 and 2000 for every firm.60 Further, we 
eliminated firms with missing data that were crucial for our computations. This 
resulted in a corrected sampling frame of 83 firms. 
 
We made a firm-specific graphic analysis, relating the annual growth in productivity 
to the annual growth in output, for each of these 83 firms to increase the expected 
response rate.61 We also made an analysis of the industry in which the firm is mainly 
active and related the performance of the firm to that of the industry as a whole. 
These analyses were sent to the 83 selected firms, accompanied by the questionnaire 
                                                          
59 This comprises all firms listed on the Amsterdam Exchange Index (AEX) and the Amsterdam 
Midkap Index (AMX) and a number of the firms listed on the Dutch national market. The 
sampling frame also included firms that had been listed in any sequences of years during the 
period 1983-2002, but were not listed in 2002. The full list of firms is included in Appendix III. 
60 As all the measurements are on growth rates, the number of usable comparative static data 
points is always one less than the number of static data points. 
61 This is a graphic representation of the Verdoorn law, see chapter nine. Specifically we sent 
the contact persons a graph resembling figure 9.3. 
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for collecting the data on social interaction effects, network effects and market 
dominance. To further increase the response rate, we identified two contact persons 
for each firm from eiher general management, financial management, marketing 
management or public relations, who both received the graphic analysis and the 
questionnaire. Contact persons who did not respond were reminded twice by 
telephone, after two weeks and after four weeks, respectively. The eventual response 
consisted of 38 completed and usable questionnaires, representing 36 different firms. 
The answers were compared for the two cases where two questionnaires per firm 
were received. In both cases, there were no significant differences in the contact 
persons’ answers on any of the constructs. For these firms, the answers of the two 
contact persons were averaged. This resulted in usable answer sets for 36 firms, or a 
response rate of 43.4%. An overview of the firms included in this sample is provided 
in Appendix III. An overview of the industry response distribution is provide in table 
8.1 below.62 
 
Industry 
Initial sampling 
frame  
(131 firms) 
Corrected sampling 
frame (83 firms) 
Research sample 
(36 firms) 
 No. % No. % No. % 
Basic industry 14 10.7 % 9 10.8 % 5 13.9 % 
Food industry 9 6.9 % 7 8.4 % 2 5.6 % 
Media 7 5.3 % 5 6.0 % 2 5.6 % 
Engineering industry 14 10.7 % 9 10.8 % 2 5.6 % 
Construction industry  10 7.6 % 8 9.6 % 4 11.1 % 
Wholesale 14 10.7 % 7 8.4 % 2 5.6 % 
Transport 10 7.6 % 5 6.0 % 2 5.6 % 
Telecommunications 4 3.1 % 1 1.2 % 1 2.8 % 
Financial services 15 11.5 % 10 12.0 % 5 13.9 % 
IT services 9 6.9 % 4 4.8 % 2 5.6 % 
Other professional services 8 6.1 % 6 7.2 % 4 11.1 % 
Retail 10 7.6 % 6 7.2 % 1 2.8 % 
Electronics industry 7 5.3 % 6 7.2 % 4 11.1 % 
sum 131 100.0% 83 100.0% 36 100.0% 
Table 8.1: Sample for the second empirical study 
                                                          
62 The industry classification was chosen to conform to the classification used in the Dutch 
financial daily Het Financieele Dagblad. It was established during the testing of the 
questionnaire that this classification would have the best face validity with the targeted contact 
persons. 
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We performed a chi-square analysis of the industry response distribution to check 
the representativeness of the research sample (Weinberg & Abramowitz, 2002). This 
analysis checks the null-hypothesis that the distribution of the research sample is 
equal to the distribution of the (corrected) sampling frame. With a significance level 
of p<0.05 our analysis showed that the null-hypothesis is not rejected (χ2=5.231, 
df=12). Therefore we conclude that the sample of firms is representative for the total 
population. 
 
A routine check for respondent bias using one-way ANOVA indicated that no 
significant differences existed in the mean responses on the main constructs and main 
financial measurements across respondents with different durations of employment in 
the industry. Moreover, no industry effects existed in the mean responses on the main 
constructs and financial measurements.63 The ANOVA analysis showed, however, 
that significant differences exist in the mean responses on the main constructs and on 
the measurement of average annual growth of net profit across different firm sizes. 
This indicates that firm size may be a factor that significantly correlates with the 
presence of the market-based mechanisms of increasing returns. A more detailed 
inspection showed that there appears to be a U-shaped relationship between firm size 
and the market-based mechanisms of increasing returns: for small firms the responses 
on the scales measuring the market-based mechanisms of increasing returns are about 
average, for medium-size firms they are significantly below average and for large 
firms they are significantly above average.64 These results have to be interpreted with 
some caution though, because of the small size of the sample. 
 
A time-trend extrapolation procedure was used to test for non-response bias 
(Armstrong & Overton, 1977). We divided the data set into quartiles based on the 
order of receipt of the questionnaire. The underlying rationale is that slow 
respondents are more similar to non-respondents than fast respondents. In comparing 
fast (1st quartile) and slow (4th quartile) respondents, no significant differences 
                                                          
63 Again, as also noted in the previous chapter, this is remarkable, because we expected that 
industry characteristics would have a major influence. 
64 There may be different explanations for this correlation. One possible explanation is that it is 
purely coincidence, caused by the small size of the sample. Another possible explanation is 
that medium-sized firms are more often than small and large firms active in saturated markets 
in which no new, increasing returns-sensitive, technologies are present and that large firms, 
more often than small and medium-sized firms, are able to evoke increasing returns 
mechanisms in their markets because of their market power. This remains highly speculative, 
however. 
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existed in the mean responses on the main constructs or on the financial 
measurements. 
 
Together these results suggest that respondent, industry and non-response bias were 
not a major problem. Sample characteristics are shown in tables 8.2 and 8.3. 
 
Number of employees of the firm Frequency Percent Valid percent 
<= 1000 5 13.9 % 13.9 % 
1000-5000 9 25.0 % 25.0 % 
5000-25000 13 36.1 % 36.1 % 
> 25000 9 25.0 % 25.0 % 
Missing 0 0.0 % 0.0 % 
sum 36 100.0 % 100.0 % 
Table 8.2: Sample characteristics of the second empirical study: number of 
employees 
 
Respondent duration of 
employment in industry 
Frequency Percent Valid percent 
5 years or less 6 16.7 % 17.1 % 
5-10 years 7 19.4 % 20.0 % 
10-20 years 16 44.4 % 45.8 % 
More than 20 years 6 16.7 % 17.1 % 
Missing 1 2.8 %  
sum 36 100.0 % 100.0 % 
Table 8.3: Sample characteristics of the second empirical study: respondent duration 
of employment 
 
The publicly available data for every firm are the annual profit & loss accounts, the 
annual balance sheets and the annual number of employees. The format of the profit 
& loss accounts and the balance sheets is the one that was maintained by Euronext 
Amsterdam (the Amsterdam Stock Exchange) in its publications and on its website.65 
When a firm’s data were available in a different format, the firm’s annual reports 
were scrutinized and if necessary recalculated to fit the database format. 
 
                                                          
65 As from 2000, the data in these formats were only available from the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange website, www.aex.nl, and as from 2004 the data in these formats are not longer 
available from this website. 
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In the previous section, we argued to take added value as the correlator for output. 
Given the format of the profit & loss account, added value can be calculated in 
different ways, additive or subtractive. In the additive approach, we calculate added 
value as the sum of employment costs, depreciation and net profit. In the subtractive 
approach, we calculate added value as turnover minus all external cost. Due to, e.g., 
extraordinary results, there may be differences between these two calculations. For 
this study, we chose to use the additive calculation of added value, because for this is 
calculation it is least necessary to correct firm data for extraordinary results. The 
calculation of added value has been corrected for the rise in general producers’ 
prices, with 1990 = 100. This price data was obtained from the Centraal Bureau voor 
de Statistiek (CBS).66 
 
As stated earlier, productivity is taken as added value divided by hours worked, 
corrected for the rise in general producer’s prices. To compute hours worked we 
multiplied the number of employees with the annual labor duration in hours. This 
data was also obtained from the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS). 
 
8.3 Validation of the subjective measures 
The measures used for this study fall into two groups: first, the subjective scales used 
to measure social interaction effects and network effects and second, the objective 
measures for the potential and the realization of scale and learning effects and for 
firm performance. These will be discussed separately below. 
 
We reassessed the construct validity of the measures for social interaction effects and 
network effects for this second empirical study. There were two reasons for this. 
First, the items in the questionnaire had been adjusted compared to the first empirical 
study, warranting a check on construct validity. Second, a further test for construct 
validity may contribute to our confidence in the stability of these constructs. 
 
Below we address the different aspects of construct validity, i.e., unidimensionality, 
reliability, within-method convergent validity and discriminant validity (Churchill & 
Iacobucci, 2002; Steenkamp & Van Trijp, 1991; Kerlinger, 1986; Churchill, 1979). 
 
                                                          
66 This is the Dutch central bureau of statistics, i.e., the census agency. 
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8.3.1 Unidimensionality 
We computed the inter-item correlations and corrected item-to-total correlations for 
each item, taking one subscale at a time, to assess unidimensionality of the scales 
(Steenkamp & Van Trijp, 1991). This resulted in the elimination of one item from the 
construct social interaction effects at the product level. The dimensionality of each 
purified scale was explored with maximum likelihood factoring using an eigenvalue 
of 1.0 and factor loadings of 0.30 as the cut-off points. This resulted in the purified 
measures as shown in table 8.4. 
 
Unidimensionality of 
the scales 
No. of 
items 
deleted 
No. of 
items 
remaining 
Lowest 
item-to-
total 
correlation 
Eigen- 
value 
(ML 
factoring) 
Variance 
explained 
Network effects 
products 
0 4 0.47 2.21 40.9% 
Network effects 
technologies  
0 4 0.62 2.73 57.7% 
Social interaction 
effects products 
1 3 0.44 2.00 54.6% 
Social interaction 
effects technologies 
0 4 0.64 2.90 63.6% 
Table 8.4: Unidimensionality of the subjective scales 
 
The unidimensionality of each purified scale was subsequently tested by estimating 
confirmatory factor models using maximum likelihood estimation in LISREL 8.3 
(Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1999), following Steenkamp & Van Trijp (1991). We chose to 
estimate two models to fit as well as possible the constraints of a five-to-one ratio of 
sample size to parameter estimates (Baumgartner & Homburg, 1996). Note that, 
because of the data constraint, it was not possible to estimate the second-order 
constructs for network effects and social interaction effects in LISREL as was done 
for the first empirical study. 
 
Following Kumar & Dillon (1987), Steenkamp & Van Trijp (1991) state that the 
overall fit of the model provides the necessary and sufficient information to 
determine the unidimensionality. We examined the values of the standardized 
residuals to identify misspecifications of the measurement models. This did not result 
in any re-specification. The schematic compositions of the constructs are shown in 
figures 8.1 and 8.2. The results of the two measurement models are shown in the 
corresponding tables 8.5 and 8.6. 
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Direct network effect, product, end-user
Direct network effect, product, supplier
Indirect network effect, product, end-user
Indirect network effect, product, supplier
Direct network effect, technology, end-user
Direct network effect, technology, supplier
Indirect network effect, technology, end-user
Indirect network effect, technology, supplier
Network effects, 
product
Network effects, 
technology
 
Figure 8-1: Measurement model 1 - network effects 
 
Measurement 
model 1 
No. of 
items 
deleted 
No. of 
items 
remaining 
Lowest t-
value 
Average 
variance 
extracted 
Composite 
reliability 
Network effects 
products 
0 4 3.36 49.4% 0.79 
Network effects 
technologies 
0 4 4.72 64.2% 0.88 
 
Evaluation of the model: χ2/df= 0.98; GFI= 0.92; NFI= 0.92; NNFI= 0.97; CFI= 0.99; IFI= 0.99; 
RMSEA= 0.000 
Table 8.5: LISREL estimates of measurement model 1 
 
Social interaction effect, opinions, product, end-user
Social interaction effect, opinions, product, supplier
Social interaction effect, expectations, product, end-user
Social interaction effect, expectations, product, supplier
Social interaction effect, opinions, technology, end-user
Social interaction effect, opinions, technology, supplier
Social interaction effect, expectations, technology, end-user
Social interaction effect, expectations, technology, supplier
Social interaction 
effects, product
Social interaction 
effects, technology
 
Figure 8-2: Measurement model 2 - social interaction effects 
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Measurement 
model 2 
No. of 
items 
deleted 
No. of 
items 
remaining 
Lowest t-
value 
Average 
variance 
extracted 
Composite 
reliability 
Social interaction 
effects products 
0 3 2.94 54.5% 0.77 
Social interaction 
effects 
technologies 
0 4 4.12 63.5% 0.87 
 
Evaluation of the model: χ2/df= 1.23; GFI= 0.91; NFI= 0.91; NNFI= 0.92; CFI= 0.96; IFI= 0.97; 
RMSEA= 0.084 
Table 8.6: LISREL estimates of measurement model 2 
 
As can be seen from the tables, the fits of both of the measurement models are good, 
meeting the required 0.90 threshold values of the absolute, i.e., GFI and NFI and 
incremental, i.e., NNFI, CFI and IFI fit indices. The parsimonious fit measure of the 
chi-square value divided by the number of degrees of freedom was below the 
recommended level of 2.0 and the root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA) was almost at or below the recommended 0.08 level for each of the 
models. 
 
8.3.2 Reliability 
We explored the reliability of each purified, unidimensional scale by computing the 
Cronbach alpha reliability coefficient. The values of the Cronbach alpha for the 
different constructs indicate that the reliability is adequate. See table 8.7 below. 
 
Reliability of the scales No. of 
items 
Lowest 
item-to-
total 
correlation
# 
Cronbach 
alpha 
Eigen- 
value 
(ML 
factoring) 
Variance 
explained 
Network effects products 4 0.47 0.73 2.21 40.9% 
Network effects 
technologies  
4 0.62 0.84 2.73 57.7% 
Social interaction effects 
products 
3 0.44 0.74 2.00 54.6% 
Social interaction effects 
technologies 
4 0.64 0.87 2.90 63.6% 
 
# For the two-item scales the figure provided is the inter-item correlation 
Table 8.7: Reliability of the subjective scales 
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8.3.3 Within-method convergent validity 
Convergent validity of the scales was investigated by estimating two confirmatory 
factor models using maximum likelihood estimation in LISREL 8.3 (Jöreskog & 
Sörbom, 1999). See section 8.3.2 for the models and the results. Steenkamp & Van 
Trijp (1991) provide three conditions for convergent validity, namely (1) that the 
factor coefficients for all the items of a construct should be significant, (2) that the 
correlation between the item and the construct should exceed 0.50 and (3) that the 
overall fit of the measurement model should be acceptable. The first and second 
conditions are met for all items and their corresponding latent constructs. The third 
condition, the overall fit of the model is met for both measurement models. 
 
8.3.4 Discriminant validity 
Discriminant validity among the scales was assessed in two steps. First, we estimated 
a two-factor model for each possible pair of scales. Discriminant validity was 
indicated when the variance-extracted estimates for the two scales exceed the square 
of the correlation between them (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988). The results revealed that 
without exception the assessment supported the discriminant validity of the scales.  
 
Second, we examined for the measurement models the chi-square difference between 
the original models and similar models in which the correlations among the latent 
constructs were constrained to unity (Bagozzi & Phillips, 1982, p.476). A 
significantly lower value of the chi-square of the constrained model indicates that the 
latent constructs are not perfectly correlated and that discriminant validity is 
achieved. The results, shown in table 8.8, indicate that discriminant validity is 
achieved for both of the scales. 
 
Discriminant 
validity 
Model with trait 
correlations 
constrained to unity 
Unconstrained 
model 
Chi-square difference# 
 χ2 df χ2 df ∆χ2 ∆df 
Model 1 
Network effects 
20.28 12 10.75 11 9.53 
(**) 
1 
Model 2 social 
interaction effects 
28.37 10 11.07 9 17.30 
(***) 
1 
 
# Significance at 5% level is indicated by *, at 1% level by **, at 0.1% level by *** 
Table 8.8: Discriminant validity of the subjective scales 
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8.3.5 Conclusions on construct validity 
Together the results of the tests for unidimensionality, reliability, convergent validity 
and discriminant validity provided further evidence on the validity of the scales. A 
summary of the results is provided in table 8.9 below. 
 
Conclusions on construct 
validity 
Content 
validity 
Unidi-
mensio-
nality 
Relia-
bility 
Within-
method 
conver-
gent 
validity 
Discrimi-
nant 
validity 
Network effects products OK OK OK OK OK 
Network effects technologies  OK OK OK OK OK 
Social interaction effects  
products 
OK OK OK OK OK 
Social interaction effects 
technologies 
OK OK OK OK OK 
Table 8.9: Conclusions of the validity of the subjective scales 
 
From these results we can conclude that the validity of the first-order constructs of 
network effects and social interaction effects is confirmed.  
 
The combined results from the validity test in the first empirical study and the 
confirmation of the validity in this second empirical study provide enough 
confidence to use both the first-order and the second-order constructs for network 
effects and social interaction effects as measurements of the market-based 
mechanisms of increasing returns in this study. On this basis the constructs were 
formed by averaging the responses to each item in a particular scale. 
 
Besides the scales measuring social interaction effects and network effects, the single 
item of technological dominance was used in the analysis as an additional measure of 
the potential for scale and learning effects. 
 
8.4 Validation of the objective measures 
Validating objective measurements is quite different from validating subjective 
measurement scales. Still, the goal is the same: to ensure that we measure what we 
want to measure. The content validation of the objective measures was discussed in 
section 8.1. Below, we deal with solving possible distortions in the measurements of 
output growth, productivity growth and net profit growth. 
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Our data is made up of financial data for firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange, and is derived from these firms’ annual reports. A number of issues have 
to be addressed with regard to these data, i.e., the consistency in the data definitions 
over time, corrections for inflation, corrections for outliers and corrections for 
negative output values. 
 
8.4.1 Consistency of the data definitions 
A first possible problem with firm-level data from annual reports is that firms 
sometimes adjust the way they calculate or present their annual figures. When major 
adjustments are made there is a danger that this will distort the computed growth 
rates of output, productivity or net profit.  
 
The consistency in the data definitions was checked for all the firms in the sample. 
When any inconsistencies were found between the report years 1995 and 2000, the 
data were adjusted according to information given by the firm in its annual report to 
provide the same data definition for both observations. In cases where this was not 
possible, we deleted the observation from the sample. 
 
A second issue is that there will be differences in how financial figures are calculated 
and presented between firms. This means that when working with the nominal 
figures, firm data may be incomparable. In our case, this is not a problem, because 
we calculate the percentage changes between 1995 and 2000. This made the data 
comparable across firms. 
 
8.4.2 Correction for inflation 
An important issue when we measure in monetary units is how to correct for 
inflation. A correction for inflation is necessary for all three measures, output growth, 
productivity growth and net profit growth. Failing to correct for inflation may lead to 
strong correlations between, e.g., output growth and productivity growth, because 
both are influenced by the general level of price increases. 
 
The next important question is: Which deflator should be used for this correction? To 
answer this question, we have to know the relevant price developments for each firm. 
Inflation is likely to be different for different countries, for different industries and 
for different firms. Contrary to firm-level data, industry-level and country-level data 
are readily available. The problem with these however is their application to 
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individual firms, when we consider that many firms in our sample perform activities 
in multiple industry sectors and many of the firms in our sample, while having their 
headquarters in the Netherlands, have large parts of their operations abroad. 
 
Even if we know the appropriate inflation figure, how can we be sure it is right? Any 
firm-level differentiated inflation correction is a hazardous task, e.g.: Are rising 
prices in a specific industry not simply a reflection of increasing product quality? 
When we make the correction at the industry level: Do we destroy the inherent 
variance that exists between industries? In view of these problems, the only deflator 
that can be used, and with some caution, is the general producers’ price-index 
number. This number deflates the general cost level and leaves the variance between 
specific industries and specific firms intact. Therefore, the measurements of output, 
of productivity and of net profit were deflated using the general producers’ price 
index published by the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS).67 
 
8.4.3 Correction for outliers 
There are years for which the financial data stand out, positively or negatively, for 
some firms in the sample. This may have different reasons, e.g., the firm may have 
had an especially bad year, the firm may have ‘financially engineered’ its figures, 
there may have been major portfolio changes like mergers and acquisitions or there 
may have been other out of the ordinary events within the firm. For all the firms in 
the sample, we checked the data on such possible outliers. When possible, the data 
were adjusted using the information provided by the firm in its annual report. When 
such a correction was not possible, we deleted the observation from the sample. 
 
8.4.4 Correction for negative growth rates 
A final problem in calculating the average annual growth rates for output and 
productivity is negative growth rates. In very exceptional cases, output, and therefore 
also productivity, may have a negative value for a certain year. For net profit, 
negative values are a more common phenomenon. As a consequence of negative 
values, a problem appears when calculating the growth rate with respect to the year 
with the negative value. The calculation will still give a number, but the growth rate 
in relation to the negative value is of course undefined. Therefore, these observations 
were deleted from our sample. 
                                                          
67 This is the Dutch central bureau of statistics, i.e., the census agency. 
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The above corrections resulted in a data file that could be used with confidence to 
measure the potential of scale and learning effects, the realization of scale and 
learning effects and firm performance. In total, as a consequence of the above 
corrections, five observations were deleted from the sample, some of these for more 
than one of the above reasons. 
 
8.4.5 Conclusions on construct validity 
As a result of the validation, we concluded that we could use the main constructs 
with confidence. We report the correlations between these main constructs in table 
8.10. 
 
 Network 
effects 
Social 
interaction 
effects 
Potential for 
scale and 
learning effects 
measured as 
technological 
dominance 
Potential for 
scale and 
learning effects 
measured as 
growth of 
output 
Realization 
of scale and 
learning 
effects 
Social 
interaction 
effects 
0.872***     
Potential for 
scale and 
learning effects 
measured as 
technological 
dominance 
0.604*** 0.518***    
Potential for 
scale and 
learning effects 
measured as 
growth of output 
0.248 0.273 0.350*   
Realization of 
scale and 
learning effects 
0.293 0.223 0.403** 0.431**  
Firm 
performance 0.191 0.224 0.311 0.943*** 0.498*** 
# Significance at 10% level is indicated by *, at 5% level by **, at 1% level by *** 
Table 8.10: Correlations between the main constructs 
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8.5 Results 
8.5.1 Research model and hypotheses 
The research model for this second empirical study is presented in figure 8.3. 
 
Social
interaction
effects
Network
effects
Potential 
for scale and 
learning effects
Realization 
of scale and 
learning effects
Firm
performanceH1
H2a
H2b
H3 H5
Subjective data
(survey among managers)
Objective data
(financial figures)
 
Figure 8-3: Research model and hypotheses of the second empirical study 
 
This research model reveals a number of relationships. First, social interaction effects 
were hypothesized to have a positive effect on network effects (H1). Second, social 
interaction effects and network effects were hypothesized to have a positive effect on 
the firm’s potential for scale and learning effects (H2a and H2b). Third, the firm’s 
potential for scale and learning effects was hypothesized to have a positive impact on 
its realization of these effects (H3). Finally, the realization of scale and learning 
effects was hypothesized to have a positive influence on firm performance (H5). We 
will subsequently test these hypotheses. 
 
8.5.2 Results for the main effects 
The hypotheses were tested using linear regression models. As our sample size was 
relatively small, it was not possible to estimate a structural equation model with 
LISREL 8.3 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1999). The linear regression models offer a more 
favorable ratio between our sample size and the number of parameters to be 
estimated (Baumgartner & Homburg, 1996). For the regression models we used the 
constructs created for the estimation of the measurement model, i.e., social 
interaction effects and network effects, and we used the objective measures of 
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productivity growth and net profit growth as measures for the realization of scale and 
learning effects and firm performance, respectively. On the basis of the correlations 
presented in table 8.10, we decided to use the single-item measure of technological 
dominance as the measure for the potential of scale and learning effects. 
 
The results of the individual linear regression models are presented in table 8.11 
below. Note, this table is spread over two pages, the left page covering the first five 
columns and the right page the last six columns. 
 
Independent variable Dependent variable Total 
number 
of obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of obser-
vations 
Unstan-
dardized beta 
Social interaction 
effects 
Network effects 36 31 0.979 
(***) 
Social interaction 
effects 
Potential for scale and 
learning effects 
36 31 0.858 
(**) 
Network effects Potential for scale and 
learning effects 
36 31 0.891 
(***) 
Potential for scale and 
learning effects 
Realization of scale and 
learning effects 
36 31 0.244 
(*) 
Realization of scale and 
learning effects 
Firm performance 36 31 0.365 
(**) 
Relationships from alternative research framework 
Social interaction 
effects 
Firm performance 36 31 0.165 
Network effects Firm performance 36 31 0.126 
Significance at the 5% level is indicated by (*), at the 1% level by (**) and at the 0.1% level by 
(***) 
 
 
The findings support H1, as social interaction effects have a positive and significant 
effect on network effects. This finding is consistent with previous theories suggesting 
that social interaction effects enhance the creation of network effects (Katz and 
Shapiro, 1986; Rosenberg, 1976).  
 
The findings support H2a and H2b, as both network effects and social interaction 
effects have a positive and significant effect on the potential for scale and learning 
effects. This finding is consistent with previous theoretical findings that a standards 
battle is likely to be won by one of the competing technologies, i.e., that there are 
multiple possible equilibria (Farrell & Saloner, 1985; 1986; Katz & Shapiro, 1985; 
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1986; Arthur, 1989; Besen & Farrell, 1994). As a consequence, the winning 
technology will dominate the market, causing a large potential for scale and learning 
effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T-value of 
beta 
 
 
Constant 
term 
T-value of 
constant term 
R square Standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-statistic 
9.606 0.299 0.773 0.761 0.666 92.272 
3.258 1.295 1.297 0.268 1.720 10.614 
4.076 0.976 1.103 0.364 1.600 16.614 
2.285 -0.315 -0.624 0.162 1.121 5.222 
2.984
(**)
0.664 
(***) 
3.895 0.248 0.779 8.903 
 
1.236 0.279 0.550 0.050 0.874 1.527 
1.050 0.392 0.808 0.037 0.880 1.102 
 
Table 8.11: Results of the individual regression models 
 
The results support H3, as the potential for scale and learning effects has a significant 
and positive effect on the realization of scale and learning effects. This finding is 
consistent with literature which shows that firms can exploit the potential for scale 
and learning effects through the pursuit of alternative competitive strategies (Besen 
& Farrell, 1994; Hagel, 1996; Shapiro & Varian, 1999). 
 
Finally, the results support H5, as the realization of scale and learning effects has a 
significant and positive effect on firm performance. This result confirms previous 
findings that show that scale and learning effects have a positive effect on 
performance (Hatch and Mowery, 1999; Makadok, 1999). 
Report second empirical study 
256 
 
We also studied the relationships between social interaction effects and firm 
performance and between network effects and firm performance. Analogous to the 
first empirical study, an alternative research framework can be drawn that includes 
these relationships (see figure 8.4). 
 
Social
interaction
effects
Network
effects
Potential 
for scale and 
learning effects
Realization 
of scale and 
learning effects
Firm
performanceH1
H2a
H2b
H3 H5
 
Figure 8-4: Alternative research model for the second empirical study 
 
As can be seen in table 8.11, the relationship between social interaction effects and 
firm performance and between network effects and firm performance were found to 
be nonsignificant. This supports our finding of the first empirical study that firm 
performance can only be achieved in markets where social interaction effects and 
network effects are present through the internalization and exploitation of scale and 
learning effects. 
 
8.5.3 Tests for mediation effects 
While we did not present hypotheses on mediation effects in chapter six, it is 
nevertheless interesting to investigate the presence of such mediation effects in our 
model. Mediation means that the relationship between an independent and a 
dependent variable goes through a third variable, the mediator. In other words, the 
relationship is indirect, namely from independent to mediator and from mediator to 
dependent. When there is only an indirect relationship between the independent and 
the dependent variable, we speak of complete mediation. When there is both a direct 
and an indirect relationship between the independent and the dependent variable, we 
speak of partial mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
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For example, the results from section 7.4 on the relationships between social 
interaction effects, network effects and the potential for scale and learning effects 
suggest that the presence of network effects may be a mediator of the relationship 
between social interaction effects and the potential for scale and learning effects. In 
the same way, we could test whether the potential for scale and learning effects is a 
mediator of the relationship between network effects and the realization of scale and 
learning effects. Finally, we could test whether the realization of scale and learning 
effects is a mediator of the relationship between the potential for scale and learning 
effects and firm performance. 
 
We tested these relationships for mediation by estimating and comparing three 
models (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
• Model 1: the influence of the independent variable on the mediator 
• Model 2: the influence of the independent on the dependent variable 
• Model 3: the influence of the independent variable and the mediating 
variable on the dependent variable 
 
For complete mediation, in model 1 the relationship between the independent 
variable and the mediator should be significant, in model 2 the relationship between 
the independent variable and the dependent variable should be significant and in 
model 3 the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent 
variable should be nonsignificant and the relationship between the mediating variable 
and the dependent variable should be significant (Baron & Kenny, 1986). For partial 
mediation, in model 3 the relationship between the independent variable and the 
dependent variable should be significant, but smaller than in model 1 (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986). The results of the mediation tests are presented in tables 8.12, 8.13 
and 8.14 below. Note, these tables are spread over two pages, the left page covering 
the first seven columns and the right page the last six columns. 
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Model 
 
Independent 
variable 
 
 
Mediator 
 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Total 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Unstan-
dardized beta 
1 Social 
interaction 
effects 
Network 
effects 
 36 31 0.979 
(***) 
2 Social 
interaction 
effects 
 Potential for 
scale and 
learning 
effects 
36 31 0.858 
(**) 
Independent: 
-0.061 
3 Social 
interaction 
effects 
Network 
effects 
Potential for 
scale and 
learning 
effects 
36 31
Mediator: 
0.939 
(*) 
Significance at the 5% level is indicated by (*), at the 1% level by (**) and at the 0.1% level by 
(***) 
 
 
Model 
 
Independent 
variable 
 
 
Mediator 
 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Total 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Unstan-
dardized beta 
1 Network 
effects 
Potential for 
scale and 
learning 
effects 
 36 31 0.891 
(***) 
2 Network 
effects 
 Realization of 
scale and 
learning 
effects 
36 31 0.257 
Independent: 
0.075 
3 Network 
effects 
Potential for 
scale and 
learning 
effects 
Realization of 
scale and 
learning 
effects 
36 31
Mediator: 
0.214 
Significance at the 5% level is indicated by (*), at the 1% level by (**) and at the 0.1% level by 
(***) 
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T-value of 
beta 
 
 
 
Constant 
term 
T-value of 
constant 
term 
R square Standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-statistic Variance 
inflation 
factor (VIF) 
9.606 0.299 0.773 0.761 0.666 92.272 - 
3.258 1.295 1.297 0.268 1.720 10.614 - 
Independent:
-0.119
Mediator:
2.063
 
1.015 1.061 0.365 1.630 8.032 4.182 
 
Table 8.12: Results of the mediation test for network effects 
 
T-value of 
beta 
 
 
 
Constant 
term 
T-value of 
constant 
term 
R square Standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-statistic Variance 
inflation 
factor (VIF) 
4.076 0.976 1.103 0.364 1.600 16.614 - 
1.590 -0.240 -0.368 0.086 1.171 2.529 - 
Independent:
0.384
Mediator:
1.591
-0.468 -0.721 0.167 1.139 2.602 1.531 
 
Table 8.13: Results of the mediation test for the potential for scale and learning 
effects 
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Model 
 
Independent 
variable 
 
 
Mediator 
 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Total 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Unstan-
dardized beta 
1 Potential for 
scale and 
learning 
effects 
Realization 
of scale and 
learning 
effects 
 36 31 0.244 
(*) 
2 Potential for 
scale and 
learning 
effects 
 Firm 
performance 
36 31 0.139 
Independent: 
0.088 
3 Potential for 
scale and 
learning 
effects 
Realization 
of scale and 
learning 
effects 
Firm 
performance 
36 31
Mediator: 
0.307 
(*) 
Significance at the 5% level is indicated by (*), at the 1% level by (**) and at the 0.1% level by 
(***) 
 
 
 
 
From these results it can be concluded that: 
• network effects completely mediate the relationship between social 
interaction effects and the potential for scale and learning effects 
• the potential for scale and learning effects does not mediate the relationship 
between network effects and the realization of scale and learning effects 
• the realization of scale and learning effects does not mediate the relationship 
between the potential for scale and learning effects and firm performance 
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T-value of 
beta 
 
 
 
Constant 
term 
T-value of 
constant 
term 
R square Standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-statistic Variance 
inflation 
factor (VIF) 
2.285 -0.315 -0.624 0.162 1.121 5.222 - 
1.764 0.266 0.704 0.097 0.852 3.111 - 
Independent:
1.094
Mediator:
2.301
0.326 0.926 0.281 0.776 5.082 1.193 
 
Table 8.14: Results of the mediation test for the realization of scale and learning 
effects 
  
8.6 Conclusions 
From the report on the second empirical study, a management survey among 
managers of 36 firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, intended to measure 
network effects and social interaction effects, combined with an objective 
measurement of scale and learning effects and firm performance, we may conclude 
the following. 
 
The same measures as developed for the first empirical study were used for 
measuring the market-based mechanisms of increasing returns. They were slightly 
adapted to accommodate the comparative static time frame of the current study. The 
adapted measures of network and social interaction effects were re-validated for the 
current study. This confirmed the validity of the constructs of network effects at the 
product level, network effects at the technology level, social interaction effects at the 
product level and social interaction effects at the technology level. The number of 
observations from the survey was not large enough to test the validity of the second-
order constructs for network effects and social interaction effects, but the results of 
the first-order construct provided enough confidence to use these second-order 
constructs in the current study. 
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New objective measures were created for measuring the firm-based mechanisms of 
increasing returns and for measuring firm performance. Analogous to the first 
empirical study, a distinction was made between the potential for scale and learning 
effects and the realization of scale and learning effects. The potential for scale and 
learning effects was measured as the average annual growth of output over the period 
of analysis (1995-2000). We took added value as the definition of output. The 
realization of scale and learning effects was measured as the average annual growth 
of productivity over the period of analysis. We took the added value divided by hours 
worked as the definition of productivity. Firm performance was measured as the 
average annual growth rate of net profit over the period of analysis. 
 
With this empirical study we addressed hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 5. These hypotheses 
are supported by the results. See table 8.15 below. 
 
Main hypotheses: Result: 
H1 The larger the social interaction effects, the larger the network 
effects 
Supported 
H2a The larger the network effects, the larger the potential for scale 
and learning effects 
Supported 
H2b The larger the social interaction effects, the larger the potential for 
scale and learning effects 
Supported 
H3 The larger the potential for scale and learning effects, the higher 
the realization of scale and learning effects 
Supported 
H4 The higher the realization of scale and learning effects, the higher 
the level of product performance 
Not tested 
H5 The higher the realization of scale and learning effects, the higher 
the level of organizational performance 
Supported 
H6 The higher the level of product performance, the higher the level of 
organizational performance 
Not tested 
Table 8.15: Results on the main hypotheses 
 
This study delivered some noticeable results. First, even with the small number of 
observations, the validity of the measures of the market-based mechanisms of 
increasing returns was supported. Second, there was support in this study for a 
relationship between the market-based mechanisms of increasing returns, i.e., 
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network effects and social interaction effects and the firm-based mechanisms of 
increasing returns, i.e., a potential for scale and learning effects. A test on mediation 
effects reveals that network effects completely mediate the relationship between 
social interaction effects and the potential for scale and learning effects. 
 
Analogous to the results of the first empirical study, we may conclude from this 
second study that firm performance is achieved in a market where market-based 
mechanisms of increasing returns are present through the firm-based mechanisms of 
increasing returns. Specifically, firm performance is achieved in markets where 
social interaction effects and network effects are present through the realization of 
scale and learning effects by the firm. 
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9. REPORT THIRD EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
In this chapter we report on the research process and the results of the third empirical 
study, an estimation of the Verdoorn law and the productivity-performance 
relationship for 118 firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. In this study we 
did not address the market-based mechanisms of increasing returns but we focused 
on the relationship between the firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns and 
firm performance. 
 
The relationship between the potential and the realization of scale and learning 
effects was investigated using a firm-level conceptualization of the Verdoorn law. 
The Verdoorn law is an empirical, long-run linear relationship between the growth of 
output and the growth of labor productivity. It was originally conceived at the 
industry level. The empirical study reported on in this chapter differs in one 
important respect from previous Verdoorn law studies: in this study we aimed to 
conceptualize and measure the Verdoorn law at the firm level, previously it has only 
been applied at country, industry or regional level. Analogous to the Verdoorn law, 
we will model the relationship between productivity, i.e., the realization of scale and 
learning effects, and firm performance. 
 
We start in section one of this chapter by explaining the reasons for choosing the 
Verdoorn law as a concept for measuring the firm-based mechanisms of increasing 
returns. We continue in section two by describing the development of the measures 
and the models of the Verdoorn law and the productivity-performance relationship 
for our specific purpose. We describe the data collection and research sample in 
section three. We address the validation of the measures in section four. In section 
five we provide the results of the research, addressing the results for individual firms, 
for industries and for the total sample, respectively. We provide conclusions in 
section six. 
 
9.1 Why the Verdoorn law? 
As we saw before in section 2.4, there is close link between increasing returns and 
economic growth theory at the macro level (Romer, 1986; 1990b; Fingleton & 
McCombie, 1998). Therefore, to measure firm-based increasing returns, we turn 
towards macroeconomic growth models that can be adapted to be applied at the firm 
level. The basic question in such models is: Where does economic, or firm, growth 
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come from? Classical economic growth theory has assumed that the quantity of land 
available was the most important driver of growth. This made for Malthus’ (1798) 
famous population theory, i.e., that population would increase geometrically whereas 
the means of subsistence, i.e., the food supply, would only increase arithmetically 
(Ekelund & Hébert, 1997). Alternatively, classical growth theory has assumed that 
growth is associated with the increase of the working population as an external 
source of energy. This would increase the extent of the market, enabling further 
division of labor, resulting in increased productivity. International comparisons at the 
country level should suffice to prove that this is not the case. At the firm level, this 
explanation is equally unlikely. The central question of modern growth theory can 
therefore be restated as: Where does economic (firm) growth come from, when not 
from the increase of the classical input factors, i.e., from the increase of labor and 
capital? 
 
If growth does not come from the increased quantities of input factors, it must come 
from the more efficient use of the existing input factors, i.e., from rising productivity 
of those factors. In the course of recent economic history, different explanations have 
been proposed for this rise of productivity. We focus on three of those: (1) the 
traditional, neoclassical analysis, exemplified by the work of Solow (1957), (2) the 
endogenous growth analysis related to the work of Romer (1986, 1990b) and Lucas 
(1988) and (3) an alternative analysis related to the work of Verdoorn (1949) and 
Kaldor (1966). These explanations are partly opposing and partly complementary. 
 
9.1.1 Neoclassical analysis and the Solow residual 
The traditional model rests on four key assumptions (Cripps & Tarling, 1973): (1) 
resources are allocated efficiently between alternative uses, (2) for the economy as 
whole there are constant returns to scale (3) prices of factors behave as if perfect 
competition prevailed in all markets and (4) any improvements in productivity can be 
attributed to the growth of knowledge. 
 
The assumption that productivity improvements must be attributed to the growth of 
knowledge stems from the prior assumptions of efficient resources allocation and 
constant returns to scale (Cripps & Tarling, 1973). When input factors can have no 
increasing marginal product, there has to be ‘something else’ that is different from 
other input factors to explain residual growth of output. We call this ‘something else’ 
by different names, e.g., technology, knowledge, creativity, inventiveness or 
entrepreneurship. In the neoclassical tradition, the growth of this ‘something else’ is 
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supposed to be an independent and exogenous determinant of economic growth and, 
consequently, of the productivity of the input factors. 
 
One of the prime examples of the traditional, neo-classical analysis is the analysis of 
Solow (1957) on the growth of the American economy. He reasoned as follows: 
society’s aggregate production function was traditionally assumed to be dependent 
on capital (K) and labor (L). Solow’s aim was to segregate variations in output (Q) 
due to exogenous technological change (A(t)) from those due to changes in 
availability of capital.  
 
Technical change to Solow was an expression of any kind of shift in the production 
function, because of, e.g., technological development or improved national 
education. The aggregate production function according to Solow then takes the 
following shape:  
 
Q = A(t) * f(K,L) 
 
The rate of exogenous technological change ∆A(t)/A(t) can be computed from 
differentiating and rewriting this function. Solow tested this technological change for 
a time series from the United States economy (1909-1949) and found that 
approximately 20% of the total output increase is traceable to increases in capital and 
labor and the remaining 80% to exogenous technological change. Solow did not 
explicitly mention knowledge as an input factor, but designated all economic growth 
that could not be attributed to increasing in capital and labor as ‘residual’. A further 
analysis of this residual shows that it involves among others technological 
developments and new forms of organization, aspects that may also be 
conceptualized as knowledge. Although opinions differ on what exactly the residual 
represents, it is commonly accepted that technology or knowledge forms the most 
substantial part of it. Many studies in growth accounting have reported similar 
results, e.g., Griliches (1994; 1998) and Nelson & Winter (1974). 
 
9.1.2 Zegveld’s firm-level analysis 
Solow’s (1957) reasoning can, with some caution, be translated to the firm level, as 
has been done by Zegveld (2000).68 Research on the relationship between knowledge 
                                                          
68 Zegveld’s reasoning differs from Solow’s, however, in the explanation of the cause of the 
residual. Rather than assuming that there is an exogenous growth of knowledge, he regards 
knowledge as an interaction factor, i.e., something that emerges from the interaction between 
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creation and growth theory at the firm level is relatively new. While several well-
known authors have partly paved the way (Griliches, 1994; 1998; Roach, 1996) or 
have indicated the relevance of this research area (Drucker, 1999; Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1997), very few authors have explored firm-level production functions 
in relation to knowledge creation. 
 
In a study of 85 Dutch firms, listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange over the 
period 1985-1997, Zegveld (2000) has translated the residual concept to the firm 
level.69 He concluded that only 46% of the productivity growth of these firms could 
be explained from the input factors labor and capital. The residual factor knowledge 
therefore explains more than half, i.e., 54%, of the productivity growth. Moreover, 
Zegveld’s (2000) study shows that there are significant differences in residual build-
up between firms. This means that, independent of increasing capital market 
efficiency and the hiring of better-educated employees, more than half of 
productivity growth in the period of analysis cannot be assigned to the primary input 
factors capital and labor. 
 
For our purpose, the main problem of the Solow model is the assumption that all 
technical change is exogenous. If we accept this assumption, the implication is that 
this knowledge will be more or less equally accessible to most countries, industries 
or firms to the same extent. This is questionable, as the residuals for different 
economic entities are far from uniform. Therefore, we should expect some 
endogenous effects to be present. In the theoretical sections 5.2 and 5.3 we explicitly 
included endogenous explanations of scale and learning effects as the cause of 
productivity improvements. Therefore, the Solow method is unfit for our purpose. 
 
9.1.3 Endogenous growth 
This neoclassical explanation would only suffice if technology were external to the 
economic system, e.g., something that is ‘produced’ in government-sponsored 
universities. It can be argued that knowledge growth or technological improvement 
will be, at least partly, endogenous: either R&D realted endogenous, in the sense that 
knowledge gained through R&D is an output of labor, information and/or capital 
                                                                                                                                         
the core stakeholders of the firm (Zegveld & Den Hartigh, 2002). This is in fact close to the 
ideas of endogenous growth theory. 
69 Please note that Zegveld (2000) used an earlier version of the database that was used for our 
second and third empirical study. Hence Zegveld tested the firm-level residual build-up for a 
sample of firms that is largely comparable to ours. 
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investments or autonomous learning related endogenous, in the sense that knowledge 
generates itself in the transformation process. 
 
If we accept that knowledge or technology is, at least partly, a product of economic 
action within the economic system, than it cannot be fully exogenous, but it has to be 
explained from within the system. 
 
This is exactly what new or endogenous growth theory tries to do, albeit at the macro 
level. By allowing for increasing returns, i.e., increasing marginal productivity of an 
input factor, in at least one sector of the economy, economic growth can be 
endogenously explained (e.g., Romer, 1986, 1990b, 1994; Lucas, 1988; Grossman & 
Helpman, 1994; Pack, 1994). As a consequence the debate shifts to the question 
which input factor is primarily responsible for this economic growth: Is it the 
continuous improvement of capital that leads to ever-larger productivity? This is the 
point of view expressed by Arrow (1962), whose model is in the opinion of Solow 
(1997) a predecessor of endogenous growth models. The argument may easily be 
extended to take the developments in ICT, sometimes labeled as knowledge capital 
as the driving force of economic growth. Alternatively, we may regard what is 
commonly called human capital as the driver of growth. This is the point of view of 
Romer (1990b) and many of the management scientists involved in the knowledge 
debate, e.g., Weggeman (1997). The implication is that in the production function we 
have to make a distinction between physical labor and knowledge labor. The third 
alternative is to regard the ‘stock of knowledge’ as a separate input factor, as is done 
by Romer (1986).  
 
Though opinions are divided, researchers seem to agree over two issues. First, 
knowledge, or the buildup of knowledge, i.e., learning, is crucial in explaining 
economic growth. Second, this crucial role is due to the increasing marginal 
productivity of knowledge, i.e., the inherent possibility of increasing returns. 
 
Still, however, there is no theoretical rationale for introducing either knowledge 
itself, or knowledge labor, or knowledge capital as a production factor determining 
increasing returns. Doing this would mean that endogenous technological growth 
would be only and completely embodied by this production factor knowledge and not 
by the conventional production factors labor or capital. This does not conform to our 
theory that scale and learning effects result, at least partly, from division of labor and 
learning-by-doing by the conventional production factors. Therefore, while the 
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endogenous growth models explicitly incorporate increasing returns, they are unfit 
for our purpose. 
 
9.1.4 The Verdoorn law 
In 1949, the Dutch economist Verdoorn published an article in the Italian journal 
L’Industria in which he explored the relationship between the growth of labor 
productivity and the growth of output.70 He hypothesized an empirical regularity in 
the sense that there is a constant elasticity of labor productivity with respect to 
output. In other words, there appears to be a linear causal relationship between the 
growth of labor productivity and the growth of output. Verdoorn illustrated this 
relationship with output and productivity data over the periods 1870-1914 and 1914-
1930 for a number of countries and a number of industrial sectors. 
 
In 1952, Verdoorn formulated two growth laws for industry. The first one is that the 
level of labor productivity in an industrial sector in a certain country at a specified 
point in time is for a large part determined by the total accumulated production in 
that country up to that point in time (1952, p.57). From experience in the airframe 
industry and with the building of liberty ships, see, e.g., Wright (1936), Hirsch 
(1952), Alchian (1963), Argote, Beckman & Epple (1990) and Thornton & 
Thompson (2001), it became known that the ratio between the percentage rise in 
accumulated output and the percentage rise in productivity was fairly stable. In the 
literature this relationship is known as the learning curve. 
 
Reasoning further, Verdoorn states that when there is a fairly stable relationship 
between the percentage rise in accumulated production and that of productivity, it is 
mathematically deducible that there must also be a fairly stable relationship between 
the rise in non-accumulated production and productivity. That is, when we take a 
long-term view, abstracting from short-term fluctuations. This is the second growth 
law that states that the rise in labor productivity in an industrial sector in a certain 
country will be largely determined by the growth of the production volume. This 
second growth law has become known as Verdoorn’s law through Kaldor’s (1966) 
inaugural lecture. 
 
Apart from a few scattered studies, e.g., Salter (1960), the Verdoorn relationship 
might have been completely forgotten were it not for the fact that Kaldor (1966) gave 
                                                          
70 An English translation of this paper by Thirlwall is available in McCombie, J., M. Pugno & 
B. Soro (eds.), Productivity growth and economic performance. 
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it a prominent place in his inaugural lecture at the University of Cambridge. Kaldor 
referred to the relationship as Verdoorn’s law. 
 
Having been a notorious critic of neoclassical economics for many years, Kaldor has 
put the Verdoorn law in the tradition of increasing returns thinking that started with 
the first chapters of Smith (1776) and was developed by Young (1928); see section 
2.4.1. Kaldor specifically tried to provide an alternative explanation for differences in 
the rate of growth between countries. The Verdoorn law provides this alternative to 
neoclassical convention by being a dynamic relationship, by allowing for increasing 
returns in the production function and by providing a basis for theories of cumulative 
causation. To this end, Kaldor reinterpreted Verdoorn’s relationship as a regression 
equation in which the growth of productivity is linearly dependent on the growth of 
output. In Kaldor’s interpretation, the coefficient of this regression equation 
represents the extent to which a country or an industry realizes scale and learning 
effects. 
 
Since Kaldor’s (1966) inaugural lecture, many publications have appeared in which 
Kaldor’s interpretation is accepted, attacked, extended or empirically tested. Some of 
the most recent of these are Jefferson (1988), Harris & Lau (1998), Fingleton & 
McCombie (1998) and Fase & Winder (1999). An extensive overview of 
publications on the Verdoorn law is provided by McCombie, Pugno & Soro (2003). 
 
Kaldor’s interpretation brings up the question of cause and effect in the Verdoorn 
relationship: Why would the growth of productivity be the result of a faster growth 
rate of output? Why would the relationship not simply reflect that a faster growth rate 
of productivity induces, via its effect on relative costs and prices, a faster growth of 
demand? Kaldor (1975) reasons that economic growth is demand-induced instead of 
constrained by exogenously given rates of growth of labor and capital combined with 
exogenously given technological progress, as the neo-classical economists assume. In 
Kaldor’s reasoning it is primarily demand growth that through increased division of 
labor and learning-by-doing stimulates technical progress. This is only the first part 
of the reasoning however. Following the logic of cumulative causation (Myrdal, 
1957), the increased productivity will lead to increased output, the extension of 
existing markets or the opening up of new ones (see figure 9.1).  
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Growth of
effective demand
Growth of 
comparative country or 
industry advantages
Productivity 
growth
Extension of 
markets and opening 
of new markets
Verdoorn law:
scale effects 
and learning 
effects
 
Figure 9-1: Cumulative causation at the country and industry level 
 
The Verdoorn law has been empirically observed across countries, regions and 
industries using country-level, region-level and industry-level data (Fingleton & 
McCombie, 1998; Harris & Lau, 1998). To date the Verdoorn law has to our 
knowledge not been estimated using firm-level data. We think that the argument of 
cumulative causation also applies at the firm level.  
 
Our reasoning in sections 5.5 and 5.6 with regard to the relationship between the 
potential and the realization of scale and learning effects is in fact a firm-specific 
reflection of Kaldor’s macro-economic cumulative causation argument (see figure 
9.2). The growth of a firm’s output over time causes productivity improvements 
through the realization of scale effects and autonomous learning effects. At the same 
time the firm can realize productivity improvements as the result of induced and 
exogenous learning effects. The firm can use these productivity gains to increase its 
output by stimulating additional market-demand for its products. This can be 
achieved by using the cost advantage to win market share by: (1) offering products at 
lower prices than competitors for equivalent benefits, i.e., a volume-efficiency 
strategy or by: (2) providing customers with unique benefits at higher prices than 
competitors, i.e., a volume-differentiation strategy. Either one of these strategies 
allows productivity gains and growth of output to become a positive feedback loop. 
This reasoning of cumulative causation at the firm level implies that the Verdoorn 
Report third empirical study 
273 
law can also be used to measure the realization of scale and learning effects using 
firm-level data. 
 
Growth of
firm output
Firm strategy
(Volume, Efficiency,
Differentiation)
Productivity 
growth
Growth of market
demand for the firm’s
products
Verdoorn law:
scale effects 
and learning 
effects
 
Figure 9-2: Cumulative causation at the firm level 
 
Therefore, if we can draw up a firm-level measurement model of the Verdoorn law, 
this measurement model may be fit to measure the relationship between the potential 
and the realization of scale and learning effects as discussed in chapter five. On this 
basis we consider it worthwhile to use the Verdoorn law to conceptualize the 
measurement of the relationship between the potential and the realization of scale 
and learning effects. 
 
9.2 The Verdoorn model and its interpretation 
As stated above, the Verdoorn relationship has been empirically observed across 
industries, regions and countries (Kaldor, 1966; Fingleton & McCombie, 1998). We 
may therefore conclude that it is useful in measuring the potential and realization of 
scale and learning effects. Still, for application at the firm level, the measure needs to 
be adjusted and further developed. 
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9.2.1 The original Verdoorn model 
The original Verdoorn model has been conceptualized at the country and industry 
level. It can be written as: 
 
qbap && +=  
 
Here, p-dot is the exponential growth rate of labor productivity, q-dot is the 
exponential growth rate of output and a and b are constants. The value of b, the 
Verdoorn coefficient, reflects the elasticity of the productivity of labor with respect to 
output volume. This interpretation is widely accepted in the literature, see, e.g., 
McCombie & De Ridder (1984), McCombie (1985), Fingleton & McCombie (1998), 
Harris & Lau (1998) and Fase & Winder (1999). Verdoorn (1949) himself found 
values for this coefficient between 0.41 and 0.57. This means that a growth of 1% in 
the volume of output causes a growth of between 0.41% and 0.57% in labor 
productivity. The magnitude of these values and of the range of values has, over the 
decades, been confirmed by many empirical contributions; see McCombie, Pugno & 
Soro (2003) for an overview. 
 
While the coefficient has received wide attention in the literature over the past few 
decades, the importance of the constant term (a) has been largely neglected. 
Verdoorn (1949) himself does not offer an interpretation for the constant term. 
However, Kaldor (1966), in his interpretation of the Verdoorn law, interprets this 
constant term as an ‘autonomous’ rate of productivity growth.71 Kaldor (1968. 
p.389): “It is a constant term, which reflects explanatory variables that were 
excluded, one of which may be an autonomous time trend.” In other words, it reflects 
the productivity change as far as this is not dependent on output growth. 
 
9.2.2 Choosing a model specification 
Over the years, many authors have specified and re-specified the Verdoorn law for 
the purposes of theory building and empirical testing, e.g., McCombie & De Ridder 
(1984), McCombie (1985), Fingleton & McCombie (1998), Harris & Lau (1998) and 
Fase & Winder (1999). The specification of the Verdoorn law by Fingleton & 
McCombie (1998) comes closest to our theoretical specifications of scale and 
                                                          
71 Note that Kaldor uses the word autonomous in the opposite way to which we use it in the 
phrase autonomous learning effects. We will continue to use the word autonomous as 
described in section 5.3 under autonomous learning effects. 
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learning effects. We will shortly address their reasoning below. Fingleton & 
McCombie (1998) start from the following Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
βαλ LKeAQ t0=  
 
Where Q represents output, A represents the state of technology, λ represents 
exogenous technological progress, K represents capital, L represents labor and α and 
β are parameters. 
 
Taking the natural logarithm gives: 
 
LKtAQ
or
LKeAQ t
lnlnlnln
lnlnlnlnln
0
0
βαλ
βαλ
+++=
+++=
  
 
Differentiating with respect to time gives: 
 
lkq βαλ ++=   
 
Where q represents the growth of output, k represents the growth of capital inputs 
and l represents the growth of labor inputs. Since p≡q-l, or the growth of labor 
productivity is by definition equal to the growth of output minus the growth of labor 
input, we can write this as: 
 
( )( ) ( )kqp
or
kqqp
or
kqqlq
βαβββλ
αβλβ
αβλββ
+−+=
+−+=
+−+=−
1
  
 
Assuming a constant capital-output ratio means that k = q and therefore: 
 ( )( )qp ββαβλ 1−++=   
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Where (α+β-1)/β represents the Verdoorn coefficient and λ/β represents the constant 
term. It now becomes clear that: 
• a positive Verdoorn coefficient measures increasing returns, because it is 
only positive when (α+β)>1  
• exogenous technological change (λ), is part of the constant term of the 
Verdoorn relationship 
 
When we assume that technological change is partly exogenous and partly 
endogenous, or: λ=λ'+ξq, the Verdoorn equation becomes: 
 ( )( )qp ββαξβλ 1−+++′=  
 
Where (ξ+α+β-1)/β represents the Verdoorn coefficient and λ'/β represents the 
constant term. In this case, the Verdoorn coefficient measures both static increasing 
returns, i.e., static scale effects, and dynamic increasing returns, i.e., dynamic scale 
and learning effects. 
 
There are three major controversies surrounding the specification and study of the 
Verdoorn law (see also Harris & Lau, 1998): the first one revolves around the 
question of whether or not to include capital in the equation. The second one is the 
question of whether a single relationship may be estimated or rather a set of 
simultaneous equations should be used. The third one is the paradox that static 
estimations of the Verdoorn law seem to deliver radically different results than the 
usual dynamic estimation. We will subsequently address these controversies and 
explain how we dealt with them in our model. 
 
9.2.3 Including capital in the Verdoorn equation 
The first Verdoorn law controversy is about the inclusion of capital in the Verdoorn 
equation. Wolfe (1968) argued, in a critique of Kaldor’s (1966) inaugural lecture, 
that measuring the effect of labor productivity without including the effects of capital 
would result in exaggerated values for the Verdoorn coefficient. Kaldor (1968) 
responded by stating that this is not necessarily the case, as the role of capital will be 
reflected in the value of the constant term. Including capital in the regression will 
likely reduce the constant term, but will not necessarily reduce the Verdoorn 
coefficient (Kaldor, 1968). Let us further explore the way in which the Verdoorn 
coefficient is dependent on capital. 
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The original Verdoorn (1949) model was based on a Cobb-Douglas production 
function of the following form: 
 
x = aα * bβ 
 
In this function, x is output, a is labor input and b is capital input.72 From this 
function, Verdoorn (1949) derived the elasticity of labor productivity with respect to 
output, which later became known as the Verdoorn coefficient (K): 
 







+−=
aa
bbK &
&βα11  
 
In this equation, a-dot and b-dot indicate the first derivative of a and b with respect to 
time. It clearly shows that the Verdoorn coefficient is influenced by the ratio between 
the use of capital and the use of labor inputs. This is confirmed by Thirlwall (1980). 
Therefore, the Verdoorn coefficient will indeed be higher when in the long run labor 
is substituted by capital, which is exactly what has been empirically observed in 
economic literature (Rowthorn, 1999).73 
 
Alternatively we can substitute a growth of capital-labor ratio into the specification 
of the Verdoorn law by Fingleton & McCombie (1998) addressed in the previous 
section. When the capital-labor ratio grows or declines, we get k=δ·l and, therefore: 
 
( )lq
or
llq
βαδλ
βαδλ
++=
⋅+⋅+=
 
 
Where q represents the growth of output, l represents the growth of labor inputs and δ 
represents the growth of the capital-labor ratio. Since p≡q-l, or the growth of (labor) 
productivity is by definition equal to the growth of output minus the growth of labor 
input, we can write this as: 
 
                                                          
72 Note that α+β is not restricted to be smaller than or equal to 1. 
73 Rowthorn (1999) performed a meta-analysis of 33 econometric studies in which he shows 
that the substitution coefficient between capital and labor is considerably below unity. In other 
words, labor is substituted by capital. 
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Here, 1-1/(αδ+β) represents the Verdoorn coefficient and λ/(αδ+β) represents the 
constant term. It now becomes clear that the growth of the capital-labor ratio affects 
both the Verdoorn coefficient and the constant term. The Verdoorn coefficient will 
be higher when the capital-labor ratio grows, confirming Wolfe’s (1968) statements, 
and the constant term will be lower, partly confirming Kaldor’s (1968) reply. 
 
De Vries (1980, p.274) states that “As easily can be verified at least the condition of 
equality of the growth rates of output and capital should be satisfied.” This is 
confirmed by Fase & Winder (1999, p.279): “… Verdoorn’s law applies if the 
capital-output ratio is constant.” Again going back to the specification of the 
Verdoorn law by Fingleton & McCombie (1998) addressed in the previous section, it 
becomes clear that the Verdoorn coefficient is dependent on the capital-output ratio. 
When the capital-output ratio grows or declines, we get k=γ·q and, therefore: 
 ( )( )qp ββγαβλ 1−++=   
 
Where (γα+β-1)/β represents the Verdoorn coefficient and λ/β represents the constant 
term. We can see that the Verdoorn coefficient is affected by the capital-output ratio. 
Therefore, the Verdoorn coefficient will be higher when in the long run capital 
becomes more prominent as an input factor.  
 
It can be concluded from the argumentations above that the Verdoorn coefficient is 
dependent on the long-run growth of the capital-labor and the capital-output ratios 
and that the constant term is dependent on the capital-labor ratio. It also becomes 
clear, however, that the Verdoorn coefficient can be corrected for a growth of the 
capital-labor and the capital-output ratios and that the constant term can be 
corrected for a growth of the capital-labor ratio. Contrary to what De Vries (1980) 
and Fase & Winder (1999) state, the above means that the capital-output ratio does 
not have to be equal to unity per se to be able to calculate the Verdoorn relationship. 
When this ratio is non-constant, but steadily growing or declining, in accordance 
with the steady-state assumption of the Verdoorn law, we can calculate the value of γ 
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and use this value to correct the Verdoorn coefficient. The same is true for the 
capital-labor ratio: when it is non-constant, but steadily growing or declining, in 
accordance with the steady-state assumption of the Verdoorn law, we can calculate 
the value of δ and use this value to correct the Verdoorn coefficient and the constant 
term. In section 9.5.7 we explain how these corrections are calculated in this study. 
 
9.2.4 Single relationship or system of equations 
The second Verdoorn law controversy is whether it should be conceptualized as a 
single relationship or as a system of equations. The original Verdoorn (1949) model, 
being a model at the country level, is formulated as a system of five equations, 
incorporating the national production function, the labor demand equation, the labor 
supply equation, the capital supply equation and the population growth. This system 
of equations makes it possible, again at the country level, for economic growth to 
become endogenous as a consequence of increasing returns in the production 
function. It will be clear however, that this specific system of equations only makes 
sense for relatively self-contained economic units. All equations, on population 
growth, on labor supply and demand, on capital supply and on production should 
relate to the same unit of analysis: a specific country. When labor, capital or 
production does not obey the country borders, however, the system of equations 
becomes less valid and may even become meaningless. In other words, the smaller 
the unit of analysis becomes and the more intertwined it becomes with other units, 
the less valid this particular system of equations becomes. Most of the researchers of 
the Verdoorn law have recognized this problem and have therefore estimated only 
the primary Verdoorn relationship, e.g., McCombie & De Ridder (1984), McCombie 
(1985), Jefferson (1988) and Fingleton & McCombie (1998). 
 
At the firm level, too, we have provided a logical explanation for how the Verdoorn 
relationship reflects part of a larger positive feedback loop; see section 9.1.4 and 
figure 9.2. In our overall research model (see section 6.1), we hypothesize a system 
of relationships in which the existence of social interaction effects and network 
effects will cause a market potential for scale and learning effects. This relationship 
has been investigated in chapters seven and eight (hypothesis H2a and H2b). This 
potential is still exogenous to the firm, but endogenous to the market. It parallels 
Kaldor’s (1966) concept of growth of effective demand. With the firm-level 
Verdoorn relationship we then estimate the extent to which the firm is able to convert 
the growth of effective market demand into productivity improvements, i.e., the 
extent to which the firm is able to convert the potential for scale and learning effects 
Report third empirical study 
280 
into realization of these scale and learning effects (hypothesis H3). This realization of 
scale and learning effects, i.e., the productivity improvement, will in turn cause a 
higher firm performance (hypothesis H5). This relationship is investigated in chapter 
eight and in the current chapter. As has been argued in sections 5.5 and 5.6, an 
increase in productivity and performance can in turn be used by the firm to improve 
its market and competitive position, which will further stimulate the effective 
demand for the firm’s products. To make this effective demand for the firm’s 
products endogenous in a firm-level model, however, would require us to investigate 
fully the ways in which the firm influences the market forces, e.g., how the firm can 
influence the extent of the social interaction effects and the network effects. This 
would require a dynamic version of our full research model, which is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Therefore, we will limit ourselves in this chapter to estimating 
(1) the Verdoorn law at the firm level, i.e., the relationship between the potential and 
the realization of scale and learning effects (hypothesis H3), and (2) the relationship 
between the growth of productivity and the growth of performance, i.e., the 
relationship between the realization of scale and learning effects and firm 
performance (hypothesis H5).  
 
9.2.5 The static-dynamic paradox 
Harris & Lau (1998) state that estimations of the Verdoorn law have delivered 
different values of the Verdoorn coefficient when estimating in static terms, i.e., with 
variables as levels, than when estimating in dynamic terms, i.e., with the variables as 
first differences. This effect they refer to as the static-dynamic paradox. 
 
The argument for using the static model is that the original Verdoorn law was based 
on a static Cobb-Douglas production function. In the specification of Verdoorn, this 
production function allows for non-increasing returns to scale, but not for exogenous 
technological change. The consequence of this reasoning would be that the 
distinction between static and dynamic economies of scale is irrelevant for estimation 
purposes (McCombie, 1982). Hence the static and dynamic coefficients should be the 
same, which is not the case.  
 
This argument is however based on a misunderstanding of Verdoorn’s law, at least as 
interpreted by Kaldor (1966, p.288): “It is a dynamic rather than a static relationship 
– between the rates of change of productivity and of output, rather than between the 
level of productivity and the scale of output – primarily because technological 
progress enters into it, and it is not just a reflection of the economies of large-scale 
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production.” The Cobb-Douglas production function in the specification of Verdoorn 
may not allow for exogenous technological change, it does allow for endogenous 
technological change (De Vries, 1985). The consequence of this is that the dynamic 
model will show values of the coefficient that are different from the static model 
because the dynamic model incorporates technological change and the static model 
does not. When we accept this reasoning, there is no matter of a paradox. For this 
study we will adopt the dynamic model. 
 
9.2.6 The firm-level Verdoorn model and its interpretation 
The Verdoorn law model used in this study can be expressed in the following 
regression equation:  
 
( ) ( ) ε+∆⋅+=∆ −− 1,1, tttt QbaP    
 
In which ∆P represents the growth of productivity between year t-1 and year t; ∆Q 
represents the growth of output between year t-1 and year t; b represents the 
uncorrected Verdoorn coefficient at the firm level; a represents the uncorrected 
constant term at the firm level and ε represents the error term. 
 
A value of the Verdoorn coefficient (b) larger than 0 means that the firm has realized 
scale effects and autonomous learning effects as a consequence of the growth of 
output over time.74 This is the endogenous part of productivity growth. The value of 
the intercept (a) indicates whether there has simultaneously been growth of 
productivity as a consequence of induced and/or exogenous learning effects.75 This is 
the exogenous part of productivity growth. Thus the Verdoorn law measures the 
relationship between the potential and the realization of scale and learning effects 
(see figure 9.3). 
 
Following what Kaldor (1966) does at the macro level, we can mark a firm’s annual 
score by judging the deviation of that year’s productivity growth from the Verdoorn 
regression line. In this way, we can relate the firm’s actual productivity growth in 
that year to what it is expected to be on the basis of the growth rate of its output (see 
figure 9.4). 
                                                          
74 For an explanation of scale effects and autonomous learning effects, see sections 5.2.1 and 
5.3.4, respectively. 
75 For an explanation of induced and exogenous learning effects, see sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3, 
respectively. 
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Figure 9-3: The firm-level Verdoorn relationship 
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Figure 9-4: Annual scores on the firm-level Verdoorn relationship 
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9.2.7 The productivity-performance model and its interpretation 
The model used in this study to estimate the productivity-performance relationship 
can be expressed in the following regression equation:  
 
( ) ( ) ε+∆⋅+=∆ −− 1,1, tttt PdcFP   
 
In which ∆FP represents the growth of firm performance between year t-1 and year t; 
∆P represents the growth of productivity between year t-1 and year t; d represents the 
uncorrected regression coefficient at the firm level; c represents the uncorrected 
constant term at the firm level and ε represents the error term. 
 
A value of the coefficient (d) larger than 0 means that firms have realized better 
performance as a consequence of the growth of productivity over time. The value of 
the intercept (c) indicates whether there has been a growth of firm performance 
independent of productivity growth (see figure 9.5) 
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Figure 9-5: The productivity-performance relationship 
 
Analogous to the procedure for the firm-level Verdoorn relationship, we can mark a 
firm’s annual score by judging the deviation of that year’s firm performance growth 
from the productivity-performance regression line. In this way, we can relate the 
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firm’s actual performance growth in that year to what it is expected to be on the basis 
of the growth rate of its productivity (see figure 9.6). 
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Figure 9-6: Annual scores on the productivity-performance relationship 
 
9.3 Operational measurements of growth of output, productivity and firm 
performance 
We need clear concepts for measuring the change in output, the change in 
productivity and the change in firm performance to be able to estimate the Verdoorn 
law and the productivity-performance relationship. For measuring in physical or 
monetary units and for the chosen correlators for input, output and performance we 
restate the arguments used in section 8.1.2 through 8.1.5.  
 
We chose to measure scale and learning effects and firm performance using publicly 
available financial data again for this third study. As in the previous empirical 
studies, we decided to measure scale and learning effects together. We did this by 
conceptualizing a firm-level Verdoorn law, the development of which has been 
covered in detail in the previous sections. According to the theoretical specification 
of scale and learning effects provided in chapter five, an explicit distinction should 
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be made between the potential for scale and learning effects and the realization of 
scale and learning effects.  
 
The firm’s annual growth rate of output over the period of analysis was used as the 
measure of the potential for scale and learning effects. The firm’s annual growth rate 
of productivity over the period of analysis was used as the measure of the realization 
of scale and learning effects. We therefore need clear concepts of measuring the 
change in output and of measuring the change in productivity. As productivity 
change means a change in the ratio of the volume of output to the volume of the 
inputs, we need measurements of outputs and inputs. For each of these, there are two 
questions to be answered: (1) Will the measurement be in units or in monetary terms? 
(2) Which correlator will be chosen for the measurement? 
 
First is the issue of what to measure: physical units or monetary units. Production 
functions are usually measured in physical units on both axes, i.e., units of output 
versus units of input. Cost functions are usually measured in a mixed way, i.e., units 
of output versus monetary measurement of cost. Both ways of measurement are used 
in the literature for learning and experience curves. Theoretically, there is no 
difference between these two ways of measuring because “… a production 
technology is always identically represented by either a production function or the 
corresponding cost function” (Chung, 1994, p.104).  
 
Taking a management perspective, initially a complete measurement in monetary 
terms, i.e., measuring both outputs and inputs in money terms, rather than in 
quantities, seems to be preferable. The manager gains nothing by increased unit 
output, if it reduces turnover or profit level; also nothing is gained by a reduction in 
unit input, e.g., less employees, if this increases employment cost. Regarding 
productivity, money is eventually the most important variable for managers. To quote 
Salter (1960, p.3): “Businessmen – despite what they say at productivity congresses – 
are interested in prices, costs, and profits, and to them increasing productivity is 
simply one means of reducing labor costs.” The well-known counter-argument is that 
measurement in money terms means units*prices and since prices are competitively 
determined, this measurement implicitly includes competition and market forces 
(Marshall, 1890). For managers, however, this is not undesirable per se, because they 
always deal with the interaction between their firm and the market forces. 
 
Measurement in monetary units has a large advantage over measurement in physical 
units for measuring output. For firms or industries with strongly diversified outputs it 
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is in principle impossible to measure physical units of output at the firm level. What 
is the unit output of a large diversified firm, e.g. AKZO Nobel, DSM, Philips or Royal 
Dutch/Shell? This question is fundamentally unanswerable at the firm level, unless 
the firm happens to deal in a very limited scope of plain commodities. We will 
therefore measure output in monetary terms, because this enables us to make 
comparisons across firms. 
 
This problem of physical or monetary measurement is less severe for measuring 
inputs if we limit the productivity measurement to labor productivity, as is done in 
the next section. A homogenous measure can be taken for labor input, e.g., number of 
employees, number of full time equivalents of employees or hours worked. Hours 
worked means the total number of hours worked added over all employees of a firm. 
 
The second issue is about the correlator chosen to measure output and input. When 
measurement in monetary terms is chosen, there are still different possible definitions 
of output. The most important ones are turnover and added value. Of these, turnover 
comes closest to indices of volume of gross output which are often used in 
productivity analyses at the industry or country level. The turnover measure suffers 
of the problem however that, when a firm produces intermediate goods that are sold 
within the firm for further processing, the gross output figure results in an 
overstatement of true gross output of the firm (cf., Kennedy, 1971). Another problem 
of the turnover approach is that insourcing or outsourcing of activities by firms may 
distort productivity statistics. For example, when a firm outsources an activity, this 
will show in a reduction of the number of employees, but not necessarily in the 
turnover figures, e.g., when outsourcing the internal IT department. 
 
Added value, i.e., turnover minus all external cost, does not suffer from these 
shortcomings. Turnover is an indicator of the value that the firm’s products generate 
for customers, in comparison to the products of other suppliers. The external cost the 
firm has to pay to its suppliers is an indicator of the part of this value that is created 
by the firm’s suppliers. Turnover minus the external cost is therefore an indicator of 
the part of the customer value that is created by the firm. The added value measure 
also conforms to what is customary in other productivity studies. We therefore use 
the firm’s annual growth rate of added value for measuring the potential for scale and 
learning effects. 
 
A partial productivity index can be derived for any input by dividing the index of 
volume of output by an index of the volume of that specific input. We may choose to 
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include either labor, i.e., measuring labor productivity, capital, i.e., measuring capital 
productivity, or a combination of a number of inputs, i.e., measuring multi-factor 
productivity. We chose to measure labor productivity for this study. Labor as an input 
is customarily expressed in number of employees, number of full-time-equivalent 
employees or in hours worked. Measuring full-time-equivalent employees is 
preferred over just measuring the normal number of employees, because the full-
time-equivalent measurement corrects for the increasing numbers of part-time jobs. 
Measuring hours worked is to be preferred over full-time-equivalent employees 
because it corrects for the general tendency for employees, at least in the 
Netherlands, for working less hours per week over the past years. We therefore 
measured labor inputs in number of hours worked.  
 
Productivity in this study can then be defined as the ratio between output and input, 
where output was measured as added value and input was measured as hours worked. 
We used the firm’s annual growth rate of productivity as a measure of the realization 
of scale and learning effects. 
 
We also chose to use an objective measurement based on publicly available financial 
data for measuring firm performance. Firm performance is measured by the firm’s 
annual growth rate of net profit. 
 
The main difference between the measurements used in this third empirical study and 
in the second empirical study is that here we have multiple observations, i.e., 
multiple years, available per firm instead of just one observation per firm. Thus, 
where the second empirical study only allowed a comparative static analysis, in this 
third study we aim to analyze specific firms over time, i.e., a dynamic analysis. 
  
Our way of calculating the annual rates of output growth (∆Qt,t-1), productivity 
growth (∆Pt,t-1) and net profit growth (∆FPt,t-1) for year t is by calculating the annual 
differences (Kennedy, 1971). 
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The consequence of this calculation is that we need two years of firm data to 
calculate one observation. Therefore, when we have firm data from years 1983-2002, 
we have 20 years of data, but only 19 observations of annual growth rates. The data 
are discussed in the next section. 
 
9.4 Sample and data description 
The data from this study were collected from publicly available data sources, i.e., the 
annual reports of firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange over the period 
1983-2002. The sampling frame for this study consisted of 131 firms listed on the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange over the period 1983-2002.76 Of these 131, we 
eliminated firms for which less than eight years of data were available, to ensure that 
we had at least seven data points per firm.77 Further, we eliminated firms with 
missing data that were crucial for our computations. For firms that were the result of 
past mergers or large acquisitions, in the case of more or less equal partnership we 
aggregated the data of the merging partners before the merger and in the case of 
acquisitions we used the data of the dominant partner before the acquisition. These 
operations resulted in a sample of 118 firms. An overview of the industry distribution 
is provided in table 9.1 below. 78 
 
To check the representativeness of the research sample, we performed a chi-square 
analysis of the industry response distribution (Weinberg & Abramowitz, 2002). This 
analysis checks the null-hypothesis that the distribution of the research sample is 
equal to the distribution of the sampling frame. With a significance level of p<0.05 
our analysis showed that the null-hypothesis is not rejected (χ2=4.015, df=12). 
                                                          
76 This comprises most firms listed on the Amsterdam Exchange Index (AEX) and the 
Amsterdam Midkap Index (AMX) and a number of the firms listed on the Dutch national 
market. The sampling frame also included firms that had been listed in any sequence of years 
during the period 1983-2002, but were no longer listed in 2002. The full list of firms is 
included in Appendix III. 
77 As all the measurements are on growth rates, the number of usable comparative static data 
points is always one less than the number of static data points. 
78 The industry classification was chosen to conform to the classification used in the Dutch 
financial daily Het Financieele Dagblad. It was established during the testing of the 
questionnaire used for the second empirical study that this classification has the best face 
validity among managers. 
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Therefore we conclude that the sample of firms is representative for the total 
population. 
 
Industry Sampling frame 
(131 firms) 
Research sample 
(118 firms) 
 No. % No. % 
Basic industry 14 10.7 % 14 11.9 % 
Food industry 9 6.9 % 8 6.8 % 
Media 7 5.3 % 6 5.1 % 
Engineering industry 14 10.7 % 14 11.9 % 
Construction industry  10 7.6 % 9 7.6 % 
Wholesale 14 10.7 % 14 11.9 % 
Transport 10 7.6 % 8 6.8 % 
Telecommunications 4 3.1 % 1 0.8 % 
Financial services 15 11.5 % 15 12.7 % 
IT services 9 6.9 % 5 4.2 % 
Other professional services 8 6.1 % 7 5.9 % 
Retail 10 7.6 % 10 8.5 % 
Electronics industry 7 5.3 % 7 5.9 % 
sum 131 100.0% 118 100.0% 
Table 9.1: Sample for the third empirical study 
 
The data available for every firm are the annual profit & loss accounts, the annual 
balance sheets and the annual number of employees. The format of the profit & loss 
accounts and the balance sheets is the one that was maintained by Euronext 
Amsterdam (the Amsterdam Stock Exchange) in its publications and on its website.79 
When a firm’s data were available in a different format, the firm’s annual reports 
were scrutinized and if necessary recalculated to fit the database format. 
 
In the previous section, we argued that we would take added value as the correlator 
for output. Given the format of the profit & loss account, added value can be 
calculated in different ways, additive or subtractive. In the additive approach, we 
calculate added value as the sum of employment costs, depreciation and net profit. In 
the subtractive approach we calculate added value as turnover minus all external cost. 
                                                          
79 As from 2000, the data in these formats were only available from the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange website, www.aex.nl, and as of 2004 the data in these formats are not longer 
available from this website. 
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Due to, e.g., extraordinary results, there may be differences between the two 
calculations. For this study, we chose to use the additive calculation of added value, 
because, for this is calculation, it is least necessary to correct firm data for 
extraordinary results. The calculation of added value was corrected for the rise in 
general producers’ prices, with 1990 = 100. This price data was obtained from the 
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS).80 
 
As stated earlier, productivity is taken as added value, corrected for the rise in 
producer’s prices, divided by hours worked. To compute hours worked we multiplied 
the number of employees with the annual labor duration in hours. Labor duration 
data for the years 1983-2002 were also obtained from the Centraal Bureau voor de 
Statistiek (CBS). 
 
We calculated two control variables: the capital-output ratio and the capital-labor 
ratio and their annual growth. Output is again taken as the additive calculation of 
added value corrected for producers’ price changes. Labor is again taken as the 
number of hours worked. Capital is taken as the annual balance sheet total. It was 
corrected for industry-specific changes in capital prices, with 1995=100. These price 
data were also obtained from the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS). 
 
9.5 Validation of the measures 
The goal of validation of the measures was to make sure that we actually measure 
what we meant to measure. A number of checks and corrections have to be made to 
the raw data to achieve validity of the measures, i.e., the consistency of the data 
definitions, the correction for inflation, the correction for outliers and the correction 
for negative growth rates. Additionally, there are some issues regarding the validity 
of the estimation of the firm-level Verdoorn relationship and the productivity-
performance relationship, i.e., the small number of data points, the danger of spurious 
regression, the correction for a growing capital-labor ratio and a growing capital-
output ratio and the test for autocorrelation. All the issues will be discussed below. 
 
9.5.1 Consistency of the data definitions 
A first possible problem with firm-level data from annual reports is that firms 
sometimes adjust the way they calculate and/or present their annual figures. When 
                                                          
80 This is the Dutch central bureau of statistics, i.e., the census agency. 
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these adjustments are major there is the danger that this will distort the computed 
growth rates of output, productivity or net profit.  
 
The consistency in the data definitions was checked for all the firms in the sample. 
When any inconsistencies were found between two subsequent annual reports, the 
data were adjusted according to the information given by the firm in its annual report 
to provide the same data definitions for all years in the entire period of analysis. In 
cases where this was not possible, we deleted the calculation of the growth between 
the two years that the data definition change took place, from the firm’s observations. 
 
A second issue is that there will be differences in how financial figures are calculated 
and presented between firms. This means that when working with the nominal 
figures, firm data may be incomparable. In our case, this was not a problem, because 
we calculated the percentage changes between subsequent years. This made the data 
comparable across firms. 
 
9.5.2 Correction for inflation 
An important issue when we measure in monetary units is how to correct for 
inflation. A correction for inflation is necessary for the measures of output growth, 
productivity growth and net profit growth. Failing to correct for inflation may lead to 
strong correlations between, e.g., output growth and productivity growth, because 
both are influenced by the general level of price increases. 
 
An important question is: Which deflator should be used for this correction? To 
answer this question, we have to know the relevant price developments for each firm. 
Inflation is likely to be different for different countries, for different industries and 
for different firms. Contrary to firm-level data, industry-level and country-level data 
are readily available. The problem with these however is their application to 
individual firms, when we consider that many firms in our sample perform activities 
in multiple industry sectors and many of the firms in our sample, while having their 
headquarters in the Netherlands, have large parts of their operations abroad. 
 
Even if we know the appropriate inflation figure, how can we be sure it is right? Any 
firm-level differentiated inflation correction is a hazardous task, e.g.: Are rising 
output prices in a specific industry not simply a reflection of increasing product 
quality? When we make the correction at the industry level: Do we not destroy the 
inherent variance that exists between industries? In view of these problems, the only 
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deflator that can be used, and with some caution, is the general producers’ price-
index number. This number deflates the general cost level and leaves the variance 
between specific industries and specific firms intact. Therefore, the measurements of 
output, of productivity and of net profit were deflated by the general producers’ 
price index published by the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS).81 
 
A separate issue was the inflation correction for the two control variables: the capital-
output ratio and the capital-labor ratio. The measure of output is again corrected for 
the general producers’ price changes. The measure of labor is non-monetary and 
therefore does not need to be inflation-corrected. There are different possible 
corrections for the development of capital prices, however. We can either correct for 
the general changes in capital prices or for the industry-specific changes in capital 
prices. Here, the problem with an industry-differentiated correction is not as severe 
as with output, because these corrections do not affect the variance in our main data. 
Moreover, we preferred to make the capital-labor and capital-output controls as 
precise as possible. Therefore we decided to correct the capital measure for the 
industry-specific capital price index, with 1995=100. These price index data were 
also obtained from the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS). 
 
9.5.3 Correction for outliers 
There are years for which the financial data stand out, positively or negatively, for 
some of the firms in our sample. This may have different reasons, e.g., the firm may 
have had an especially bad year, the firm may have ‘financially engineered’ its 
figures, there may have been major portfolio changes like mergers and acquisitions 
or there may have been any other out of the ordinary events within the firm. For all 
the firms in the sample, we checked the data on such possible outliers. When 
possible, the data were adjusted using the information provided by the firm in its 
annual report. When such a correction was not possible, we deleted the data from 
such a year from the range of observations. This corresponds to the deletion of two 
growth observations from the firm data, i.e., the observation previous year – 
extraordinary year and the observation extraordinary year – next year. 
 
                                                          
81 This is the Dutch central bureau of statistics, i.e., the census agency. 
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9.5.4 Correction for negative growth rates 
Another problem in calculating the average annual growth rates for output, for 
productivity and for net proft is negative growth rates. In very exceptional cases, 
output, and therefore also productivity, for a certain year may have a negative value. 
For net profit, negative values are a more common phenomenon. As a consequence 
of negative values, a problem appears when calculating the growth rate with respect 
to the year with the negative value, i.e., the calculation year with negative value – 
next year. The calculation will still give a number, but the growth rate in relation to 
the negative value is of course undefined. Therefore, these growth observations were 
deleted from the firm’s range of observations. 
 
The above corrections resulted in a data file that could be used with confidence to 
measure the potential for scale and learning effects, the realization of scale and 
learning effects and firm performance. In total, as a consequence of the above 
corrections, 22 observations were deleted from the sample, some of these for more 
than one of the above reasons. 
 
9.5.5 Small number of data points 
One of the characteristics of our data set is that the number of data points per firm is 
relatively limited. For the best firms in our sample we have 20 annual observations 
(1983 to 2002), resulting in a maximum of 19 data points for the firm-level Verdoorn 
law and productivity-performance estimations. For other firms, the number of 
observations is even less. We limited our sample to firms for which at least seven 
data points were available for estimation. Rowthorn (1975) points out the danger of 
drawing conclusions on the basis of such a limited number of data points. He 
demonstrates that in the study of Cripps & Tarling (1973) the exclusion of one 
observation from the analysis makes a slightly positive Verdoorn relationship turn 
into a strongly negative relationship. The same objection applies to our estimation of 
the productivity-performance relationship. 
 
We might ask whether our data sets per individual firm, limited as it they are in the 
number of data points, cause the same risks. We think this is in general not the case, 
for two reasons. First, because every firm’s data set was scrutinized for outliers. 
Second, because the number of data points may be significantly increased by the 
pooling of individual firm data and then analyzing at a higher level, e.g., the industry 
level, as has been done in section 9.6.5 and 9.6.6. These analyses show values of the 
parameters of the relationship that are comparable to the individual firm estimates. 
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Therefore, in general it is unlikely that the Verdoorn relationship is significantly 
under- or overstated. At the individual firm level, however, sometimes a single 
observation may tilt the entire regression. These specific observations have been 
closely scrutinized and, when appropriate, have been deleted from the analysis. In 
Appendix IV we provide a detailed account of how this was done for each firm. 
 
9.5.6 The danger of spurious regression 
It has been argued that the regression of the Verdoorn law is a somewhat spurious 
exercise (Wolfe, 1968). This is true insofar as the dependent and independent 
variables both have growth of output in them. Therefore, if the denominator of 
productivity, i.e., the number of hours worked, were, over time, completely 
independent from the level of output and therefore a completely random factor in the 
equation, we would be essentially regressing growth of output on growth of output. 
Hence the regression coefficient would be equal to or close to unity. This is a point 
that requires further investigation.82 
 
Let us translate the problem to the specification of the firm-level Verdoorn law as 
presented in section 9.2.6. 
 
The firm-level Verdoorn relationship, excluding the statistical error term, is:  
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82 We would like to thank Dr. C.W.M. Naastepad of the Delft University of Technology for 
bringing the seriousness of this point to our attention. 
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Here, I represents input, in our case, hours worked.  
 
Substitution of the above equation in the firm-level Verdoorn relationship gives: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )11 111 −∗+=−∗ −−− tttttt QQbaQQII   
 
Replacing (It-1/It) with ψ we get: 
 ( ) ( )( )11 11 −∗+=−∗ −− tttt QQbaQQψ   
 
This can be rewritten as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )abQQbQQ tttt −−∗=−∗ −− 11 1ψ   
 
Wolfe’s (1968) argument is that the Verdoorn relationship is an identity when the 
growth of labor input is very low, i.e., when ψ is almost equal to unity. On the basis 
of the above equation, the further argument is that the left side and the right side of 
this equation are almost equal, that therefore the estimation of parameter b will be 
almost equal to ψ and, consequentially, b will be close to unity. Assuming this is 
true, it follows that: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )abQQbQQb tttt −−∗=−∗ −− 11 1   
 
Or: 
 
ab +=1   
 
There are three arguments why this is not the case. The first is that the equality of ψ 
and b does not follow at all from the above equation. Or, almost equal is not the same 
as equal. The argument only applies when we assume beforehand that b=ψ=1, but 
this exactly what we are trying to prove. In other words, when we assume that b=ψ, 
the consequence is that b=ψ, this is circular reasoning and therefore invalid. 
 
The second argument is that it is unlikely that b is equal to unity. Starting from a 
default constant returns to scale model, we would normally expect a duplication of 
output to coincide with a duplication of all inputs. Therefore, based on such a 
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constant returns to scale model, we would expect the Verdoorn coefficient (b) to 
revolve around 0 rather then around 1. 
 
Regarding the value of ψ, it is unlikely that a firm would be able to grow 
significantly in output over time without at a certain point extending its labor input, 
or, when ∆Qt,t-1 is positive, ψ will likely have a value smaller than unity. If this is not 
the case, the firm would enjoy infinitely increasing returns to scale. It is therefore 
unlikely that at the firm level the value of ψ is equal to unity. This argument was 
phrased for the country and industry level by Kaldor (1966, p.299) as: “Indeed all 
historical evidence suggests that a fast rate of industrial growth has invariably be 
associated with a fast rate of growth of employment in both the secondary and the 
tertiary sectors of the economy.”  
 
The third argument is that the empirical values of b and a do not correspond to the 
unity assumption. The values found for b and a in our empirical analyses are as 
follows. 
• The average value of b over all the firm-level analyses is 0.542, with a 
maximum of 2.451, a minimum of –0.462 and a standard deviation of 0.416. 
The average value of a over all the firm-level analyses is equal to –0.006, 
with a maximum of 0.125, a minimum of –0.185 and a standard deviation of 
0.043. A t-test on the average value of b with test value 1 shows that b is 
significantly different from 1 (t=-11.889, p<0.001). A t-test on the average 
value of a as b-1, and therefore with test value –0.458, shows that a is 
significantly different from b-1 (t=114.098, p<0.001). 
• The average value of b over all the industry-level analyses is 0.399, with a 
maximum of 0.672, a minimum of 0.100 and a standard deviation of 0.189. 
The average value of a over all the industry-level analyses is –0.003, with a 
maximum of 0.024, a minimum of –0.041 and a standard deviation of 0.016. 
A t-test on the average value of b with test value 1 shows that b is 
significantly different from 1 (t=-11.460, p<0.001). A t-test on the average 
value of a as b-1, and therefore with test value –0.601, shows that a is 
significantly different from b-1 (t=134.197, p<0.001). 
• The value of b from the analysis of the total population is 0.476, with a 95% 
confidence interval between 0.451 and 0.502. The value of a from the 
analysis of the total population is –0.014, with a 95% confidence interval 
between –0.020 and –0.008, which is nowhere near the value of b-1. 
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In our total dataset, the average value of ψ is 0.950, with a standard deviation of 
0.152. We can therefore confirm the expectation that the average value of ψ is indeed 
close to unity. A t-test with test value 1 shows, however, that ψ is still significantly 
different from 1 (t=-14.491, p<0.001). Moreover, the value of the standard deviation 
of ψ combined with a check on individual firms in our data-set indicates that there is 
quite some variance between firms and that therefore at the firm level ψ is certainly 
not equal to unity as a general rule. 
 
Regarding the productivity-performance relationship, the dependent and independent 
variables, net profit and productivity, are not by definition related. Therefore, there is 
no risk of spurious regression between the variables in the productivity-performance 
relationship. 
 
9.5.7 Check for changes in the capital-labor and capital-output ratio 
In section 9.2.3 we addressed the issue of correcting the Verdoorn coefficient and the 
constant term for a change in the capital-labor ratio and correcting the coefficient for 
a change in the capital-output ratio. 
 
For every individual firm model, for every industry model and for the model of the 
total population both the constancy of the capital-labor ratio and the capital-output 
ratio were checked. This was done through t-tests with test value 0 on the growth 
observations of the capital-labor ratio and the capital-output ratio. Nonsignificance of 
this t-test indicates that the average growth rate does not differ significantly from 0. 
Significance of the t-test indicates that the average growth rate is significantly 
different from 0. In these cases, the data were checked for stability, i.e., it was judged 
whether the change in the growth rate, hence the significance of the t-test, was due to 
outliers. When this was the case, these observations were removed from the analysis 
and the t-test was re-run.  
 
Regarding the capital-labor ratio, for the firm-specific Verdoorn models we found 
84 firms for which the t-test was nonsignificant, i.e., the change of the capital-labor 
ratio was not significantly different from 0, and 33 firms for which the t-test was 
significant, i.e., the change in the capital-labor ratio differed significantly from 0 (see 
table 9.2 below).83 For the industry-specific Verdoorn models, we found 4 industries 
for which the t-test was nonsignificant, i.e., the change in the capital-labor ratio was 
                                                          
83 These numbers add up to 117 instead of 118, because one firm was excluded from the firm-
specific Verdoorn analysis. 
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not significantly different from 0, and 9 industries for which the t-test was 
significant, i.e., the change in the capital-labor ratio did differ significantly from 0 
(see table 9.3 below). For the Verdoorn model on the total population, we also found 
that the t-test was significant, i.e., the change in the capital-labor ratio did differ 
significantly from 0 (see table 9.4 below). For these models, therefore, a correction 
has to be made to the Verdoorn coefficient and to the constant term. 
 
Regarding the capital-output ratio, for the firm-specific Verdoorn models we found 
113 firms for which the t-test was nonsignificant, i.e., the change in the capital-output 
ratio was not significantly different from 0, and 4 firms for which the t-test was 
significant, i.e., the change in the capital-output ratio did differ significantly from 0 
(see table 9.2 below).84 For the industry-specific Verdoorn models, we found 12 
industries for which the t-test was nonsignificant, i.e., the change in the capital-
output ratio was not significantly different from 0, and 1 industry for which the t-test 
was significant, i.e., the change in the capital-output ratio did differ significantly 
from 0 (see table 9.3 below). For the Verdoorn model on the total population, we also 
found that the t-test was significant, i.e., the change in the capital-output ratio did 
differ significantly from 0 (see table 9.4 below). For these models, therefore, a 
correction has to be made to the Verdoorn coefficient. 
                                                          
84 These numbers add up to 117 instead of 118, because one firm was excluded from the firm-
specific Verdoorn analysis. 
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Checks for 
changes in 
capital-labor 
and capital-
output ratios 
  T-test for change 
in capital-labor 
ratio  
(test value = 0) 
T-test for change in 
capital-output ratio  
(test value = 0) 
Firm name Available 
data range 
from/to: 
Total 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Number 
of 
obser-
vations 
in model
Deleted 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Mean of 
change in 
capital-
labor 
ratio 
T-
value 
Mean of 
change in 
capital-
output 
ratio 
T-value 
Aalberts Industries 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 0.018 0.930 0.011 0.476 
ABN-Amro 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 0.040
(**)
2.792 -0.018 -0.954 
Achmea 1993 2002 9 9 8 1 0.018 0.507 -0.034 -1.360 
Achmea 1993 2002 9 9 8 1 0.018 0.507 -0.034 -1.360 
AEGON 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 0.108
(*)
2.152 0.036 0.849 
Ahold 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 0.034 0.864 0.035 0.942 
Ahrend 1983 2000 17 17 14 3 0.038 1.377 0.016 0.559 
AKZO-Nobel 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 0.039
(**)
2.743 0.017 1.012 
Arcadis 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 0.018 0.858 -0.007 -0.376 
ASM International 1994 2002 8 8 7 1 0.086 1.299 -0.032 -0.215 
ASM Lithography 1993 2002 9 9 7 2 0.150
(*)
2.227 0.105 0.864 
ASR 
Verzekeringsgroep 
1984 1999 15 15 14 1 0.087
(***)
8.098 0.004 0.193 
Atag 1986 1999 13 13 12 1 -0.014 -0.282 0.003 0.077 
Athlon 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 0.065
(*)
2.016 0.083 
(**) 
2.940 
Ballast-Nedam 1986 2002 16 16 15 1 -0.009 -0.205 0.007 0.172 
BAM 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 0.070 1.361 0.043 0.821 
Batenburg 1985 2002 17 17 15 2 0.024 1.536 -0.003 -0.229 
Beers 1983 1999 16 16 15 1 0.074
(**)
3.478 -0.005 -0.214 
Begemann 1983 1994 11 11 8 3 0.136 1.546 0.116 0.936 
BE Semiconductor 
Industries 
1994 2002 8 8 8 0 0.170 1.662 0.301 1.421 
Blydenstein-Willink 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 -0.020 -0.842 -0.016 -0.432 
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Checks for 
changes in 
capital-labor 
and capital-
output ratios 
  T-test for change 
in capital-labor 
ratio  
(test value = 0) 
T-test for change in 
capital-output ratio  
(test value = 0) 
Firm name Available 
data range 
from/to: 
Total 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Number 
of 
obser-
vations 
in model
Deleted 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Mean of 
change in 
capital-
labor 
ratio 
T-
value 
Mean of 
change in 
capital-
output 
ratio 
T-value 
Boskalis-Westminster 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 0.018 0.563 0.002 0.051 
Brocacef 1983 1999 16 16 15 1 0.047 1.643 0.027 0.619 
Buhrmann 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 0.015 0.560 -0.001 -0.038 
CAP Gemini 1986 1999 13 13 13 0 -0.019 -0.764 -0.022 -1.054 
Cindu 1983 1997 14 14 12 2 -0.011 -0.490 -0.034 -1.486 
CMG 1993 2002 9 9 6 3 0.075
(*)
2.535 0.043 0.819 
Content 1985 1997 12 12 10 2 0.007 0.141 0.006 0.139 
Corus 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 0.034
(*)
1.756 -0.002 -0.062 
Crédit Lyonnais 
Nederland 
1983 1997 14 14 13 1 0.096 1.590 0.047 0.733 
CSM 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 0.016 0.849 -0.014 -0.756 
Delft Instruments 1984 2002 18 18 16 2 0.031 1.295 0.000 0.015 
Draka 1988 2002 14 14 13 1 0.024 0.355 -0.010 -0.160 
DSM 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 0.069
(*)
1.980 0.018 0.496 
EVC 1993 2002 9 9 6 3 0.057 0.927 0.048 0.334 
Exendis 1985 2002 17 17 14 3 0.020 0.415 0.027 0.571 
Fortis 1983 2002 19 19 14 5 0.033 1.588 0.021 0.967 
Frans Maas 1986 2002 16 16 16 0 0.003 0.155 -0.009 -0.642 
Free Record Shop 1989 2001 12 12 11 1 -0.037 -1.301 -0.024 -0.810 
Fugro 1989 2002 13 13 13 0 0.061 1.235 0.021 0.567 
Gamma Holding 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 0.021 0.802 0.008 0.393 
Gelderse Papier 1985 1999 14 14 14 0 0.002 0.078 -0.006 -0.107 
Getronics 1984 2002 18 18 15 3 -0.048
(*)
-0.196 -0.075 
(*) 
-2.552 
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Checks for 
changes in 
capital-labor 
and capital-
output ratios 
  T-test for change 
in capital-labor 
ratio  
(test value = 0) 
T-test for change in 
capital-output ratio  
(test value = 0) 
Firm name Available 
data range 
from/to: 
Total 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Number 
of 
obser-
vations 
in model
Deleted 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Mean of 
change in 
capital-
labor 
ratio 
T-
value 
Mean of 
change in 
capital-
output 
ratio 
T-value 
Geveke 1984 2001 17 17 15 2 0.071 1.648 0.037 0.878 
Van der Giessen 1983 1996 13 13 9 4 0.041 0.629 0.008 0.125 
Gist-Brocades 1983 1997 14 14 13 1 0.016 0.540 0.010 0.357 
Grolsch 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 0.038
(*)
2.406 0.009 0.468 
Grontmij 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 0.055
(*)
2.528 0.032 1.574 
GTI 1983 2000 17 17 17 0 0.029 1.323 -0.002 -0.086 
Gucci 1993 2002 9 9 6 3 0.147 1.573 0.011 0.273 
Hagemeyer 1983 2002 19 19 19 0 0.039 0.540 0.013 0.192 
HBG 1983 2000 17 17 15 2 0.047
(*)
2.240 0.007 0.360 
Heijmans 1990 2002 12 12 12 0 0.086
(*)
2.430 0.047 1.308 
Heineken 1983 2002 19 19 19 0 0.029
(*)
2.194 -0.006 -0.519 
Hunter Douglas 1983 2002 19 19 15 4 0.020 0.937 0.005 0.339 
IHC Caland 1983 2002 19 19 12 7 0.111
(*)
2.110 0.088 1.582 
Imtech 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 0.035
(*)
2.195 -0.009 -0.523 
ING Group 1988 2002 14 14 12 2 0.067
(**)
3.660 -0.025 -1.150 
KAS Bank 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 0.080
(*)
1.815 0.019 0.659 
KBB 1983 1997 14 14 14 0 0.010 0.610 -0.023 -1.466 
Kempen & Co. 1986 2000 14 14 12 2 0.036 0.685 -0.022 -0.308 
KLM 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 0.006 0.257 0.046 1.374 
KPN 1983 2002 19 19 13 6 0.039
(*)
2.208 -0.005 -0.194 
Landré 1983 1998 15 15 11 4 -0.018 -0.509 -0.018 .-488 
Laurus 1986 2002 16 16 11 5 0.031 1.660 0.002 0.084 
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and capital-
output ratios 
  T-test for change 
in capital-labor 
ratio  
(test value = 0) 
T-test for change in 
capital-output ratio  
(test value = 0) 
Firm name Available 
data range 
from/to: 
Total 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Number 
of 
obser-
vations 
in model
Deleted 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Mean of 
change in 
capital-
labor 
ratio 
T-
value 
Mean of 
change in 
capital-
output 
ratio 
T-value 
LCI 1988 2001 13 13 10 3 0.023 0.439 0.046 0.881 
Van Leer 1983 1998 15 15 14 1 0.026 1.444 -0.005 -0.294 
Macintosh 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 0.015 0.679 -0.026 -1.300 
Van Melle 1983 1999 16 16 15 1 0.031 1.638 0.010 0.500 
Bank Mendes Gans 1983 1998 15 13 12 1 -0.051 -1.689 -0.069 
(*) 
-2.082 
Van der Moolen 1986 2002 16 16 16 0 0.067 0.477 0.212 0.853 
NBM 1983 2000 17 17 16 1 0.047 1.197 0.022 0.567 
NEDAP 1983 2002 19 19 19 0 0.045
(*)
2.227 0.070 0.540 
Nedlloyd 1983 2001 18 16 13 3 0.009 0.518 -0.005 -0.228 
Neways 1985 2002 17 17 16 1 0.027 0.576 -0.003 -0.079 
NIB Capital 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 0.047
(*)
1.811 -0.015 -0.436 
NKF 1986 1997 11 11 10 1 0.029 0.391 0.010 0.153 
Norit 1983 2000 17 17 16 1 0.002 0.124 -0.017 -0.817 
NS 1995 2002 7 7 7 0 0.072 0.849 0.018 0.634 
Numico 1983 2002 19 19 14 5 0.022 1.102 -0.026 -1.518 
Nutreco 1995 2002 7 7 7 0 0.034 0.591 0.029 0.379 
Océ 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 0.013 0.983 -0.005 -0.268 
Van Ommeren 1983 1998 15 15 11 4 0.006 0.220 -0.012 -0.462 
OPG 1984 2002 18 18 14 4 0.014 0.498 0.006 0.174 
Ordina 1985 2002 17 17 16 1 -0.005 -0.107 -0.018 -0.389 
Otra 1983 1997 14 14 11 3 0.030
(**)
2.831 -0.015 -0.718 
P&C Group 1983 1997 14 14 13 1 0.055
(**)
2.910 0.024 0.997 
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Checks for 
changes in 
capital-labor 
and capital-
output ratios 
  T-test for change 
in capital-labor 
ratio  
(test value = 0) 
T-test for change in 
capital-output ratio  
(test value = 0) 
Firm name Available 
data range 
from/to: 
Total 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Number 
of 
obser-
vations 
in model
Deleted 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Mean of 
change in 
capital-
labor 
ratio 
T-
value 
Mean of 
change in 
capital-
output 
ratio 
T-value 
Pakhoed 1983 1998 15 15 12 3 0.062 1.349 0.027 0.593 
Philips 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 0.048
(*)
2.270 0.003 0.074 
Polygram 1988 1997 9 9 9 0 0.078
(*)
1.965 0.023 0.752 
Polynorm 1983 2000 17 17 16 1 0.037
(*)
2.118 0.012 0.681 
Randstad 1986 2002 16 16 14 2 0.005 0.197 -0.001 -0.021 
Reed Elsevier 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 0.077
(**)
2.718 0.023 0.623 
Rood Testhouse 1986 2002 16 16 16 0 -0.045 -0.758 0.020 0.270 
Royal Begemann 
Group 
1995 2002 7 3 Ex-
cluded 
from 
analy-
sis 
       
Samas 1983 2002 19 19 13 6 0.026 0.718 -0.017 -0.833 
Schuitema 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 0.059
(*)
2.116 0.018 0.733 
Royal Dutch/Shell 
Group 
1983 2002 19 19 16 3 0.036 1.220 -0.004 -0.250 
Simac 1985 2002 17 17 14 3 -0.001 -0.013 -0.011 -0.170 
Smit Internationale 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 0.014 0.396 0.037 1.072 
SNS Bank 1990 2002 12 12 11 1 0.119
(**)
3.315 0.058 1.785 
Sphinx 1984 1998 14 14 14 0 -0.003 -0.089 -0.013 -0.231 
Staal Bankiers 1984 1997 13 13 9 4 0.025 0.706 -0.037 -0.547 
Stork 1983 2002 19 19 19 0 0.025 1.625 0.020 1.113 
Telegraaf 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 0.043
(**)
2.708 0.010 0.554 
Ten Cate 1983 2002 19 19 19 0 0.043
(*)
1.805 0.006 0.168 
Tulip 1983 2002 19 16 13 3 0.046 0.697 0.072 1.002 
Twentsche Kabel 
Holding 
1983 2002 19 19 16 3 0.028 1.340 0.010 0.450 
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Checks for 
changes in 
capital-labor 
and capital-
output ratios 
  T-test for change 
in capital-labor 
ratio  
(test value = 0) 
T-test for change in 
capital-output ratio  
(test value = 0) 
Firm name Available 
data range 
from/to: 
Total 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Number 
of 
obser-
vations 
in model
Deleted 
number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Mean of 
change in 
capital-
labor 
ratio 
T-
value 
Mean of 
change in 
capital-
output 
ratio 
T-value 
Unilever 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 0.026 0.774 0.009 0.227 
Vendex KBB 1990 2002 12 12 9 3 -0.024 -0.811 -0.055 
(*) 
-2.731 
Vilenzo 1989 2002 13 13 11 2 0.033 0.642 0.048 1.507 
VNU 1983 2002 19 19 12 7 0.025 0.825 0.003 0.094 
VOPAK 1983 2002 19 19 15 4 0.030 1.005 0.010 0.315 
Vredestein 1985 2002 17 17 16 1 0.015 0.771 -0.005 -0.110 
Volker-Wessels-
Stevin 
1983 2002 19 19 17 2 0.009 0.279 -0.014 -0.459 
Wegener-Arcade 1983 2002 19 18 17 1 0.030 0.849 -0.006 -0.167 
Wessanen 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 -0.029 -1.292 -0.044 -1.519 
Wolff 1983 1995 12 12 10 2 -0.001 -0.028 -0.006 -0.156 
Wolters-Kluwer 1986 2002 16 16 15 1 0.061 1.280 -0.010 -0.223 
Averages     16 16 14 2 0.035  0.012  
 
Significance at the 5% level is indicated by (*), at the 1% level by (**) and at the 0.1% level by (***) 
 
Significance levels are 1-tailed, because the changes in capital-labor and capital-output ratios are expected to be positive. 
 
Significance of the t-test means that the null-hypotheses, i.e., that the mean is equal to the test-value, is rejected. Therefore, 
significance means that the change in capital-labor or capital-output ratio is different from 0. 
Table 9.2: Checks for constancy of the capital-labor and the capital-output ratio for 
the firm-specific Verdoorn models 
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Checks for 
changes in 
capital-labor 
and capital-
output ratios 
  T-test for change in 
capital-labor ratio  
(test value = 0) 
T-test for change in capital-
output ratio  
(test value = 0) 
Industry name Total 
number 
of obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of obser-
vations 
Number 
of obser-
vations in 
model 
Deleted 
number 
of obser-
vations 
Mean of 
change in 
capital-
labor ratio 
T-value Mean of change 
in capital-output 
ratio 
T-value 
Basic industry 232 232 226 6 0.021
(**)
2.859 0.001 0.066 
Food industry 140 140 131 9 0.018
(*)
1.933 -0.004 -0.427 
Media 105 104 95 9 0.062
(***)
3.745 0.023 1.439 
Engineering industry 241 241 226 15 0.029
(***)
3.241 0.013 1.492 
Construction industry 158 158 145 13 0.047
(***)
3.807 0.026 
(*) 
2.066 
Wholesale 215 215 207 8 0.026
(**)
2.411 -0.001 -0.113 
Transport 134 134 126 8 0.018 1.514 0.004 0.350 
Telecommunications 36 25 17 8 0.076 1.347 0.003 0.084 
Financial services 224 217 209 8 0.055
(***)
3.456 -0.003 -0.217 
IT services 96 96 83 13 0.019 0.866 -0.006 -0.304 
Other business 
services 
120 120 117 3 0.011 0.727 0.016 1.092 
Retail 147 147 128 19 0.020
(*)
2.086 0.008 0.834 
Electronics industry 99 96 85 11 0.068
(***)
3.998 0.034 1.545 
Averages 150 148 138 10 0.036  0.009   
 
Significance at the 5% level is indicated by (*), at the 1% level by (**) and at the 0.1% level by (***) 
 
Significance levels are 1-tailed, because the changes in capital-labor and capital-output ratios are expected to be positive. 
 
Significance of the t-test means that the null-hypotheses, i.e., that the mean is equal to the test-value, is rejected. Therefore, 
significance means that the change in capital-labor or capital-output ratio is different from 0. 
Table 9.3: Checks for constancy of the capital-labor and the capital-output ratio for 
the industry-specific Verdoorn models 
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Checks for 
changes in 
capital-labor and 
capital-output 
ratios 
 T-test for change in capital-
labor ratio  
(test value = 0) 
T-test for change in 
capital-output ratio (test 
value = 0) 
 Total 
number of 
obser-
vations 
Valid number 
of obser-
vations 
Number of 
obser-
vations in 
model 
Deleted 
number of 
observations 
Mean of 
change in 
capital-labor 
ratio 
T-value Mean of 
change in 
capital-
output ratio 
T-value 
All firms 1947 1925 1860 65 0.036
(***)
8.883 0.015 
(*) 
3.376 
 
Significance at the 5% level is indicated by (*), at the 1% level by (**) and at the 0.1% level by (***) 
 
Significance levels are 1-tailed, because the changes in capital-labor and capital-output ratios are expected to be positive. 
 
Significance of the t-test means that the null-hypotheses, i.e., that the mean is equal to the test-value, is rejected. Therefore, 
significance means that the change in capital-labor or capital-output ratio is different from 0.  
Table 9.4: Checks for constancy of the capital-labor and the capital-output ratio for 
the Verdoorn model on the total population 
 
The necessary corrections can be calculated from the differences between the 
Verdoorn models in sections 9.2.2 and 9.2.3. The correction (φ) on the Verdoorn 
coefficient from the change in capital-labor ratio can be calculated as follows: 
 
bb −= ˆφ   
 
Where: 
 ( )βαδ +−= 11bˆ   
 
And: 
 ( ) ββα 1−+=b   
 
This gives: 
 ( ) ( ) ββαβαδφ 111 −+−+−=   
 
The correction (ζ) on the constant term from the change in capital-labor ratio can be 
calculated as follows: 
 
aa −= ˆζ   
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Where: 
 ( )βαδλ +=aˆ   
 
And: 
 
βλ=a   
 
This gives: 
 ( ) βλβαδλζ −+=  
  
Or, after some rearranging: 
 ( )( )ββαδλαδζ +−=   
 
The correction (θ) on the Verdoorn coefficient from the change in capital-output ratio 
can be calculated as follows: 
 
bb −= ˆθ   
 
Where: 
 ( ) ββγα 1ˆ −+=b   
 
And: 
 ( ) ββα 1−+=b   
 
This gives: 
 ( ) ( ) ββαββγαθ 11 −+−−+=   
 
Or, after some rearranging: 
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( )1−= γβ
αθ   
 
To calculate φ, ζ and θ, the values of δ and γ had to be calculated from the average 
growth rates of capital and labor and capital and output, respectively. Further, the 
values of λ, α and β had to be additionally estimated from the data. We did this by an 
Ordinary Least Squares estimation of the production function that formed the basis 
of our interpretation of the Verdoorn law: 
 
lkq βαλ ++=   
 
These estimations are reported on in Appendix V. Note that, because of the data 
limits, many of the firm-specific estimations of this production function are 
nonsignificant and that therefore the parameters λ, α and β are often unusable to 
make the desired corrections. In the same way, corrections on nonsignificant 
coefficients and nonsignificant constant terms of the Verdoorn estimations are 
unusable. We therefore only made corrections when the estimations of both the 
production function parameters and the Verdoorn coefficient and constant term were 
significant. The values of these corrections are presented in the sections where results 
of the Verdoorn model estimations are discussed (see section 9.6). 
 
9.5.8 Test for autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation means that in the regression the residuals for period t are correlated 
with the residuals of period t-1. There can be different reasons for autocorrelation to 
appear: periodicity of the dependent variable not explained by the model, presence of 
a time lag between the independent and the dependent variable that has not been 
included in the model or nonlinearity in the data (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1976). 
 
The presence of autocorrelation, both in the Verdoorn model and in the productivity-
performance model was checked for by using the Durbin-Watson test. For every 
individual firm model, for every industry model and for the model of the total 
population it was checked whether, given the number of observations and the number 
of degrees of freedom of the model, the Durbin-Watson test value indicates that there 
is no autocorrelation, indicates that autocorrelation cannot be decided upon, indicates 
positive autocorrelation or indicates negative autocorrelation. The outcomes of these 
tests are reported in the tables summarizing the analyses (see section 9.6). Regarding 
the firm-specific Verdoorn models, we found 93 firms for which the test showed 
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there was no autocorrelation, 18 firms for which the test on autocorrelation was 
inconclusive, 5 firms for which the test showed positive autocorrelation and 1 firm 
for which the test showed negative autocorrelation.85 Regarding the industry-specific 
Verdoorn models, we found that for 12 out of 13 industries there was no 
autocorrelation, and for one industry the test on autocorrelation was inconclusive. For 
the Verdoorn model on the total population, we also found that the test on 
autocorrelation was inconclusive. 
 
Regarding the firm-specific productivity-performance models, we found 94 firms for 
which the test showed there was no autocorrelation, 17 firms for which the test on 
autocorrelation was inconclusive, 2 firms for which the test showed positive 
autocorrelation and 3 firms for which the test showed negative autocorrelation.86 
Regarding the industry-specific productivity-performance models, we found that for 
12 out of 13 industries there was no autocorrelation, and for one industry the test on 
autocorrelation was inconclusive. For the productivity-performance model on the 
total population, the test showed negative autocorrelation. 
 
It is recommended (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1976) to try and understand why 
autocorrelation exists in a model and to subsequently correct the model, e.g. through 
adding a lagged variable, so that the model does no longer exhibit autocorrelation. 
We did not do this, for two reasons. First, understanding the presence of 
autocorrelation in firm-level data over the period of 1983-2002 requires in-depth 
research into that specific firm’s recent business history. Such research falls outside 
the scope of this thesis. Second, in this thesis we want to compare the Verdoorn and 
productivity-performance models across firms and across industries. While it is likely 
that tailoring a model for each individual firm or individual industry will provide a 
better fit and fewer problems with autocorrelation, we will thereby loose the ability 
to compare. 
 
In view of these arguments and in view of the statement by Pindyck & Rubinfeld 
(1976) that autocorrelation will not cause bias in the estimators, we just signaled 
autocorrelation but we did not correct for it. Still, we are aware that, for a number of 
the model that we tested, there may be a problem. Further research may shed light on 
                                                          
85 These numbers add up to 117 instead of 118, because one firm was excluded from the firm-
specific Verdoorn analysis. 
86 These numbers add up to 116 instead of 118, because two firms were excluded from the 
firm-specific productivity-performance analysis. 
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the causes of autocorrelation in the Verdoorn law and in the productivity-
performance models. 
 
9.6 Results 
9.6.1 Research model and hypotheses 
In this section we present the results of the Verdoorn law analyses and of the 
analyses of the productivity-performance relationship. The research model for this 
third empirical study is sketched in figure 9.7. This research model reveals two 
hypothese. First, the firm’s potential for scale and learning effects is hypothesized to 
have a positive impact on its realization of these effects (H3). This relationship is 
measured with the firm-level Verdoorn model. Second, the realization of scale and 
learning effects is hypothesized to have a positive influence on firm performance 
(H5). This relationship was measured with the productivity-performance model. We 
will subsequently test these hypotheses. 
 
Potential 
for scale and 
learning effects
Realization 
of scale and 
learning effects
Firm
performance
H3 H5
Verdoorn
law
relationship
Productivity-
performance
relationship
 
Figure 9-7: Research model and hypotheses of the third empirical study 
 
9.6.2 Estimation method 
The relationships between the annual growth in output and the annual growth in 
productivity and the relationship between the annual growth in productivity and the 
annual growth in net profit were estimated as linear regression models using 
Ordinary Least Squares as the estimation method. This was done for every firm, for 
every industry based on pooled firm-level data and for the total population based on 
pooled firm-level data.  
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The firm-level Verdoorn model and the productivity-performance model were 
estimated for the 118 firms defined in section 9.4 based on firm-level data consisting 
of the annual growth rates of output, of productivity and of net profit as discussed in 
sections 9.3 and 9.4. It was decided during these estimations to exclude one more 
firm, Royal Begemann Group, from the Verdoorn analysis because, on second sight, 
too many observations had to be deleted from the model as outliers, leaving the 
model with too few observations to obtain a reliable estimate. It was also decided 
during these estimations to exclude two more firms, EVC and Royal Begemann 
Group, from the productivity-performance analysis because, on second sight, too 
many observations had to be deleted from these models as outliers, leaving the 
models with too few observations to obtain a reliable estimate. 
 
The Verdoorn model and the productivity-performance relationship were also 
estimated for the 13 industry sectors defined in section 9.4 based on pooled firm-
level data. For these estimations, the sample consisted of the 131 firms listed on the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange over the period 1983-2002.87 No firms had to be deleted 
from the sample, because the number of data points for each individual firm was only 
a small proportion of the pooled number of data points for the industry. 
 
Finally, the Verdoorn model and the productivity-performance relationship were 
estimated for the entire population of firms, based on pooled firm-level data. For 
these estimations, the sample also consisted of the 131 firms listed on the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange over the period 1983-2002. As with the industry-specific models, no 
firms had to be deleted from the sample, because the number of data points for each 
individual firm was only a small proportion of the pooled number of data points. 
 
The following steps were taken in carrying out the analyses. 
1. Graphs were made, setting out the annual growth rate in output against the 
annual growth rate in productivity and the annual growth rate in 
productivity against the annual growth rate in net profit for every individual 
firm, for every industry and for the total population. These graphs were 
judged visually for outliers and influential points. 
2. The regression model including all observations was initially estimated for 
every individual firm, for every industry and for total population. The 
statistical output indicated among others the observations located over two 
times the standard residual from this initial regression line and the Cook 
distances of every observation. 
                                                          
87 See table 9.1 for the distribution of these 131 firms over the different industries. 
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3. Influential points, distorting the regression, were removed, based on 
judgment of the Cook distances computed from the initial regression model. 
4. Statistical outliers, defined as observations that were located over two times 
the standard residual from the initial regression line, were removed from the 
firm-specific models. In the industry-specific models and in the model of 
the total population, outliers were defined as observations that were located 
over three times the standard residual from the initial regression line. These 
were also removed. 
5. Every regression model was re-estimated using the remaining observations. 
 
The following figures are reported for each regression model: 
• the total number of observations available from the raw data 
• the valid number of observations, i.e., the total number of observations 
minus the observations that were deleted from the raw data due to irregular 
data definitions (see section 9.5.1), outliers due to extraordinary events (see 
section 9.5.3) and negative growth rates (see section 9.5.4) 
• the number of observations used to estimate the regression model 
• the number of observations deleted from the model on statistical grounds 
• the unstandardized estimate of the coefficient and its significance; for the 
Verdoorn model the coefficient is b, indicating the extent to which the firm 
is able to realize scale effects and autonomous learning effects; for the 
productivity-performance model the coefficient is d, indicating the extent to 
which the firm is able to realize net profit as a consequence of the 
realization of scale and learning effects 
• the t-value of the coefficient, indicating its significance 
• the estimate of the constant term and its significance; for the Verdoorn 
model the constant term is a, indicating the extent to which the firm is able 
to realize induced and exogenous learning effects; for the productivity-
performance model the constant term is c, indicating the extent to which the 
firm is able to realize net profit from other sources than the realization of 
scale and learning effects 
• the t-value of the constant term, indicating its significance 
• the value of the R-square, indicating the fit of the model, i.e., the 
explanatory power of the regression model 
• the standard error of the estimate, indicating the standard distance of the 
individual observations to the regression line, which serves as an estimator 
for the error variance of the regression 
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• the F-statistic, testing the equality of variances between the regression and 
the residual88 
• the Durbin-Watson test statistic for identifying the presence of 
autocorrelation in the model 
• the outcome of the Durbin-Watson test, indicating the absence, presence and 
nature of autocorrelation in the model 
 
9.6.3 Estimation of the firm-level Verdoorn model for individual firms 
The estimations of the firm-level Verdoorn models for the 118 individual firms in our 
sample are provided in table 9.5 below. Note that this table is spread over two pages, 
the left page covering the first eight columns and the right page the last eight 
columns. 
                                                          
88 The F-value is defined as the mean sum of squares due to the regression divided by the 
mean sum of square due to the residual (Weinberg & Abramowitz). Mean sum of squares is 
defined by the total sum of squares divided by the number of degrees of freedom. 
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Firm name Available 
data range 
from/to: 
Total 
number 
of obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of obser-
vations 
No. of 
obser-
vations 
in model 
Deleted 
no. of 
obser-
vations 
Unstan-
dardized 
beta (b) 
Aalberts Industries 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 -0.046 
ABN-Amro 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 0.765 
(***) 
Achmea 1993 2002 9 9 8 1 -0.462 
AEGON 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 0.734 
(***) 
Ahold 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 0.277 
(*) 
Ahrend 1983 2000 17 17 14 3 0.246 
(*) 
AKZO-Nobel 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 0.913 
(***) 
Arcadis 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 0.084 
ASM International 1994 2002 8 8 7 1 0.922 
(***) 
ASM Lithography 1993 2002 9 9 7 2 0.597 
(***) 
ASR 
Verzekeringsgroep 
1984 1999 15 15 14 1 0.998 
(***) 
Atag 1986 1999 13 13 12 1 -0.040 
Athlon 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 0.362 
(**) 
Ballast-Nedam 1986 2002 16 16 15 1 0.627 
(***) 
BAM 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 0.172 
Batenburg 1985 2002 17 17 15 2 0.428 
(**) 
Beers 1983 1999 16 16 15 1 0.789 
(**) 
Begemann 1983 1994 11 11 8 3 0.549 
(**) 
BE Semiconductor 
Industries 
1994 2002 8 8 8 0 0.669 
(**) 
Blydenstein-Willink 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 0.603 
(**) 
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T-value 
of beta 
(b) 
Constant 
term (a) 
T-value 
of 
constant 
term (a) 
R 
square 
Standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-
statistic 
Durbin-
Watson 
coefficient 
Result of test 
for auto-
correlation 
-0.596 0.021 0.902 0.022 0.052 0.356 1.209 Inconclusive 
6.207 0.000 -0.035 0.707 0.042 38.530 2.675 Inconclusive 
-0.501 0.125 0.874 0.040 0.093 0.251 2.232 No 
6.318 -0.015 -0.604 0.714 0.084 39.916 2.000 No 
2.491 -0.040 -1.888 0.279 0.060 6.204 1.468 No 
2.974 0.010 1.315 0.424 0.021 8.843 2.373 No 
5.430 0.016 1.353 0.678 0.033 29.482 2.354 No 
0.490 0.020 1.179 0.015 0.050 0.241 1.725 No 
8.009 -0.079 -0.785 0.928 0.223 64.141 1.890 No 
12.348 -0.185 
(**) 
-5.943 0.968 0.055 152.470 2.538 No 
14.070 -0.031 
(*) 
-2.959 0.943 0.022 197.959 1.789 No 
-0.485 -0.013 -0.671 0.023 0.056 0.235 1.220 Inconclusive 
3.098 -0.037 -1.533 0.390 0.093 9.596 1.441 No 
4.665 -0.029 -1.554 0.626 0.070 21.762 1.523 No 
1.899 0.008 0.526 0.194 0.049 3.605 2.464 No 
3.239 -0.002 -0.125 0.447 0.032 10.492 2.495 No 
3.730 -0.012 -0.425 0.517 0.052 13.914 1.765 No 
4.478 -0.017 -0.317 0.770 0.141 20.054 2.079 No 
3.954 -0.011 -0.113 0.723 0.262 15.631 1.340 No 
3.329 0.009 0.336 0.425 0.113 11.081 2.207 No 
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Firm name Available 
data range 
from/to: 
Total 
number 
of obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of obser-
vations 
No. of 
obser-
vations 
in model 
Deleted 
no. of 
obser-
vations 
Unstan-
dardized 
beta (b) 
Boskalis-Westminster 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 0.563 
(**) 
Brocacef 1983 1999 16 16 15 1 0.743 
(**) 
Buhrmann 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 0.732 
(***) 
CAP Gemini 1986 1999 13 13 13 0 0.142 
Cindu 1983 1997 14 14 12 2 0.235 
(*) 
CMG 1993 2002 9 9 6 3 0.393 
Content 1985 1997 12 12 10 2 0.908 
(***) 
Corus 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 0.819 
(***) 
Crédit Lyonnais 
Nederland 
1983 1997 14 14 13 1 0.812 
(***) 
CSM 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 0.138 
Delft Instruments 1984 2002 18 18 16 2 1.077 
(***) 
Draka 1988 2002 14 14 13 1 0.045 
DSM 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 0.834 
(***) 
EVC 1993 2002 9 9 6 3 1.094 
(***) 
Exendis 1985 2002 17 17 14 3 0.463 
(*) 
Fortis 1983 2002 19 19 14 5 0.429 
Frans Maas 1986 2002 16 16 16 0 0.002 
Free Record Shop 1989 2001 12 12 11 1 0.418 
Fugro 1989 2002 13 13 13 0 0.340 
Gamma Holding 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 0.311 
Gelderse Papier 1985 1999 14 14 14 0 0.504 
(**) 
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T-value 
of beta 
(b) 
Constant 
term (a) 
T-value 
of 
constant 
term (a) 
R 
square 
Standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-
statistic 
Durbin-
Watson 
coefficient 
Result of test 
for auto-
correlation 
3.336 -0.014 -0.667 0.410 0.077 11.132 2.861 Negative auto-
correlation 
3.755 0.029 1.341 0.520 0.084 14.101 2.111 No 
7.167 -0.019 -1.077 0.786 0.064 51.371 2.250 No 
1.270 -0.014 -0.737 0.128 0.050 1.613 1.709 No 
2.637 0.007 0.607 0.410 0.031 6.953 2.417 No 
2.282 -0.081 -1.324 0.510 0.078 5.209 1.814 No 
7.184 -0.085 
(**) 
-5.010 0.866 0.037 51.608 0.953 Inconclusive 
4.977 0.035 1.619 0.623 0.089 24.772 1.274 Inconclusive 
7.543 0.041 
(**) 
4.647 0.838 0.032 56.904 1.754 No 
1.233 0.017 1.303 0.098 0.027 1.520 0.668 Positive auto-
correlation 
8.963 0.035 2.083 0.852 0.068 80.333 1.887 No 
0.268 0.005 0.122 0.006 0.089 0.072 2.646 No 
12.639 0.034 
(**) 
3.590 0.914 0.039 159.757 1.792 No 
10.953 0.049 1.600 0.968 0.075 119.968 2.161 No 
2.484 0.014 0.493 0.340 0.103 6.169 1.866 No 
1.931 -0.017 -0.790 0.237 0.053 3.730 2.187 No 
0.015 0.012 0.747 0.000 0.053 0.000 1.584 No 
2.031 -0.070 -1.836 0.314 0.089 4.123 1.269 Inconclusive 
1.939 -0.031 -0.711 0.255 0.092 3.760 2.130 No 
1.454 0.001 0.026 0.117 0.082 2.113 2.229 No 
4.361 -0.004 -0.104 0.613 0.145 19.018 1.794 No 
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Firm name Available 
data range 
from/to: 
Total 
number 
of obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of obser-
vations 
No. of 
obser-
vations 
in model 
Deleted 
no. of 
obser-
vations 
Unstan-
dardized 
beta (b) 
Getronics 1984 2002 18 18 15 3 0.105 
Geveke 1984 2001 17 17 15 2 0.121 
Van der Giessen 1983 1996 13 13 9 4 0.827 
(***) 
Gist-Brocades 1983 1997 14 14 13 1 0.806 
(**) 
Grolsch 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 0.897 
(***) 
Grontmij 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 0.011 
GTI 1983 2000 17 17 17 0 0.405 
(**) 
Gucci 1993 2002 9 9 6 3 0.817 
(**) 
Hagemeyer 1983 2002 19 19 19 0 0.171 
HBG 1983 2000 17 17 15 2 -0.188 
Heijmans 1990 2002 12 12 12 0 -0.138 
Heineken 1983 2002 19 19 19 0 0.316 
Hunter Douglas 1983 2002 19 19 15 4 1.081 
(***) 
IHC Caland 1983 2002 19 19 12 7 0.303 
(*) 
Imtech 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 0.998 
(**) 
ING Group 1988 2002 14 14 12 2 0.782 
(***) 
KAS Bank 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 0.853 
(***) 
KBB 1983 1997 14 14 14 0 0.171 
Kempen & Co. 1986 2000 14 14 12 2 0.738 
(**) 
KLM 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 0.950 
(***) 
KPN 1983 2002 19 19 13 6 0.913 
(**) 
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T-value 
of beta 
(b) 
Constant 
term (a) 
T-value 
of 
constant 
term (a) 
R 
square 
Standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-
statistic 
Durbin-
Watson 
coefficient 
Result of test 
for auto-
correlation 
1.215 -0.001 -0.017 0.102 0.063 1.477 2.720 Inconclusive 
1.258 0.022 1.554 0.108 0.041 1.582 2.026 No 
6.160 0.045 
(*) 
2.950 0.844 0.046 37.947 1.911 No 
3.799 -0.008 -0.500 0.568 0.055 14.436 1.707 No 
7.860 0.012 1.344 0.805 0.037 61.772 2.020 No 
0.061 0.022 1.555 0.000 0.045 0.004 1.447 No 
3.381 0.002 0.143 0.432 0.042 11.430 2.196 No 
4.788 -0.151 -1.764 0.851 0.139 22.921 1.510 No 
1.379 0.004 0.109 0.101 0.120 1.902 1.506 No 
-0.874 0.045 
(*) 
2.696 0.055 0.062 0.763 1.591 No 
-0.744 0.061 1.869 0.052 0.048 0.553 1.433 No 
1.423 0.012 0.505 0.106 0.065 2.024 1.398 Inconclusive 
7.539 -0.048 
(**) 
-3.658 0.814 0.038 56.835 1.981 No 
2.300 -0.018 -0.719 0.346 0.060 5.290 1.554 No 
4.292 0.030 1.757 0.551 0.067 18.421 1.528 No 
9.234 -0.012 -0.654 0.895 0.049 85.262 2.016 no 
9.581 -0.019 -1.385 0.852 0.048 91.795 2.347 No 
0.835 0.028 1.813 0.055 0.051 0.696 1.353 No 
4.562 -0.061 -1.133 0.675 0.140 20.812 2.713 Inconclusive 
13.422 -0.028 
(**) 
-3.014 0.923 0.039 180.155 1.001 Positive auto-
correlation 
4.232 0.008 0.592 0.620 0.034 17.913 1.779 No 
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Firm name Available 
data range 
from/to: 
Total 
number 
of obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of obser-
vations 
No. of 
obser-
vations 
in model 
Deleted 
no. of 
obser-
vations 
Unstan-
dardized 
beta (b) 
Landré 1983 1998 15 15 11 4 0.235 
(*) 
Laurus 1986 2002 16 16 11 5 -0.057 
LCI 1988 2001 13 13 10 3 0.487 
(**) 
Van Leer 1983 1998 15 15 14 1 0.577 
(**) 
Macintosh 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 0.640 
(*) 
Van Melle 1983 1999 16 16 15 1 0.911 
(***) 
Bank Mendes Gans 1983 1998 15 13 12 1 0.533 
(*) 
Van der Moolen 1986 2002 16 16 16 0 0.748 
(***) 
NBM 1983 2000 17 17 16 1 0.288 
(**) 
NEDAP 1983 2002 19 19 19 0 0.667 
(***) 
Nedlloyd 1983 2001 18 16 13 3 0.903 
(**) 
Neways 1985 2002 17 17 16 1 -0.027 
NIB Capital 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 1.067 
(***) 
NKF 1986 1997 11 11 10 1 0.443 
(**) 
Norit 1983 2000 17 17 16 1 0.339 
(***) 
NS 1995 2002 7 7 7 0 1.028 
(**) 
Numico 1983 2002 19 19 14 5 0.372 
Nutreco 1995 2002 7 7 7 0 -0.047 
Océ 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 0.427 
(*) 
Van Ommeren 1983 1998 15 15 11 4 0.408 
OPG 1984 2002 18 18 14 4 0.189 
(*) 
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T-value 
of beta 
(b) 
Constant 
term (a) 
T-value 
of 
constant 
term (a) 
R 
square 
Standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-
statistic 
Durbin-
Watson 
coefficient 
Result of test 
for auto-
correlation 
3.199 -0.009 -1.249 0.532 0.023 10.233 1.188 Inconclusive 
-0.256 0.034 1.519 0.007 0.050 0.066 1.842 No 
4.065 -0.091 
(*) 
-2.332 0.647 0.110 16.521 1.803 No 
3.489 0.024 2.088 0.504 0.042 12.173 1.527 No 
2.572 0.003 0.093 0.321 0.098 6.617 1.432 No 
6.856 -0.055 
(**) 
-3.773 0.783 0.035 46.998 1.657 No 
2.694 -0.007 -0.340 0.421 0.056 7.258 0.811 Positive auto-
correlation 
9.728 -0.183 
(**) 
-3.874 0.871 0.166 94.643 2.373 No 
3.810 0.004 0.319 0.509 0.044 14.519 1.785 No 
6.150 -0.020 -1.535 0.690 0.041 37.824 1.229 Inconclusive 
4.234 0.019 1.191 0.620 0.057 17.930 1.386 No 
-0.194 0.041 0.886 0.003 0.137 0.038 2.651 Inconclusive 
20.532 -0.061 
(***) 
-4.819 0.968 0.041 421.552 1.350 Inconclusive 
4.820 -0.004 -0.283 0.744 0.044 23.228 1.074 Inconclusive 
5.251 -0.006 -0.571 0.663 0.036 27.578 1.836 No 
7.350 0.019 0.882 0.915 0.057 54.019 2.421 No 
1.298 0.013 0.410 0.123 0.060 1.686 1.771 No 
-0.110 0.020 0.276 0.002 0.090 0.012 0.980 Inconclusive 
2.548 -0.001 -0.101 0.317 0.042 6.491 1.506 No 
1.605 0.025 1.743 0.222 0.046 2.575 2.106 No 
2.322 -0.007 -0.553 0.310 0.034 5.391 1.767 No 
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Firm name Available 
data range 
from/to: 
Total 
number 
of obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of obser-
vations 
No. of 
obser-
vations 
in model 
Deleted 
no. of 
obser-
vations 
Unstan-
dardized 
beta (b) 
Ordina 1985 2002 17 17 16 1 0.047 
Otra 1983 1997 14 14 11 3 0.747 
(*) 
P&C Group 1983 1997 14 14 13 1 0.926 
(**) 
Pakhoed 1983 1998 15 15 12 3 -0.145 
Philips 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 0.979 
(***) 
Polygram 1988 1997 9 9 9 0 0.610 
(*) 
Polynorm 1983 2000 17 17 16 1 0.378 
(*) 
Randstad 1986 2002 16 16 14 2 0.214 
Reed Elsevier 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 0.906 
(***) 
Rood Testhouse 1986 2002 16 16 16 0 0.623 
(**) 
Royal Begemann 
Group 
1995 2002 7 3 Ex-
cluded 
from 
analysis 
    
Samas 1983 2002 19 19 13 6 0.733 
(**) 
Schuitema 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 0.820 
(**) 
Royal Dutch/Shell 
Group 
1983 2002 19 19 16 3 1.134 
(***) 
Simac 1985 2002 17 17 14 3 0.044 
Smit Internationale 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 1.377 
(***) 
SNS Bank 1990 2002 12 12 11 1 0.661 
(***) 
Sphinx 1984 1998 14 14 14 0 0.691 
(*) 
Staal Bankiers 1984 1997 13 13 9 4 0.641 
Stork 1983 2002 19 19 19 0 0.412 
(***) 
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T-value 
of beta 
(b) 
Constant 
term (a) 
T-value 
of 
constant 
term (a) 
R 
square 
Standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-
statistic 
Durbin-
Watson 
coefficient 
Result of test 
for auto-
correlation 
1.277 0.000 0.024 0.104 0.044 1.630 2.176 No 
3.101 0.006 0.282 0.517 0.050 9.618 1.654 no 
4.395 0.031 1.474 0.637 0.074 19.319 1.176 Inconclusive 
-0.458 0.040 
(*) 
2.226 0.021 0.053 0.210 2.050 No 
18.160 0.032 
(*) 
2.730 0.954 0.049 329.773 1.734 No 
2.578 -0.024 -0.657 0.487 0.059 6.646 1.570 No 
2.213 -0.009 -0.450 0.259 0.045 4.898 1.787 No 
1.959 -0.026 -1.254 0.242 0.045 3.839 2.576 No 
5.916 -0.011 -0.424 0.686 0.091 34.995 2.092 No 
4.270 -0.040 -0.712 0.566 0.220 18.231 1.700 No 
 
 
 
  
          
3.420 0.014 0.811 0.515 0.055 11.697 1.929 No 
4.163 -0.001 -0.060 0.553 0.033 17.331 1.609 No 
12.749 0.036 
(**) 
3.724 0.921 0.039 162.527 1.321 Inconclusive 
0.346 0.004 0.129 0.010 0.078 0.120 1.800 No 
5.254 0.016 0.706 0.663 0.089 27.603 1.561 No 
9.177 -0.015 -1.167 0.903 0.032 84.209 1.599 No 
2.940 -0.023 -0.520 0.419 0.144 8.641 2.281 No 
3.276 -0.018 -0.332 0.605 0.124 10.730 1.804 No 
4.671 -0.002 -0.235 0.562 0.036 21.820 1.675 No 
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Firm name Available 
data range 
from/to: 
Total 
number 
of obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of obser-
vations 
No. of 
obser-
vations 
in model 
Deleted 
no. of 
obser-
vations 
Unstan-
dardized 
beta (b) 
Telegraaf 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 0.485 
(**) 
Ten Cate 1983 2002 19 19 19 0 0.827 
(***) 
Tulip 1983 2002 19 16 13 3 0.525 
(**) 
Twentsche Kabel 
Holding 
1983 2002 19 19 16 3 0.584 
(*) 
Unilever 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 0.737 
(***) 
Vendex KBB 1990 2002 12 12 9 3 2.451 
(**) 
Vilenzo 1989 2002 13 13 11 2 0.524 
VNU 1983 2002 19 19 12 7 0.288 
VOPAK 1983 2002 19 19 15 4 -0.145 
Vredestein 1985 2002 17 17 16 1 1.131 
(***) 
Volker-Wessels-Stevin 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 -0.032 
Wegener-Arcade 1983 2002 19 18 17 1 0.083 
Wessanen 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 0.599 
(**) 
Wolff 1983 1995 12 12 10 2 1.690 
(***) 
Wolters-Kluwer 1986 2002 16 16 15 1 0.663 
(**) 
Averages     16 16 14 2 0.542 
Significance at the 5% level is indicated by (*), at the 1% level by (**) and at the 0.1% level by 
(***) 
 
 
The analysis shows that, for individual firms, the average Verdoorn coefficient was 
0.542 during the period 1983-2002. This means that every increase in output of 1% 
has caused a growth in productivity by 0.542%. We can therefore say that firms have 
on average realized scale effects and autonomous learning effects because their 
output has increased over time. Of the 118 firm-specific models, 81 showed a 
significant value of the Verdoorn coefficient. 
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T-value 
of beta 
(b) 
Constant 
term (a) 
T-value 
of 
constant 
term (a) 
R 
square 
Standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-
statistic 
Durbin-
Watson 
coefficient 
Result of test 
for auto-
correlation 
4.335 0.011 1.333 0.573 0.024 18.792 1.652 No 
5.298 0.011 0.436 0.623 0.107 28.072 2.336 No 
4.064 -0.098 -1.896 0.600 0.161 16.519 1.795 No 
2.894 -0.029 -1.084 0.374 0.081 8.376 2.137 No 
6.021 0.015 1.618 0.721 0.036 36.253 2.100 No 
3.825 0.004 0.169 0.676 0.060 14.632 0.669 Positive auto-
correlation 
1.761 -0.060 -1.333 0.256 0.124 3.102 0.693 Positive auto-
correlation 
1.482 0.004 0.170 0.180 0.061 2.197 2.496 No 
-0.695 0.026 1.988 0.036 0.044 0.483 2.228 No 
13.533 0.011 0.739 0.929 0.056 183.152 1.558 No 
-0.275 0.025 1.840 0.005 0.050 0.076 2.021 No 
1.157 0.027 1.891 0.082 0.048 1.339 1.796 No 
3.337 -0.017 -0.857 0.426 0.062 11.138 2.436 No 
9.166 -0.043 -2.176 0.913 0.058 84.011 1.314 Inconclusive 
3.117 0.003 0.106 0.428 0.053 9.713 1.816 No 
 -0.006  0.479      
 
Table 9.5: Results from the estimation of the firm-specific Verdoorn models 
 
When we only count the significant firm-specific models, the average value of the 
Verdoorn coefficient is 0.734. These values are in accordance with the values found 
in previous research, e.g., with the values found by Verdoorn (1949) himself, by 
Kaldor (1966), by Kennedy (1971), by Vaciago (1975), by Stoneman (1979) and by 
De Vries (1985). This provides confidence in the robustness of our measurement 
model. 
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It is noteworthy that the Verdoorn coefficients vary greatly across firms: they vary 
from –0.462 for Achmea to 2.451 for Vendex KBB. Again, when we only consider the 
significant firm-specific models, the Verdoorn coefficients vary from 0.189 for OPG 
to 2.451 for Vendex KBB. Lower values of the coefficient have also been found by 
Cripps & Tarling (1973) and Fase & Van den Heuvel (1988). Cripps & Tarling 
(1973) also found negative values of the coefficient for parts of their sample. 
Although extreme values of the coefficient are not in contradiction with the theory, 
they may be an indication of a possible problem with the validity of the model for 
that specific firm (see also Fase & Winder, 1999). Still, we should not be surprised to 
find higher variances at the firm level than at the industry or country level. 
 
Interestingly, our analysis also shows that, on average, firms were simultaneously 
confronted with a negative value of the intercept of -0.006. This means that over this 
period firms were confronted with an average decline in productivity by 0.6%. This 
decline is caused by the relative inability of firms to realize induced and exogenous 
learning effects. Of the 118 firms, 16 showed a significant value of the intercept. 
When we only count the firm-specific models with significant intercepts, the average 
value of the intercept is –0.031. It is noteworthy that the intercepts also vary greatly 
across firms: the values of the intercept range from –0.185 for ASM Lithography to 
0.125 for Achmea. Again, when we only consider the firm-specific models with 
significant intercepts, the values vary from –0.185 for ASM Lithography to 0.045 for 
Van der Giessen. 
 
We present the corrections on the Verdoorn coefficient due to changes in the capital-
labor and the capital-output ratios for a number of firms in tables 9.6 and 9.7 below. 
Note that, although in principle these corrections can be made, the parameter 
estimates needed to make them were for many firms nonsignificant. Below we only 
present the corrections for those firms where the necessary parameter estimates were 
significant.89 
 
As can be seen in table 9.6, the rise in capital-labor ratio causes moderate downward 
corrections of the Verdoorn coefficient for the firms Athlon and KAS Bank. These 
corrections do not greatly affect the general results of our firm-specific Verdoorn 
analysis. 
                                                          
89 The parameter estimates for making corrections on the constant term for changes in the 
capital-labor ratio were all nonsignificant and are therefore not presented here. For the 
complete tables, including the nonsignificant parameter estimates, see Appendix V. 
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Name initial  
coefficient 
(estimated 
b) 
alpha (α) 
(coefficient of 
change in 
capital) 
beta (β) 
(coefficient of 
change in 
labor) 
average 
growth of 
capital 
input 
average 
growth of 
labor 
input 
delta (δ) correction on 
coefficient: 
phi (φ) 
corrected 
coefficient (b) 
Athlon 0.362 0.607 0.551 0.146 0.083 1.767 0.097 0.265 
KAS 
Bank 
0.853 0.516 0.960 0.111 0.031 3.566 0.147 0.706 
Table 9.6: Corrections on the Verdoorn coefficient for changes in the capital-labor 
ratio on the firm-specific Verdoorn models, based on significant estimates of the 
parameters 
 
Name Initial  
coefficient 
(estimated 
b) 
alpha (α) 
(coefficient of 
change in 
capital) 
beta (β) 
(coefficient of 
change in 
labor) 
average 
growth of 
capital 
input 
average 
growth of 
output 
gamma 
(γ) 
correction on 
coefficient: 
thèta (θ) 
corrected 
coefficient (b) 
Athlon 0.362 0.607 0.551 0.146 0.071 2.054 1.161 -0.799 
Table 9.7: Corrections on the Verdoorn coefficient for changes in the capital-output 
ratio on the firm-specific Verdoorn models, based on significant estimates of the 
parameters 
 
As can be seen in table 9.7, the rise in capital-output ratio causes a rather dramatic 
downward correction on the Verdoorn coefficient for the firm Athlon. As there were 
only a few firms with a non-constant capital-output ratio, this result does not greatly 
affect the general results of our firm-specific Verdoorn law analysis. It does affect 
the variance in coefficients, which goes from 0.189 for OPG and 2.451 for Vendex 
KBB in the original estimations to –0.799 for Athlon and 2.451 for Vendex KBB in 
the corrected estimations. When both the corrections for change in capital-labor and 
capital-output ratio are made, the value of the coefficient for Athlon will probably be 
even lower. Such a strong negative value is an exception, but is not theoretically 
impossible. As mentioned before, such values may be an indication of a possible 
problem with the validity of the model for the specific firm (see also Fase & Winder, 
1999). 
9.6.4 Estimation of the productivity-performance model for individual firms 
The estimations of the productivity-performance models for the 118 individual firms 
in our sample are provided in table 9.8 below. Note that this table is spread over two 
pages, the left page covering the first eight columns and the right page the last eight 
columns. 
Report third empirical study 
328 
 
Firm name Available 
data range 
from/to: 
Total 
number 
of obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of obser-
vations 
No. of 
obser-
vations 
in model 
Deleted 
no. of 
obser-
vations 
Unstan-
dardized 
beta (d) 
Aalberts Industries 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 1.402 
ABN-Amro 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 1.903 
(***) 
Achmea 1993 2002 9 9 8 1 0.345 
AEGON 1983 2002 19 19 19 0 0.835 
(**) 
Ahold 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 1.361 
(*) 
Ahrend 1983 2000 17 17 13 4 7.352 
(*) 
AKZO-Nobel 1983 2002 19 19 15 4 1.791 
(**) 
Arcadis 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 2.810 
ASM International 1994 2002 8 6 5 1 7.465 
ASM Lithography 1993 2002 9 8 8 0 3.820 
(***) 
ASR 
Verzekeringsgroep 
1984 1999 15 15 15 0 1.830 
(***) 
Atag 1986 1999 13 13 12 1 1.273 
Athlon 1983 2002 19 19 15 4 2.453 
(**) 
Ballast-Nedam 1986 2002 16 14 9 5 1.301 
(*) 
BAM 1983 2002 19 18 16 2 3.922 
(*) 
Batenburg 1985 2002 17 17 17 0 2.023 
(*) 
Beers 1983 1999 16 16 14 2 0.546 
(**) 
Begemann 1983 1994 11 10 9 1 0.068 
BE Semiconductor 
Industries 
1994 2002 8 5 5 0 7.967 
Blydenstein-Willink 1983 2002 19 12 11 1 4.181 
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T-value 
of beta 
(d) 
Constant 
term (c) 
T-value 
of 
constant 
term (c) 
R 
square 
Standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-
statistic 
Durbin-
Watson 
coefficient 
Result of test 
for auto-
correlation 
1.453 0.234 
(***) 
4.773 0.117 0.204 2.111 2.093 No 
6.065 0.002 0.061 0.697 0.098 36.783 2.172 No 
0.644 0.123 2.319 0.065 0.125 0.415 1.272 Inconclusive 
3.473 0.112 
(*) 
2.627 0.415 0.176 12.062 2.320 No 
2.367 0.182 
(***) 
6.804 0.272 0.107 5.605 1.141 Inconclusive 
2.595 -0.078 -0.767 0.380 0.269 6.736 1.633 No 
3.477 -0.043 -1.209 0.482 0.133 12.088 2.523 No 
1.462 0.075 0.720 0.118 0.393 2.137 2.970 Negative auto-
correlation 
2.090 0.034 0.021 0.593 3.507 4.367 1.393 No 
10.394 0.551 
(**) 
3.886 0.947 0.401 108.025 2.118 No 
14.349 0.021 1.391 0.941 0.043 205.888 1.626 No 
0.714 0.120 1.228 0.049 0.320 0.510 2.580 No 
3.570 0.047 0.984 0.515 0.177 12.744 1.120 Inconclusive 
3.295 0.049 1.137 0.608 0.129 10.854 2.893 Inconclusive 
2.784 0.056 0.759 0.356 0.232 7.752 2.041 No 
2.704 0.025 0.620 0.328 0.144 7.310 2.468 No 
3.543 0.023 1.595 0.511 0.044 12.555 1.983 No 
0.063 0.317 1.166 0.001 0.801 0.004 1.599 No 
3.086 0.262 0.240 0.760 2.359 9.525 0.585 Inconclusive 
1.145 -1.100 -1.575 0.127 2.195 1.310 2.383 No 
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Firm name Available 
data range 
from/to: 
Total 
number 
of obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of obser-
vations 
No. of 
obser-
vations 
in model 
Deleted 
no. of 
obser-
vations 
Unstan-
dardized 
beta (d) 
Boskalis-Westminster 1983 2002 19 15 12 3 2.480 
(**) 
Brocacef 1983 1999 16 15 13 2 2.576 
(**) 
Buhrmann 1983 2002 19 18 14 4 4.758 
(**) 
CAP Gemini 1986 1999 13 13 13 0 3.060 
(**) 
Cindu 1983 1997 14 13 12 1 4.834 
CMG 1993 2002 9 8 7 1 2.178 
Content 1985 1997 12 11 9 2 1.700 
(**) 
Corus 1983 2002 19 11 10 1 6.588 
(**) 
Crédit Lyonnais 
Nederland 
1983 1997 14 8 8 0 1.954 
CSM 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 0.954 
(**) 
Delft Instruments 1984 2002 18 13 12 1 14.969 
(***) 
Draka 1988 2002 14 14 10 4 0.988 
(*) 
DSM 1983 2002 19 18 17 1 4.913 
(***) 
EVC 1993 2002 9 3 Ex-
cluded 
from 
analysis 
    
Exendis 1985 2002 17 17 13 4 2.970 
(***) 
Fortis 1983 2002 19 19 15 4 1.232 
(*) 
Frans Maas 1986 2002 16 14 13 1 2.518 
(*) 
Free Record Shop 1989 2001 12 12 11 1 2.665 
(*) 
Fugro 1989 2002 13 13 13 0 4.125 
(***) 
Gamma Holding 1983 2002 19 19 19 0 0.552 
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T-value 
of beta 
(d) 
Constant 
term (c) 
T-value 
of 
constant 
term (c) 
R 
square 
Standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-
statistic 
Durbin-
Watson 
coefficient 
Result of test 
for auto-
correlation 
3.556 0.052 1.005 0.558 0.144 12.642 2.136 No 
3.672 -0.085 -1.122 0.551 0.255 13.483 2.368 No 
3.200 0.000 -0.002 0.460 0.508 10.241 2.795 Inconclusive 
3.582 0.085 2.002 0.538 0.153 12.827 1.368 No 
1.556 -0.035 -0.211 0.195 0.431 2.422 1.869 No 
1.920 0.315 
(*) 
2.769 0.381 0.311 3.687 1.332 No 
4.044 0.100 
(*) 
2.516 0.700 0.119 16.357 2.764 Inconclusive 
4.541 -0.224 -1.455 0.720 0.484 20.619 1.689 No 
1.463 0.021 0.170 0.263 0.299 2.140 2.262 No 
3.706 0.098 
(***) 
9.417 0.495 0.027 13.737 1.611 No 
6.818 -0.041 -0.151 0.823 0.939 46.481 2.337 No 
2.323 0.154 
(***) 
5.910 0.403 0.068 5.396 2.033 No 
8.837 -0.039 -0.524 0.839 0.278 78.097 2.503 No 
 
 
 
  
          
4.918 -0.051 -0.881 0.687 0.207 24.182 2.099 No 
2.776 0.090 
(**) 
3.393 0.372 0.101 7.705 1.599 No 
2.487 0.075 1.615 0.360 0.165 6.185 1.771 No 
2.888 0.094 1.041 0.481 0.297 8.340 1.734 No 
5.500 0.130 1.651 0.733 0.266 30.253 1.910 No 
0.720 0.105 1.564 0.030 0.293 0.518 2.052 No 
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Firm name Available 
data range 
from/to: 
Total 
number 
of obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of obser-
vations 
No. of 
obser-
vations 
in model 
Deleted 
no. of 
obser-
vations 
Unstan-
dardized 
beta (d) 
Gelderse Papier 1985 1999 14 11 10 1 7.341 
(**) 
Getronics 1984 2002 18 17 14 3 1.507 
Geveke 1984 2001 17 15 14 1 3.017 
Van der Giessen 1983 1996 13 10 7 3 17.262 
(*) 
Gist-Brocades 1983 1997 14 14 12 2 3.765 
(**) 
Grolsch 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 0.664 
(*) 
Grontmij 1983 2002 19 19 19 0 0.958 
GTI 1983 2000 17 17 17 0 1.308 
Gucci 1993 2002 9 8 7 1 1.676 
(*) 
Hagemeyer 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 0.952 
HBG 1983 2000 17 17 16 1 -0.332 
Heijmans 1990 2002 12 12 12 0 -0.890 
Heineken 1983 2002 19 19 19 0 0.675 
Hunter Douglas 1983 2002 19 19 19 0 2.856 
(***) 
IHC Caland 1983 2002 19 16 13 3 2.521 
(*) 
Imtech 1983 2002 19 18 15 3 5.348 
(**) 
ING Group 1988 2002 14 14 12 2 2.522 
(***) 
KAS Bank 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 2.807 
(***) 
KBB 1983 1997 14 14 13 1 4.838 
(**) 
Kempen & Co. 1986 2000 14 14 13 1 1.915 
(***) 
KLM 1983 2002 19 16 14 2 9.880 
(**) 
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T-value 
of beta 
(d) 
Constant 
term (c) 
T-value 
of 
constant 
term (c) 
R 
square 
Standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-
statistic 
Durbin-
Watson 
coefficient 
Result of test 
for auto-
correlation 
5.560 -0.269 -1.235 0.794 0.658 30.918 1.883 No 
1.971 0.245 
(**) 
4.344 0.245 0.182 3.884 1.042 Positive auto-
correlation 
1.964 0.070 0.829 0.243 0.230 3.857 2.353 No 
2.884 -0.524 -1.274 0.625 1.089 8.319 1.463 No 
3.835 -0.071 -1.228 0.595 0.180 14.708 1.431 No 
2.202 0.059 
(*) 
3.472 0.244 0.057 4.848 1.939 No 
0.362 0.246 1.885 0.008 0.531 0.131 1.826 No 
0.724 0.192 1.733 0.034 0.389 0.524 1.482 No 
2.973 0.260 2.216 0.639 0.311 8.837 1.386 No 
1.063 0.111 1.170 0.066 0.397 1.131 0.852 Positive auto-
correlation 
-0.808 0.063 
(*) 
2.160 0.045 0.095 0.653 1.414 No 
-0.917 0.311 
(***) 
5.406 0.078 0.150 0.841 2.383 No 
1.933 0.089 
(**) 
3.439 0.180 0.099 3.735 2.197 No 
5.139 0.109 1.874 0.608 0.250 26.406 1.923 No 
2.824 0.017 0.277 0.420 0.212 7.974 2.180 No 
3.418 -0.049 -0.369 0.473 0.409 11.683 1.850 No 
7.403 0.006 0.164 0.846 0.101 54.810 1.588 No 
7.986 0.036 0.791 0.810 0.172 63.784 2.741 Inconclusive 
4.601 -0.081 -1.260 0.658 0.189 21.169 2.088 No 
6.387 0.146 1.927 0.788 0.270 40.796 1.868 No 
4.526 0.205 0.726 0.631 1.020 20.488 1.730 No 
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Firm name Available 
data range 
from/to: 
Total 
number 
of obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of obser-
vations 
No. of 
obser-
vations 
in model 
Deleted 
no. of 
obser-
vations 
Unstan-
dardized 
beta (d) 
KPN 1983 2002 19 18 12 6 0.197 
Landré 1983 1998 15 14 11 3 3.636 
Laurus 1986 2002 16 14 11 3 0.537 
LCI 1988 2001 13 11 11 0 3.692 
(**) 
Van Leer 1983 1998 15 15 12 3 0.933 
Macintosh 1983 2002 19 18 16 2 3.708 
(*) 
Van Melle 1983 1999 16 16 16 0 2.586 
(**) 
Bank Mendes Gans 1983 1998 15 13 10 3 0.321 
(*) 
Van der Moolen 1986 2002 16 16 13 3 1.326 
(***) 
NBM 1983 2000 17 17 15 2 4.117 
(***) 
NEDAP 1983 2002 19 19 19 0 3.762 
(***) 
Nedlloyd 1983 2001 18 13 9 4 7.534 
(*) 
Neways 1985 2002 17 16 14 2 1.863 
(*) 
NIB Capital 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 1.943 
(***) 
NKF 1986 1997 11 11 9 2 3.716 
(***) 
Norit 1983 2000 17 17 13 4 3.059 
**) 
NS 1995 2002 7 7 5 2 6.054 
Numico 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 -0.147 
Nutreco 1995 2002 7 7 7 0 3.752 
Océ 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 1.142 
Van Ommeren 1983 1998 15 15 9 6 1.851 
(**) 
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T-value 
of beta 
(d) 
Constant 
term (c) 
T-value 
of 
constant 
term (c) 
R 
square 
Standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-
statistic 
Durbin-
Watson 
coefficient 
Result of test 
for auto-
correlation 
0.467 0.085 
(*) 
2.786 0.021 0.072 0.218 1.062 Inconclusive 
1.492 -0.011 -0.156 0.198 0.241 2.226 2.118 No 
0.665 0.058 1.322 0.047 0.122 0.442 2.074 No 
3.798 0.214 1.182 0.591 0.625 14.428 1.927 No 
1.456 0.117 
(*) 
2.753 0.175 0.132 2.119 2.451 No 
2.944 -0.215 -1.672 0.382 0.509 8.667 1.880 No 
3.649 0.075 1.307 0.487 0.212 13.312 2.327 No 
3.226 0.063 
(***) 
7.207 0.565 0.027 10.410 1.060 Inconclusive 
4.887 0.166 2.138 0.685 0.247 23.878 2.186 No 
4.069 0.146 
(*) 
2.220 0.560 0.237 16.557 1.130 Inconclusive 
7.845 0.015 0.396 0.784 0.145 61.545 2.015 No 
3.374 -0.071 -0.386 0.619 0.498 11.383 1.989 No 
2.286 0.024 0.233 0.303 0.374 5.224 1.809 No 
9.757 0.074 1.396 0.856 0.225 95.198 1.191 Inconclusive 
5.417 -0.047 -0.934 0.807 0.131 29.349 1.359 No 
3.519 0.070 1.083 0.530 0.182 12.384 1.616 No 
2.894 -0.134 -0.997 0.736 0.223 8.376 1.682 No 
-0.308 0.192 4.400 0.006 0.182 0.095 2.169 No 
1.833 0.281 1.773 0.402 0.414 3.358 1.919 No 
0.833 0.099 1.089 0.044 0.302 0.694 2.049 No 
3.477 0.165 
(**) 
5.088 0.633 0.082 12.092 2.488 No 
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Firm name Available 
data range 
from/to: 
Total 
number 
of obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of obser-
vations 
No. of 
obser-
vations 
in model 
Deleted 
no. of 
obser-
vations 
Unstan-
dardized 
beta (d) 
OPG 1984 2002 18 18 17 1 3.405 
(**) 
Ordina 1985 2002 17 17 16 1 2.976 
Otra 1983 1997 14 14 14 0 3.622 
(*) 
P&C Group 1983 1997 14 11 9 2 5.030 
(***) 
Pakhoed 1983 1998 15 15 12 3 7.622 
(**) 
Philips 1983 2002 19 15 12 3 4.966 
(**) 
Polygram 1988 1997 9 9 7 2 1.598 
(**) 
Polynorm 1983 2000 17 17 16 1 3.450 
(**) 
Randstad 1986 2002 16 16 15 1 1.902 
(*) 
Reed Elsevier 1983 2002 19 18 15 3 0.758 
Rood Testhouse 1986 2002 16 11 10 1 14.263 
(*) 
Royal Begemann 
Group 
1995 2002 7 3 Ex-
cluded 
from 
analysis 
   
Samas 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 2.057 
(**) 
Schuitema 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 1.117 
(**) 
Royal Dutch/Shell 
Group 
1983 2002 19 19 17 2 1.554 
(***) 
Simac 1985 2002 17 14 12 2 5.102 
(**) 
Smit Internationale 1983 2002 19 16 12 4 3.152 
SNS Bank 1990 2002 12 12 10 2 2.275 
(***) 
Sphinx 1984 1998 14 12 11 1 2.425 
(**) 
Staal Bankiers 1984 1997 13 12 11 1 2.154 
(***) 
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T-value 
of beta 
(d) 
Constant 
term (c) 
T-value 
of 
constant 
term (c) 
R 
square 
Standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-
statistic 
Durbin-
Watson 
coefficient 
Result of test 
for auto-
correlation 
3.759 0.113 1.553 0.485 0.300 14.132 2.005 No 
1.240 0.226 2.049 0.099 0.419 1.538 1.630 No 
2.251 0.155 1.119 0.297 0.451 5.066 1.894 No 
7.348 -0.062 -0.730 0.885 0.237 53.992 2.037 No 
3.500 -0.049 -0.457 0.551 0.302 12.251 1.382 No 
3.811 -0.167 -1.041 0.592 0.552 14.524 2.798 Inconclusive 
4.759 0.071 
(*) 
2.805 0.819 0.049 22.645 1.730 No 
3.927 0.036 0.664 0.524 0.193 15.421 2.184 No 
2.188 0.198 
(**) 
3.823 0.269 0.201 4.789 1.262 Inconclusive 
1.922 0.177 
(*) 
2.916 0.221 0.179 3.696 1.690 No 
2.973 0.501 0.681 0.525 2.086 8.838 3.167 Negative auto-
correlation 
 
 
 
  
          
2.924 0.154 
(*) 
2.515 0.363 0.246 8.548 1.952 No 
3.468 0.058 
(*) 
2.458 0.462 0.068 12.028 1.702 No 
8.299 -0.014 -0.501 0.821 0.110 68.877 1.586 No 
4.505 0.094 1.128 0.670 0.280 20.293 2.466 No 
1.770 0.047 0.234 0.239 0.603 3.132 2.609 No 
5.860 -0.005 -0.119 0.811 0.081 34.341 1.963 No 
3.900 0.150 1.254 0.628 0.383 15.212 1.448 No 
6.193 0.048 0.696 0.810 0.220 38.352 2.940 Inconclusive 
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Firm name Available 
data range 
from/to: 
Total 
number 
of obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of obser-
vations 
No. of 
obser-
vations 
in model 
Deleted 
no. of 
obser-
vations 
Unstan-
dardized 
beta (d) 
Stork 1983 2002 19 18 17 1 1.491 
Telegraaf 1983 2002 19 18 17 1 1.847 
(**) 
Ten Cate 1983 2002 19 17 16 1 2.424 
(*) 
Tulip 1983 2002 19 13 12 1 4.744 
(***) 
Twentsche Kabel 
Holding 
1983 2002 19 19 18 1 2.632 
(***) 
Unilever 1983 2002 19 19 15 4 2.179 
(***) 
Vendex KBB 1990 2002 12 12 10 2 4.916 
(***) 
Vilenzo 1989 2002 13 13 11 2 0.909 
VNU 1983 2002 19 19 18 1 2.689 
(***) 
VOPAK 1983 2002 19 19 16 3 6.491 
(**) 
Vredestein 1985 2002 17 13 9 4 5.620 
(*) 
Volker-Wessels-Stevin 1983 2002 19 18 14 4 0.050 
Wegener-Arcade 1983 2002 19 18 15 3 2.575 
Wessanen 1983 2002 19 19 17 2 2.150 
(***) 
Wolff 1983 1995 12 9 7 2 0.602 
Wolters-Kluwer 1986 2002 16 16 12 4 0.037 
Averages     16 14.9 13.2 1.8 3.083 
Significance at the 5% level is indicated by (*), at the 1% level by (**) and at the 0.1% level by 
(***) 
Report third empirical study 
339 
 
T-value 
of beta 
(d) 
Constant 
term (c) 
T-value 
of 
constant 
term (c) 
R 
square 
Standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-
statistic 
Durbin-
Watson 
coefficient 
Result of test 
for auto-
correlation 
0.943 0.134 1.694 0.056 0.308 0.890 1.829 No 
0.268 0.039 1.136 0.416 0.135 10.682 2.156 No 
2.724 -0.077 -0.722 0.346 0.402 7.420 1.568 No 
8.442 0.223 1.928 0.877 0.395 71.276 1.760 No 
5.075 0.064 1.309 0.617 0.203 25.751 1.423 No 
6.001 -0.007 -0.278 0.735 0.093 36.015 1.483 No 
3.901 0.184 1.414 0.655 0.407 15.217 1.229 Inconclusive 
1.616 0.043 0.579 0.225 0.242 2.611 2.084 No 
5.611 0.126 1.430 0.663 0.368 31.48 1.742 No 
4.164 -0.072 -0.732 0.553 0.343 17.341 3.009 Negative auto-
correlation 
3.229 -0.212 -2.113 0.598 0.241 10.426 1.011 Inconclusive 
0.153 0.125 
(***) 
7.663 0.002 0.056 0.023 1.392 No 
2.037 0.070 1.184 0.242 0.123 4.148 1.601 No 
7.268 0.075 
(*) 
2.693 0.779 0.115 52.819 2.229 No 
0.291 0.169 1.202 0.017 0.255 0.085 2.397 No 
0.205 0.197 
(***) 
11.442 0.004 0.032 0.042 1.390 No 
 0.062  0.459      
 
Table 9.8: Results from the estimation of the firm-specific productivity-performance 
models 
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The analysis shows that the average coefficient of the firm-specific productivity-
performance models was 3.083 during the period 1983-2002. This means that every 
increase in productivity of 1% has caused a growth in net profit by 3.083%. Firms 
have therefore been able to make strategic use of their productivity increases. Of the 
118 firm-specific models, 79 showed a significant value of the productivity-
performance coefficient. When we only count the significant firm-specific models, 
the average value of the productivity-performance coefficient is 3.630. It is 
noteworthy that the productivity-performance coefficients vary greatly across firms: 
the coefficients range from –0.890 for Heijmans to 17.262 (!) for Van der Giessen. 
Again, when we only consider the significant firm-specific models, the productivity-
performance coefficients vary from 0.321 for Bank Mendes Gans to 17.262 for Van 
der Giessen. 
 
Our analysis also shows that, on average, firms simultaneously realized a positive 
value of the intercept of 0.062. This means that over this period firms increased their 
net profits independent of the rise in their productivity by 6.2%. Of the 118 firms, 27 
showed a significant value of the intercept. When we only count the firm-specific 
models with significant intercepts, the average value of the intercept is 0.157. It is 
noteworthy that the intercepts, too, vary greatly across firms: from a value of –1.575 
for Blydenstein-Willink to 0.551 for ASM Lithography. Again, when we only 
consider the firm-specific models with significant intercepts, the values of the 
intercepts vary from 0.058 for Schuitema to 0.551 for ASM Lithography. 
 
9.6.5 Estimation of the Verdoorn model for industries 
The estimations of the Verdoorn model for the 13 industries in our sample are 
provided in table 9.9 below. Note that this table is spread over two pages, the left 
page covering the first seven columns and the right page the last seven columns. 
 
The analysis shows that the average Verdoorn coefficient for the industry models 
based on pooled firm-level data was 0.399 during the period 1983-2002. This means 
that every increase in output of 1% has caused a growth in productivity by 0.399%. 
The values found are in accordance with the values found in previous research, e.g., 
by Verdoorn (1949) himself, by Kaldor (1966), by Kennedy (1971), by Vaciago 
(1975), by Stoneman (1979) or by De Vries (1985). We can therefore say that firms 
in these industries have realized scale effects and autonomous learning effects 
because their output has increased over time. All of the 13 industry models showed a 
significant value for the Verdoorn coefficient. It is noteworthy that the Verdoorn 
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coefficients vary greatly across industries, though considerably less so than across 
firms. The industry coefficients range from 0.100 for IT Services to 0.672 for Basic 
Industry. 
 
Our analysis also shows that for the industry models based on pooled firm-level data, 
on average, firms showed a slightly negative value of the intercept of -0.003. This 
means that over the period of analysis firms in these industries were confronted with 
an average decline in productivity by 0.3%. This result differs only slightly from our 
findings on the firm-specific models in section 9.6.3. The difference is probably due 
to the aggregation of firms into industry-level analysis. The decline is caused by the 
relative inability of firms to realize induced and exogenous learning effects. Of the 
13 industries, 3 showed a significant value of the intercept. When we only count the 
industry-specific models with significant intercepts, the average value of the intercept 
is –0.038. This result is in line with the findings on the firm-specific models in 
section 9.6.3. The intercepts vary greatly across industries, ranging from –0.041 for 
Other Business Services to 0.024 for Media. Both values are significant. 
 
In tables 9.10, 9.11 and 9.12 below, we present the corrections on the Verdoorn 
coefficient and the constant term due to changes in the capital-labor ratio and the 
corrections on the Verdoorn coefficient due to the changes in the capital-output ratios 
for a number of industries. Note that, although in principle these corrections can be 
made, the parameter estimates needed to make them were nonsignificant for some 
industries. Below we only present those corrections where the necessary parameter 
estimates were significant.90 
 
As can be seen in table 9.10, the rise in capital-labor ratio causes moderate, i.e., 
0.072 for Construction Industry, to high, i.e., 0.697 for Basic Industry, downward 
corrections on the Verdoorn coefficients of the industries involved. As there were 
nine industries with a non-constant capital-labor ratio, and for eight of these can we 
make corrections to the Verdoorn coefficient, this result significantly affects the 
general results of our industry-specific Verdoorn law analysis. The average Verdoorn 
coefficient for the industry models based on pooled firm-level data goes from 0.399 
in the original estimations to 0.231 in the corrected estimations i.e., from values that 
are close to those found by Verdoorn (1949), to values that are close to those found 
by Fase & Van den Heuvel (1988). The variation in coefficients goes from 0.100 for 
IT Services and 0.672 for Basic Industry in the original estimations to –0.304 for 
Retail and 0.652 for Telecommunications in the corrected estimations. 
                                                          
90 For the complete tables, including the nonsignificant parameter estimates, see Appendix V. 
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Industry name Total 
number of 
obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of obser-
vations 
No. of 
obser-
vations in 
model 
Deleted 
no. of 
obser-
vations 
Unstan-
dardized 
beta 
T-value 
of beta 
Basic industry 232 232 226 6 0.672 
(***) 
17.268 
Food industry 140 140 131 9 0.322 
(***) 
6.056 
Media 105 104 95 9 0.177 
(**) 
2.719 
Engineering industry 241 241 226 15 0.261 
(***) 
7.468 
Construction industry 158 158 145 13 0.234 
(***) 
5.967 
Wholesale 215 215 207 8 0.346 
(***) 
7.951 
Transport 134 134 126 8 0.566 
(***) 
8.552 
Telecommunications 36 25 17 8 0.652 
(**) 
3.354 
Financial services 224 217 209 8 0.606 
(***) 
16.981 
IT services 96 96 83 13 0.100 
(**) 
2.916 
Other business services 120 120 117 3 0.449 
(***) 
8.313 
Retail 147 147 128 19 0.297 
(***) 
4.024 
Electronics industry 99 96 85 11 0.511 
(***) 
11.600 
Averages 150 148 138 10 0.399   
Significance at the 5% level is indicated by (*), at the 1% level by (**) and at the 0.1% level by 
(***) 
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Constant 
term 
 
 
T-value of 
constant 
term 
R 
square 
Standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-statistic Durbin-
Watson 
coefficient 
Result of test for 
autocorrelation 
0.008 1.132 0.571 0.103 298.187 2.059 No 
0.003 0.476 0.221 0.067 36.670 1.739 No 
0.024 
(*) 
2.287 0.074 0.079 7.393 2.024 No 
-0.002 -0.334 0.199 0.084 55.770 1.953 No 
0.004 0.621 0.199 0.064 35.604 2.054 No 
0.002 0.189 0.236 0.108 63.223 1.931 No 
-0.001 -0.079 0.371 0.101 73.135 2.004 No 
0.008 0.291 0.429 0.091 11.252 1.805 No 
-0.021 
(*) 
-1.984 0.582 0.133 288.345 1.884 No 
0.000 0.004 0.095 0.086 8.506 2.113 No 
-0.041 
(**) 
-3.217 0.375 0.123 69.101 1.965 No 
-0.006 -0.557 0.114 0.095 16.191 1.940 No 
-0.018 -1.123 0.619 0.135 134.567 1.657 Inconclusive 
-0.003   0.314      
 
Table 9.9: Results from the estimation of the industry-specific Verdoorn models 
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Name initial  
coefficient 
(estimated 
b) 
alpha (α) 
(coefficient of 
change in 
capital) 
beta (β) 
(coefficient 
of change 
in labor) 
average 
growth of 
capital 
input 
average 
growth of 
labor input
delta 
(δ) 
correction on 
coefficient: 
phi (φ) 
corrected 
coefficient (b) 
Basic industry 0.672 0.399 0.484 0.026 0.008 3.386 0.697 -0.025 
Media 0.177 0.102 0.618 0.127 0.063 2.009 0.238 -0.061 
Engineering 
industry 
0.261 0.202 0.725 0.090 0.065 1.376 0.104 0.157 
Construction 
industry 
0.234 0.079 0.871 0.111 0.061 1.822 0.072 0.162 
Wholesale 0.346 0.279 0.596 0.081 0.062 1.307 0.169 0.177 
Financial 
services 
0.606 0.363 0.600 0.129 0.080 1.619 0.220 0.386 
Retail 0.297 0.321 0.352 0.080 0.064 1.250 0.601 -0.304 
Electronics 
industry 
0.511 0.476 0.745 0.158 0.087 1.826 0.084 0.427 
Table 9.10: Corrections on the Verdoorn coefficient for changes in the capital-labor 
ratio on the industry-specific Verdoorn models, based on significant estimates of the 
parameters 
 
Name initial 
constant 
term  
(estimated 
a) 
lambda (λ)  
(exogenous 
techno-
logical 
change) 
alpha (α) 
(coeffi-
cient of 
change 
in 
capital) 
beta (β) 
(coeffi-
cient of 
change in 
labor) 
average 
growth of 
capital 
input 
average 
growth of 
labor input
delta 
(δ) 
correction 
on 
constant 
term: 
zeta (ζ) 
corrected 
constant 
term (a) 
Basic industry nonsign. 0.032 0.399 0.484 0.026 0.008 3.386 -0.049 n.a. 
Media 0.024 0.052 0.102 0.618 0.127 0.063 2.009 -0.021 0.045 
Engineering 
industry 
nonsign. 0.018 0.202 0.725 0.090 0.065 1.376 -0.007 n.a. 
Construction 
industry 
nonsign. 0.023 0.079 0.871 0.111 0.061 1.822 -0.004 n.a. 
Wholesale nonsign. 0.032 0.279 0.596 0.081 0.062 1.307 -0.020 n.a. 
Financial 
services 
-0.021 0.057 0.363 0.600 0.129 0.080 1.619 -0.047 0.026 
Retail nonsign. 0.027 0.321 0.352 0.080 0.064 1.250 -0.041 n.a. 
Table 9.11: Corrections on the constant term for changes in the capital-labor ratio 
on the industry-specific Verdoorn models, based on significant estimates of the 
parameters 
 
As can be seen in table 9.11, the rise in capital-labor ratio causes small, i.e., -0.004 
for Construction Industry, to substantial, i.e., -0.049 for Basic Industry, upward 
corrections on the constant term for the industries involved. As there were nine 
industries with a non-constant capital-labor ratio, for seven of these can we calculate 
the correction, and for two of these can we present a corrected constant term, this 
result significantly affects the general results of our industry-specific Verdoorn law 
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analysis. The average value of the constant term for the industry models based on 
pooled firm-level data goes from –0.003 in the original estimations to 0.002 in the 
corrected estimations, which is a change in the sign of the constant term, meaning 
that firms in these industries were on average able to realize induced and exogenous 
learning effects. Counting only the significant models, the variation in constant terms 
goes from –0.041 for Other Business Services and 0.024 for Media in the original 
estimations to –0.041 for Other Business Services and 0.045 for Media in the 
corrected estimations. 
 
Name initial  
coefficient 
(estimated 
b) 
alpha (α) 
(coefficient of 
change in 
capital) 
beta (β) 
(coefficient 
of change 
in labor) 
average 
growth of 
capital 
input 
average 
growth of 
output 
gamma 
(γ) 
correction on 
coefficient: 
thèta (θ) 
corrected 
coefficient (b) 
Construction 
industry 
0.234 0.079 0.871 0.111 0.085 1.301 0.027 0.207 
Table 9.12: Corrections on the Verdoorn coefficient for changes in the capital-output 
ratio on the industry-specific Verdoorn models, based on significant estimates of the 
parameters 
 
As can be seen in table 9.12, the rise in capital-output ratio causes only a small 
downward correction on the Verdoorn coefficient for the Construction Industry. As 
this was the only industry with a non-constant capital-output ratio, this result does 
not greatly affect the general results of our industry-specific Verdoorn law analysis. 
 
9.6.6 Estimation of the productivity-performance model for industries 
The estimations of the productivity-performance model for the 13 industries in our 
sample are provided in table 9.13 on the next pages. Note that this table is spread 
over two pages, the left page covering the first seven columns and the right page the 
last seven columns. 
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Industry name Total 
number 
of obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of obser-
vations 
No. of 
obser-
vations in 
model 
Deleted 
no. of 
obser-
vations 
Unstan-
dardized 
beta 
T-value 
of beta 
Basic industry 232 198 187 11 4.086 
(***) 
12.811 
Food industry 140 140 130 10 1.535 
(***) 
7.953 
Media 105 102 96 6 1.738 
(***) 
6.952 
Engineering industry 241 231 218 13 2.900 
(***) 
9.575 
Construction industry 158 147 136 11 1.221 
(**) 
3.160 
Wholesale 215 204 190 14 3.484 
(***) 
13.725 
Transport 134 121 109 12 4.760 
(***) 
9.814 
Telecommunications 36 22 19 3 0.475 0.682 
Financial services 224 211 205 6 1.638 
(***) 
20.704 
IT services 96 89 76 13 2.819 
(***) 
4.811 
Other business 
services 
120 111 97 14 2.496 
(***) 
4.743 
Retail 147 140 124 16 1.983 
(***) 
7.392 
Electronics industry 99 82 66 16 3.812 
(***) 
9.941 
Averages 149 138 127 11 2.534   
Significance at the 5% level is indicated by (*), at the 1% level by (**) and at the 0.1% level by 
(***) 
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Constant 
term 
 
 
T-value of 
constant 
term 
R square Standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-statistic Durbin-
Watson 
coefficient 
Result of test for 
autocorrelation 
-0.073 -1.776 0.470 0.559 164.128 1.791 No 
0.079 
(***) 
5.316 0.331 0.165 63.244 2.085 No 
0.071 
(*) 
2.469 0.340 0.267 48.326 1.823 No 
0.084 
(**) 
3.145 0.298 0.388 91.686 1.930 No 
0.125 
(***) 
4.778 0.069 0.275 9.985 1.934 No 
0.072 
(*) 
2.511 0.501 0.389 188.380 2.010 No 
0.102 1.699 0.474 0.626 96.315 1.920 No 
0.164 1.824 0.027 0.331 0.465 1.347 Inconclusive 
0.089 
(***) 
5.150 0.679 0.240 428.636 1.921 No 
0.205 
(***) 
4.686 0.238 0.364 23.141 1.788 No 
0.105 
(**) 
2.783 0.191 0.363 22.500 2.224 No 
0.053 1.825 0.309 0.320 54.642 2.083 No 
0.019 0.339 0.607 0.457 98.819 2.145 No 
0.084   0.349      
 
Table 9.13: Results from the estimation of the industry-specific productivity-
performance models 
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The analysis shows that the average coefficient of the productivity-performance for 
the industry models based on pooled firm-level data was 2.534 during the period 
1983-2002. This means that every increase in productivity by 1% has caused a 
growth in net profit by 2.534%. Firms in these industries have therefore been able to 
make strategic use of their productivity increases. Of the 13 industries, 12 showed a 
significant value of the productivity-performance coefficient. When we only count 
the significant industry-specific models, the average value of the productivity-
performance coefficient is 2.706. It is noteworthy that the productivity-performance 
coefficients vary greatly across industries, through less so than across firms. The 
coefficients vary from –0.475 for Telecommunications to 4.086 for Basic Industry. 
Again, when we only consider the significant industry-specific models, the 
coefficients vary from 1.221 for Construction Industry to 4.086 for Basic Industry. 
 
Our analysis also shows that, for the industry models based on pooled firm-level 
data, on average firms realized a positive value of the intercept of 0.084. This means 
that over this period firms in these industries increased their net profits independent 
of the rise in their productivity by 8.4%. Of the 13 industries, 8 showed a significant 
value of the intercept. When we only count the industry-specific models with 
significant intercepts, the average value of the intercept is 0.104. The intercepts vary 
across industries, though considerably less so than across firms. The values of the 
intercept vary from –0.073 for Basic Industry to 0.205 for IT Services. Again, when 
we only consider the models with significant intercepts, the values of the intercept 
vary from 0.071 for Media to 0.205 for IT Services. 
 
9.6.7 Estimation of the Verdoorn model for the entire population 
The estimation of the Verdoorn model for the entire population is provided in table 
9.14 below. Note that this table is spread over two pages, the left page covering the 
first seven columns and the right page the last seven columns. 
 
 Total 
number of 
obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of obser-
vations 
No. of 
obser-
vations in 
model 
Deleted 
no. of 
obser-
vations 
Unstan-
dardized 
beta 
T-value 
of beta 
All firms 1947 1925 1860 65 0.476 
(***) 
36.195 
Significance at the 5% level is indicated by (*), at the 1% level by (**) and at the 0.1% level by 
(***) 
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The analysis shows that the Verdoorn coefficient for the total population model 
based on pooled firm-level data was 0.476 (p<0.001) during the period 1983-2002. 
This means that every increase in output of 1% has caused a growth in productivity 
by 0.476%. Firms in the population have therefore realized scale effects and 
autonomous learning effects because their output has increased over time. The value 
found is in accordance with previous research (e.g., Verdoorn, 1949; Kaldor, 1966; 
Kennedy, 1971; Vaciago, 1975; Stoneman, 1979; De Vries, 1985). 
 
Our analysis also shows that, for the total population model based on pooled firm-
level data, firms were simultaneously confronted with a negative value of the 
intercept of -0.014 (p<0.001). This means that over this period firms in the 
population were confronted with an average decline in productivity by 1.4%. This 
decline is caused by the relative inability of firms to realize induced and exogenous 
learning effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constant 
term 
 
 
T-value of 
constant 
term 
R 
square 
Standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-statistic Durbin-
Watson 
coefficient 
Result of test for 
autocorrelation 
-0.014 
(***) 
-4.279 0.414 0.172 1310.078 1.923 Inconclusive  
 
Table 9.14: Result from the estimation of the Verdoorn model on the total population 
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We present the corrections on the Verdoorn coefficient and the constant term due to 
the change in the capital-labor ratio and the correction on the Verdoorn coefficient 
due to the change in the capital-output ratio for the model on the total population in 
tables 9.15, 9.16 and 9.17 below. 
 
Name initial  
coefficient 
(estimated 
b) 
alpha (α) 
(coefficient of 
change in 
capital) 
beta (β) 
(coefficient 
of change 
in labor) 
average 
growth of 
capital 
input 
average 
growth of 
labor input
delta 
(δ) 
correction on 
coefficient: 
phi (φ) 
corrected 
coefficient (b) 
Total population 0.476 0.257 0.591 0.103 0.071 1.443 0.218 0.258 
Table 9.15: Correction on the Verdoorn coefficient for the change in the capital-
labor ratio on the Verdoorn model on the total population (based on significant 
estimates of the parameters) 
 
As can be seen in table 9.15, the rise in capital-labor ratio causes a considerable, i.e., 
0.218, downward correction on the Verdoorn coefficient. The average Verdoorn 
coefficient for the model on the total population based on pooled firm-level data goes 
from 0.476 in the original estimation to 0.258 in the corrected estimation, i.e., from a 
value that is close to that found by Verdoorn (1949), to a value that is closer to that 
found by Fase & Van den Heuvel (1988). 
 
Name initial 
constant 
term  
(estimated 
a) 
lambda (λ)  
(exogenous 
techno-
logical 
change) 
alpha (α) 
(coeffi-
cient of 
change 
in 
capital) 
beta (β) 
(coeffi-
cient of 
change in 
labor) 
average 
growth of 
capital 
input 
average 
growth of 
labor input
delta 
(δ) 
correction 
on 
constant 
term: 
zeta (ζ) 
corrected 
constant 
term (a) 
Total population -0.014 0.036 0.257 0.591 0.103 0.071 1.443 -0.023 0.009 
Table 9.16: Correction on the constant term for the change in the capital-labor ratio 
on the Verdoorn model on the total population (based on significant estimates of the 
parameters) 
 
As can be seen in table 9.16, the rise of the capital-labor ratio causes a substantial, 
i.e., -0.023 upward correction on the constant term. The value of the constant term 
for total population model based on pooled firm-level data goes from –0.014 in the 
original estimations to 0.009 in the corrected estimations, which is a change in the 
sign of the constant term, meaning that firms were on average able to realize induced 
and exogenous learning effects. 
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Name initial  
coefficient 
(estimated 
b) 
alpha (α) 
(coefficient of 
change in 
capital) 
beta (β) 
(coefficient 
of change 
in labor) 
average 
growth of 
capital 
input 
average 
growth of 
output 
gamma 
(γ) 
correction on 
coefficient: 
thèta (θ) 
corrected 
coefficient (b) 
Total population 0.476 0.257 0.591 0.103 0.104 0.986 -0.006 0.482 
Table 9.17: Correction on the Verdoorn coefficient for the change in the capital-
output ratio on the Verdoorn model on the total population (based on significant 
estimates of the parameters) 
 
As can be seen in table 9.17, the rise in capital-output ratio causes a small upward 
correction on the Verdoorn coefficient. This result does not greatly affect the general 
results of the Verdoorn law analysis for the total population. 
 
9.6.8 Estimation of the productivity-performance model for the entire population 
The estimations of the productivity-performance relationship for the entire 
population are provided in table 9.18 below. Note that this table is spread over two 
pages, the left page covering the first seven columns and the right page the last seven 
columns. 
 
The analysis shows that the productivity-performance coefficient for the total 
population model based on pooled firm-level data was 3.493 (p<0.001) during the 
period 1983-2002. This means that every increase in productivity of 1% has caused a 
growth in net profit by 3.493%. Firms in the population have therefore been able to 
make strategic use of their productivity increases. 
 
Our analysis also shows that for the total population model based on pooled firm-
level data, firms on average realized a positive value of the intercept of 0.028. This 
means that over this period firms in the population increased their net profits 
independent of the rise in their productivity by 2.8%. This value is nonsignificant, 
however. 
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 Total 
number of 
obser-
vations 
Valid 
number 
of obser-
vations 
No. of 
obser-
vations in 
model 
Deleted 
no. of 
obser-
vations 
Unstan-
dardized 
beta 
T-value 
of beta 
All firms 1947 1798 1767 31 3.493 
(***) 
28.250 
Significance at the 5% level is indicated by (*), at the 1% level by (**) and at the 0.1% level by 
(***) 
 
 
 
9.6.9 Results of the estimations of the Verdoorn model 
The results of the estimation of the Verdoorn model for individual firms provide 
partial support for hypothesis H3, because for 68.6% (81 out of 118) of the firms 
there is a positive and significant relationship between the potential for scale and 
learning effects and the realization of scale effects and autonomous learning effects. 
Only for 13.6% (16 out of 118) of the firms is there a significant relationship 
between the potential for scale and learning effects and the realization of induced and 
exogenous learning effects, and this relationship is on average negative. 
 
The results of the estimation of the Verdoorn model for industries also provide partial 
support for hypothesis H3, because for all industries (100%) there is a positive and 
significant relationship between the potential for scale and learning effects and the 
realization of scale and autonomous learning effects. For 3 out of 13 industries 
(23.1%) there is a significant relationship between the potential for scale and learning 
effects and the realization of induced and exogenous learning effects. However, this 
relationship is on average negative. 
 
The result of the estimation of the Verdoorn model for the entire populations 
provides support for hypothesis H3, because there is a positive and significant 
relationship between the potential for scale and learning effects and the realization of 
scale and autonomous learning effects. There is a negative and significant 
relationship, however, between the potential for scale and learning effects and the 
realization of induced and exogenous learning effects. 
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Constant 
term 
 
 
T-value of 
constant 
term 
R 
square 
Standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-statistic Durbin-
Watson 
coefficient 
Result of test for 
auto-correlation 
0.028 1.284 0.311 0.892 798.088 2.120 Negative auto-
correlation 
 
Table 9.18: Results from the estimation of the productivity-performance model on the 
total population 
 
9.6.10 Results of the estimations of the productivity-performance model 
The results of the estimation of the productivity-performance model for individual 
firms provide partial support for hypothesis H5, because for 66.9% (79 out of 118) of 
the firms there is a positive and significant relationship between the realization of 
scale and learning effects and firm performance. The positive values of the intercept, 
significantly so for 22.9% or 27 out of 118 firms, provide an indication that net profit 
is probably co-determined by variables that are not included in our model. 
 
The results of the estimation of the productivity-performance model for industries 
provide partial support for hypothesis H5, because for 12 out of 13 (92.3%) of the 
industries there is a positive and significant relationship between the realization of 
scale and learning effects and firm performance. The positive values of the intercept, 
significantly so for 61.5% or 8 out of 13 industries, provide an indication that net 
profit is probably co-determined by variables that are not included in our model. 
 
The result of the estimation of the productivity-performance model for the entire 
population provides support for hypothesis H5, because for the model of the entire 
population there is a positive and significant relationship between the realization of 
scale and learning effects and firm performance. The positive, but nonsignificant 
value of the intercept provides a possible indication that net profit is probably co-
determined by variables that are not included in our model. 
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9.7 Conclusions 
The following can be concluded from the results of the third empirical study, an 
analysis of the Verdoorn law and the productivity-performance relationship for 118 
firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. 
 
For our purpose, i.e., investigating the firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns, 
the Verdoorn law is the most adequate model to measure the extent to which firms 
are able to realize scale and learning effects from the potential for scale and learning 
effects. 
 
Analogous to the Verdoorn law, we developed a second model, measuring the extent 
to which firms are able to exploit the realization of scale and learning effects to 
realize improvements in their performance. 
 
For our model of the Verdoorn law, the interpretation of the parameter estimates is 
that the Verdoorn coefficient is the extent to which firms are able to realize scale 
effects and autonomous learning effects from the potentential for scale and learning 
effects and the constant term is the extent to which firms are able to realize induced 
and exogenous learning effects from the potentential for scale and learning effects. 
 
For our model of the productivity-performance relationship, the interpretation of the 
parameter estimates is that the coefficient is the extent to which firms are able to 
increase their performance through the realization of scale and learning effects and 
the constant term is the extent to which firms are able to increase their performance 
independent of the realization of scale and learning effects. 
 
This empirical study addressed hypotheses H3 and H5. Both models, the Verdoorn 
relationship and the productivity performance relationship, have been estimated for 
individual firms, for industries and for the entire sample of firms. The results support 
both hypothesis H3 and hypothesis H5. See table 9.19 below. 
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Research hypotheses: Result: 
H1 The larger the social interaction effects, the larger the network 
effects 
Not tested 
H2a The larger the network effects, the larger the potential for scale 
and learning effects 
Not tested 
H2b The larger the social interaction effects, the larger the potential for 
scale and learning effects 
Not tested 
H3 The larger the potential for scale and learning effects, the higher 
the realization of scale and learning effects 
Partially 
supported 
H4 The higher the realization of scale and learning effects, the higher 
the level of product performance 
Not tested 
H5 The higher the realization of scale and learning effects, the higher 
the level of organizational performance 
Partially 
supported 
H6 The higher the level of product performance, the higher the level of 
organizational performance 
Not tested 
Table 9.19: Results on the research hypotheses 
 
The most noticeable results from the firm-level estimation of the Verdoorn law are as 
follows. First, we found positive values of the Verdoorn coefficient, of, on average, 
between 0.399 and 0.542, depending on whether the model was estimated for 
individual firms, for industries or for the total population. These values are in 
accordance with values found in previous empirical research into the Verdoorn law at 
the industry, region or country level. The positive Verdoorn coefficient indicates that 
firms are in general able to realize scale effects and autonomous learning effects. The 
average value of the Verdoorn coefficient for firms does not tell the entire story 
however, because (1) for the firm-specific models, the variance in values between 
firms seems to be considerable, with values ranging from –0.799 to 2.451 and (2) for 
the industry-specific models and the model for the total population substantial 
corrections for changes in the capital-labor and capital-output ratios have to be made, 
resulting in substantially lower average values of the coefficient of between 0.231 
and 0.258. This means that (1) the variance in values found is rather high, which 
should not come as a surprise, however, because the variance at the firm level may be 
expected to be higher than the variance at the industry, regional or country level and, 
(2) the corrected average values found are somewhat below those generally found in 
previous research. This may mean that the Verdoorn law has become somewhat 
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weaker in the past twenty years than it was during the 1950’s to 1970’s, the period 
that is reported on by, e.g., Kaldor (1966), Kennedy (1971), Vaciago (1975) or De 
Vries (1985). 
 
A second noticeable result is that we found slightly negative values for the constant 
term, of, on average, between –0.003 and –0.014, depending on whether the model 
was estimated for individual firms, for industries or for the entire population. This 
means that firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange are on average unable to 
realize induced and exogenous learning effects. Here, too, however, the variance 
between firms is considerable, with values ranging from –0.185 to 0.045, and the 
corrections due to changes in the capital-labor ratio cause the sign of the average 
constant term to switch from slightly negative to slightly positive, i.e., to between 
0.002 and 0.009. 
 
The first noticeable result from the estimations of the productivity-performance 
relationship are the large positive values of the coefficient, of, on average, between 
2.534 and 3.493, depending on whether the model was estimated for individual firms, 
for industries or for the entire population. The large positive coefficient indicates that 
firms are generally able to exploit their realization of scale and learning effects to 
increase their performance. The average value of the coefficient for firms does not 
tell the entire story, however, because the variance in values between firms seems to 
be considerable, with values ranging from 0.321 to 17.262 (!). Although extreme 
values of the coefficient are nowhere in contradiction with the theory, they may be an 
indication of a possible problem with the validity of the model for that specific firm. 
 
A second noticeable result is that we found, on average, small positive values for the 
constant term, of between 0.028 and 0.084, depending on whether the model was 
estimated for individual firms, for industries or for the entire population. This means 
that firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange are generally able to increase 
their net profits partly independent of the rise in their productivity. This means that 
there are probably other variables, not included in our model, that influence firm 
performance. Here, too, however, the variance between firms is considerable, with 
values ranging from –1.575 to 0.551. 
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10. CONCLUSIONS, MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS AND 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
In this final chapter, we present the conclusions drawn from the research. In this 
thesis, we have made four contributions to the existing theory and research on 
increasing returns. 
1. We further developed increasing returns theory from a management 
perspective, addressing the four mechanisms of increasing returns, i.e., 
network effects, social interaction effects, scale effects and learning effects, 
and their interrelations following the structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm, in an integral way. 
2. We developed tools allowing us to measure the mechanisms of increasing 
returns, i.e., we developed a questionnaire with valid constructs for 
measuring network effects and social interaction effects and we 
conceptualized the firm-level Verdoorn law to measure scale and learning 
effects. 
3. We performed three empirical studies into the relationships between the 
different mechanisms of increasing returns and into the relationship between 
the mechanisms of increasing returns and the performance of firms. The 
outcomes of these studies provide confidence in the developed measurement 
tools and in general confirm the hypothesized research framework. 
4. In doing the three things listed above, we have provided a reliable 
framework that can be used to help managers understand the presence of 
increasing returns in their markets and their firms, allowing them to take 
conscious management actions based upon the consequences of this 
presence and to increase the performance of their products and their firms. 
 
We address the conclusions drawn from the research presented in this thesis 
according to the central problem and the research questions in section one. In section 
two we address the limitations of the research and we make suggestions for further 
research to overcome these limitations. Finally, in section three we address the 
management implications to be drawn from the research and we make suggestions 
for further research based on these management implications. 
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10.1 Conclusions from the research 
The central problem of this thesis was: 
 
What is the effect of market-based mechanisms of increasing returns on 
firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns and what is their joint effect 
on firm performance? 
 
Drawing conclusions from the research we can provide the following set of answers 
to this problem. First, we found evidence that the presence of the market-based 
mechanisms of increasing returns positively and significantly influences the presence 
of the firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns. Second, we found ample 
evidence that presence of the firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns positively 
and significantly influences firm performance. Third, we found no evidence for a 
direct influence of the presence of market-based mechanisms of increasing returns on 
firm performance. We conclude that, in the presence of market-based mechanisms of 
increasing returns, better firm performance is only achieved through the 
internalization and exploitation of the firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns. 
 
Below, we discuss these conclusions in more detail following the order of the 
research questions as presented in section 1.3. 
 
10.1.1 How can market-based and firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns be 
theoretically specified and defined? 
A theoretical specification and definition of increasing returns was given in the 
theoretical part of this thesis. An introduction to, and a systematic study of, the 
literature in chapters two and three showed that four generic increasing returns 
mechanisms can be distinguished: (1) network effects, (2) social interaction effects, 
(3) scale effects and, (4) learning effects. Of these mechanisms, social interaction 
effects and network effects are market-based and scale effects and learning effects 
are firm-based. The common denominator of mechanisms is the possibility of each 
one to bring about a positive feedback effect. We therefore defined increasing returns 
as: 
 
Positive feedback effects in markets and firms 
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The two market-based increasing returns mechanisms, namely network effects and 
social interaction effects, were theoretically specified in chapter four. Network 
effects occur when the economic utility to an economic agent of using a product or 
technology becomes larger as its network of users grows in size. The network effect 
may set in motion a positive feedback loop that will cause a product or technology to 
become more prevalent in the market. Social interaction effects occur when an 
economic agent’s preference for a product or technology is dependent upon the 
opinions or expectations of other economic agents. The social interaction effect may 
set in motion a positive feedback loop that will cause agents to expect that a certain 
product or technology will become more prevalent in the market. Increased 
prevalence of a product or a technology will result in a market potential, to be 
exploited by the firms that are best able to internalize this potential. 
 
The two firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns, namely scale effects and 
learning effects, were specified theoretically in chapter five. Scale effects occur when 
there is a positive static relationship between the size of output of a firm and its 
productivity. This is reflected in a downward slope of the firm’s average total cost 
curve. Scale effects may set in motion a positive feedback loop when the firm can 
convert the cost advantage acquired through large production volumes into 
increasing sales volumes. Learning effects imply that there is a positive dynamic 
relationship between the firm’s growth of output and its growth of productivity. This 
is reflected in a downward shift of the firm’s average total cost curve. Learning 
effects may set in motion a positive feedback loop when the firm can convert the cost 
advantage acquired from productivity growth into further output growth.  
 
The choice of the positive feedback definition means that to speak of increasing 
returns the positive feedback loop has to be closed. For firm-based increasing returns 
this means that, because of the presence of network effects and social interaction 
effects there may be a potential for scale effects and learning effects in the market 
but that this potential is not increasing returns as such. It only becomes so when these 
scale and learning effects are used by the firm in such a way that further cost 
improvements or further productivity growth become possible. According to this 
theoretical specification, we made an explicit distinction between the potential for 
scale and learning effects and the realization of scale and learning effects. 
 
The theoretical specification of increasing returns from a management perspective 
resulted in the following research model (see figure 10.1). 
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Figure 10-1: Research model 
 
Based on this research model, measurement models were constructed and the 
hypothesized relationships were studied empirically. 
 
10.1.2 How can market-based and firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns be 
measured? 
In the first, second and third empirical studies, chapters seven, eight and nine, 
respectively, instruments were developed for measuring the market-based and firm-
based mechanisms of increasing returns. In the first empirical study, subjective 
measures were developed for social interaction effects, for network effects, for the 
potential and the realization of scale and learning effects and for a number of 
influencing factors. These measures were developed and validated according to 
Churchill’s (1979) steps ‘for developing better measures of marketing constructs.’ It 
was concluded that network effects and social interaction effects can both be 
conceptualized as second-order constructs, each consisting of two first-order 
constructs at the product level and the technology level. Regarding scale and learning 
effects it turned out to be very difficult for respondents to differentiate between 
those. Therefore, we concluded that scale and learning effects could best be captured 
in a single construct, albeit distinguishing between the potential and the realization 
of scale and learning effects. Firm performance was measured using scales that were 
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adapted from Griffin & Page (1996), Naman & Slevin (1993) and Slater & Narver 
(1994). 
 
In the second empirical study, subjective and objective measurements were 
combined. The subjective scales for measuring network effects and social interaction 
effects were slightly adjusted for capturing the comparative static time frame of the 
study and were revalidated. The validity of these measures was confirmed and we 
may therefore conclude that these measures can be applied with confidence to 
measure network effects and social interaction effects. Objective measurements were 
developed for measuring the potential and realization of scale and learning effects 
and for measuring firm performance. We argued in chapter six that for practical 
measurement at the firm level it is almost impossible to differentiate between scale 
effects and learning effects. The potential for scale and learning effects was measured 
as the growth in firm output, the realization of scale and learning effects was 
measured as the growth in the firm’s labor productivity and firm performance was 
measured as the growth in the firm’s net profit. The data were closely scrutinized and 
corrected to ensure the validity of these measures. 
 
In the third empirical study, the objective measures from the second empirical study 
were further developed and made fit to be applied to the individual firm. To measure 
the extent to which individual firms are able to realize scale and learning effects from 
the potential for scale and learning effects, we conceptualized the Verdoorn law, a 
long-term linear relationship between the growth in output and the growth in labor 
productivity, for the firm level. Analogous to the Verdoorn law, we developed a 
model relating the growth of productivity to the growth of net profit, reflecting the 
extent to which firms are able to exploit realization of scale and learning effects to 
attain better firm performance. The data were closely scrutinized and corrected to 
ensure the validity of these measures. Corrections were made on the firm-level 
Verdoorn models for changes in the capital-labor and capital-output ratios. We 
conclude that these measures can be applied with confidence to measure the 
relationship between the potential and the realization of scale and learning effects 
and the relationship between the realization of scale and learning effects and firm 
performance, respectively. 
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10.1.3 What is the effect of market-based mechanisms of increasing returns on firm-
based mechanisms of increasing returns? 
This relationship was investigated in the first and second empirical studies. First it 
was established in both these studies that network effects and social interaction 
effects are present across industries. This is quite a surprising result, because 
following the increasing returns literature, e.g., Arthur (1996) and Economides 
(1996), we expected these effects to be much higher in the ‘high-tech’ or knowledge-
intensive industries. A possible explanation for the absence of the expected industry 
differences is that we are generally inclined to think of technology in terms of the 
current ‘high-tech’ industries and we tend to forget that many of the current ‘low-
tech’ industries are also strongly technology driven. For example, in our research, we 
have found dominant technologies for the pressing of plastic parts, for the extrusion 
of metal profiles, for the manufacturing of orthopedic shoes or for the configuration 
of central heating systems. In other words, the distinction between ‘high-tech’ and 
‘low-tech’, with the connotation that ‘high-tech’ will be dominated by increasing 
returns and ‘low-tech’ will not, may be illusory. 
 
Second, it was established in the first and second empirical studies that, within the 
market-based mechanisms of increasing returns, network effects are influenced by 
social interaction effects. The explanation for this may be that we defined, and 
measured, social interaction effects mainly in terms of expectations about products or 
technologies and network effects mainly in terms of actual behavior and that it is 
common sense that expectations will precede and influence actual behavior. It was 
found in the first empirical study that this relationship between social interaction 
effects and network effects is influenced by technological substitutability and by 
product complementarity and compatibility, and is stable for product substitutability, 
for technological complementarity and compatibility, for knowledge intensity of the 
product and for lock-in, market predictability and path dependence. 
 
Third, in the first and second empirical studies, we found evidence that social 
interaction effects and network effects positively and significantly influence the 
presence of a market potential for scale and learning effects. In the first empirical 
study we found no significant direct relationship between social interaction effects 
and the potential for scale and learning effects, but we did find a significant indirect 
relationship through the influence of network effects. In the second empirical study 
we found that the presence of network effects completely mediates the relationship 
between social interaction effects and the potential for scale and learning effects. It 
was found in the first empirical study that this relationship between (1) social 
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interaction effects and (2) network effects and the potential for scale and learning 
effects is stable for product and technological substitutability, for product and 
technological complementarity and compatibility, for the knowledge intensity of the 
product and for lock-in, market predictability and path dependence. 
 
With respect to our triangulation approach, we may conclude that the within-method 
triangulation of the first and second empirical studies increases our confidence in the 
existence of social interaction effects and network effects across industries, in the 
existence of a positive relationship between social interaction effects and network 
effects and in the existence of a positive relationship between (1) social interaction 
effects and (2) network effects and the potential for scale and learning effects. 
 
10.1.4 What is the joint effect of market-based and firm-based mechanisms of 
increasing returns on firm performance? 
In the first and second empirical studies we investigated the effect of the market-
based mechanisms of increasing returns on firm performance. No evidence was 
found in either study for a direct relationship between the presence of social 
interaction effect and network effects and firm performance. We therefore conclude 
that when a firm wants to achieve better performance in a market where social 
interaction effects and/or network effects are present, it can only do so through 
internalizing the potential for scale and learning effects and subsequently exploiting 
the realized potential. 
 
The relationships between the potential and the realization of scale and learning 
effects and between the realization of scale and learning effects and firm 
performance have been investigated in the first, second and third empirical studies. In 
every one of those studies we found evidence for significant and positive 
relationships between the potential and the realization of scale and learning effects 
and between the realization of scale and learning effects and firm performance. It 
was found in the first empirical study that this relationship between the potential and 
the realization of scale and learning effects is stable for product and technological 
substitutability, for product and technological complementarity and compatibility, 
and surprisingly, for knowledge intensity of the product. 
 
With respect to our triangulation approach, we may conclude that the within-method 
triangulation of the first and second empirical studies increases our confidence in the 
absence of the direct relationship between network and social interaction effects and 
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firm performance and increases our confidence in the existence of a positive 
relationship between the potential and the realization of scale and learning effects. 
The between-method triangulation approach of the first, second and third empirical 
studies also greatly increases our confidence in the existence of this latter 
relationship and in the positive relationship between the realization of scale and 
learning effects and firm performance. 
 
10.1.5 Summarizing the conclusions on the hypotheses 
The conclusions for the research hypotheses are summarized in table 10.1 below. 
 
Research hypotheses: 
 
First 
empirical 
study 
Second 
empirical 
study 
Third 
empirical 
study 
H1 The larger the social interaction effects, the 
larger the network effects 
Supported Supported Not tested 
H2a The larger the network effects, the larger the 
potential for scale and learning effects 
Supported Supported Not tested 
H2b The larger the social interaction effects, the 
larger the potential for scale and learning 
effects 
Not 
supported# 
Supported Not tested 
H3 The larger the potential for scale and 
learning effects, the higher the realization of 
scale and learning effects 
Supported Supported Partially 
supported 
H4 The higher the realization of scale and 
learning effects, the higher the level of 
product performance 
Supported Not tested Not tested 
H5 The higher the realization of scale and 
learning effects, the higher the level of 
organizational performance 
Supported Supported Partially 
supported 
H6 The higher the level of product performance, 
the higher the level of organizational 
performance 
Supported Not tested Not tested 
# There is, however, an indirect influence of social interaction effects on the potential for 
scale and learning effects through the support of hypotheses H1 and H2a 
Table 10.1: Summary of the results for the research hypotheses 
 
10.2 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
This thesis is limited by several factors that should be addressed in future research. 
These factors are discussed according to their relationship with the chosen basic 
research paradigm, with the chosen measurement tools and methods of analysis or 
with the results of the research. 
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10.2.1 Limitations and further research with regard to the choice of the research 
paradigm – theory of the firm 
First, we chose to mold the research around the structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm that was originally developed within industrial organization theory. This 
approach enabled us to focus the research and to root it in a recognized theoretical 
and empirical tradition, however, it limited the research, because the choice for the 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm implies that we take the developments in 
the market as the starting point of the analysis. For further research, it would 
therefore be interesting to study increasing returns and its implications for firm 
performance from a resource-based perspective, i.e., taking the firm as the starting 
point of the analysis. 
 
Second, we chose to include into the research only the primary relationships of the 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm, i.e., the relationship between market 
structure and firm conduct, the relationship between firm conduct and firm 
performance and, in the alternative research models tested in the first and second 
empirical studies, the relationship between market structure and firm performance. 
Further research should include the feedback loops between firm conduct and market 
structure and between firm performance and firm conduct and between firm 
performance and market structure. This will enable research into how firms can 
influence the direction and extent of the market-based mechanisms of increasing 
returns. In further research the dynamic aspects of increasing returns should also be 
taken into account, enabling more in-depth research into the dynamics of technology 
battles, of lock-in effects, of excess inertia and excess momentum, of path 
dependence and of the strategies of individual firms with respect to these issues.  
 
Third, in this thesis we used the structure-conduct-performance paradigm in a 
narrow definition, in the sense that we abstracted from public policy influences on 
market structure and firm conduct. As the famous legal cases between the United 
States and the European Union and some of the worlds’ largest software firms have 
shown, the presence of increasing returns mechanisms in markets and the behavior of 
firms in such markets may evoke strong legal and public reactions. These issues 
should be addressed in further research. 
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10.2.2 Limitations and further research with regard to the measurement tools and 
the methods of analysis 
With regard to the developed measurement tools and the methods of analysis chosen, 
the following limitations can be identified. 
 
First, in this thesis we used several newly developed measures to collect data from 
firms in different industries to test the hypotheses. In future research, the 
psychometric properties of the measures and the hypothesized relationships should 
be tested using other independent samples. 
 
The subjective data for this thesis were collected using the key informant approach, 
which precludes a thorough analysis of measurement error. In future research it 
would be useful to use multiple respondents at different positions within the 
organization. This will enable us to use more advanced modeling techniques to test 
the hypotheses. 
 
In the measurement of the subjective data we encountered problems with the 
validation of the constructs market predictability, product complementarity and 
compatibility, technological complementarity and compatibility and knowledge 
intensity of products. In future research the specification and the measurement of 
these constructs should be further addressed. In the measurement of the constructs of 
the potential of scale and learning effects and the realization of scale and learning 
effects we encountered the problem that (1) in the test phase respondents indicated 
that they were unable to distinguish between scale effects and learning effects, and 
hence we combined them in a single construct, but that (2) in the final questionnaire 
respondents nevertheless implicitly differentiated between scale effects and learning 
effects, through not enough to split them into separate constructs. This problem 
should be addressed in future research by re-specifying the constructs for measuring 
scale and learning effects. 
 
In the measurement of the objective data, we were also confronted with the practical 
difficulties of distinguishing between scale effects and learning effects. Managers 
participating in our pilot checks indicated an unwillingness to share the detailed 
financial information needed to perform distinct measurements of scale effects and 
learning effects, at least for large-scale research. This limitation may be overcome by 
conducting research on a smaller scale, e.g., through case studies, enabling detailed 
financial analysis of firms or business units. Such an approach did not fit the aims of 
this thesis, but might be used in future research. 
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In the first and second empirical studies, we conducted cross-sectional research based 
on static and comparative static research models, respectively. For future research, it 
would be interesting to follow individual firms or collections of firms longitudinally 
to address more in-depth the dynamic aspects of increasing returns and its 
consequences for the strategies of firms and to confirm the causal inferences made in 
the current empirical studies. 
 
In the third empirical study we chose to measure the relationship between output and 
productivity, i.e., between the potential and the realization of scale and learning 
effects, at the firm level. Zegveld (2000) performed a similar analysis using an 
adaptation of the Solow (1957) model to measure productivity increases at the firm 
level. For this study, however, we chose not to use the Solow model, but rather a 
firm-level specification of the Verdoorn law (Verdoorn, 1949; Kaldor, 1966). For 
future research it would be interesting to investigate the differences between the 
measurements based on the firm-level Verdoorn law and the firm-level Solow 
residual. 
 
In the second and third empirical studies we measured the relationships between the 
growth of output and the growth of productivity and between the growth of 
productivity and the growth of net profit representing the relationships between the 
potential and the realization of scale and learning effects and between the realization 
of scale and learning effects and firm performance. This choice of measurements 
implies that in our research the firm was considered to be a ‘black box’. Further 
research should enter this ‘black box’ and test our finding against substantive 
evidence, e.g., of the buildup of capabilities that enable a firm to internalize the 
potential for scale and learning effects or to exploit scale and learning effect. Here, 
too, a longitudinal research design would provide more in-depth insights into the 
process of how firms adapt to the presence of increasing returns.  
 
In this thesis we made no use of game-theoretic modeling, despite the fact that game 
theory is widely used in many theoretical contributions to the increasing returns 
literature. The reason for this was that with our research we aimed to deliver 
theoretically integrative and empirical contributions, rather than adding to the already 
extensive game-theoretical body of knowledge on increasing returns. Nevertheless it 
has been pointed out to us that using game-theoretic models, e.g., to conceptualize 
Conclusions, management implications and suggestions for further research 
368 
the directions of interaction effects between the different mechanisms of increasing 
returns, might be a challenging goal for future research.91 
 
Analogously, we paid limited attention to mathematical-economic analysis or 
increasing returns. Here, too, the reason was that we chose to focus on the integrative 
and empirical contribution rather than on delivering a contribution to the already 
extensive mathematical-economic body of knowledge on increasing returns. 
Nevertheless, the mathematical-economic aspects could be addressed in further 
research, especially with regard to further development of the firm-level Verdoorn 
model and its relationships with other productivity measurements. 
 
10.2.3 Limitations and further research with regard to the research results 
With regard to the results of the empirical studies, a number of limitations can be 
recognized. 
 
First, in this thesis we studied, among others, the following relationships: 
• the relationship between (1) social interaction effects and (2) network 
effects and the potential for scale and learning effects 
• the relationship between the potential and the realization of scale and 
learning effects 
• the relationship between the realization of scale and learning effects and 
firm performance 
 
It became clear from the values found from the estimations of these relationships that 
there must be other factors at the firm level and at the market level that also influence 
the potential of scale and learning effects, the realization of scale and learning effects 
and firm performance. We may think of market-level factors like, e.g., size and 
growth of the market, the number and size distribution of firms active in this market 
or the number and size distribution of customers active in this market. We may think 
of firm-level factors like, e.g., existing firm resources and capabilities, the speed with 
which firms can build resources and capabilities, existing levels of process efficiency 
and product differentiation or the quality of the firm’s management. Future research 
should address these factors and incorporate them into the research to achieve better 
specifications and stronger estimates for these relationships. 
 
                                                          
91 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer of the Strategic Management Journal for 
bringing this to our attention. 
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Second, in this thesis we only addressed influencing, i.e., moderating effects in the 
first empirical study by testing the stability of the relationships between social 
interaction effects and network effects, between (1) social interaction effects and (2) 
network effects and the potential for scale and learning effects and between the 
potential and the realization of scale and learning effects. In future research 
moderating effects these relationships and on other relationships in the model should 
be addressed more formally and in more detail. In future research, moderating effects 
should also be addressed for the relationships that were estimated on the basis of the 
financial measurements, i.e., on relationships studied in the second and third 
empirical studies. 
 
Third, in this thesis we only addressed a limited number of moderating variables, 
namely technological substitutability, technological complementarity and 
compatibility, product substitutability, product complementarity and compatibility, 
knowledge intensity of the product and lock-in, market predictability and path 
dependence. In the sections 4.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 many more variables were addressed 
that can be expected to moderate the relationships of our general research model. 
These moderating variables have not been addressed in this thesis, for two different 
reasons. The first and foremost reason was that addressing all these moderators fell 
outside the scope of our research, which was primarily aimed at measuring the 
mechanisms of increasing returns and empirically studying their interrelations and 
their relationships with firm performance. To do this, we started by studying the main 
relationships. Moderating relationships, however interesting, were a second priority. 
Nevertheless, in further research these moderators and their effects should be further 
explored. Specifically we think of the following variables: marginal gains of network 
size, conformity and individuality, degree and structure of economic interdependence 
and nature of the technology, addressed in section 4.3; the factors limiting the extent 
of scale effects and of learning effects, addressed in section 5.4; the firm’s strategies 
for internalizing the potential for scale and learning effects, addressed in section 5.5; 
the generic strategies for value creation, addressed in section 5.6. The second reason 
for not incorporating all possible moderators was that for some of these variables a 
preliminary analysis of the measurement model (not reported) showed a general lack 
of validity, specifically the variables with respect to the nature of the product, i.e., 
industrial or consumer product, product tangibility and product durability. The 
measurements of these variables should be properly addressed in future research. 
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10.3 Management implications 
Increasing returns is important for managers because it influences market outcomes 
and firm performance. Managers can not afford to ignore increasing returns; 
therefore, the research presented in this thesis has important implications for 
managers. 
 
10.3.1 Management framework 
We showed in the research that increasing returns exists in markets, in the forms of 
network effects and social interaction effects. This is important for managers because 
it means that their markets will function differently than conventional economic 
theory predicts: competition shifts from the product level to the technology network 
level, technology battles will emerge, in which the winner takes all, technologies 
may become locked in, markets may become less predictable, i.e., showing excess 
inertia or excess momentum, technology diffusion processes may become path 
dependent and it is not even assured that the best technology or the best firm will win 
the battle. These are disturbing implications, and firms will have to adjust their 
behavior to be able to survive.  
 
An important additional finding is that increasing returns is not something only found 
in the high-tech industries; it is found across industry sectors. Increasing returns is 
therefore not just a hype to be associated with the ‘new economy’, but rather 
something that every firm in every industry sector may encounter and may have to 
deal with.  
 
In the research we showed that these market-level implications create a market 
potential for scale and learning effects. It is up to individual firms to realize this 
potential. To do so, firms first have to internalize it, i.e., convert a market-level 
potential into a firm-level potential. Firms can do so by making the right strategic 
choices, e.g., by choosing a shaper or an adapter or a reserving the right to play 
strategy, by learning how to fight technology battles, by learning how to influence 
market expectations, by learning how to avoid lock-out situations, by competing at 
the network level and by exploiting their installed base. 
 
It was further shown in the research that firms could only profit from the presence of 
network effects and social interaction effects in the market by realizing scale and 
learning effects within the firm. Firms only realize scale and learning effects by 
closing the positive feedback loop, i.e., by using the productivity gains from scale 
Conclusions, management implications and suggestions for further research 
371 
and learning effects to improve their value proposition in the market in such a way 
that it results in a higher market share, a larger production volume, and therefore a 
larger potential for scale and learning effects. Firms can do this by further 
capitalizing on their strategy used to internalize the potential for scale and learning 
effects and by pursuing generic competitive strategy as described by Porter (1980; 
1985), e.g., cost-leadership, differentiation or focus. 
 
Finally, it was shown in the research that the firm’s ability to realize scale and 
learning effects, i.e., increasing productivity, is an important factor influencing firm 
performance. This performance improvement is part of the feedback loop described 
above: productivity advantages from scale and learning effects may be used to 
improve the firm’s product proposition in the market, causing higher sales, higher 
market share and higher contribution margins, i.e., better product performance; and 
to improve business processes and spread best practices throughout the organization, 
causing efficiency improvements and higher profitability, i.e., better firm 
performance. 
 
The implications of the above reasoning for managers are threefold. First, managers 
will have to understand the relationships between the different mechanisms of 
increasing returns, their influences on market outcomes and their influences on firm 
performance. Our research provides the building blocks for a framework that enables 
managers to do just so (see figure 10.2). 
 
Second, managers have to be able to recognize and identify the increasing returns 
sensitivity of their markets and their firms.  
 
Third, managers have to be able to act strategically upon the presence of increasing 
returns in their markets and firms and to exploit opportunities when they arise. 
Below, we discuss these two management implications and their consequences for 
further research. 
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Figure 10-2: Management framework 
 
10.3.2 Management implications and further research 
The second management implication is that managers have to be able to recognize 
and identify the increasing returns sensitivity of their markets and their firms. Our 
research provides a measurement tool in the form of a questionnaire that can be used 
to assist managers wit this task. In further research new tools and methods will have 
to be designed to enable managers to determine the increasing returns sensitivity of 
their markets and firms.  
 
Besides tools and methods, future research should address the way in which industry 
characteristics determine the increasing returns sensitivity of markets, i.e., the 
presence of network effects and social interaction effects. Examples of industry 
characteristics that may be of influence on the presence of increasing returns in the 
market are size and growth of the market, the number and size distribution of firms 
active in this market and the number and size distribution of customers active in this 
market. Specifically, the influence of the degree and structure of economic 
interdependence on the extent of network effects and social interaction effects should 
be addressed in future research. In other words: How does the composition and 
structure of a business ecosystem, i.e., the collection of suppliers, vendors, partners 
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and customers in the market, influence the presence of increasing returns in the 
market? 
 
Analogous to industry characteristics, future research should address the way in 
which firm characteristics determine the increasing returns sensitivity of firms, i.e., 
the presence of scale effects and learning effects. Examples of firm characteristics 
that may be of influence on the presence of increasing returns in the firm are existing 
firm resources and capabilities, the speed with which firms can build resources and 
capabilities, existing levels of process efficiency and product differentiation and the 
quality of the firm’s management. Our research provides only a limited description of 
the market patterns that managers can use to recognize increasing returns in their 
markets. The characterization of such patterns and the management tools needed to 
detect them should be addressed in future research. 
 
The third management implication is that managers have to be able to act 
strategically upon the presence of increasing returns in their markets and firms and to 
exploit opportunities when they arise. They can only do so if the first and second 
implications have been fulfilled, i.e., if they understand increasing returns and if they 
are able to recognize and identify them. Our research provides the generic strategic 
actions firms can take to internalize the potential for scale and learning effects and to 
exploit scale and learning effects.  
 
Our research also provides measurement tools that managers can use to assess how 
successful they are in their strategic actions upon the presence of increasing returns, 
i.e., the firm-level Verdoorn law for measuring the success of internalizing the 
potential for scale and learning effects and the productivity-performance relationship 
for measuring the success of exploiting scale and learning effects. In further research, 
the possible strategic actions that firms can take to internalize the potential for scale 
and learning effects and to exploit scale and learning effects should be worked out in 
much more detail. Possible questions to be addressed are: How can firms internalize 
the market potential that stems from the presence of network and social interaction 
effects? How can firms optimally realize this potential? How can they convert the 
realized potential into superior performance and into sustainable competitive 
advantage? How can such an advantage be used to create a favorable starting position 
with regard to the next technology generation? 
 
These questions will have to be answered in different ways, depending on the type of 
strategy the firm chooses, i.e., a shaper or an adapter strategy. Important questions 
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are therefore why and when the firm should choose a shaper strategy and why and 
when the firm should choose an adapter strategy. The specific implications of the 
choice for an adapter strategy require further insight into questions like: How can a 
firm identify the current state of the market and determine the appropriate adaptation 
strategy? When does a technology reach sufficient critical mass to become the 
market standard? When should a firm enter the market? To what technological 
standard should the firm adapt? What resources should the firm acquire and what 
capabilities should it build on to ensure success? 
 
The specific implications of the choice for a shaper strategy require further insight 
into questions like: To what extent can the firm influence or set in motion the market-
based mechanisms of increasing returns? How can the firm influence the outcomes of 
these mechanisms and how can these outcomes be converted into firm-specific 
advantage? What resources should the firm acquire and what capabilities should it 
build on to ensure success? 
 
Besides these conceptualizations of firm strategies, there is also a need to test 
whether these strategies are indeed the determinant factors of firm success. 
Eventually, firms will not be satisfied with strategies to internalize and exploit 
existing increasing returns. Rather, managers of such firms will want to manage, or 
better: govern, the increasing returns mechanisms in the market to their own 
advantage. In future research therefore questions like: How can a firm influence its 
market structure in such a way that the diffusion of a new technology maximally 
enhances the firm’s performance? should be addressed. Analogous to this question, 
public policy makers may ask: How can government agencies or public-private 
partnerships influence the market structure in such a way that the diffusion of a new 
technology maximally enhances market efficiency or social welfare? 
 
10.3.3 Concluding 
We conclude from the research that increasing returns in markets and firms is an 
important factor determining firm success and failure. The success stories of firms 
that have won technology battles in increasing returns markets are well known. 
Examples are Microsoft with MS-DOS, MS-Windows, MS-Office and MS Internet 
Explorer, JVC with the VHS video system, Sony with the Playstation game console 
and Philips and Sony with the Compact Disc: the failures get little publicity. We 
should recognize that the mechanisms of increasing returns can bring increasing 
prosperity, but they can also bring increasing misery for firms that lose the 
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technology battle. Examples are Netscape with its Navigator web browser, Sony with 
its Betamax video system, Sega with its game console and Philips with its CD-
Interactive. Arthur (1996) even talks about the ‘casino of technology’, in which the 
mechanisms of increasing returns plus a large portion of luck and chance determine 
the very survival of the firm. This may give the impression that competing in 
increasing returns markets is like playing a game of Russian roulette, in which 
managers and their firms are at the mercy of erratic market forces. We think this is 
not the whole truth: we think that, provided that managers understand the 
mechanisms of increasing returns and their consequences, they are certainly capable 
of dealing with the challenges of competing in increasing returns markets. 
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APPENDIX I: ITEMS FROM THE QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN 
THE FIRST EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
A star (*) behind an item indicates that this item was not included in the final 
construct. 
 
Market-based mechanisms of increasing returns 
Product-related social interaction effects 
Instruction: please use the following scale to indicate the extent of your agreement 
about how well each of the following statements is an accurate description of the 
market that you serve with your primary product. Here: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree.  
 
In the market the attractiveness of our primary product will increase if: 
• it becomes known that opinion leaders among customers use this product 
• it becomes known that lead suppliers offer this product 
• it is expected that more customers will start to use this product 
• it is expected that more suppliers will start to offer this product 
 
Technology-related social interaction effects 
Instruction: please use the following scale to indicate the extent of your agreement 
about how well each of the following statements is an accurate description of the 
market that you serve with your primary product. Here: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree.  
 
In the market the attractiveness of our primary product’s technology will increase if: 
• it becomes known that opinion leaders among customers use products based 
on this product technology 
• it becomes known that lead suppliers offer products based on this product 
technology 
• it is expected that more customers will start to use products based on this 
product technology 
• it is expected that more suppliers will start to offer products based on this 
product technology 
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Product-related network effects 
Instruction: please use the following scale to indicate the extent of your agreement 
about how well each of the following statements is an accurate description of the 
market that you serve with your primary product. Here: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree.  
 
In the market the attractiveness of our product will increase if:  
• more customers use this product 
• more suppliers offer this product 
• more customers use complementary products 
• more suppliers offer complementary products 
 
Technology-related network effects 
Instruction: please use the following scale to indicate the extent of your agreement 
about how well each of the following statements is an accurate description of the 
market that you serve with your primary product. Here: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree.  
 
In the market the attractiveness of our primary product’s technology will increase if: 
• more customers use products based on this product technology 
• more suppliers offer products based on this product technology 
• more customers use complementary products based on this product 
technology 
• more suppliers offer complementary products based on this product 
technology 
 
Firm-based mechanisms of increasing returns 
Potential for scale and learning effects 
Instruction: realization of economies of scale means that through a higher sales 
volume in units your firm is able to: 
• lower the fixed costs per unit volume 
• lower the variable costs per unit volume 
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Realization of economies of learning means that your firm is able to increase 
efficiency through increasing knowledge and experience. Here: 1 = very low 
potential, 7 = very high potential.  
 
What is the potential for your primary product to:  
• realize economies of scale with regard to fixed costs? 
• realize economies of scale with regard to variable costs? 
• realize economies of learning? 
 
Realization of scale and learning effects 
Instruction: please use the following scale to indicate how well your firm utilizes the 
potential for economies of scale and learning. Here: 1 = very poor utilization, 7 = 
very good utilization. 
 
To what extent has your firm been able to utilize the potential for: 
• economies of scale with regard to fixed costs? 
• economies of scale with regard to variable costs? 
• economies of learning? 
 
Firm performance 
Product performance 
Instruction: please use the following scale to indicate the extent of your agreement 
about how well your primary product has performed on each of the performance 
indicators mentioned below. Here: 1 = very poor and 7 = very good. 
 
Product Performance: 
• customer acceptance (*) 
• customer satisfaction (*) 
• unit sales volume 
• sales growth 
• market share 
• contribution margin 
• price/quality ratio (*) 
• development costs (*) 
• integral cost price (*) 
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• product innovativeness (*) 
 
Organizational performance 
Instruction: please use the following scale to indicate the extent of your agreement 
about how well your firm has performed over the last year relative to competitors on 
each of the performance indicators mentioned below. Here: 1 = very much poorer 
and 7 = very much better. 
 
Organizational performance: 
• sales growth 
• market share 
• new product success 
• sales share new products, i.e., products introduced last 5 years 
• operational cash flow 
• profitability 
• ROI or IRR 
 
Moderators 
Product complementarity and compatibility 
Instruction: please use the following scale to indicate the extent of your agreement 
about the extent to which customers use your primary product and product 
technology together with complementary products? Here: 1 = very small extent and 7 
= very large extent. 
 
To what extent: 
• do customers use your primary product together with complementary 
products?  
• is your primary product compatible with complementary products? 
 
Technology complementarity and compatibility 
Instruction: please use the following scale to indicate the extent of your agreement 
about the extent to which your primary product and product technology is compatible 
with complementary products and product technologies. Here: 1 = very small extent 
and 7 = very large extent. 
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To what extent: 
• do customers use your product technology together with complementary 
product technologies? 
• is your product technology compatible with complementary product 
technologies? 
 
Path dependence 
Instruction: please use the following scale to indicate the extent of your agreement 
about how well each of the following statements is an accurate description of the 
market that you serve with your primary product. Here: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree. 
 
In the market where our primary product is traded: 
• the existing preferences of end users influence the future preferences of end 
users 
• the existing market share of a product influences the future market share of 
this product 
• the existing market share of a supplier influences the future market share of 
this supplier 
• the existing market share of a product technology influences the future 
market share of this product technology (*) 
 
Lock-in effects 
Instruction: please use the following scale to indicate the extent of your agreement 
about how well each of the following statements is an accurate description of the 
market that you serve with your primary product. Here: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree. 
 
In the market where our primary product is traded: 
• it is, in terms of time, money and effort, costly for end users to change 
between the products of different suppliers (*) 
• it is, in terms of time, money and effort, costly for end users to change 
between suppliers (*) 
• it is, in terms of time, money and effort, costly for end users to change 
between product technologies 
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• it is, in terms of time, money and effort, costly for suppliers to change 
between product technologies 
 
Product substitution effects 
Instruction: please use the following scale to indicate the extent of your agreement 
about how well each of the following statements is an accurate description of the 
market that you serve with your primary product. Here: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree.  
 
In the market where our primary product is traded: 
• end users consider the different products traded as substitutes, i.e., as equal 
alternatives 
• end users consider the different suppliers as substitutes, i.e., as equal 
alternatives 
 
Technology substitution effects 
Instruction: please use the following scale to indicate the extent of your agreement 
about how well each of the following statements is an accurate description of the 
market that you serve with your primary product. Here: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree.  
 
In the market where our primary product is traded: 
• end users consider the different product technologies as substitutes, i.e., as 
equal alternatives 
• suppliers consider the different product technologies as substitutes, i.e., as 
equal alternatives 
 
Market predictability 
Instruction: please use the following scale to indicate the extent of your agreement 
about how well each of the following statements is an accurate description of the 
market that you serve with your primary product. Here: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree. 
 
In the market where our primary product is traded: 
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• the market situation next year will be different from the market situation 
today (*) 
• the market developments are predictable 
• the technological developments are predictable 
 
Labor-capital-knowledge intensity 
A 7-point semantic differential scale was used for each of the characteristics. 
 
Instruction: the questions below relate to the primary product of your firm.  
 
One the scale below, where do you position your primary product with respect to the 
following characteristics: 
• labor intensive versus capital intensive product? (*) 
• capital intensive versus knowledge intensive product? 
• knowledge intensive versus labor intensive product? 
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APPENDIX II: ITEMS FROM THE QUESTIONNAIRE USED 
IN THE SECOND EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
A star (*) behind an item indicates that this item was not included in the analysis. 
 
Market-based mechanisms of increasing returns 
Product-related social interaction effects 
Instruction: please use the following scale to indicate the extent of your agreement 
about how well each of the following statements is an accurate description of the 
market that you serve with your primary product. Here: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree.  
 
In our market the attractiveness of the primary product has increased in the past 5 to 
10 years, because: 
• it became known that opinion leaders among customers started using this 
product 
• it became known that lead suppliers started offering this product 
• it was expected that more customers would be going to start using this 
product 
• it was expected that more suppliers would be going to start offering this 
product 
 
Technology-related social interaction effects 
Instruction: please use the following scale to indicate the extent of your agreement 
about how well each of the following statements is an accurate description of the 
market that you serve with your primary product. Here: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree.  
 
In our market the attractiveness of the primary product technology has increased in 
the past 5 to 10 years, because: 
• it became known that opinion leaders among customers started using 
products based on this product technology 
• it became known that lead suppliers started offering products based on this 
product technology 
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• it was expected that more customers would be going to start using products 
based on this product technology 
• it was expected that more suppliers would be going to start offering 
products based on this product technology 
 
Product-related network effects 
Instruction: please use the following scale to indicate the extent of your agreement 
about how well each of the following statements is an accurate description of the 
market that you serve with your primary product. Here: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree.  
 
In our market the attractiveness of the primary product has increased in the past 5 to 
10 years, because:  
• more customers started using this product 
• more suppliers started offering this product 
• more customers started using complementary products 
• more suppliers started offering complementary products 
 
Technology-related network effects 
Instruction: please use the following scale to indicate the extent of your agreement 
about how well each of the following statements is an accurate description of the 
market that you serve with your primary product. Here: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree.  
 
In our market the attractiveness of the primary product technology has increased in 
the past 5 to 10 years, because: 
• more customers started using products based on this product technology 
• more suppliers started offering products based on this product technology 
• more customers started using complementary products based on this product 
technology 
• more suppliers started offering complementary products based on this 
product technology 
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Dependent variables: market dominance 
Instruction: please use the following scale to indicate the extent of your agreement 
about how well each of the following statements is an accurate description of the 
market that you serve with your primary product. Here: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree. 
 
In our market: 
• in the past 5 to 10 years one of the products has become increasingly 
dominant (*) 
• in the past 5 to 10 years one of the suppliers has become increasingly 
dominant (*) 
• in the past 5 to 10 years one of the product technologies has become 
increasingly dominant 
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APPENDIX III: LIST OF FIRMS FROM THE SECOND AND 
THIRD EMPIRICAL STUDIES  
 
Firm name Corrected 
sampling frame 
second empirical 
study 
(Chapter 8) 
Sample second 
empirical study 
(Chapter 8) 
Sample third 
empirical study, 
individual firm 
analyses 
(Chapter 9) 
Sample third 
empirical study, 
industry analyses 
(Chapter 9) 
Aalberts Industries 1 0 1 1 
ABN-Amro 1 1 1 1 
Achmea 1 1 1 1 
AEGON 1 0 1 1 
Ahold 1 0 1 1 
Ahrend 1 1 1 1 
AKZO-Nobel 1 1 1 1 
Amstelland 0 0 0 1 
Arcadis 1 1 1 1 
ASM International 1 0 1 1 
ASM Lithography 1 1 1 1 
ASR Verzekerings-
groep 
0 0 1 1 
Atag 0 0 1 1 
Athlon 1 1 1 1 
Baan Company 0 0 0 1 
Ballast-Nedam 1 0 1 1 
BAM 1 0 1 1 
Batenburg 1 0 1 1 
Beers 0 0 1 1 
Begemann 0 0 1 1 
BE Semiconductor 
Industries 
1 1 1 1 
Blydenstein-Willink 1 1 1 1 
Boskalis-
Westminster 
1 0 1 1 
Brocacef 0 0 1 1 
Buhrmann 1 0 1 1 
CAP Gemini 0 0 1 1 
Cindu 0 0 1 1 
CMG 1 0 1 1 
Content 0 0 1 1 
Corus 0 0 1 1 
Crédit Lyonnais 
Nederland 
0 0 1 1 
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Firm name Corrected 
sampling frame 
second empirical 
study 
(Chapter 8) 
Sample second 
empirical study 
(Chapter 8) 
Sample third 
empirical study, 
individual firm 
analyses 
(Chapter 9) 
Sample third 
empirical study, 
industry analyses 
(Chapter 9) 
CSM 1 0 1 1 
Delft Instruments 1 1 1 1 
Draka 1 0 1 1 
DSM 1 0 1 1 
Endemol 0 0 0 1 
EVC 1 0 1 1 
Exendis 1 0 1 1 
Fortis 1 1 1 1 
Frans Maas 1 0 1 1 
Free Record Shop 1 0 1 1 
Friesland-Coberco 
Dairy Foods 
0 0 0 1 
Fugro 1 1 1 1 
Gamma Holding 1 0 1 1 
Gelderse Papier 0 0 1 1 
Getronics 1 1 1 1 
Geveke 1 0 1 1 
Van der Giessen 0 0 1 1 
Gist-Brocades 0 0 1 1 
Grolsch 1 1 1 1 
Grontmij 1 0 1 1 
GTI 0 0 1 1 
Gucci 0 0 1 1 
Hagemeyer 1 0 1 1 
HBG 1 1 1 1 
Heijmans 1 1 1 1 
Heineken 1 0 1 1 
Hunter Douglas 1 0 1 1 
IHC Caland 1 1 1 1 
Imtech 1 0 1 1 
ING Group 1 0 1 1 
KAS Bank 1 1 1 1 
KBB 0 0 1 1 
Kempen & Co. 1 0 1 1 
KLM 1 1 1 1 
KPN 1 1 1 1 
Landis 0 0 0 1 
Landré 0 0 1 1 
Laurus 1 0 1 1 
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Firm name Corrected 
sampling frame 
second empirical 
study 
(Chapter 8) 
Sample second 
empirical study 
(Chapter 8) 
Sample third 
empirical study, 
individual firm 
analyses 
(Chapter 9) 
Sample third 
empirical study, 
industry analyses 
(Chapter 9) 
LCI 0 0 1 1 
Van Leer 0 0 1 1 
Libertel 0 0 0 1 
Macintosh 1 0 1 1 
Van Melle 0 0 1 1 
Bank Mendes 
Gans 
0 0 1 1 
Van der Moolen 1 0 1 1 
NBM 0 0 1 1 
NEDAP 1 0 1 1 
Nedlloyd 1 0 1 1 
Neways 1 1 1 1 
NIB Capital 1 0 1 1 
NKF 0 0 1 1 
Norit 1 0 1 1 
NS 0 0 1 1 
Numico 1 1 1 1 
Nutreco 1 0 1 1 
Océ 1 1 1 1 
Van Ommeren 0 0 1 1 
OPG 1 0 1 1 
Ordina 1 0 1 1 
Otra 0 0 1 1 
P&C Group 0 0 1 1 
P&O Nedlloyd 0 0 0 1 
Pakhoed 0 0 1 1 
Philips 1 0 1 1 
Pink Roccade 0 0 0 1 
Polygram 0 0 1 1 
Polynorm 1 1 1 1 
Randstad 1 1 1 1 
Reed Elsevier 1 0 1 1 
Rood Testhouse 1 0 1 1 
Royal Begemann 
Group 
0 0 1 1 
Samas 1 1 1 1 
Schuitema 1 0 1 1 
Royal Dutch/Shell 
Group 
1 1 1 1 
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Firm name Corrected 
sampling frame 
second empirical 
study 
(Chapter 8) 
Sample second 
empirical study 
(Chapter 8) 
Sample third 
empirical study, 
individual firm 
analyses 
(Chapter 9) 
Sample third 
empirical study, 
industry analyses 
(Chapter 9) 
Simac 1 1 1 1 
Smit Internationale 1 0 1 1 
SNS Bank 1 1 1 1 
Sphinx 0 0 1 1 
Staal Bankiers 0 0 1 1 
Stork 1 0 1 1 
Telegraaf 1 0 1 1 
Ten Cate 1 1 1 1 
TPG 0 0 0 1 
Tulip 0 0 1 1 
Twentsche Kabel 
Holding 
1 0 1 1 
Unilever 1 0 1 1 
Unit4 Agresso 0 0 0 1 
UPC 0 0 0 1 
Vedior 0 0 0 1 
Vendex KBB 1 1 1 1 
Versatel 0 0 0 1 
Vilenzo 0 0 1 1 
VNU 1 1 1 1 
VOPAK 1 1 1 1 
Vredestein 1 1 1 1 
Volker-Wessels-
Stevin 
1 1 1 1 
Wegener 1 1 1 1 
Wessanen 1 0 1 1 
Wolff 0 0 1 1 
Wolters-Kluwer 1 0 1 1 
sum 83 36 118 131 
Table III.1: List of firms from the second and third empirical studies 
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APPENDIX IV: DETAILED REPORT ON THE ESTIMATION 
OF THE VERDOORN LAW AND THE PRODUCTIVITY-
PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIP 
 
The tables below provide the detailed reports on the analyses of the Verdoorn law 
and the productivity-performance relationship. We address the analyses of the 118 
firms in our sample in the first section, the analyses of the 13 different industries in 
the second section and the analysis of the entire population in the third section. 
 
The following steps were taken in carrying out the analyses. 
• Graphs were made, setting out the annual growth rate in output, i.e., added 
value, against the annual growth rate in productivity, i.e., added value 
divided by hours worked, and the annual growth rate in productivity against 
the annual growth rate in net profit, for every individual firm, for every 
industry and for the total population. These graphs were visually judged for 
outliers and influential points. 
• The regression model including all observations was initially estimated for 
every individual firm, for every industry and for the total population. The 
statistical output indicated among others the observations located over two 
times the standard residual from this initial regression line and the Cook 
distances of every observation. 
• Influential points, distorting the regression, were removed, based on 
judgment of these Cook distances computed from the initial regression 
model. 
• Statistical outliers, defined as observations that were located over two times 
the standard residual from the initial regression line, were removed from the 
firm-specific models. In the industry-specific models and in the model of 
the total population, outliers were defined as observations that were located 
over three times the standard residual from the initial regression line. These 
were also removed. 
• Subsequently, every regression model was re-estimated. 
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Analyses of the firms 
 
Firm name Remarks Verdoorn analysis Remarks productivity-performance 
analysis 
Aalberts 
Industries 
1983-1984 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.071 to 0.022, beta goes from 0.139 
to –0.046, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
1983-1984 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.648 to 0.117, beta goes from 3.409 
to 1.402, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
ABN-Amro 1997-1998 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.288 to 0.707, beta goes from 0.590 
to 0.765, the model remains significant
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
1997-1998 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.526 to 0.697, beta goes from 1.341 
to 1.903, the model remains significant 
Achmea 2001-2002 is an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: financially bad year in 2002 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.903 to 0.040, beta goes from 0.896 
to –0.462, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
2001-2002 is an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: financially bad year in 2002 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.927 to 0.065, beta goes from 2.614 
to 0.345, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
AEGON 1991-1992 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.557 to 0.714, beta goes from 0.754 
to 0.734, the model remains significant
No remarks 
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Firm name Remarks Verdoorn analysis Remarks productivity-performance 
analysis 
Ahold 2000-2001 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: the revision of the annual 
report 2001 due to consolidation 
problems that emerged in 2003 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.179 to 0.279, beta goes from 0.354 
to 0.277, the model remains significant
2000-2001 and 2001-2002 are 
influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.184 to 0.272, beta goes from 2.606 
to 1.361, the model becomes 
significant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive, but on the brink of 
positive autocorrelation. 
Ahrend 1985-1986, 1993-1994 and 1999-2000 
are statistical outliers (> 2 times the 
std residual) and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.125 to 0.424, beta goes from 0.346 
to 0.246, the model becomes 
significant 
1983-1984, 1985-1986, 1993-1994 
and 1999-2000 are influential points 
distorting the regression and are 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.137 to 0.380, beta goes from 3.793 
to 7.352, the model becomes 
significant 
AKZO-Nobel 1997-1998 and 1998-1999 are 
statistical outliers (> 2 times the std 
residual) and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.111 to 0.522, beta goes from 0.394 
to 0.522, the model becomes 
significant 
1993-1994 is an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.522 to 0.678, beta goes from 0.522 
to 0.913, the model remains significant
1999-2000 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and 1998-1999 
is an influential point and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.023 to 0.271, beta goes from  
–1.435 to 2.748, the model becomes 
significant 
After this operation, it turns out that 
now 1993-1994 is a statistical outlier 
(> 2 times the std residual) and 
198301984 is an influential point. 
Removing these points gives a better 
representation of the productivity-
performance relationship. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.271 to 0.482, beta goes from 2.748 
to 1.791, the model remains significant 
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Firm name Remarks Verdoorn analysis Remarks productivity-performance 
analysis 
Arcadis 1991-1992 is an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.207 to 0.015, beta goes from 0.148 
to 0.084, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
1985-1986 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.291 to 0.118, beta goes from 7.393 
to 2.810, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
The model estimated shows negative 
autocorrelation 
ASM Inter-
national 
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. 1996-1997 is 
an influential point distorting the 
average change in capital-output ratio 
and is therefore removed from the 
analysis. The point is also removed 
from the regression analysis. 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.944 to 0.928, beta goes from 0.921 
to 0.922, the model remains significant
The observations 1994-1995 and 
1997-1998 exhibit missing values and 
are therefore excluded from the 
analysis. 
1998-1999 is an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.069 to 0. 593, beta goes from 
11.790 to 7.465, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
Because of the missing values and the 
exclusion of one more observation the 
model is estimated based on the five 
remaining observations. The value of 
the standard error of estimate (3.507) 
casts severe doubts on the quality of 
the model. 
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Firm name Remarks Verdoorn analysis Remarks productivity-performance 
analysis 
ASM 
Lithography 
2001-2002 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.636 to 0.967, beta goes from 0.849 
to 0.690, the model remains significant
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. 2000-2001 is 
an influential point distorting the 
average change in capital-output ratio 
and is therefore removed from the 
analysis. The point is also removed 
from the regression analysis. 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.967 to 0.968, beta goes from 0.690 
to 0.597, the model remains significant
The observation 2001-2002 exhibits a 
missing value and is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
ASR Verze-
keringsgroep 
1992-1993 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.879 to 0.943, beta goes from 1.015 
to 0.998, the model remains significant
No remarks. 
Atag 1998-1999 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and an 
influential point and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.252 to 0.023, beta goes from 0.236 
to -0.040, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
1998-1999 is an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.811 to 0. 049, beta goes from 
11.777 to 1.273, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
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Firm name Remarks Verdoorn analysis Remarks productivity-performance 
analysis 
Athlon 1992-1993 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.454 to 0.533, beta goes from 0.904 
to 0.475, the model remains significant
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. 1984-1985 is 
an influential point distorting the 
average change in capital-output ratio 
and is therefore removed from the 
analysis. The point is also removed 
from the regression analysis. 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.533 to 0.390, beta goes from 0.475 
to 0.362, the model remains significant
The capital-output ratio is constantly 
increasing, with a annual average of 
0.083 (=8.3%) 
1984-1985, 1991-1992, 2000-2001 
and 2001-2002 are influential points 
distorting the regression and are 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.378 to 0. 515, beta goes from 3.411 
to 2.453, the model remains 
significant. 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
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Firm name Remarks Verdoorn analysis Remarks productivity-performance 
analysis 
Ballast-
Nedam 
1986-1987 is an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.972 to 0.626, beta goes from 1.184 
to 0.627, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
The observations 1986-1987 and 
2001-2002 exhibit missing values and 
are therefore excluded from the 
analysis. 
2000-2001 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and 1987-1988 
and 1988-1989 are influential points 
distorting the regression and are 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.160 to 0.083, beta goes from 4.694 
to 1.330, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
After this operation it turns out that 
1998-1999 become outliers / 
influential points distorting the 
regression. Excluding these gives a 
better representation of the 
productivity-performance relation, 
albeit only representing the era from 
1990-1998. 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.083 to 0.608, beta goes from 1.330 
to 1.301, the model becomes 
significant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
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Firm name Remarks Verdoorn analysis Remarks productivity-performance 
analysis 
BAM 2000-2001 is an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.145 to 0.214, beta goes from 0.096 
to 0.178, the model remains 
nonsignificant, but is on the brink of 
significance 
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. 2001-2002 is 
an influential point distorting the 
average change in capital-output ratio 
and is therefore removed from the 
analysis. The point is also removed 
from the regression analysis. 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.214 to 0.194, beta goes from 0.178 
to 0.172, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
Alternative models estimated: 
Removing 1988-1989 as an influential 
point gives: beta = 0.271, t-value = 
2.073, significance = 0.057, R square 
= 0.235 
Removing instead 1985-1986 and 
1996-1997 as statistical outliers (> 2 
times the std residual) gives: beta = 
0.183, t-value = 3.181, significance = 
0.007, R square = 0.438 
The observation 1996-1997 exhibits a 
missing value and is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
1986-1987 and 1995-1996 are 
statistical outliers (> 2 times the std 
residual) and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.365 to 0.356, beta goes from 6.795 
to 3.922, the model remains significant 
Batenburg 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 are 
influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.004 to 0.447, beta goes from 0.043 
to 0.428, the model becomes 
significant 
No remarks. 
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Firm name Remarks Verdoorn analysis Remarks productivity-performance 
analysis 
Beers 1996-1997 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.302 to 0.517, beta goes from 0.717 
to 0.789, the model remains significant
1993-1994 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and 1983-1984 
is an influential point distorting the 
regression and is therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.405 to 0.511, beta goes from 1.442 
to 0.546, the model remains significant 
Begemann 1985-1986, 1987-1988 and 1988-1989 
are influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.058 to 0.770, beta goes from 0.120 
to 0.549, the model becomes 
significant 
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. It turns out 
that the capital-output ratio is 
changing in an erratic way during the 
years 1984-1985, 1985-1986, 1989-
1990, 1990-1991 and 1991-1992. 
There is however no reason to 
assume that the capital-output ratio 
would steadily grow or decline when 
the erratic observations would be 
removed. 
The observation 1985-1986 exhibits a 
missing value and is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
1984-1985 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and an 
influential point and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.207 to 0.001, beta goes from 25.950 
to 0.068, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
BE Semi-
conductor 
Industries 
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. The average 
change in capital-output ratio turns out 
to be heavily influenced by the large 
changes in Added value (especially 
the net profit component). There is 
however no reason to assume the 
capital-output ratio would steadily 
grow or decline when the erratic 
observations would be removed. 
The observations 1995-1996, 1998-
1999 and 2001-2002 exhibit missing 
values and are therefore excluded 
from the analysis. 
Because of the missing values the 
model is estimated based on the five 
remaining observations. The value of 
the standard error of estimate (3.507) 
casts severe doubts on the quality of 
the model. 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
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Blydenstein-
Willink 
1985-1986 and 1987-1988 are 
statistical outliers (> 2 times the std 
residual) and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.118 to 0.425, beta goes from 0.605 
to 0.603, the model becomes 
significant 
The observations 1987-1988, 1988-
1989, 1992-1993, 1995-1996, 1996-
1997, 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 
exhibit missing values and are 
therefore excluded from the analysis. 
1997-1998 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.086 to 0.127, beta goes from 4.616 
to 4.181, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
Boskalis-
Westminster 
1983-1984 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and an 
influential point and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.294 to 0.410, beta goes from  
-0.618 to 0.563, the model remains 
significant 
The model estimated shows negative 
autocorrelation 
The observations 1983-1984, 1985-
1986, 1986-1987 and 1987-1988 
exhibit missing values and are 
therefore excluded from the analysis. 
1984-1985, 1988-1989 and 1989-1990 
are influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.372 to 0.558, beta goes from 8.572 
to 2.480, the model remains significant 
Because of the missing values and the 
exclusion of three more observations 
the model only represents the era 
from 1990. 
Brocacef 1994-1995 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.243 to 0.520, beta goes from 0.552 
to 0.743, the model becomes 
significant 
The observation 1989-1990 exhibits a 
missing value and is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
1988-1989 and 1994-1995 are 
influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.445 to 0.551, beta goes from 11.011 
to 2.576, the model remains significant 
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Buhrmann 1997-1998 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and 1998-1999 
and 1999-2000 are influential points 
and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.266 to 0.786, beta goes from 0.405 
to 0.732, the model remains significant
The observation 1993-1994 exhibits a 
missing value and is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
1992-1993, 1997-1998, 1998-1999 
and 2001-2002 are influential points 
distorting the regression and are 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.512 to 0.460, beta goes from 26.993 
to 4.758, the model remains significant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
Cap Gemini No remarks No remarks 
Cindu 1989-1990 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.010 to 0.451, beta goes from 0.029 
to 0.242, the model becomes 
significant 
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. 1996-1997 is 
an influential point distorting the 
average change in capital-output ratio 
and is therefore removed from the 
analysis. The point is also removed 
from the regression analysis. 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.451 to 0.410, beta goes from 0.242 
to 0.235, the model remains significant
The observation 1983-1984 exhibits a 
missing value and is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
1993-1994 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.019 to 0.195, beta goes from 1.910 
to 4.834, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
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CMG 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 are 
influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.987 to 0.469, beta goes from 0.552 
to 0.411, the model becomes 
nonsignificant (just) 
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. 1999-2000 is 
an influential point distorting the 
average change in capital-output ratio 
and is therefore removed from the 
analysis. The point is also removed 
from the regression analysis. 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.469 to 0.510, beta goes from 0.411 
to 0.393, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
The observation 2001-2002 exhibits a 
missing value and is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
2000-2001 is an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.943 to 0.381, beta goes from 13.482 
to 2.178, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
Content 1990-1991 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and 1985-1986 
is an influential point and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.503 to 0.866, beta goes from 0.634 
to 0.908, the model remains significant
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
The observation 1986-1987 exhibits a 
missing value and is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
1985-1986 and 1990-1991 are 
influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.330 to 0.700, beta goes from  
–3.389 to 1.700, the model becomes 
significant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
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Corus 1998-1999 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and 1999-2000 
is an influential point and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.203 to 0.623, beta goes from 0.393 
to 0.819, the model becomes 
significant (from just nonsignificant) 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
The observations 1983-1984, 1987-
1988, 1991-1992, 1992-1993, 1993-
1994, 1999-2000, 2000-2001 and 
2001-2002 exhibit missing values and 
are therefore excluded from the 
analysis. 
1998-1999 is an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.886 to 0.720, beta goes from 6.968 
to 6.588, the model remains significant 
Crédit 
Lyonnais 
Nederland 
1987-1988 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.442 to 0.838, beta goes from 0.231 
to 0.812, the model becomes 
significant 
The observations 1983-1984, 1984-
1985, 1985-1986, 1986-1987, 1987-
1988 and 1988-1989 exhibit missing 
values and are therefore excluded 
from the analysis. 
The model is nonsignificant. 
CSM 1999-2000 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and 2000-2001 
and 2001-2002 are influential points 
and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.682 to 0.098, beta goes from 0.444 
to 0.138, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
The model estimated show positive 
autocorrelation 
1999-2000, 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 
are influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.711 to 0.495, beta goes from 4.229 
to 0.954, the model remains significant 
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Delft 
Instruments 
1997-1998 and 1998-1999 are 
influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.869 to 0.852, beta goes from 1.165 
to 1.077, the model remains significant
An analysis of the change in capital-
output ratio shows that 1997-1998 and 
1998-1999 are also influential points in 
the average growth in capital-output 
ratio. 
The observations 1986-1987, 1990-
1991, 1991-1992, 1992-1993 and 
1998-1999 exhibit missing values and 
are therefore excluded from the 
analysis. 
1993-1994 is an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.079 to 0.823, beta goes from 39.151 
to 14.969, the model becomes 
significant 
The value of the standard error of the 
estimate casts some doubt on the 
quality of the model, however. 
Draka 2001-2002 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.218 to 0.006, beta goes from 0.269 
to 0.045, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
1988-1989, 1992-1993, 1993-1994 
and 2001-2002 are influential points 
distorting the regression and are 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.390 to 0.403, beta goes from 2.341 
to 0.988, the model remains significant 
 
DSM 1993-1994 and 1997-1998 are 
statistical outliers (> 2 times the std 
residual) and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.734 to 0.914, beta goes from 0.812 
to 0.834, the model remains significant
The observation 1993-1994 exhibits a 
missing value and is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
1992-1993 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.776 to 0.839, beta goes from 5.450 
to 4.913, the model remains significant 
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EVC 1994-1995 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.998 to 0.987, beta goes from 0.855 
to 1.077, the model remains significant
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. 1993-1994 
and 1997-1998 are influential points 
distorting the average change in 
capital-output ratio and are therefore 
removed from the analysis. The points 
are also removed from the regression 
analysis. 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.987 to 0.968, beta goes from 1.077 
to 1.094, the model remains significant
The observations 1994-1995, 1996-
1997, 1998-1999, 1999-2000, 2000-
2001 and 2001-2002 exhibit missing 
values and are therefore excluded 
from the analysis. This leaves 3 valid 
observations, which is not sufficient for 
estimating the model. 
EVC is therefore excluded from the 
analysis. 
Exendis 1985-1986 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and 1986-1987 
and 2000-2001 are influential points 
and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.013 to 0.340, beta goes from 0.044 
to 0.463, the model becomes 
significant 
1985-1986, 1986-1987, 1993-1994 
and 2001-2002 are influential points 
distorting the regression and are 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.082 to 0.687, beta goes from 1.631 
to 2.970, the model becomes 
significant 
Fortis The Fortis graph gives a fuzzy image. 
There are five observations that can 
be qualified as either outliers or 
influential points. 
The initial estimated model gives: beta 
= 0.289, t-value = 4.498, significance 
= 0.000, R square = 0.543. This model 
however does not adequately 
represent the Fortis data. We 
therefore chose to remove the five 
observations, i.e., 1989-1990, 1992-
1993, 1993-1994, 1997-1998 and 
2001-2002. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.543 to 0.237, beta goes from 0.289 
to 0.429, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
1989-1990, 1992-1993, 1997-1998 
and 2001-2002 are influential points 
distorting the regression and are 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.618 to 0.372, beta goes from 2.744 
to 1.232, the model remains significant 
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Frans Maas The model is nonsignificant The observations 1993-1994 and 
1994-1995 exhibit missing values and 
are therefore excluded from the 
analysis. 
1992-1993 is an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.396 to 0.360, beta goes from 4.679 
to 2.518, the model remains significant 
Free Record 
Shop 
1992-1993 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and an 
influential point and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.348 to 0.314, beta goes from 0.828 
to 0.418, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
1992-1993 is an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.863 to 0.481, beta goes from 7.009 
to 2.665, the model remains significant 
Fugro The model is nonsignificant No remarks 
Gamma 
Holding 
1989-1990 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.020 to 0.117, beta goes from  
-0.085 to 0.311, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
The model is nonsignificant 
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Gelderse 
Papier 
No remarks The observations 1993-1994, 1995-
1996 and 1998-1999 exhibit missing 
values and are therefore excluded 
from the analysis. 
1996-1997 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.576 to 0.794, beta goes from 9.585 
to 7.341, the model remains significant 
The value of the standard error of the 
estimate casts some doubt on the 
quality of the model, however. 
Getronics 1998-1999, 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 
are influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.172 to 0.102, beta goes from 0.203 
to 0.105, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
The capital-output ratio is constantly 
declining, with a annual average of -
0.075 (= -7.5%) 
The observation 2001-2002 exhibits a 
missing value and is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
1985-1986, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 
are influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.835 to 0.245, beta goes from 27.658 
to 1.507, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
The model estimated shows positive 
autocorrelation 
Geveke 1991-1992 and 1993-1994 are 
statistical outliers (> 2 times the std 
residual) and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.034 to 0.108, beta goes from 0.160 
to 0.121, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. It turns out 
that the removal of 1991-1992 and 
1993-1994 from the regression is the 
cause of the somewhat high average. 
As the change in capital-output ratio is 
nonsignificant, this requires no further 
action. 
The observations 1992-1993 and 
1993-1994 exhibit missing values and 
are therefore excluded from the 
analysis. 
1991-1992 is an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.783 to 0.243, beta goes from 8.648 
to 3.017, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
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Van der 
Giessen 
1985-1986 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.668 to 0.933, beta goes from 1.013 
to 1.092, the model remains significant
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. 1986-1987, 
1987-1988 and 1995-1996 are 
influential points distorting the average 
change in capital-output ratio and are 
therefore removed from the analysis. 
The points are also removed from the 
regression analysis. 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.933 to 0.844, beta goes from 1.092 
to 0.827, the model remains significant
The observations 1984-1985, 1986-
1987 and 1987-1988 exhibit missing 
values and are therefore excluded 
from the analysis. 
1985-1986, 1991-1992 and 1995-1996 
are influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.052 to 0.625, beta goes from  
–10.430 to 17.262, the model 
becomes significant 
The value of the standard error of the 
estimate casts some doubt on the 
quality of the model, however. 
Gist-
Brocades 
1990-1991 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.604 to 0.568, beta goes from 1.076 
to 0.806, the model remains significant
1994-1995 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and 1990-1991 
is an influential point distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.641 to 0.595, beta goes from 4.616 
to 3.765, the model remains significant 
 
Grolsch 1990-1991 and 1993-1994 are 
influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.001 to 0.805, beta goes from 0.015 
to 0.897, the model becomes 
significant 
1996-1997 and 1997-1998 are 
influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.754 to 0.244, beta goes from 3.066 
to 0.664, the model remains (just) 
significant 
Grontmij 1990-1991 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.167 to 0.000, beta goes from  
-0.141 to 0.011, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
The model is nonsignificant 
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GTI No remarks The model is nonsignificant 
Gucci 1999-2000 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.546 to 0.854, beta goes from 0.960 
to 1.123, the model remains significant
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. 1993-1994 
and 1998-1999 are influential points 
distorting the average change in 
capital-output ratio and are therefore 
removed from the analysis. The points 
are also removed from the regression 
analysis. 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.854 to 0.851, beta goes from 1.123 
to 0.817, the model remains significant
The observation 1993-1994 exhibits a 
missing value and is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
1994-1995 is an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.819 to 0.639, beta goes from 3.076 
to 1.676, the model remains significant 
Hagemeyer The Hagemeyer graph gives a fuzzy 
image. There are six observations that 
can be qualified as either outliers or 
influential points. 
Removing these six observations, i.e., 
1993-1994, 1994-1995, 1995-1996, 
1998-1999, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 
and estimating the model gives: beta = 
0.231, t-value = 4.306, significance = 
0.001, R square = 0.628. This model 
however does not adequately 
represent the Hagemeyer data. We 
therefore stick to the original model. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.628 to 0.101, beta goes from 0.231 
to 0.171, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
1999-2000 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and an 
influential point and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.321 to 0.066, beta goes from 6.644 
to 0.952, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
The model estimated shows positive 
autocorrelation 
HBG 1996-1997 and 1999-2000 are 
influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.029 to 0.055, beta goes from 0.089 
to -0.188, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
1999-2000 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and an 
influential point and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.374 to 0.045, beta goes from 4.024 
to –0.332, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
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Heijmans The model is nonsignificant The Heijmans graph gives a fuzzy 
image. Therefore, a number of 
alternative models have been 
estimated. 
Estimating the model based on all 
observations gives: beta = -0.890, t-
value = -0.917, significance = 0.381, R 
square = 0.078. 
Removing 1994-1995 as a statistical 
outlier (> 2 times the std residual) 
gives: beta = -0.711, t-value = -1.051, 
significance = 0.321, R square = 
0.109. 
Removing 1995-1996 as an influential 
point distorting the regression gives: 
beta = -1.749, t-value = -1.724, 
significance = 0.119, R square = 
0.248. 
Removing 1991-1992 and 1995-1996 
as influential points distorting the 
regression and 1994-1995 as a 
statistical outlier (> 2 times the std 
residual) gives: beta = -0.948, t-value 
= -2.026, significance = 0.082, R 
square = 0.370. 
All of the models are nonsignificant 
and, moreover, do not seem to give an 
adequate representation of the 
Heijmans data. We therefore stick to 
the (also nonsignificant) model based 
on all observations. Note however that 
a negative value of beta, i.e., when 
productivity rises with x%, net profit 
falls with x%, is extremely unlikely to 
occur. 
Heineken The model is nonsignificant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
The model is nonsignificant 
Hunter 
Douglas 
1983-1984, 1984-1985, 1985-1986 
and 1986-1987 are influential points 
and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.052 to 0.814, beta goes from 0.286 
to 1.081, the model becomes 
significant 
The model only represents the era 
from 1987 
No remarks 
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IHC Caland 1988-1989 and 1989-1990 are 
statistical outliers (> 2 times the std 
residual) and 1986-1987 is an 
influential point and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.988 to 0.912, beta goes from 1.453 
to 0.820, the model remains significant
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. The period 
from 1984 to 1989 is characterized by 
an extreme volatility of the capital-
output ratio. All the years previous to 
1990 have therefore been removed 
from the analysis. The points are also 
removed from the regression analysis. 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.912 to 0.346, beta goes from 0.820 
to 0.303, the model remains significant
The model only represents the era 
from 1990 onwards 
Still, after these deletions, the average 
value of the change in capital-output 
ratio warrants a further analysis of this 
change. It turns out however, that the 
capital-output ratio does not 
significantly differ from 0 (1-tailed 
significance = 0.071) 
The observations 1985-1986, 1986-
1987 and 1988-1989 exhibit missing 
values and are therefore excluded 
from the analysis. 
1984-1985, 1987-1988 and 1989-1990 
are influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.575 to 0.420, beta goes from 13.568 
to 2.521, the model remains significant 
Imtech 2000-2001 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and 1997-1998 
is an influential point and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.259 to 0.551, beta goes from 0.465 
to 0.998, the model remains significant
The observation 1991-1992 exhibits a 
missing value and is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
1983-1984, 1990-1991 and 2000-2001 
are influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.072 to 0.473, beta goes from 25.675 
to 5.348, the model becomes 
significant 
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ING Group 1997-1998 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and 2000-2001 
is an influential point and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.831 to 0.895, beta goes from 0.807 
to 0.782, the model remains significant
1999-2000 and 2000-2001 are 
influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.904 to 0.846, beta goes from 2.033 
to 2.522, the model remains significant 
KAS Bank 2001-2002 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.972 to 0.852, beta goes from 0.977 
to 0.853, the model remains significant
1984-1985 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and 2001-2002 
is an influential point distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.497 to 0.810, beta goes from 1.767 
to 2.807, the model remains significant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
KBB The model is nonsignificant 1983-1984 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and an 
influential point and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.000 to 0.658, beta goes from  
–0.375 to 4.838, the model becomes 
significant 
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Kempen & 
Co. 
1997-1998 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.630 to 0.776, beta goes from 0.630 
to 0.772, the model remains significant
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. 1989-1990 is 
an influential point distorting the 
average change in capital-output ratio 
and is therefore removed from the 
analysis. The point is also removed 
from the regression analysis. 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.776 to 0.675, beta goes from 0.772 
to 0.738, the model remains significant
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
1990-1991 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and an 
influential point and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.370 to 0.788, beta goes from 3.095 
to 1.915, the model remains significant 
KLM 1990-1991 and 1996-1997 are 
influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.951 to 0.923, beta goes from 0.978 
to 0.950, the model remains significant
The model estimated shows positive 
autocorrelation 
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. It turns out 
that the relatively high average 
change is due to the removal of the 
influential points 1990-1991 and 1996-
1997 from the analysis. The change in 
capital-output ratio does not 
significantly differ from 0 (1-tailed 
significance = 0.094) 
The observations 1990-1991, 1992-
1993 and 2001-2002 exhibit missing 
values and are therefore excluded 
from the analysis. 
1991-1992 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and 1996-1997 
is an influential point distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.754 to 0.631, beta goes from 15.093 
to 9.880, the model remains significant 
The value of the standard error of the 
estimate casts some doubt on the 
quality of the model, however. 
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KPN The KPN graph gives a fuzzy image. 
There are six observations that can be 
qualified as either outliers or influential 
points. 
These six observations are 1996-
1997, 1997-1998, 1998-1999, 1999-
2000, 2000-2001 and 2001-2002, 
coincidentally the years after the 
company split into a post and logistics 
group (i.e., TPG) and a 
telecommunications group (KPN). 
These observations were therefore 
removed from the analysis. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.149 to 0.620, beta goes from 0.443 
to 0.913, the model becomes 
significant 
The model only represents the era 
until 1996 (i.e., the era when the post 
and logistics and the 
telecommunications were combined in 
one company). 
From the remaining six observations, 
covering the era from 1996, no definite 
conclusion can be drawn as to the 
Verdoorn relationship. 
The observation 2001-2002 exhibits a 
missing value and is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
The KPN graph gives a fuzzy image. 
There are six observations that can be 
qualified as either outliers or influential 
points. 
These six observations are 1988-
1989, 1996-1997, 1997-1998, 1998-
1999, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 
(2001-2002 exhibits a missing value). 
Five of those six are from the years 
after the company split into a post and 
logistics group (i.e., TPG) and a 
telecommunications group (KPN). 
These five observations were 
therefore removed from the analysis. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.321 to 0.126, beta goes from  
–2.361 to 0.950, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
This model only represents the era 
until 1996 (i.e., the era when the post 
and logistics and the 
telecommunications were combined in 
one company). 
In the remaining graph, 1988-1989 is 
a statistical outlier (> 2 times the std 
residual) and an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.126 to 0.021, beta goes from 0.950 
to 0.197, the model remains 
nonsignificant. 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
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Landré 1984-1985, 1992-1993, 1993-1994 
and 1997-1998 are influential points 
and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.053 to 0.532, beta goes from 0.087 
to 0.235, the model becomes 
significant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
The observation 1993-1994 exhibits a 
missing value and is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
1984-1985, 1992-1993 and 1997-1998 
are influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.429 to 0.198, beta goes from 21.472 
to 3.636, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
Laurus The Laurus graph gives a fuzzy 
image. There are five observations 
that can be qualified as either outliers 
or influential points. 
These five observations are 1995-
1996, 1997-1998, 1999-2000, 2000-
2001 and 2001-2002. Removing these 
observations from the analysis 
probably gives a more adequate 
representation of the company as 
‘going concern’ 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.049 to 0.007, beta goes from 0.186 
to -0.057, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
The fuzzy image is probably related to 
the many changes in composition 
(mergers and acquisitions) of the 
company over the period analyzed. 
The observations 2000-2001 and 
2001-2002 exhibit missing values and 
are therefore excluded from the 
analysis. 
The Laurus graph gives a fuzzy 
image. There are three observations 
that can be qualified as either outliers 
or influential points. 
These five observations are 1995-
1996, 1997-1998 and 1999-2000 (note 
that 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 have 
already been removed due to missing 
values). Removing these three 
observations from the analysis 
probably gives a more adequate 
representation of the company as 
‘going concern’. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.033 to 0.047, beta goes from  
–0.935 to 0.537, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
The fuzzy image is probably related to 
the many changes in composition 
(mergers and acquisitions) of the 
company over the period analyzed. 
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LCI 1987-1988, 1988-1989 and 1989-1990 
are influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.211 to 0.647, beta goes from 0.207 
to 0.487, the model becomes 
significant 
The model only represents the era 
from 1990 onwards 
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. It turns out 
that the relatively high average 
change is due to the removal of the 
influential points 1987-1988, 1988-
1989 and 1989-1990 from the 
analysis. The change in capital-output 
ratio does not significantly differ from 0 
(1-tailed significance = 0.199) 
The observations 1993-1994 and 
1997-1998 exhibit missing values and 
are therefore excluded from the 
analysis. 
No further remarks on the model. 
Van Leer 1991-1992 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.166 to 0.504, beta goes from 0.215 
to 0.577, the model becomes 
significant 
1990-1991, 1991-1992 and 1992-1993 
are influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.080 to 0.175, beta goes from 1.740 
to 0.933, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
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Macintosh 1992-1993, 1996-1997 and 2000-
2001are influential points and are 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.005 to 0.321, beta goes from 0.106 
to 0.640, the model becomes 
significant 
The observation 2001-2002 exhibits a 
missing value and is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
1992-1993 and 1997-1998 are 
influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.004 to 0.382, beta goes from  
–1.126 to 3.708, the model becomes 
significant 
In the remaining graph, 1987-1988 
and 2000-2001 can be considered as 
influential points distorting the 
regression. Removing these points 
gives: beta = 4.182, t-value = 4.649, 
significance = 0.001, R square = 
0.643. 
This model is not so radically different 
from the previous one as to justify 
removing these two observations. 
Van Melle 1990-1991 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.678 to 0.783, beta goes from 0.936 
to 0.911, the model remains significant
No remarks. 
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Bank 
Mendes 
Gans 
The observations 1983-1984 and 
1984-1985 exhibit missing values and 
are therefore excluded from the 
analysis. 
1997-1998 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.345 to 0.421, beta goes from 0.621 
to 0.533, the model remains significant
The model estimated shows positive 
autocorrelation 
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. The capital-
output ratio is constantly declining, 
with a annual average of -0.069 (= -
6.9%). The removed observation has 
no influence on this value. 
The observations 1983-1984 and 
1984-1985 exhibit missing values and 
are therefore excluded from the 
analysis. 
1985-1986 and 1986-1987 are 
statistical outliers (> 2 times the std 
residual) and 1987-1988 is an 
influential point distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.187 to 0.565, beta goes from 0.400 
to 0.321, the model becomes 
significant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
Van der 
Moolen 
No remarks on the regression. 
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. It turns out 
that the relatively high average 
change is due to the general volatility 
of the ratio over the entire period of 
analysis. The change in capital-output 
ratio does not significantly differ from 0 
(1-tailed significance = 0.203) 
1989-1990 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and 1992-1993 
and 1996-1997 are influential points 
distorting the regression and are 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.732 to 0.685, beta goes from 2.354 
to 1.326, the model remains significant 
NBM 1997-1998 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.179 to 0.509, beta goes from 0.071 
to 0.288, the model becomes 
significant 
1987-1988 and 1989-1990 are 
statistical outliers (> 2 times the std 
residual) and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.248 to 0.560, beta goes from 4.375 
to 4.117, the model remains significant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
Nedap The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
No remarks 
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Nedlloyd The observations 1999-2000 and 
2000-2001 exhibit missing values and 
are therefore excluded from the 
analysis. 
1986-1987, 1995-1996 and 1998-1999 
are influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.102 to 0.620, beta goes from 0.596 
to 0.903, the model becomes 
significant 
The observations 1983-1984, 1987-
1988, 1990-1991, 1992-1993 and 
1993-1994 exhibit missing values and 
are therefore excluded from the 
analysis. 
1986-1987, 1998-1999, 1999-2000 
and 2000-2001 influential points 
distorting the regression and are 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.004 to 0.619, beta goes from 0.070 
to 7.534, the model becomes 
significant 
The model only represents the era 
from 1984 until 1998 
Neways 2000-2001 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.057 to 0.003, beta goes from 0.123 
to -0.027, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
The observation 2001-2002 exhibits a 
missing value and is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
1992-1993 and 2000-2001 are 
influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.408 to 0.303, beta goes from 9.646 
to 1.863, the model remains significant 
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NIB Capital 1999-2000 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square remains 
0.974, beta goes from 0.800 to 0.999, 
the model remains significant 
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. 1998-1999 
and 2001-2002 are influential points 
distorting the average change in 
capital-output ratio and are therefore 
removed from the analysis. The points 
are also removed from the regression 
analysis. 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.974 to 0.968, beta goes from 0.999 
to 1.067, the model remains significant
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
1999-2000 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and an 
influential point distorting the 
regression and is therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.912 to 0.856, beta goes from 3.132 
to 1.943, the model remains significant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
NKF 1994-1995 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.369 to 0.744, beta goes from 0.298 
to 0.443, the model remains significant
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
1994-1995 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and 1996-1997 
is an influential point distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.553 to 0.807, beta goes from 3.614 
to 3.716, the model remains significant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
Norit 1987-1988 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.587 to 0.663, beta goes from 0.360 
to 0.339, the model remains significant
1990-1991, 1991-1992, 1993-1994 
and 1994-1995 are influential points 
distorting the regression and are 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.180 to 0.530, beta goes from 2.664 
to 3.059, the model remains significant 
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NS No remarks 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 are 
influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.843 to 0.736, beta goes from 8.448 
to 6.054, the model becomes (just) 
nonsignificant 
Numico 2001-2002 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.676 to 0.203, beta goes from 0.699 
to -0.247, the model becomes (just) 
nonsignificant. This model however 
does not seem to adequately 
represent the Numico data. Especially 
observations 1994-1995, 1995-1996, 
1998-1999 and 1999-2000 appear to 
be outliers. Removing these 
observations gives: beta = 0.372, t-
value = 1.298, significance = 0.219, R 
square = 0.123. Note that the model is 
nonsignificant. This model seems to 
represent best the Numico data. 
An alternative model was estimated 
that only represents the era until 1994. 
This gives: beta = 0.500, t-value = 
2.076, significance = 0.068, R square 
= 0.324. This model shows positive 
autocorrelation. 
2001-2002 is an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.916 to 0.006, beta goes from 5.542 
to –0.147, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
 
Nutreco The model is nonsignificant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
The model is nonsignificant 
Océ 1987-1988, 1995-1996 and 1996-1997 
are influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.225 to 0.317, beta goes from 0.273 
to 0.427, the model remains significant
2000-2001 and 2001-2002 are 
influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.074 to 0.044, beta goes from 10.711 
to 1.142, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
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Van 
Ommeren 
1986-1987, 1991-1992, 1994-1995 
and 1996-1997 are influential points 
and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.225 to 0.222, beta goes from  
-0.950 to 0.408, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
1986-1987, 1988-1989, 1991-1992, 
1992-1993, 1993-1994 and 1994-1995 
are influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.000 to 0.633, beta goes from 0.251 
to 1.851, the model becomes 
significant 
The large number of influential points 
casts some doubt on the 
representativeness of the estimated 
model for the entire period. 
OPG 1994-1995, 1997-1998, 1998-1999 
and 1999-2000 are influential points 
and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.031 to 0.310, beta goes from 0.171 
to 0.189, the model becomes 
significant 
1997-1998 is an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.742 to 0.485, beta goes from 4.699 
to 3.405, the model remains significant 
Ordina 1995-1996 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.121 to 0.104, beta goes from 0.079 
to 0.047, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
1995-1996 is an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.067 to 0.099, beta goes from 1.547 
to 2.976, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
Otra 1985-1986, 1988-1989 and 1990-1991 
are influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.083 to 0.517, beta goes from 0.211 
to 0.747, the model becomes 
significant 
No remarks 
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P&C Group 1996-1997 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.916 to 0.637, beta goes from 1.019 
to 0.926, the model remains significant
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
The observations 1983-1984, 1994-
1995 and 1995-1996 exhibit missing 
values and are therefore excluded 
from the analysis. 
1993-1994 and 1996-1997 influential 
points distorting the regression and 
are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.813 to 0.885, beta goes from 
127.549 to 5.030, the model remains 
significant 
The model only represents the era 
from 1984-1993. 
Pakhoed 1983-1984, 1990-1991 and 1996-1997 
are influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.001 to 0.021, beta goes from  
-0.019 to -0.145, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
1987-1988, 1990-1991 and 1996-1997 
influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.452 to 0.551, beta goes from 4.339 
to 7.622, the model remains significant 
Philips The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. 2000-2001 is 
an influential point distorting the 
average change in capital-output ratio 
and is therefore removed from the 
analysis. The point is also removed 
from the regression analysis. 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.968 to 0.954, beta goes from 0.978 
to 0.979, the model remains significant
The observations 1990-1991, 1992-
1993, 1996-1997 and 2001-2002 
exhibit missing values and are 
therefore excluded from the analysis. 
1989-1990 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and 1999-2000 
and 2000-2001 are influential points 
distorting the regression and are 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.675 to 0.592, beta goes from 5.388 
to 4.966, the model remains significant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
Polygram No remarks 1995-1996 and 1996-1997 influential 
points distorting the regression and 
are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.767 to 0.819, beta goes from 1.775 
to 1.598, the model remains significant 
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Polynorm 1985-1986 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.452 to 0.259, beta goes from 0.315 
to 0.378, the model remains significant
1984-1985 is an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.388 to 0.524, beta goes from 2.947 
to 3.450, the model remains significant 
Randstad 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 are 
influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.142 to 0.242, beta goes from 0.189 
to 0.214, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
2000-2001 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.037 to 0.269, beta goes from 0.995 
to 1.902, the model becomes 
significant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
Reed 
Elsevier 
1992-1993 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.002 to 0.686, beta goes from  
-0.017 to 0.906, the model becomes 
significant 
The observation 1999-2000 exhibits a 
missing value and is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
1992-1993, 1998-1999 and 2000-2001 
are influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.002 to 0.221, beta goes from 0.215 
to 0.758, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
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Rood 
Testhouse 
No remarks The observations 1990-1991, 1991-
1992, 1992-1993, 1998-1999 and 
2001-2002 exhibit missing values and 
are therefore excluded from the 
analysis. 
1997-1998 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and an 
influential point distorting the 
regression and is therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.209 to 0.525, beta goes from 
126.866 to 14.263, the model 
becomes significant 
The model estimated shows negative 
autocorrelation 
The value of the standard error of the 
estimate also casts severe doubt on 
the quality of the model. 
Removing further possible influential 
points does not lead to a satisfactory 
model. 
Royal 
Begemann 
Group 
The observations 1995-1996, 1999-
2000, 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 
exhibit missing values and are 
therefore excluded from the analysis. 
This leaves 3 valid observations, 
which is not sufficient for estimating 
the model. 
RBG is therefore excluded from the 
analysis. 
The observations 1995-1996, 1999-
2000, 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 
exhibit missing values and are 
therefore excluded from the analysis. 
This leaves 3 valid observations, 
which is not sufficient for estimating 
the model. 
RBG is therefore excluded from the 
analysis. 
Samas The Samas graph gives a fuzzy 
image. There are six observations that 
can be qualified as either outliers or 
influential points. 
These six observations are 1986-
1987, 1989-1990, 1993-1994, 1994-
1995, 1999-2000 and 2001-2002. 
Removing these observations from the 
analysis probably gives a more 
adequate representation of the 
company as ‘going concern’ 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.261 to 0.515, beta goes from 0.307 
to 0.733, the model remains significant
1999-2000 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and an 
influential point and 2001-2002 is an 
influential point distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.687 to 0.363, beta goes from 4.400 
to 2.057, the model remains significant 
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Schuitema 1985-1986, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 
are influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.043 to 0.553, beta goes from  
-0.090 to 0.820, the model becomes 
significant 
1983-1984 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and 1999-2000 
and 2000-2001 are influential points 
distorting the regression and are 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.002 to 0.462, beta goes from 0.193 
to 1.117, the model becomes 
significant 
Royal Dutch/ 
Shell Group 
1997-1998, 1998-1999 and 2000-2001 
are influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.895 to 0.921, beta goes from 1.087 
to 1.134, the model remains significant
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
1997-1998 and 1998-1999 are 
influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.475 to 0.821, beta goes from 21.594 
to 1.554, the model remains significant 
Simac 1996-1997, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 
are influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.196 to 0.010, beta goes from 0.234 
to 0.044, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
The observations 1998-1999, 1999-
2000 and 2001-2002 exhibit missing 
values and are therefore excluded 
from the analysis. 
2000-2001 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and an 
influential point distorting the 
regression and 1997-1998 is an 
influential point distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.747 to 0.670, beta goes from 53.963 
to 5.102, the model remains significant 
The model only represents the era 
until 1997. 
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Smit Inter-
nationale 
1987-1988 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.997 to 0. 891, beta goes from 1.101 
to 1.009, the model remains significant
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. 1986-1987 is 
an influential point distorting the 
average change in capital-output ratio 
and is therefore removed from the 
analysis. The point is also removed 
from the regression analysis. 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.891 to 0.722, beta goes from 1.009 
to 1.045, the model remains significant
After these adjustments, the 
observation 1997-1998 becomes an 
influential point and is therefore 
removed. 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.722 to 0.663, beta goes from 1.045 
to 1.377, the model remains significant
The observations 1987-1988, 1988-
1989 and 1992-1993 exhibit missing 
values and are therefore excluded 
from the analysis. 
1986-1987, 1993-1994, 1995-1996 
and 1997-1998 are influential points 
distorting the regression and are 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.712 to 0.239, beta goes from 22.928 
to 3.152, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
SNS Bank 1995-1996 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.218 to 0. 903, beta goes from 0.204 
to 0.661, the model becomes 
significant 
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. It turns out 
that the relatively high average 
change is due to the removal of the 
influential point 1995-1996 from the 
analysis. With this observation 
included, the change in capital-output 
ratio does not significantly differ from 0 
(1-tailed significance = 0.268). With 
this observation excluded, the change 
in capital-output ratio does only just 
not significantly differ from 0 (1-tailed 
significance = 0.052). 
1995-1996 and 2001-2002 are 
influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.396 to 0.811, beta goes from 2.166 
to 2.275, the model remains significant 
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Sphinx No remarks The observations 1995-1996 and 
1996-1997 exhibit missing values and 
are therefore excluded from the 
analysis. 
1994-1995 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and an 
influential point distorting the 
regression and is therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.528 to 0.628, beta goes from 3.280 
to 2.425, the model remains significant 
Staal 
Bankiers 
1989-1990 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.894 to 0. 466, beta goes from 0.839 
to 0.449, the model remains significant
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. 1988-1989, 
1990-1991 and 1995-1996 are 
influential points distorting the average 
change in capital-output ratio and are 
therefore removed from the analysis. 
The points are also removed from the 
regression analysis. 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.466 to 0.605, beta goes from 0.449 
to 0.641, the model remains significant
The observation 1990-1991 exhibits a 
missing value and is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
1989-1990 is an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.966 to 0.810, beta goes from 4.141 
to 2.154, the model remains significant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
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Stork No remarks The observation 2001-2002 exhibits a 
missing value and is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
The Stork graph gives a fuzzy image. 
Excluding 1983-1984, 1988-1989, 
1992-1993, 1994-1995, 1995-1996 
and 1999-2000 gives: beta = 8.817, t-
value = 6.308, significance = 0.000, R 
square = 0.799. 
Excluding 1986-1987, 1991-1992, 
1998-1999 and 2000-2001 gives: beta 
= -0.119, t-value = -0.152, significance 
= 0.882, R square = 0.002. 
The difference between the two 
models does not seem to follow a 
clear pattern, nor is it clearly related to 
changes in the composition of Stork’s 
business. 
We therefore decided to remove only 
2000-2001, as it is clearly a statistical 
outlier (> 2 times the std residual) as 
well as an influential point distorting 
the regression. 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.188 to 0.056, beta goes from 3.581 
to 1.491, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
Telegraaf 1992-1993, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 
are influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.085 to 0.573, beta goes from 0.195 
to 0.485, the model becomes 
significant 
The observation 2001-2002 exhibits a 
missing value and is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
2000-2001 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and an 
influential point distorting the 
regression and is therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.541 to 0.416, beta goes from 4.419 
to 1.847, the model remains significant 
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Ten Cate No remarks The observations 1998-1999 and 
2001-2002 exhibit missing values and 
are therefore excluded from the 
analysis. 
1997-1998 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and an 
influential point distorting the 
regression and is therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.480 to 0.346, beta goes from 5.704 
to 2.424, the model remains significant 
Tulip The observations 1997-1998, 2000-
2001 and 2001-2002 exhibit missing 
values and are therefore excluded. 
1996-1997, 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 
are influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
1.000 to 0.600, beta goes from 0.965 
to 0.525, the model remains significant
The model only represents the era 
until 1996 
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. It turns out 
that the relatively high average 
change is due to the general volatility 
of the ratio over the entire period of 
analysis. The change in capital-output 
ratio does not significantly differ from 0 
(1-tailed significance = 0.168) 
The observations 1992-1993, 1996-
1997, 1997-1998, 1998-1999, 2000-
2001 and 2001-2002 exhibit missing 
values and are therefore excluded 
from the analysis. 
1999-2000 is an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.844 to 0.877, beta goes from 92.152 
to 4.744, the model remains significant 
The model only represents the era 
until 1996 
Twentsche 
Kabel 
Holding 
1983-1984, 1994-1995 and 2001-2002 
are influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.542 to 0.374, beta goes from 0.544 
to 0.584, the model remains significant
2001-2002 is an influential point 
distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.753 to 0.617, beta goes from 9.139 
to 2.632, the model remains significant 
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Unilever 1984-1985 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and 1996-1997 
is an influential point and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.789 to 0.710, beta goes from 1.068 
to 0.749, the model remains significant
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. 1999-2000 is 
an influential point distorting the 
average change in capital-output ratio 
and is therefore removed from the 
analysis. The point is also removed 
from the regression analysis. 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.710 to 0.721, beta goes from 0.749 
to 0.737, the model remains significant
1984-1985, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 
are statistical outliers (> 2 times the 
std residual) and 1996-1997 is an 
influential point distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.698 to 0.735, beta goes from 2.912 
to 2.179, the model remains significant 
Vendex KBB 1996-1997, 1997-1998 and 1998-1999 
are influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.004 to 0.676, beta goes from 0.062 
to 2.451, the model becomes 
significant 
The model estimated shows positive 
autocorrelation 
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. It turns out 
that the removal of 1997-1998 from 
the regression is the cause of the high 
average change. 
Over the period analyzed and with the 
influential points removed the capital-
output ratio is constantly declining, 
with a annual average of -0.055 (= -
5.5%) 
2000-2001 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and 1996-1997 
is an influential point distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.102 to 0.655, beta goes from 5.873 
to 4.916, the model becomes 
significant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
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Vilenzo 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 are 
influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.142 to 0.256, beta goes from 0.635 
to 0.524, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
The model estimated shows positive 
autocorrelation 
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. It turns out 
that the relatively high average 
change is an adequate representation 
of reality. Indeed, without the removal 
of the influential points 2000-2001 and 
2001-2002, the average change in 
capital-output ratio would be 0.064 
(6.4%) and significant (1-tailed 
significance = 0.027). With the 
removal of the influential points 
however, the change in capital-output 
ratio does not significantly differ from 0 
(1-tailed significance = 0.082) 
2000-2001 and 2001-2002 are 
influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.101 to 0.225, beta goes from  
–0.254 to 0.909, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
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VNU The VNU graph gives a fuzzy image. 
There are six observations that can be 
qualified as either outliers or influential 
points. 
These six observations are 1986-
1987, 1992-1993, 1998-1999, 1999-
2000, 2000-2001 and 2001-2002. 
Removing these observations from the 
analysis probably gives a more 
adequate representation of the 
company as ‘going concern’ 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.223 to 0.203, beta goes from 0.383 
to 0.250, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. 1997-1998 is 
an influential point distorting the 
average change in capital-output ratio 
and is therefore removed from the 
analysis. The point is also removed 
from the regression analysis. 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.203 to 0.180, beta goes from 0.250 
to 0.288, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
1992-1993 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and an 
influential point distorting the 
regression and is therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.547 to 0.663, beta goes from 2.957 
to 2.689, the model remains significant 
Vopak 1986-1987, 1991-1992, 1996-1997 
and 2001-2002 are influential points 
and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.373 to 0.036, beta goes from  
-0.591 to -0.145, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
1986-1987, 1991-1992 and 2001-2002 
are influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.201 to 0.553, beta goes from 1.789 
to 6.491, the model becomes 
significant (from just nonsignificant) 
The model estimated show negative 
autocorrelation 
Appendix IV 
464 
Firm name Remarks Verdoorn analysis Remarks productivity-performance 
analysis 
Vredestein 1990-1991 is a statistical outlier (> 2 
times the std residual) and is therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.884 to 0.929, beta goes from 1.004 
to 1.131, the model remains significant
The observations 1989-1990, 1990-
1991, 1991-1992 and 2001-2002 
exhibit missing values and are 
therefore excluded from the analysis. 
1988-1989, 1994-1995, 1999-2000 
and 2000-2001 are influential points 
distorting the regression and are 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.508 to 0.598, beta goes from 
259.115 to 5.620, the model remains 
significant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
Volker-
Wessels-
Stevin 
1986-1987 and 1987-1988 are 
influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.570 to 0.005, beta goes from 0.647 
to -0.032, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
The observation 1987-1988 exhibits a 
missing value and is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
1984-1985, 1986-1987, 1988-1989 
and 1995-1996 influential points 
distorting the regression and are 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.736 to 0.002, beta goes from 28.514 
to 0.050, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
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Wegener-
Arcade 
The observation 1983-1984 exhibits 
missing values and is therefore 
excluded. 
The Wegener graph gives a fuzzy 
image. There are at least five 
observations that can be qualified as 
either outliers or influential points. 
These five observations are 1985-
1986, 1986-1987, 1991-1992, 1999-
2000 and 2000-2001. Removing these 
observations from the analysis 
probably gives again a picture with a 
number of influential points.  
The model is therefore based on all 
observations. Note that the model is 
nonsignificant. 
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. 1999-2000 is 
an influential point distorting the 
average change in capital-output ratio 
and is therefore removed from the 
analysis. The point is also removed 
from the regression analysis. 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.072 to 0.082, beta goes from 0.072 
to 0.083, the model remains 
nonsignificant 
The observation 1983-1984 exhibits 
missing values and is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
1985-1986, 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 
are influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.224 to 0.242, beta goes from 8.153 
to 2.575, the model becomes (just) 
nonsignificant (from just significant). 
The graph appears more like an 
inverse quadratic relationship than like 
a linear relationship. 
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Wessanen 1986-1987 and 1987-1988 are 
influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.096 to 0.426, beta goes from 0.259 
to 0.599, the model becomes 
significant 
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. It turns out 
that the relatively high average 
change is due to the removal of the 
influential points 1986-1987 and 1987-
1988 from the analysis. With these 
observations included, the average 
change in capital-output ratio is not 
significantly different from 0 (1-tailed 
significance = 0.378). With these 
observation excluded, the change in 
capital-output ratio also does not 
significantly differ from 0 (1-tailed 
significance = 0.074). 
2000-2001 and 2001-2002 are 
influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.471 to 0.779, beta goes from 2.835 
to 2.150, the model remains 
significant. 
Wolff 1992-1993 and 1993-1994 are 
influential points and are therefore 
removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.759 to 0.913, beta goes from 1.190 
to 1.690, the model remains significant
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
The observations 1992-1993, 1993-
1994 and 1994-1995 exhibit missing 
values and are therefore excluded 
from the analysis. 
1990-1991 and 1991-1992 are 
influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.603 to 0.017, beta goes from 74.621 
to 0.602, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
The model only represents the era 
until 1990 
Wolters-
Kluwer 
1995-1996 is an influential point and is 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.016 to 0.428, beta goes from  
-0.114 to 0.663, the model becomes 
significant 
1995-1996, 1999-2000, 2000-2001 
and 2001-2002 are influential points 
distorting the regression and are 
therefore removed 
Cause: unknown 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.344 to 0.004, beta goes from 2.610 
to 0.037, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
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the productivity-performance relationship 
 
Analyses of the industries 
 
Industry 
name 
Remarks Verdoorn analysis Remarks productivity-
performance analysis 
Basic 
industry 
Blydenstein 1985-1986 and 1987-
1988, Corus 1998-1999 and Gamma 
1989-1990 are statistical outliers (> 3 
times the std residual) and are 
therefore removed. 
EVC 1993-1994 and 1994-1995 are 
influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore 
removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.931 to 0.571, beta goes from 0.835 
to 0.672, the model remains 
significant 
AKZO-Nobel 1999-2000, Blydenstein 
1986-1987, 1994-1995, 1997-1998 
and 1999-2000, Gelderse Papier 
1996-1997 and Vredestein 1988-
1989 are statistical outliers (> 3 
times the std residual) and are 
therefore removed. 
EVC 1993-1994 and 1997-1998, 
Royal Dutch/Shell Group 1998-1999 
and Vredestein 2000-2001 are 
influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore 
removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.075 to 0.470, beta goes from 
20.252 to 4.086, the model remains 
significant 
Food 
industry 
Numico 1994-1995 and 1998-1999, 
Unilever 1996-1997 and Wessanen 
1998-1999 are statistical outliers (> 3 
times the std residual) and are 
therefore removed. 
Grolsch 1990-1991 and 1993-1994 
and Numico 1999-2000 and 2001-
2002 are influential points distorting 
the regression and are therefore 
removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.412 to 0.224, beta goes from 0.516 
to 0.324, the model remains 
significant 
In the data series of the change in 
capital-output ratio Unilever 1999-
2000 is an additional statistical 
outlier (> 3 times the std deviation 
from the average) and is therefore 
removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.412 to 0.224, beta goes from 0.516 
to 0.324, the model remains 
significant 
CSM 2000-2001, Friesland Coberco 
Dairy Foods 1999-2000, Nutreco 
1996-1997, Unilever 1999-2000 and 
Wessanen 2000-2001 and 2001-
2002 are statistical outliers (> 3 
times the std residual) and are 
therefore removed. 
Grolsch 1997-1998, Numico 1998-
1999 and 2001-2002 and Unilever 
1996-1997 are influential points 
distorting the regression and are 
therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.786 to 0.331, beta goes from 
4.659to 1.535, the model remains 
significant 
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Media Endemol 1998-1999 and VNU 1999-
2000 and 2000-2001 are statistical 
outliers (> 3 times the std residual) 
and are therefore removed. 
Elsevier 1992-1993, 1997-1998 and 
1998-1999 and VNU 2001-2002 are 
influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore 
removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.015 to 0.044, beta goes from 0.063 
to 0.135, the model becomes 
significant 
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. In the data 
series of the change in capital-output 
ratio VNU 1997-1998 and Wolters 
1995-1996 are statistical outliers (> 3 
times the std deviation from the 
average) and are therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.044 to 0.074, beta goes from 0.135 
to 0.177, the model becomes 
significant 
Elsevier 1992-1993 and 2000-2001, 
VNU 1992-1993 and Wegener 2001-
2002 are statistical outliers (> 3 
times the std residual) and are 
therefore removed. 
Telegraaf 2000-2001 and VNU 1999-
2000 are influential points distorting 
the regression and are therefore 
removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.156 to 0.340, beta goes from 1.985 
to 1.738, the model remains 
significant 
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Engineering 
industry 
Begemann 1985-1986, 1987-1988 
and 1988-1989, Delft Instruments 
1998-1999, Exendis 1985-1986, 
1986-1987 and 2000-2001 and Van 
der Giessen 1985-1986 and 1987-
1988 are statistical outliers (> 3 
times the std residual) and are 
therefore removed. 
Begemann 1985-1986, 1987-1988 
and 1989-1990 and Exendis 2000-
2001 are influential points distorting 
the regression and are therefore 
removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.106 to 0.339, beta goes from 0.167 
to 0.368, the model remains 
significant 
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. In the data 
series of the change in capital-output 
ratio Atag 1998-1999, Begemann 
1984-1985, Van der Giessen 1986-
1987 and 1995-1996 and Twentsche 
Kabel Holding 2001-2002 are 
additional statistical outliers (> 3 
times the std deviation from the 
average) and are therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.339 to 0.199, beta goes from 0.135 
to 0.261, the model remains 
significant 
Begemann 1984-1985, Delft 
Instruments 1993-1994 and Van der 
Giessen 1985-1986 and 1991-1992 
are extreme statistical outliers (> 3 
times the std residual) and are 
therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.031 to 0.275, beta goes from 7.442 
to 3.991, the model remains 
significant 
Atag 1998-1999, Delft Instruments 
1987-1988 and 1997-1998, Exendis 
1986-1987 and 2001-2002, Van der 
Giessen 1983-1984 and Twentsche 
Kabel Holding 2001-2002 are 
statistical outliers (> 3 times the std 
residual) and are therefore removed. 
Begemann 1989-1990 and Exendis 
1985-1986 are influential points 
distorting the regression and are 
therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.275 to 0.298, beta goes from 3.991 
to 2.900, the model remains 
significant 
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Construction 
industry 
BAM 2000-2001, Boskalis 1983-
1984, IHC Caland 1985-1986, 1986-
1987, 1987-1988, 1988-1989 and 
1989-1990, NBM 1987-1988 and 
VWS 1987-1988 are statistical 
outliers (> 3 times the std residual) 
and are therefore removed. 
Ballast-Nedam 1986-1987, IHC 
Caland 1984-1985 and VWS 1986-
1987 are influential points distorting 
the regression and are therefore 
removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.956 to 0.201, beta goes from 1.400 
to 0.234, the model remains 
significant 
The average value of the change in 
capital-output ratio warrants a further 
analysis of this change. In the data 
series of the change in capital-output 
ratio BAM 2001-2002 is an additional 
statistical outlier (> 3 times the std 
deviation from the average) and is 
therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.201 to 0.199, beta remains 0.234, 
the model remains significant 
Over the period analyzed and with 
the outliers and influential points 
removed the capital-output ratio is 
constantly increasing, with a annual 
average of 0.026 (= 2.6%) 
Ballast-Nedam 1988-1989 and 2000-
2001, BAM 1995-1996, Boskalis 
1984-1985 and 1988-1989, HBG 
1999-2000, IHC Caland 1984-1985, 
1987-1988 and 1989-1990, NBM 
1987-1988 and VWS 1986-1987 are 
statistical outliers (> 3 times the std 
residual) and are therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.467 to 0.069, beta goes from 
11.928 to 1.221, the model remains 
significant 
Appendix IV 
471 
Industry 
name 
Remarks Verdoorn analysis Remarks productivity-
performance analysis 
Wholesale Buhrmann 1997-1998 and Wolff 
1993-1994 are statistical outliers (> 3 
times the std residual) and are 
therefore removed. 
Landré 1997-1998, LCI 1988-1989 
and 1989-1990 and Samas 2001-
2002 are influential points distorting 
the regression and are therefore 
removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.142 to 0.251, beta goes from 0.239 
to 0.356, the model remains 
significant 
In the data series of the change in 
capital-output ratio Buhrmann 1998-
1999 and Hagemeyer 1983-1984 are 
additional statistical outliers (> 3 
times the std deviation from the 
average) and are therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.251 to 0.236, beta goes from 0.356 
to 0.346, the model remains 
significant 
Ahrend 1983-1984, Brocacef 1988-
1989 and 1994-1995, Buhrmann 
1992-1993, 1997-1998 and 2001-
2002, Geveke 1991-1992, 
Hagemeyer 1998-1999 and 1999-
2000, Imtech 1983-1984 and 1990-
1991, Landré 1997-1998 Samas 
1999-2000 and Wolff 1991-1992 are 
statistical outliers (> 3 times the std 
residual) and are therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.140 to 0.501, beta goes from 
14.644 to 3.484, the model remains 
significant 
Transport Nedlloyd 1998-1999 and 1999-2000, 
Van Ommeren 1986-1987 and 1991-
1992 and Vopak 2001-2002 are 
statistical outliers (> 3 times the std 
residual) and are therefore removed. 
Nedlloyd 2000-2001 and Smit 
Internationale 1986-1987 and 1987-
1988 are influential points distorting 
the regression and are therefore 
removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.073 to 0.371, beta goes from 0.736 
to 0.566, the model remains 
significant 
KLM 1991-1992 and 1996-1997, 
Nedlloyd 1986-1987, Van Ommeren 
1993-1994 and Smit Internationale 
1986-1987 and 1993-1994 are 
statistical outliers (> 3 times the std 
residual) and are therefore removed. 
KLM 1989-1990 and 2000-2001, 
Nedlloyd 1998-1999, 1999-2000 and 
2000-2001 and Van Ommeren 1991-
1992 are influential points distorting 
the regression and are therefore 
removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.004 to 0.474, beta goes from 0.148 
to 4.760, the model remains 
significant 
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Telecommu-
nications 
For this analysis, the data of KPN, 
Libertel, UPC and Versatel have 
been pooled. 
The data of Libertel, UPC and 
Versatel are characterized by 1) a 
limited number of observations, 2) a 
large share of invalid observations 
and 3) a large number of outliers and 
influential points. The consequence 
is that the available data to estimate 
the industry model for 
Telecommunications largely reflects 
the data of KPN. 
KPN 1997-1998 is a statistical outlier 
(> 3 times the std residual) and is 
therefore removed. 
KPN 2000-2001 and 2001-2002, 
Libertel 1996-197, 1997-1998 and 
1998-1999 and UPC 1996-1997 are 
influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore 
removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.980 to 0.414, beta goes from 0.700 
to 0.577, the model remains 
significant 
In the data series of the change in 
capital-output ratio KPN 1999-2000 
is an additional statistical outlier (> 3 
times the std deviation from the 
average) and is therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.414 to 0.429, beta goes from 
0.577to 0.652, the model remains 
significant 
For this analysis, the data of Libertel, 
KPN, UPC and Versatel have been 
pooled. 
The data of Libertel, UPC and 
Versatel are characterized by (1) a 
limited number of observations, (2) a 
large share of invalid observations 
and (3) a large number of outliers 
and influential points. The 
consequence is that the available 
data to estimate the industry model 
for Telecommunications largely 
reflects the data of KPN. 
KPN 1997-1998 and 2000-2001 and 
Libertel 1997-1998 are influential 
points distorting the regression and 
are therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.206 to 0.027, beta goes from –
2.241 to 0.475, the model becomes 
nonsignificant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
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Industry 
name 
Remarks Verdoorn analysis Remarks productivity-
performance analysis 
Financial 
services 
RBG 1998-1999 is a statistical outlier 
(> 3 times the std residual) and is 
therefore removed. 
NIB 1999-2000 and Staal Bankiers 
1989-1990 are influential points 
distorting the regression and are 
therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.800 to 0.633, beta goes from 0.805 
to 0.652, the model remains 
significant 
In the data series of the change in 
capital-output ratio Achmea 2001-
2002, Kempen & Co. 1989-1990, 
Van der Moolen 1987-1988 and 
2000-2001 and NIB 1998-1999 are 
additional statistical outliers (> 3 
times the std deviation from the 
average) and are therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.633 to 0.582, beta goes from 0.652 
to 0.606, the model remains 
significant 
Kempen & Co. 1990-1991, Van der 
Moolen 1989-1990, NIB 1999-2000, 
RBG 1998-1999 and Staal Bankiers 
1989-1990 are statistical outliers (> 3 
times the std residual) and are 
therefore removed. 
Achmea 2001-2002 is an influential 
point distorting the regression and is 
therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.640 to 0.679, beta goes from 2.228 
to 1.638, the model remains 
significant 
IT services Baan Company 1993-1994 and 
1997-1998, CMG 2001-2002, 
Getronics 2001-2002 and Landis 
1998-1999 and 1999-2000 are 
statistical outliers (> 3 times the std 
residual) and are therefore removed. 
CMG 2000-2001, Getronics 1998-
1999 and 2000-2001, Simac 2000-
2001 and Unit4 1997-1998 and 
2000-2001 are influential points 
distorting the regression and are 
therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.658 to 0.094, beta goes from 0.410 
to 0.100, the model remains 
significant 
In the data series of the change in 
capital-output ratio CMG 1999-2000 
is an additional statistical outlier (> 3 
times the std deviation from the 
average) and is therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.094 to 0.095, beta remains at 
0.100, the model remains significant 
Getronics 2000-2001, Pink-Roccade 
2000-2001 and Simac 2000-2001 
are statistical outliers (> 3 times the 
std residual) and are therefore 
removed. 
Baan Company 1994-1995, 1995-
1996, 1996-1997 and 1997-1998, 
CMG 2000-2001, Landis 1999-2000, 
Simac 1997-1998 and Unit4 1998-
1999, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 are 
influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore 
removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.366 to 0.238, beta goes from 
13.513 to 2.819, the model remains 
significant 
Appendix IV 
474 
Industry 
name 
Remarks Verdoorn analysis Remarks productivity-
performance analysis 
Other 
business 
services 
Athlon 1992-1993 and Vedior 1998-
1999 are statistical outliers (> 3 
times the std residual) and are 
therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.264 to 0.398, beta goes from 0.925 
to 0.465, the model remains 
significant 
In the data series of the change in 
capital-output ratio Athlon 1984-1985 
is an additional statistical outlier (> 3 
times the std deviation from the 
average) and is therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.398 to 0.375, beta goes from 0.465 
to 0.449, the model remains 
significant 
Rood 1997-1998 is an extreme 
statistical outlier (> 3 times the std 
residual) and is therefore removed. 
Vedior 1998-1999 is an extreme 
influential point distorting the 
regression and is therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.011 to 0.099, beta goes from 3.476 
to 2.810, the model becomes 
significant 
Content 1985-1986, Grontmij 1995-
1996 and Rood 1989-1990, 1993-
1994, 1994-1995 and 1999-2000 are 
statistical outliers (> 3 times the std 
residual) and are therefore removed. 
Arcadis 1985-1986, Athlon 1984-
1985 and 1991-1992, Content 1990-
1991, Rod 2000-2001 and Vedior 
1999-2000 are influential points 
distorting the regression and are 
therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.099 to 0.191, beta goes from 2.810 
to 2.496, the model remains 
significant 
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Industry 
name 
Remarks Verdoorn analysis Remarks productivity-
performance analysis 
Retail Gucci 1993-1994, Laurus 1997-1998 
and 2001-2002, Macintosh 1992-
1993 and Vilenzo 2001-2002 are 
statistical outliers (> 3 times the std 
residual) and are therefore removed. 
Free Record Shop 1992-1993, Gucci 
1994-1995, 1995-1996 and 1999-
2000, Laurus 1995-1996 and 2000-
2001, P&C 1996-1997, Schuitema 
1985-1986 and 2000-2001, Vendex 
1996-1997, 1997-1998 and 1998-
1999 and Vilenzo 2000-2001 are 
influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore 
removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.144 to 0.114, beta goes from 0.364 
to 0.288, the model remains 
significant 
In the data series of the change in 
capital-output ratio Gucci 1998-1999 
is an additional statistical outlier (> 3 
times the std deviation from the 
average) and is therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square remains 
0.114, beta goes from 0.288 to 
0.297, the model remains significant 
KBB 1983-1984, Laurus 1995-1996, 
Macintosh 2000-2001, P&C 1993-
1994 and 1996-1997, Schuitema 
1983-1984 and Vilenzo 2001-2002 
are statistical outliers (> 3 times the 
std residual) and are therefore 
removed. 
Ahold 2001-2002, Free Record Shop 
1992-1993, Gucci 1994-1995, 
Laurus 1997-1998, Macintosh 1992-
1993 and 1996-1997, Vendex 1996-
1997 and 2001-2002 and Vilenzo 
2000-2001 are influential points 
distorting the regression and are 
therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.106 to 0.309, beta goes from 
17.830 to 1.983, the model remains 
significant 
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Industry 
name 
Remarks Verdoorn analysis Remarks productivity-
performance analysis 
Electronics 
industry 
Tulip 1998-1999 is an extreme 
influential point distorting the 
regression and is therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.999 to 0.784, beta goes from 0.964 
to 0.778, the model remains 
significant 
ASM Lithography 2001-2002 and 
Neways 1991-1992 are statistical 
outliers (> 3 times the std residual) 
and are therefore removed. 
ASM International 1997-1998 and 
Tulip 1996-1997 and 1999-2000 are 
influential points distorting the 
regression and are therefore 
removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.784 to 0.672, beta goes from 0.778 
to 0.595, the model remains 
significant 
In the data series of the change in 
capital-output ratio ASM International 
1996-1997, ASM Lithography 2000-
2001, BE Semiconductor Industries 
1994-1995 and 2000-2001 and 
Philips 2000-2001 are additional 
statistical outliers (> 3 times the std 
deviation from the average) and are 
therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.672 to 0.619, beta goes from 0.595 
to 0.511, the model remains 
significant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
Tulip 1999-2000 is an extreme 
statistical outlier and is therefore 
removed. 
ASM International 1998-1999 is an 
extreme influential point distorting 
the regression and is therefore 
removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.398 to 0.454, beta goes from 
42.329 to 6.195, the model remains 
significant 
ASM International 2001-2002, 
Neways 2000-2001 and Océ 2001-
2002 are statistical outliers (> 3 
times the std residual) and are 
therefore removed. 
ASM International 1996-1997 and 
1999-2000, ASM Lithography 1999-
2000 and 2000-2001, BE 
Semiconductor Industries 1994-
1995, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001, 
Neways 1992-1993 and Philips 
1989-1990, 1999-2000 and 2000-
2001 are influential points distorting 
the regression and are therefore 
removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.454 to 0.607, beta goes from 6.195 
to 3.812, the model remains 
significant 
 
Table IV.2: A detailed report on the industry-specific analyses of the Verdoorn law 
and the productivity-performance relationship 
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Analysis of the entire population 
 
 Remarks Verdoorn analysis Remarks productivity-performance 
analysis 
All firms IHC Caland 1986-1987, Nedlloyd 
1999-2000 and UPC 1996-1997 are 
extreme statistical outliers and are 
therefore removed. 
Tulip 1998-1999 is an extreme 
influential point distorting the 
regression and is therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.949 to 0.606, beta goes from 0.949 
to 0.636, the model remains 
significant 
Subsequently, 38 statistical outliers 
(> 3 times the std residual) have been 
removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.606 to 0.513, beta goes from 0.636 
to 0.558, the model remains 
significant 
From the data series of the change in 
capital-output ratio, 23 additional 
statistical outliers (> 3 times the std 
deviation from the average value, i.e., 
smaller than -1.5143 or larger than 
1.6177) have been removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.513 to 0.414, beta goes from 0.558 
to 0.476, the model remains 
significant 
The test for autocorrelation was 
inconclusive. 
Over the period analyzed and with 
the outliers and influential points 
removed the capital-output ratio is 
constantly increasing, with a annual 
average of 0.015 (= 1.5%) 
Delft Instruments 1993-1994, P&C 
1996-1997, Rood 1997-1998, Tulip 
1999-2000 and Vredestein 2000-
2001 are extreme statistical outliers 
and are therefore removed. 
Nedlloyd 1999-2000 is an extreme 
influential point distorting the 
regression and is therefore removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.017 to 0.085, beta goes from 2.328 
to 4.471, the model remains 
significant 
Subsequently, 24 statistical outliers (> 
3 times the std residual) and 2 
influential points distorting the 
regression have been removed. 
Consequence: R square goes from 
0.085 to 0.311, beta goes from 4.471 
to 3.493, the model remains 
significant 
The model estimated shows negative 
autocorrelation. 
 
Table IV.3: A detailed report on the analyses of the Verdoorn law and the 
productivity-performance relationship for the entire population 
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APPENDIX V: SUPPORTING ESTIMATIONS FOR THE 
CORRECTIONS ON THE VERDOORN LAW ESTIMATION 
 
The corrections on the estimations of the Verdoorn law for changes in the capital-
labor and the capital-output ratios can be calculated from the differences between the 
Verdoorn models with and without the parameters δ and γ (see section 9.5.7).  
 
To make these calculations, the values of λ, α and β had to be additionally estimated 
from the data. We did this by an Ordinary Least Squares estimation of the 
production function that formed the basis of our interpretation of the Verdoorn law: 
 
εβαλ +++= lkq   
 
Where q represents growth of output, k represents growth of capital input, l 
represents growth of labor input and ε represents the error term. The results of this 
estimation are reported in table V.1 (for firms) and V.2 (for industries and for the 
entire population) below. Note that, because of the data limits, many of the firm-
specific estimations of this production function are nonsignificant and that therefore 
the parameters λ, α and β are often unusable for making the desired corrections. 
 
The calculated corrections on the Verdoorn coefficient and the constant term for the 
change in capital-labor ratio are presented in table V.3 (for firms) and V.4 (for 
industries and for the entire population) below. As only a small number of these 
calculations were based on significant estimates, the actual corrections made are 
presented in table V.5 (for firms) and V.6 (for industries and for the entire 
population.  
 
Note that tables V.1 through V.6 are spread over two pages, the left page covering 
the first columns and the right page the last columns. 
 
The calculated corrections made to the Verdoorn coefficient for the change in 
capital-output ratio are presented in table V.7. As only a part of these calculations 
were based on significant estimates, the actual corrections made are presented in 
table V.8. 
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Firm name total 
number 
of obser-
vations 
valid 
number 
of obser-
vations 
number 
of obser-
vations in 
model 
deleted 
number of
obser-
vations 
lambda  
(exogenous 
technological 
change) 
t-value of 
lambda 
ABN-Amro 19 19 18 1 0.061 
(*) 
2.715 
AEGON 19 19 18 1 0.027 0.555 
AKZO-Nobel 19 19 16 3 0.011 0.684 
ASM Lithography 9 9 7 2 -1.313 
 
-2.128 
ASR Verzekeringsgroep 15 15 14 1 0.116 1.557 
Athlon 19 19 17 2 -0.063 
 
-2.080 
Beers 16 16 15 1 0.086 
(**) 
3.326 
CMG 9 9 6 3 0.218 1.132 
Corus 19 19 17 2 0.007 0.221 
DSM 19 19 17 2 0.070 
 
1.995 
Getronics 18 18 15 3 0.047 1.089 
Grolsch 19 19 17 2 0.042 
 
1.914 
Grontmij 19 19 18 1 0.034 
(*) 
2.443 
HBG 17 17 15 2 0.035 
(*) 
2.698 
Heijmans 12 12 12 0 0.074 
(**) 
4.152 
Heineken 19 19 19 0 0.022 1.200 
IHC Caland 19 19 12 7 -0.002 -0.023 
Imtech 19 19 17 2 0.006 0.300 
ING Group 14 14 12 2 -0.023 -0.486 
KAS Bank 19 19 18 1 0.003 0.110 
KPN 19 19 13 6 0.057 
(**) 
4.007 
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alpha 
(coefficient 
of change 
in capital) 
t-value 
of alpha 
beta  
(coefficient of 
change in 
labor) 
t-value 
of beta 
adjusted 
R-square 
standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-statistic significance 
level of 
model 
0.264 0.782 0.321 0.449 0.097 0.079 1.918 0.181 
0.374 
 
2.095 0.926
(*)
2.239 0.290 0.148 4.472 0.030 
0.154 0.591 0.210 0.473 0.053 0.053 0.362 0.703 
0.971 1.374 3.930
(*)
3.247 0.595 0.296 5.413 0.073 
0.130 0.206 -0.441 -0.324 -0.170 0.093 0.057 0.945 
0.607 
(**) 
3.371 0.551
(*)
2.480 0.762 0.097 26.677 0.000 
0.277 1.340 0.029 0.077 0.041 0.064 1.298 0.309 
-0.917 -1.188 1.585 2.426 0.433 0.140 3.295 0.143 
0.985 
(*) 
2.430 -0.156 -0.328 0.295 0.114 4.345 0.034 
0.372 
 
1.832 1.872
(*)
2.803 0.407 0.112 6.498 0.010 
-0.061 -0.293 1.024
(***)
6.045 0.809 0.086 30.745 0.000 
-0.496 -1.467 0.868 1.468 0.068 0.077 1.587 0.239 
-0.011 -0.088 0.656
(***)
5.235 0.608 0.037 14.200 0.000 
-0.096 -0.520 0.678
(**)
4.617 0.690 0.043 16.561 0.000 
0.101 1.174 0.531
(*)
2.953 0.758 0.038 18.220 0.001 
0.673 
(*) 
0.269 0.207 1.109 0.484 0.049 9.435 0.002 
0.083 0.420 1.096
(**)
4.250 0.625 0.084 10.170 0.005 
0.652 
(*) 
2.401 -0.321 -0.947 0.202 0.064 3.027 0.081 
1.796 
(**) 
3.698 -0.610 -0.730 0.639 0.106 10.742 0.004 
0.516 
(***) 
4.662 0.960
(*)
2.296 0.578 0.085 12.624 0.001 
-0.325 -1.672 0.458 1.016 0.078 0.043 1.506 0.268 
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Firm name total 
number 
of obser-
vations 
valid 
number 
of obser-
vations 
number 
of obser-
vations in 
model 
deleted 
number of 
obser-
vations 
lambda  
(exogenous 
technological 
change) 
t-value of 
lambda 
Bank Mendes Gans 15 13 12 1 0.033 1.291 
Nedap 19 19 19 0 0.055 
 
1.958 
NIB Capital 19 19 16 3 0.123 1.185 
Otra 14 14 11 3 0.051 1.774 
P&C Group 14 14 13 1 -0.029 -0.868 
Philips 19 19 18 1 0.026 0.434 
Polygram 9 9 9 0 -0.040 -0.513 
Polynorm 17 17 16 1 0.032 1.434 
Reed Elsevier 19 19 18 1 0.045 1.081 
Schuitema 19 19 16 3 0.038 
(*) 
2.965 
SNS Bank 12 12 11 1 -0.011 -0.274 
Telegraaf 19 19 16 3 0.033 
(*) 
2.663 
Ten Cate 19 19 19 0 0.060 1.421 
Vendex KBB 12 12 9 3 0.014 1.196 
Significance at the 5% level is indicated by (*), at the 1% level by (**) and at the 0.1% level by 
(***) 
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alpha 
(coefficient 
of change 
in capital) 
t-value 
of alpha 
beta  
(coefficient of 
change in 
labor) 
t-value 
of beta 
adjusted 
R-square 
standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-statistic significance 
level of 
model 
0.055 0.247 0.689 1.994 0.175 0.077 2.169 0.170 
-0.251 -1.249 1.106
(**)
2.951 0.282 0.075 4.531 0.028 
0.968 1.633 -1.492 -1.446 0.271 0.175 3.794 0.050 
0.098 0.159 0.358 0.524 -0.102 0.069 0.537 0.604 
1.240 
 
2.170 -0.238 -0.525 0.201 0.091 2.513 0.131 
1.312 
(*) 
2.463 0.063 0.055 0.246 0.192 3.771 0.047 
0.620 1.750 1.058 2.294 0.326 0.072 2.937 0.129 
0.185 1.010 0.624
(*)
2.468 0.407 0.052 6.148 0.013 
0.474 1.716 -0.141 -0.318 0.064 0.140 1.581 0.238 
0.124 1.244 0.313 0.890 0.033 0.042 1.253 0.318 
0.233 0.984 1.775
(*)
2.448 0.639 0.085 9.869 0.007 
-0.011 -0.069 1.200
(**)
3.618 0.507 0.039 8.719 0.004 
-0.142 -0.305 0.508 1.146 -0.035 0.165 0.695 0.514 
0.147 0.910 -0.333 -2.256 0.313 0.027 2.824 0.137 
 
Table V.1: OLS estimates of the production function underlying our specification of 
the Verdoorn law for individual firms 
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 total 
number 
of obser-
vations 
valid 
number 
of obser-
vations 
number 
of obser-
vations in 
model 
deleted 
number of 
obser-
vations 
lambda  
(exogenous 
technological 
change) 
t-value of 
lambda 
Basic industry 232 232 226 6 0.032 
(**) 
3.151 
Food industry 140 140 131 9 0.031 
(***) 
3.993 
Media 105 104 95 9 0.052 
(***) 
5.408 
Engineering industry 241 241 226 15 0.018 
(**) 
2.653 
Construction industry 158 158 145 13 0.023 
(***) 
3.297 
Wholesale 215 215 207 8 0.032 
(***) 
3.432 
Financial services 224 217 209 8 0.057 
(***) 
3.520 
Retail 147 147 128 19 0.027 
(**) 
3.153 
Electronics industry 99 96 85 11 0.019 0.647 
   
Total population 1947 1925 1860 65 0.036 
(***) 
8.257 
Significance at the 5% level is indicated by (*), at the 1% level by (**) and at the 0.1% level by 
(***) 
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alpha 
(coefficient 
of change 
in capital) 
t-value 
of alpha 
beta  
(coefficient of 
change in 
labor) 
t-value 
of beta 
adjusted 
R-square 
standard 
error of 
estimate 
F-statistic significance 
level of 
model 
0.399 
(***) 
4.222 0.484
(***)
4.715 0.286 0.149 46.078 0.000 
0.118 
 
1.871 0.736
(***)
10.061 0.517 0.076 70.667 0.000 
0.102 
(*) 
2.438 0.618
(***)
8.740 0.589 0.080 68.424 0.000 
0.202 
(***) 
4.752 0.725
(***)
14.084 0.669 0.092 228.437 0.000 
0.079 
(*) 
2.167 0.871
(***)
13.581 0.704 0.074 171.882 0.000 
0.279 
(***) 
5.526 0.596
(***)
9.727 0.544 0.122 123.998 0.000 
0.363 
(***) 
6.370 0.600
(***)
5.981 0.386 0.203 66.400 0.000 
0.321 
(***) 
4.985 0.352
(***)
5.131 0.486 0.082 61.022 0.000 
0.476 
(**) 
3.393 0.745
(***)
3.903 0.515 0.233 45.664 0.000 
   
0.257 
(***) 
13.101 0.591
(***)
22.142 0.429 0.169 699.998 0.000 
 
Table V.2: OLS estimates of the production function underlying our specification of 
the Verdoorn law for industries and for the entire population 
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Name initial constant 
term 
(estimated a) 
initial coefficient 
(estimated b) 
lambda 
(exo-
genous 
techno-
logical 
change) 
alpha 
(coefficient 
of change 
in capital) 
beta (coeffi-
cient of 
change in 
labor) 
ABN-Amro 0.000 0.765
(***)
0.061
(*)
0.264 0.321 
AEGON -0.015 0.734
(***)
0.027 0.374 0.926 
(*) 
AKZO-Nobel 0.016 0.913
(***)
0.011 0.154 0.210 
ASM Lithography -0.185
(**)
0.597
(***)
-1.313 0.971 3.930 
(*) 
ASR 
Verzekeringsgroep 
-0.031
(*)
0.998
(***)
0.116 0.130 -0.441 
Athlon -0.037 0.362
(**)
-0.063 0.607 
(**) 
0.551 
(*) 
Beers -0.012 0.789
(**)
0.086
(**)
0.277 0.029 
CMG -0.081 0.393 0.218 -0.917 1.585 
 
Corus 0.035 0.819
(***)
0.007 0.985 
(*) 
-0.156 
DSM 0.034
(**)
0.834
(***)
0.070 0.372 
 
1.872 
(*) 
Getronics -0.001 0.105 0.047 -0.061 1.024 
(***) 
Grolsch 0.012 0.897
(***)
0.042 -0.496 0.868 
Grontmij 0.022 0.011 0.034
(*)
-0.011 0.656 
(***) 
HBG 0.045
(*)
-0.188 0.035
(*)
-0.096 0.678 
(**) 
Heijmans 0.061 -0.138 0.074
(**)
0.101 0.531 
(*) 
Heineken 0.012 0.316 0.022 0.673 
(*) 
0.207 
IHC Caland -0.018 0.303
(*)
-0.002 0.083 1.096 
(**) 
Imtech 0.030 0.998
(**)
0.006 0.652 
(*) 
-0.321 
ING Group -0.012 0.782
(***)
-0.023 1.796 
(**) 
-0.610 
KAS Bank -0.019 0.853
(***)
0.003 0.516 
(***) 
0.960 
(*) 
KPN 0.008 0.913
(**)
0.057
(**)
-0.325 0.458 
Nedap -0.020 0.667
(***)
0.055 -0.251 1.106 
(**) 
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average 
growth of 
capital input 
 
 
 
average 
growth of 
labor input 
delta correction on 
constant term 
(zèta) 
correction on 
coefficient 
(phi) 
corrected 
constant term 
(a) 
corrected 
coefficient (b) 
0.061 0.019 3.139 -0.137 1.423 0.137 -0.658 
0.152 0.046 3.272 -0.017 0.211 0.002 0.523 
0.028 -0.010 -2.979 -0.097 8.049 0.113 -7.136 
0.516 0.328 1.572 0.093 -0.176 -0.278 0.773 
0.118 0.029 4.114 1.500 -12.636 -1.531 13.634 
0.146 0.083 1.767 0.076 0.097 -0.113 0.265 
0.112 0.036 3.119 -2.864 23.743 2.852 -22.954 
0.347 0.258 1.342 0.478 -1.616 -0.559 2.009 
0.003 -0.028 -0.101 0.017 3.817 0.018 -2.998 
0.037 -0.030 -1.217 0.012 -0.369 0.022 1.203 
0.209 0.278 0.750 0.002 0.014 -0.003 0.091 
0.024 -0.009 -2.581 -0.029 1.258 0.041 -0.361 
0.084 0.032 2.673 0.002 -0.056 0.020 0.067 
0.029 -0.012 -2.442 -0.013 0.519 0.058 -0.707 
0.218 0.118 1.838 -0.036 0.298 0.097 -0.436 
0.072 0.044 1.627 -0.090 0.812 0.102 -0.496 
0.225 0.115 1.952 0.000 0.042 -0.018 0.261 
0.008 -0.025 -0.313 0.007 0.821 0.023 0.177 
0.109 0.039 2.777 -0.044 1.076 0.032 -0.294 
0.111 0.031 3.566 -0.002 0.147 -0.017 0.706 
0.036 
 
 
-0.003 -11.188 -0.110 2.649 0.118 -1.736 
0.092 
 
0.046 2.009 0.042 -0.531 -0.062 1.198 
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Name initial constant 
term 
(estimated a) 
initial coefficient 
(estimated b) 
lambda 
(exo-
genous 
techno-
logical 
change) 
alpha 
(coefficient 
of change 
in capital) 
beta (coeffi-
cient of 
change in 
labor) 
NIB Capital -0.061
(***)
1.067
(***)
0.123 0.968 -1.492 
Otra 0.006 0.747
(*)
0.051 0.098 0.358 
P&C Group 0.031 0.926
(**)
-0.029 1.240 
 
-0.238 
Philips 0.032
(*)
0.979
(***)
0.026 1.312 
(*) 
0.063 
Polygram -0.024 0.610
(*)
-0.040 0.620 1.058 
 
Polynorm -0.009 0.378
(*)
0.032 0.185 0.624 
(*) 
Reed Elsevier -0.011 0.906
(***)
0.045 0.474 -0.141 
Schuitema -0.001 0.820
(**)
0.038
(*)
0.124 0.313 
SNS Bank -0.015 0.661
(***)
-0.011 0.233 1.775 
(*) 
Telegraaf 0.011 0.485
(**)
0.033
(*)
-0.011 1.200 
(**) 
Ten Cate 0.011 0.827
(***)
0.060 -0.142 0.508 
Significance at the 5% level is indicated by (*), at the 1% level by (**) and at the 0.1% level by 
(***) 
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average 
growth of 
capital input 
 
 
 
average 
growth of 
labor input 
delta correction on 
constant term 
(zeta) 
correction on 
coefficient 
(phi) 
corrected 
constant term 
(a) 
corrected 
coefficient (b) 
0.099 0.053 1.873 0.465 -3.133 -0.526 4.200 
0.039 0.010 4.067 -0.074 1.196 0.080 -0.449 
0.025 -0.026 -0.958 -0.102 1.710 0.133 -0.784 
0.017 -0.029 -0.583 -0.447 -3.539 0.479 4.518 
0.148 0.071 2.103 0.021 -0.064 -0.045 0.674 
0.103 0.064 1.592 -0.016 0.217 0.007 0.161 
0.100 0.023 4.269 0.341 -4.262 -0.352 5.168 
0.069 0.010 6.878 -0.089 1.941 0.088 -1.121 
0.176 0.049 3.623 0.002 0.050 -0.017 0.611 
0.058 0.014 4.212 0.001 -0.024 0.010 0.509 
0.042 0.004 10.424 -0.179 3.277 0.190 -2.450 
 
Table V.3: Calculated corrections on the Verdoorn coefficient and the constant term 
for changes in the capital-labor ratio for individual firms 
Appendix V 
490 
 
 initial constant 
term 
(estimated a) 
initial coefficient 
(estimated b) 
lambda 
(exo-
genous 
techno-
logical 
change) 
alpha 
(coefficient 
of change 
in capital) 
beta (coeffi-
cient of 
change in 
labor) 
Basic industry 0.008 0.672
(***)
0.032
(**)
0.399 
(***) 
0.484 
(***) 
Food industry 0.003 0.322
(***)
0.031
(***)
0.118 
 
0.736 
(***) 
Media 0.024
(*)
0.177
(**)
0.052
(***)
0.102 
(*) 
0.618 
(***) 
Engineering industry -0.002 0.261
(***)
0.018
(**)
0.202 
(***) 
0.725 
(***) 
Construction industry 0.004 0.234
(***)
0.023
(***)
0.079 
(*) 
0.871 
(***) 
Wholesale 0.002 0.346
(***)
0.032
(***)
0.279 
(***) 
0.596 
(***) 
Financial services -0.021
(*)
0.606
(***)
0.057
(***)
0.363 
(***) 
0.600 
(***) 
Retail -0.006 0.297
(***)
0.027
(**)
0.321 
(***) 
0.352 
(***) 
Electronics industry -0.018 0.511
(***)
0.019 0.476 
(**) 
0.745 
(***) 
   
Total population -0.014
(***)
0.476 0.036
(***)
0.257 
(***) 
0.591 
(***) 
Significance at the 5% level is indicated by (*), at the 1% level by (**) and at the 0.1% level by 
(***) 
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average 
growth of 
capital input 
 
 
 
average 
growth of 
labor input 
delta correction on 
constant term 
(zeta) 
correction on 
coefficient 
(phi) 
corrected 
constant term 
(a) 
corrected 
coefficient (b) 
0.026 0.008 3.386 -0.049 0.697 0.057 -0.025 
0.061 0.047 1.310 -0.007 0.076 0.010 0.246 
0.127 0.063 2.009 -0.021 0.238 0.045 -0.061 
0.090 0.065 1.376 -0.007 0.104 0.005 0.157 
0.111 0.061 1.822 -0.004 0.072 0.008 0.162 
0.081 0.062 1.307 -0.020 0.169 0.022 0.177 
0.129 0.080 1.619 -0.047 0.220 0.026 0.386 
0.080 0.064 1.250 -0.041 0.601 0.035 -0.304 
0.158 0.087 1.826 -0.014 0.084 -0.004 0.427 
   
0.103 0.071 1.443 -0.023 0.218 0.009 0.258 
 
Table V.4: Calculated corrections on the Verdoorn coefficient and the constant term 
for changes in the capital-labor ratio for industries and for the entire population 
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Name initial  
constant  
term 
(estimated 
a) 
initial 
coefficient 
(estimated b) 
lambda (exo-
genous techno-
logical change)
alpha 
(coefficient of 
change in 
capital) 
beta 
(coefficient of 
change in 
labor) 
ABN-Amro nonsign. 0.765
(***)
0.061
(*)
nonsign. nonsign. 
AEGON nonsign. 0.734
(***)
nonsign. nonsign. 0.926 
(*) 
AKZO-Nobel nonsign. 0.913
(***)
nonsign. nonsign. nonsign. 
ASM Lithography -0.185 
(**) 
0.597
(***)
nonsign. nonsign. 3.930 
(*) 
ASR  
Verzekeringsgroep 
-0.031 
(*) 
0.998
(***)
nonsign. nonsign. nonsign. 
Athlon nonsign. 0.362
(**)
nonsign. 0.607
(**)
0.551 
(*) 
Beers nonsign. 0.789
(**)
0.086
(**)
nonsign. nonsign. 
CMG nonsign. nonsign. nonsign. nonsign. nonsign. 
Corus nonsign. 0.819
(***)
nonsign. 0.985
(*)
nonsign. 
DSM 0.034 
(**) 
0.834
(***)
nonsign. nonsign. 1.872 
(*) 
Getronics nonsign. nonsign. nonsign. nonsign. 1.024 
(***) 
Grolsch nonsign. 0.897
(***)
nonsign. nonsign. nonsign. 
Grontmij nonsign. nonsign. 0.034 nonsign. 0.656 
HBG 0.045 
(*) 
nonsign. 0.035
(*)
nonsign. 0.678 
(***) 
Heijmans nonsign. nonsign. 0.074
(**)
nonsign. 0.531 
(*) 
Heineken nonsign. nonsign. nonsign. 0.673
(*)
nonsign. 
IHC Caland nonsign. 0.303
(*)
nonsign. nonsign. 1.096 
(**) 
Imtech nonsign. 0.998
(**)
nonsign. 0.652
(*)
nonsign. 
ING Group nonsign. 0.782
(***)
nonsign. 1.796
(**)
nonsign. 
KAS Bank nonsign. 0.853
(***)
nonsign. 0.516
(***)
0.960 
(*) 
KPN nonsign. 0.913
(**)
0.057
(**)
nonsign. nonsign. 
Nedap nonsign. 0.667
(***)
nonsign. nonsign. 1.106 
(**) 
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average 
growth of 
capital input 
 
 
average 
growth of 
labor input 
delta correction on 
constant term 
(zeta) 
correction on 
coefficient 
(phi) 
corrected 
constant term 
(a) 
corrected 
coefficient (b) 
0.061 0.019 3.139 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.152 0.046 3.272 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.028 -0.010 -2.979 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.516 0.328 1.572 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.118 0.029 4.114 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.146 0.083 1.767 n.a. 0.097 n.a. 0.265 
0.112 0.036 3.119 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.347 0.258 1.342 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.003 -0.028 -0.101 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.037 -0.030 -1.217 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.209 0.278 0.750 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.024 -0.009 -2.581 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.084 0.032 2.673 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.029 -0.012 -2.442 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.218 0.118 1.838 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.072 0.044 1.627 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.225 0.115 1.952 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.008 -0.025 -0.313 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.109 0.039 2.777 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.111 0.031 3.566 n.a. 0.147 n.a. 0.706 
0.036 -0.003 -11.188 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.092 0.046 2.009 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
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Name initial  
constant  
term  
(estimated a) 
initial 
coefficient 
(estimated 
b) 
lambda (exo-
genous techno-
logical change)
alpha (coefficient 
of change in 
capital) 
beta 
(coefficient of 
change in 
labor) 
NIB Capital -0.061
(***)
1.067
(***)
nonsign. nonsign. nonsign. 
Otra nonsign. 0.747
(*)
nonsign. nonsign. nonsign. 
P&C Group nonsign. 0.926
(**)
nonsign. nonsign. nonsign. 
Philips 0.032
(*)
0.979
(***)
nonsign. 1.312
(*)
nonsign. 
Polygram nonsign. 0.610
(*)
nonsign. nonsign. nonsign. 
Polynorm nonsign. 0.378
(*)
nonsign. nonsign. 0.624 
(*) 
Reed Elsevier nonsign. 0.906
(***)
nonsign. nonsign. nonsign. 
Schuitema nonsign. 0.820
(**)
0.038
(*)
nonsign. nonsign. 
SNS Bank nonsign. 0.661
(***)
nonsign. nonsign. 1.775 
(*) 
Telegraaf nonsign. 0.485
(**)
0.033
(*)
nonsign. 1.200 
(**) 
Ten Cate nonsign. 0.827
(***)
nonsign. nonsign. nonsign. 
Significance at the 5% level is indicated by (*), at the 1% level by (**) and at the 0.1% level by 
(***) 
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average 
growth of 
capital input 
 
average 
growth of 
labor input 
delta correction on 
constant term 
(zeta) 
correction on 
coefficient 
(phi) 
corrected 
constant term 
(a) 
corrected 
coefficient (b) 
0.099 0.053 1.873 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.039 0.010 4.067 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.025 -0.026 -0.958 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.017 -0.029 -0.583 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.148 0.071 2.103 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.103 0.064 1.592 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.100 0.023 4.269 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.069 0.010 6.878 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.176 0.049 3.623 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.058 0.014 4.212 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.042 0.004 10.424 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
Table V.5: Actual corrections on the Verdoorn coefficient and the constant term for 
changes in the capital-labor ratio for individual firms 
 
Appendix V 
496 
 
Name initial  
constant  
term  
(estimated a)
initial 
coefficient 
(estimated b) 
lambda 
(exo-genous 
techno-
logical 
change) 
alpha 
(coefficient 
of change in 
capital) 
beta 
(coefficient of 
change in 
labor) 
Basic industry nonsign. 0.672
(***)
0.032
(**)
0.399
(***)
0.484 
(***) 
Food industry nonsign. 0.322
(***)
0.031
(***)
nonsign. 0.736 
(***) 
Media 0.024
(*)
0.177
(**)
0.052
(***)
0.102
(*)
0.618 
(***) 
Engineering industry nonsign. 0.261
(***)
0.018
(**)
0.202
(***)
0.725 
(***) 
Construction industry nonsign. 0.234
(***)
0.023
(***)
0.079
(*)
0.871 
(***) 
Wholesale nonsign. 0.346
(***)
0.032
(***)
0.279
(***)
0.596 
(***) 
Financial services -0.021
(*)
0.606
(***)
0.057
(***)
0.363
(***)
0.600 
(***) 
Retail nonsign. 0.297
(***)
0.027
(**)
0.321
(***)
0.352 
(***) 
Electronics industry nonsign. 0.511
(***)
nonsign. 0.476
(**)
0.745 
(***) 
  
Total population -0.014
(***)
0.476
(***)
0.036
(***)
0.257
(***)
0.591 
(***) 
Significance at the 5% level is indicated by (*), at the 1% level by (**) and at the 0.1% level by 
(***) 
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average 
growth of 
capital input 
 
 
average 
growth of 
labor input 
delta correction on 
constant term 
(zeta) 
correction on 
coefficient 
(phi) 
corrected 
constant term 
(a) 
corrected 
coefficient (b) 
0.026 0.008 3.386 -0.049 0.697 n.a. -0.025 
0.061 0.047 1.310 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.127 0.063 2.009 -0.021 0.238 0.045 -0.061 
0.090 0.065 1.376 -0.007 0.104 n.a. 0.157 
0.111 0.061 1.822 -0.004 0.072 n.a. 0.162 
0.081 0.062 1.307 -0.020 0.169 n.a. 0.177 
0.129 0.080 1.619 -0.047 0.220 0.026 0.386 
0.080 0.064 1.250 -0.041 0.601 n.a. -0.304 
0.158 0.087 1.826 n.a. 0.084 n.a. 0.427 
   
0.103 0.071 1.443 -0.023 0.218 0.009 0.258 
   
Table V.6: Actual corrections on the Verdoorn coefficient and the constant term for 
changes in the capital-labor ratio for industries and for the entire population 
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Name initial 
coefficient 
(estimated 
b) 
alpha 
(coefficient 
of change 
in capital) 
beta 
(coefficient of 
change in 
labor) 
average growth of 
capital input 
average 
growth 
of 
output 
gamma correction 
on 
coefficient 
(theta) 
corrected 
coefficient 
(b) 
Athlon 0.362 
(**) 
0.607
(**)
0.551
(*)
0.146 0.071 2.054 1.161 -0.799 
Getronics 0.105 -0.061 1.024
(***)
0.209 0.319 0.654 0.021 0.084 
Bank Mendes Gans 0.553 
(*) 
0.055 0.689 -0.023 0.054 -0.424 -0.114 0.667 
Vendex KBB 2.451 
(**) 
0.147 -0.333 -0.043 0.013 -3.308 1.902 0.549 
Construction industry 0.234 
(***) 
0.079
(*)
0.871
(***)
0.111 0.085 1.301 0.027 0.207 
Total population 0.476 
(***) 
0.257
(***)
0.591
(***)
0.103 0.104 0.986 -0.006 0.482 
Table V.7: Calculated corrections on the Verdoorn coefficient for changes in the 
capital-output ratio 
 
Name Initial 
coefficient 
(estimated 
b) 
alpha 
(coefficien
t of 
change in 
capital) 
beta 
(coefficient 
of change 
in labor) 
average 
growth of 
capital 
input 
average 
growth of 
output 
gamma correction 
on 
coefficient 
(theta) 
corrected 
coefficient 
(b) 
Athlon 0.362 
(**) 
0.607
(**)
0.551
(*)
0.146 0.071 2.054 1.161 -0.799 
Getronics nonsign. nonsign. 1.024
(***)
0.209 0.319 0.654 n.a. n.a. 
Bank Mendes Gans 0.553 
(*) 
nonsign. nonsign. -0.023 0.054 -0.424 n.a. n.a. 
Vendex KBB 2.451 
(**) 
nonsign. nonsign. -0.043 0.013 -3.308 n.a. n.a. 
Construction industry 0.234 
(***) 
0.079
(*)
0.871
(***)
0.111 0.085 1.301 0.027 0.207 
Total population 0.476 
(***) 
0.257
(***)
0.591
(***)
0.103 0.104 0.986 -0.006 0.482 
Table V.8: Actual corrections on the Verdoorn coefficient for changes in the capital-
output ratio 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
What is increasing returns? 
This thesis is about increasing returns, positive feedback effects in markets and firms. 
Positive feedback means that success causes further success and failure causes 
further failure.  
 
In markets and firms there are four mechanisms of increasing returns: network 
effects, social interaction effects, scale effects and learning effects. Increasing returns 
is therefore a broader concept than the traditional increasing returns to scale, which 
only includes scale effects. Of the four mechanisms, network effects and social 
interaction effects are market-based and scale effects and learning effects are firm-
based. 
1. Network effects occur when the usefulness of a product becomes larger as its 
network of users grows in size. Network size is determined by the number 
of suppliers and users of products based on a common technological 
standard. The larger the network, the more attractive it becomes for non-
users to buy the product, thereby increasing the size of the network. An 
example is computer operating software: the larger the network of users, the 
easier it becomes to exchange files worldwide, the more attractive the 
software, the more it is sold, the larger the network. In other words, there is 
a positive feedback loop or increasing returns. 
2. Social interaction effects occur when the opinions or expectations of a 
customer with regard to a product are dependent on the opinions or 
expectations of others. The more customers that have a preference for a 
certain product, or an expectation that a certain technology will become the 
market standard, the more other customers will copy these preferences and 
expectations, thus making the product more popular, causing the technology 
indeed becoming the market standard. Here, we also see a positive feedback 
loop. 
3. Scale effects occur when there is a positive relation between the scale at 
which a firm operates and its productivity. In other words: larger scale 
production causes lower unit costs. This is a well-known effect that in itself 
is not yet increasing returns as we define it because there is no positive 
feedback loop. The firm can create such a positive feedback loop by using 
the lower unit cost either to lower its product price or to increase its 
customer value. This will improve the firm’s competitive position in the 
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market, causing more demand for the firm’s products, causing a larger scale 
of production and thus again lower unit costs. This closes the positive 
feedback loop is closed and thus the firm realizes increasing returns. 
4. Learning effects occur when there is a positive relation between the 
cumulative production of the firm and its productivity. In other words: the 
growth in knowledge and experience, which increases over time, will result 
in lower unit costs. This can result from conscious training, from 
technological change or from learning-by-doing. For learning effects, the 
reasoning is the same as for scale effects: they are not increasing returns in 
themselves. Only when the firm creates a positive feedback loop by 
investing the acquired cost advantage in lowering product prices or 
increasing customer value, can we speak of increasing returns. 
 
The four mechanisms of increasing returns, and the ways in which they cause 
positive feedback effects, are sketched in the figure below. 
 
Social
interaction
effects
Scale
effects
Number of
(potential)
customers
Production
volume
Size of the
network
Network
effects
Learning
effects
Market-based mechanisms
of increasing returns
Firm-based mechanisms
of increasing returns
 
The mechanisms of increasing returns 
 
Why study increasing returns? Aims and goals 
Why would it be interesting to study increasing returns and the four mechanisms 
described? Almost everyone knows the law of diminishing returns, which states that 
putting in increasing effort will eventually lead to decreasing rise of output. Yet there 
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are reasons to study the opposite, i.e., increasing returns. First, increasing returns 
mechanisms are actually present in markets and firms and have a considerable 
influence on firm performance. Second, in our current information and knowledge 
society, with its dense networks of electronic connectivity, increasing returns 
mechanisms are becoming more important. We need only to look at the ICT industry, 
and at firms like Microsoft, Cisco or Nokia, to see all four increasing returns 
mechanisms at work. Third it is an appealing concept: we put effort in and get 
progressively more out in return! That sounds like a free lunch, a compelling yet 
doubtful concept. Yet, if we look more carefully, the presence of increasing returns 
mechanisms is a precondition for any system to grow. Fourth, we are in good 
company as economists since Adam Smith have found it worthwhile to study this 
topic. 
 
Four goals were set in this thesis: 
• Could we, from a management perspective, develop an integral concept of 
increasing returns? 
• Could we create insight into the mechanisms of increasing returns by 
measuring them? 
• Could we empirically, i.e., based on real-world data, analyze the relations 
between those mechanisms and the consequences of these mechanisms for 
business performance? 
• Could we, using the above knowledge, define a number of building blocks 
that managers can use to understand the consequences of increasing returns 
for their market and their firm, enabling them to take strategic action and 
thereby improve their firms’ performance? 
 
To realize these goals we used a well-known framework taken from industrial 
organization theory, the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, following the 
research of, among others, Michael Porter.  
 
Basic reasoning 
The basic reasoning underpinning this framework is that what happens in the market 
influences the performance of firms, through the behavior of these firms. In this 
thesis, network effects and social interaction effects are indicative of what happens in 
the market and scale effects and learning effects are indicative of the behavior of the 
firm, see the figure below. 
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Basic framework 
 
Reasoning further within this framework, the presence of network effects and social 
interaction effects causes a battle for the technological standard in the market. The 
consequences of this battle are that: 
• competition will take place on the network level instead of on the product 
level: a very high-quality product with a small network of users may easily 
lose the battle to a good-enough product with a large network of users 
• the outcome of the technology battle cannot be predicted in advance: 
multiple outcomes are possible, usually with one of the technologies taking 
a dominant position, winner-takes-all 
• the market may lock in, meaning that an existing technology becomes so 
established that users will find the investments required for a newer or 
qualitatively better technology prohibitive and therefore will be stuck with 
the existing technology 
• the market may show excessive behavior, either not taking off at all because 
all the players wait for each other to invest first, or taking off spectacularly 
fast because all the players imitate each other an do not want to be last-to-
market 
• the market may be path dependent, meaning that a small chance event in 
history, amplified by positive feedback can have a large influence on the 
market outcome 
• the market may be imperfect and/or inefficient, meaning that the best 
technology does not necessarily win the technology battle 
 
In this thesis we reason that these market consequences give rise to a potential for 
individual firms to achieve scale and learning effects. An individual firm could gain, 
depending on its strategy and management skills, a large part of the potential market. 
Generic increasing returns strategies that firms could follow are: 
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• A shaper strategy, i.e., a firm sponsoring its own proprietary technology 
that will generate high returns if it becomes dominant in the market. Firms 
following such a strategy enjoy the largest potential for scale and learning 
effects; however, such a strategy is both costly and risky, which means that 
only a few firms can afford to develop and implement it. 
• A follower strategy, i.e., a firm joining the dominant technology network by 
acquiring a license to develop products based on this technology. In a 
situation where the firm is not a sponsor of the dominant technology, it may 
nevertheless profit from the potential for scale and learning effects created 
by the dominant technology, by offering products or technologies that are 
compatible with, and complementary to, this technology. 
• Reserving the right to play, i.e., a firm can postpone the decision to commit 
itself to a technology network until it becomes clear which technology 
network will dominate the market; doing all that is necessary to create or 
keep open opportunities in order to acquire a strong position at a later stage. 
 
Whether an individual firm is also able to exploit any advantage from an increasing 
returns strategy is dependent on the generic competitive strategy it follows. 
Following a cost-leadership strategy, the firm will lower its product prices and 
acquire a competitive advantage by being the cheapest in the market. Following a 
differentiation strategy, the firm will increase its customer value and acquire a 
competitive advantage by offering unique value in the market. 
 
This reasoning led us to construct the following research model. 
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Research model 
 
Research and results 
Three empirical studies were conducted for which new measurement models were 
constructed and tested and for which primary and secondary data was collected and 
analyzed. The first and second empirical studies were survey studies; the third was an 
analysis of the developments in firms’ productivity over time, based on financial 
data. The results of all three studies support the presented research model, which 
means that the presence of network effects and social interaction effects in the market 
influence firm performance, but always through the realization of scale and learning 
effects in the firm. This means that in an increasing returns market the management 
of the firm is an important factor for determining firm performance.  
 
Management implications 
The implications for management presented in this thesis are threefold. First, it is 
important for managers to understand the mechanisms of increasing returns in their 
markets and their firms, the relations between those mechanisms and the 
consequences for business performance. A number of building blocks are presented 
in this thesis that can be used to assist managers to understand their firms’ situations. 
See the figure below. 
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Management implications 
 
Second, managers will need to recognize and estimate the increasing returns 
sensitivity of their market and their firm. A number of measurement instruments are 
presented in this thesis that can be used to support managers to do so. The 
questionnaire used for measuring network effects and social interaction effects in the 
market was tested thoroughly and was found to be a reliable and valid measurement 
instrument for this goal. A measurement instrument was developed of the relation 
between output and productivity for measuring scale and learning effects. This 
relation is known as Verdoorn’s law at the country and industry level and in this 
thesis Verdoorn’s law has been applied at the firm level for the first time. An 
equivalent model was developed to measure the relation between productivity and 
business performance. These analyses have been made, and are available from the 
author, for larger Dutch firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (AEX). Such 
analyses can also be made for all other firms, provided the necessary financial data 
are made available. 
 
Third, managers should be able to fathom the strategic implications of the presence 
of increasing returns in their markets and firms. This will enable them to take 
strategic actions to exploit business opportunities arising from increasing returns and 
to avoid pitfalls, resulting in better business performance. 
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In summary, competing in increasing returns markets is certainly more risky and it 
requires different management skills than competing in traditional markets. This 
might give the impression that it is like playing a game of Russian roulette, in which 
managers and their firms are at the mercy of erratic market forces. We think this is 
not the whole truth: we think that, provided that managers understand the 
mechanisms of increasing returns and their consequences, they are certainly capable 
of dealing with the challenges of competing in increasing returns markets. 
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SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 
Wat is increasing returns? 
Dit proefschrift gaat over increasing returns92, positieve feedback effecten in markten 
en bedrijven.93 Positieve feedback betekent dat de outputs van een systeem, dus een 
markt of een bedrijf, een positieve invloed hebben op de inputs ervan. Hierdoor 
zullen toenemende inputs leiden tot progressief toenemende outputs. In 
managementtermen betekent dit dat succes leidt tot vermeerderd succes en falen tot 
vermeerderd falen. 
 
Uit de literatuurstudie die voor dit proefschrift is uitgevoerd, blijkt dat er in markten 
en bedrijven vier mechanismen van positieve feedback zijn, de mechanismen van 
increasing returns: netwerkeffecten, sociale interactie-effecten, schaaleffecten en 
leereffecten. Van deze mechanismen zijn netwerkeffecten en sociale interactie-
effecten gerelateerd aan de markt en schaaleffecten en leereffecten gerelateerd aan 
het bedrijf. 
 
1. Netwerkeffecten treden op als de gebruiksmogelijkheden van een product 
toenemen naarmate het gebruikersnetwerk groter wordt. Het gebruikersnetwerk 
bestaat uit alle gebruikers en aanbieders van het product. Door het groter worden van 
dit netwerk wordt het aantrekkelijker voor niet-gebruikers om het product eveneens 
aan te schaffen, waardoor het netwerk weer wordt vergroot. Op deze wijze ontstaat 
dus een positieve feedback loop. We spreken hier van directe netwerkeffecten. Een 
voorbeeld is de besturingssoftware van een computer: hoe groter het netwerk van 
gebruikers, hoe gemakkelijker het wordt om wereldwijd bestanden uit te wisselen, 
hoe aantrekkelijker weer het product, hoe meer verkocht, hoe groter het netwerk. De 
gebruiksmogelijkheden van een product nemen eveneens toe als het netwerk van 
complementaire producten groter wordt, dat wil zeggen, wanneer er meer producten 
op de markt komen die samen met dit product te gebruiken zijn. We spreken hier van 
indirecte netwerkeffecten.  
 
Een voorbeeld is het gebruik van besturingssoftware van een computer samen met de 
toepassingsprogramma’s: hoe meer toepassingsprogramma’s er beschikbaar zijn, hoe 
                                                          
92 In het Nederlands kan increasing returns worden vertaald als toenemende meeropbrengsten. 
Ik geef echter de voorkeur aan het gebruik van increasing returns. 
93 Let op! Deze definitie wijkt af van de gebruikelijke economische definitie van increasing 
returns. 
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aantrekkelijker het besturingsprogramma, hoe aantrekkelijker het voor aanbieders 
wordt om nieuwe toepassingsprogramma’s te ontwikkelen. 
 
2. Sociale interactie-effecten treden op als de voorkeuren of verwachtingen van een 
gebruiker ten aanzien van een product afhankelijk zijn van de voorkeuren of 
verwachtingen van andere gebruikers. Bij afhankelijkheid van voorkeuren spreken 
we van informatie-uitwisseling, bij afhankelijkheid van verwachtingen spreken we 
van zelfversterkende verwachtingen. Voorbeelden van informatie-uitwisseling zijn 
hypes en modeverschijnselen waarbij gebruikers elkaars voorkeuren overnemen en 
vaak ook elkaars gedrag kopiëren. Hoe meer gebruikers een voorkeuren voor een 
bepaald product hebben, hoe meer andere gebruikers deze voorkeur zullen 
overnemen. Op deze wijze ontstaat een positieve feedback loop.  
 
Een voorbeeld van zelfversterkende verwachtingen bij nieuw op de markt komende 
technologieën is het volgende: wanneer veel gebruikers verwachten dat technologie 
A de marktstandaard zal worden, zullen andere gebruikers hiermee in hun 
aanschafgedrag rekening houden, door producten gebaseerd op technologie A te 
kopen en producten gebaseerd op technologie B juist niet te kopen, waardoor 
technologie A ook inderdaad de marktstandaard wordt. Ook in dit geval is er sprake 
van een positieve feedback loop. 
 
3. Schaaleffecten treden op als er een positieve relatie is tussen de schaal waarop een 
bedrijf opereert en de productiviteit van het bedrijf. Met andere woorden: een grotere 
schaal van produceren leidt tot lagere kosten per eenheid product. Dit kan te maken 
hebben met de vaste kosten: als de schaal van productie groter wordt, kunnen de 
vaste kosten over een groter aantal producten worden uitgesmeerd, waardoor de vaste 
kosten per eenheid product lager zullen worden. Het kan ook te maken hebben met 
de variabele kosten: als de schaal van productie groter wordt kan er voordeliger in 
grotere hoeveelheden worden ingekocht, waardoor de variabele kosten per eenheid 
product lager zullen worden.  
 
Het is van groot belang te onderkennen dat het optreden van schaaleffecten als 
hierboven beschreven nog niet betekent dat er ook sprake is van increasing returns. 
Hiervoor moet in onze defnitie  immers sprake zijn van een positieve feedback loop. 
Een dergelijke loop ontstaat pas waneer het bedrijf de lagere kosten per eenheid 
product gebruikt om ófwel de prijs van het product in de markt te verlagen, ófwel de 
waarde van het product voor de klant te verhogen. Onder voorwaarden dat (1) er 
voldoende vraag is in de markt, (2) de prijs-elasticiteit voldoende hoog is en (3) het 
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bedrijf met het verlagen van de prijs of het verhogen van de klantwaarde in staat is de 
positie ten opzichte van concurrenten te verbeteren, zal de vraag naar de producten 
van dit bedrijf toenemen, waardoor de kosten per eenheid lager zullen worden. 
Alleen als dit het geval is, is de positieve feedback loop gesloten en spreken we van 
increasing returns. 
 
4. Leereffecten treden op als er een positieve relatie is tussen de cumulatieve 
productiegrootte tot nu toe en de productiviteit van een bedrijf. Met andere woorden: 
de groeiende kennis en ervaring die in de loop van de tijd door het bedrijf wordt 
opgebouwd zal leiden tot lagere kosten per eenheid product. Zulke groeiende kennis 
en ervaring kan het resultaat zijn van een drietal onderscheiden processen. Ten 
eerste, het proces van gepland leren, het verhogen van kennis door bewuste actie van 
het management. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn trainingen, bewust doorgevoerde 
procesverbeteringen of het inhuren van beter gekwalificeerde medewerkers. Ten 
tweede, het proces van exogeen leren: het verhogen van kennis door oorzaken die 
buiten het bedrijf liggen. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn verbeterde kwalificaties van de 
beroepsbevolking, kennis-spillovers tussen bedrijven of tussen bedrijven en 
universiteiten, of exogene technologische veranderingen. Ten derde, het proces van 
autonoom leren, ofwel learning-by-doing. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn verbetering van 
efficiency door een bepaalde taak vaker uit te voeren, de leercurve, en het door 
toepassing van bestaande kennis of technologie verkrijgen van nieuwe kennis of 
technologie, endogene technologische verandering.  
 
Ten aanzien van leereffecten en increasing returns geldt eenzelfde redenering als bij 
schaaleffecten: leereffecten op zich zijn nog geen increasing returns. Zij worden dit 
pas wanneer het door leereffecten verkregen kostenvoordeel wordt gebruikt om 
prijzen te verlagen of klantwaarde te verhogen, waardoor de vraag naar de producten 
van het bedrijf toeneemt. Met andere woorden, ook leereffecten zijn pas increasing 
returns wanneer de positieve feedback loop gesloten is. 
 
De vier mechanismen van increasing returns, en de wijze waarop ze tot positieve 
feedback leiden, zijn in de onderstaande figuur weergegeven. 
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De mechanismen van increasing returns 
 
Waarom increasing returns bestuderen? 
Waarom is het nu interessant om het verschijnsel increasing returns, en de vier 
beschreven mechanismen in het bijzonder, te bestuderen? Tenslotte kent bijna 
iedereen de wet van de afnemende meeropbrengsten, een wet die keer op keer is 
bewezen en die stelt dat toenemende inspanningen uiteindelijk tot minder stijging 
van output zullen leiden. Er is een viertal redenen te geven waarom het toch 
interessant is om naar het tegenovergestelde, toenemende meeropbrengsten, ofwel 
naar increasing returns te kijken. De eerste is dat increasing returns daadwerkelijk 
binnen markten en bedrijven aanwezig lijkt te zijn en een belangrijke invloed lijkt te 
hebben op de prestaties van bedrijven. Een tweede is dat increasing returns in onze 
huidige informatie- en kennismaatschappij met zijn sterk verknoopte elektronische 
netwerken aan belang lijkt te winnen. We hoeven maar naar de ICT-sector en naar 
bedrijven als Microsoft, Cisco of Nokia te kijken om alle vier de increasing returns 
mechanismen aan het werk te zien. Een derde reden is dat increasing returns een zeer 
aansprekend, maar tegelijkertijd zeer verdacht concept is: inputs die leiden tot 
progressief toenemende outputs, succes dat leidt tot meer succes? Dat ruikt naar 
‘zelfrijzend bakmeel’ en piramidespelen. Toch is, bij nader inzien, increasing returns 
een essentiële voorwaarde voor economische groei, op landenniveau zowel als op 
bedrijfsniveau: waar zou groei immers vandaan moeten komen als dergelijke 
mechanismen niet ergens in het economisch systeem aanwezig zouden zijn? Een 
vierde reden voor het bestuderen van increasing returns is dat we ons in goed 
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gezelschap bevinden: economen sinds Adam Smith hebben het de moeite waarde 
gevonden om zich met het onderwerp bezig te houden. 
 
Doelstellingen van het proefschrift 
De centrale doelstellingen van dit proefschrift zijn afgeleid van de eerste 
bovengenoemde reden: 
1. Kunnen we, vanuit een managementperspectief, bijdragen aan de 
ontwikkeling van een integraal concept van increasing returns, dus een 
concept waarin alle vier de genoemde mechanismen, de marktgerelateerde 
zowel als de bedrijfsgerelateerde, verenigd zijn? 
2. Kunnen we het optreden van deze mechanismen in markten en bedrijven 
inzichtelijk maken door ze te meten? 
3. Kunnen we empirisch analyseren wat de relaties tussen deze mechanismen 
zijn en wat de consequenties zijn van het optreden van deze mechanismen 
voor de prestaties van bedrijven? 
4. Kunnen we, als we deze kennis hebben, een aantal bouwblokken definiëren 
die managers kunnen gebruiken om de consequenties van increasing returns 
voor hun markt en bedrijf te begrijpen, zodat ze op die basis strategische 
acties kunnen ondernemen om de prestaties van hun bedrijf te verbeteren? 
 
Om deze doelstellingen te verwezenlijken is gebruik gemaakt van een bekend 
framework uit de managementwetenschappen, namelijk het structure-conduct-
performance paradigma uit de industrial organization theory of the firm. Om precies 
te zijn hebben we hierbij een gedragsbenadering gevolgd, omdat we van mening zijn 
dat de gedragingen van bedrijven een wezenlijke invloed hebben, en volgden we de 
Harvard-traditie, gebruik makend van en voortbouwend op het werk van onder 
andere Michael Porter, omdat we van mening zijn dat marktimperfecties een 
wezenlijke rol spelen bij de te bestuderen materie. 
 
Literatuurstudie 
Op basis van dit framework is allereerst een uitgebreide literatuurstudie verricht. 
Deze bestaat uit twee delen. Het eerste deel is een uitgebreide kwalitatieve 
beschrijving van de geschiedenis van het economisch denken over increasing returns, 
beginnend in het tijdperk voor Adam Smith en via nieuwe benaderingen zoals 
endogene groeitheorie, complexity science en social economics eindigend bij de 
hedendaagse managementwetenschappen.  
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Het tweede deel is een gedetailleerde analyse van 96 historische en hedendaagse 
publicaties op het gebied van increasing returns. De belangrijkste bevindingen van 
deze literatuurstudie zijn dat:  
• de literatuur geclassificeerd kan worden volgens de vier mechanismen van 
increasing returns 
• netwerkeffecten en sociale interactie-effecten gezien kunnen worden als 
deel van marktstructuur (structure in ons framework) en schaaleffecten en 
leereffecten als deel van bedrijfsgedrag (conduct in ons framework) 
• empirische studies naar increasing returns, studies met integrale 
benaderingen van increasing returns en studies naar de impact van 
increasing returns op bedrijfsprestaties schaars zijn  
 
Daarmee zijn het de in dit proefschrift verrichte onderzoeken en de gekozen 
benadering gelegitimeerd. 
 
Vervolgens is het gebruikte structure-conduct-performance paradigma vertaald naar 
onze onderzoeksdoelen. In dit paradigma is de basisredenering dat de marktstructuur 
de prestaties van bedrijven in de markt beïnvloedt via de gedragingen van die 
bedrijven. Vertaald naar ons onderzoeksveld beschouwen we de marktgerelateerde 
mechanismen van increasing returns, dus netwerkeffecten en sociale interactie-
effecten, als determinanten van marktstructuur (structure). De bedrijfsgerelateerde 
mechanismen van increasing returns beschouwen we als determinanten van het 
gedrag van bedrijven (conduct). We nemen hierbij aan dat de marktgerelateerde 
mechanismen van increasing returns de bedrijfsprestatie zullen beïnvloeden ten 
minste gedeeltelijk via de bedrijfsgerelateerde mechanismen van increasing returns.  
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mechanismen
van increasing returns
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Uit het verrichte literatuuronderzoek blijkt dat kan worden aangenomen dat de 
aanwezigheid van netwerkeffecten en sociale interactie-effecten in de markt zal 
leiden tot een strijd tussen technologieën in de markt, en dus tussen de producten die 
op deze technologieën zijn gebaseerd. Hierbij treden diverse effecten op, die 
specifiek zijn voor een increasing returns markt: 
• concurrentie vindt plaats op netwerkniveau en niet op het niveau van het 
individuele product, dus een technisch superieur product dat een klein 
gebruikersnetwerk heeft of waarvoor weing complementaire producten 
beschikbaar zijn zal de strijd verliezen van een product dat een groter 
netwerk heeft en/of waarvoor veel complementaire producten beschikbaar 
zijn 
• de uitkomst van de strijd tussen technologieën ligt niet op voorhand vast; in 
economische termen zijn er meerdere evenwichten mogelijk, vaak 
evenwichten waarbij één van de technologieën een dominante positie in de 
markt verovert: winner-takes-all 
• lock-in effecten kunnen optreden, waarbij een bestaande technologie 
zodanig is ingeburgerd dat de overgang naar een andere, kwalitatief betere, 
technologie zoveel investeringen kost dat de gebruikers er niet aan beginnen 
en dus als het ware vastzitten in de bestaande technologie 
• er kan sprake zijn van extreme marktontwikkelingen, in de vorm van 
excessieve inertie, waarbij de markt klein blijft en er geen 
technologiestandaard ontstaat doordat alle partijen op elkaar wachten met 
het doen van investeringen, of juist excessief momentum, waarbij de markt 
in zeer korte tijd zeer snel groeit en er snel een technologiestandaard 
ontstaat doordat alle partijen elkaar imiteren en zeker niet de last mover 
willen zijn 
• er kan sprake zijn van padafhankelijkheid in de markt, wat betekent dat het 
verleden en/of de bestaande situatie een grote invloed hebben op de 
toekomst omdat een kleine toevallige gebeurtenis, versterkt door positieve 
feedback, grote invloed kan hebben op de einduitkomst 
• er zijn marktimperfecties of marktinefficiënties mogelijk, hetgeen betekent 
dat door toevalligheden de beste technologie niet altijd de marktstandaard 
hoeft te worden94 
 
                                                          
94 Met name dit laatste aspect is onderwerp van heftig debat tussen economen van 
verschillende stromingen, omdat dit, als het klopt, de standaard economische theorie onderuit 
haalt. Dit debat is echter in het proefschrift niet gevoerd. 
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De redenering in het proefschrift is dat deze effecten ertoe leiden dat er voor 
individuele bedrijven een marktpotentieel ontstaat, dat wil zeggen een potentiële 
vraag naar de producten van het bedrijf en dus een potentieel om schaaleffecten en 
leereffecten te behalen. Zoals hierboven al beredeneerd betekent dit nog lang niet dat 
er ook sprake is van bedrijfsgerelateerde increasing returns. Dit hangt immers af van 
het vermogen van het bedrijf om het potentieel ook daadwerkelijk te realiseren en het 
vervolgens te exploiteren, namelijk door de prijzen verlagen en/of de klantwaarde 
verhogen. Of het bedrijf hiertoe in staat is, zelfs indien aan de randvoorwaarden is 
voldaan95, hangt onder meer af van de door het bedrijf gevolgde increasing returns-
strategie: een bedrijf kan acteren als shaper, waarbij het zelfstandig een technologie 
op de markt zet die, indien succesvol, hoge inkomsten zal opleveren, of als follower, 
waarbij het producten of technologieën op de markt brengt die compatible met en/of 
complementair zijn aan een dominante technologie. Een bedrijf kan ook besluiten te 
wachten – reserving the right to play – totdat de markt zich verder uitkristalliseert en 
er een betere keuze gemaakt kan worden. Indien het bedrijf vervolgens ook in staat is 
de gerealiseerde schaal- en leereffecten te exploiteren zal hiermee de bedrijfsprestatie 
verbeteren. Dit hangt onder meer af van de door het bedrijf gevolgde generieke 
concurrentie-strategie, bijvoorbeeld, cost-leadership, differentiatie of focus. 
 
Onderzoeksmodel en hypothesen 
De bovenstaande redenering heeft geleid tot een onderzoeksmodel (zie de 
onderstaande figuur. In dit model vinden we een zevental hypothesen. Het 
empirische onderzoek van dit proefschrift is opgezet in drie afzonderlijke studies, 
waarmee deze hypothesen zijn getoetst (zie de onderstaande tabel). 
 
 
                                                          
95 Recapitulerend: (1) voldoende vraag in de markt, (2) voldoende hoge prijs-elasticiteit en (3) 
het bedrijf moet met het verlagen van prijzen en/of verhogen van klantwaarde in staat zijn de 
positie ten opzichte van concurrenten te verbeteren. 
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Onderzoeksmodel 
 
Studie: 
 
 
Onderzoekshypothesen: 
Eerste 
empirische 
studie 
(hfdst. 7) 
Tweede 
empirische 
studie 
(hfdst. 8) 
Derde 
empirische 
studie 
(hfdst. 9) 
H1 Hoe groter de sociale interactie-
effecten, hoe groter de 
netwerkeffecten 
X X  
H2a Hoe groter de netwerkeffecten, hoe 
groter het potentieel voor schaal- en 
leereffecten 
X X  
H2b Hoe groter de sociale interctie-
effecten, hoe groter het potentieel 
voor schaal- en leereffecten 
X X  
H3 Hoe groter het potentieel voor 
schaal- en leereffecten, hoe groter 
de realisatie van schaal- en 
leereffecten 
X X X 
H4 Hoe groter de realisatie van schaal- 
en leereffecten, hoe hoger de 
productprestatie 
X   
H5 Hoe groter de realisatie van schaal- 
en leereffecten, hoe hoger de 
bedrijfsprestatie 
X X X 
H6 Hoe hoger de productprestatie, hoe 
hoger de bedrijfsprestatie X   
Overzicht van de onderzoekshypothesen en de empirische studies waarin deze 
worden getoetst 
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Eerste empirische studie 
De eerste empirische studie is een cross-sectionele survey onder 257 managers van 
Nederlandse industriële bedrijven. Voor deze studie is een vragenlijst ontwikkeld die 
telefonisch bij de respondenten is afgenomen. Aangezien er in de literatuur geen 
bestaande constructen (vragen, meetinstrumenten) te vinden waren om increasing 
returns op deze wijze bij bedrijven te meten, zijn deze constructen door ons nieuw 
ontwikkeld en getest. Het gaat hierbij om constructen voor het meten van de 
mechanismen van increasing returns, te weten netwerkeffecten, sociale interactie-
effecten en schaal- en leereffecten, alsmede om een aantal aanvullende constructen. 
Voor het testen hiervan is gebruik gemaakt van meetmodellen in LISREL 8.3. De 
tests wijzen uit dat de constructen voor het meten van netwerkeffecten en sociale 
interactie-effecten in alle opzichten zowel betrouwbaar als valide zijn en dus 
bruikbaar om de geformuleerde hypothesen te toetsen.  
 
Voor het toetsen van de hypothesen is gebruik gemaakt van causale modellen, 
eveneens in LISREL 8.3. De toetsing wijst uit dat, op hypothese H2b na, alle 
hypothesen ondersteund worden.96 Schatting van een alternatief causaal model, 
waarbij ter aanvulling directe relaties zijn opgenomen tussen enerzijds 
netwerkeffecten en sociale interactie-effecten en anderzijds productprestatie en 
ondernemingsprestatie, levert geen betere resultaten op dan het oorspronkelijke 
onderzoeksmodel. Dit betekent dat het oorspronkelijke onderzoeksmodel het best 
met de empirische gegevens overeenkomt. Tests voor de stabiliteit van het 
onderzoeksmodel wijzen uit dat, op de relatie tussen sociale interactie-effecten en 
netwerkeffecten na, het model stabiel is voor variaties in mogelijk beïnvloedende 
variabelen. Ook dit draagt bij aan het vertrouwen in de juistheid van het 
onderzoeksmodel. 
 
Tweede empirische studie  
De tweede empirische studie is eveneens een cross-sectionele survey, dit keer 
schriftelijk gehouden onder managers van 36 grote Nederlandse bedrijven genoteerd 
aan de Amsterdam Stock Exchange (AEX). In deze studie zijn de martkgerelateerde 
en de bedrijfsgerelateerde mechanismen van increasing returns, alsook de 
ondernemingsprestatie gemeten over een periode van vijf jaar, zodat sprake is van 
een comparatief statisch onderzoeksontwerp. In de survey zijn alleen data verzameld 
over de marktgerelateerde mechanismen van increasing returns. Dit is gedaan met de 
                                                          
96 Hypothese H2b wordt weliswaar niet direct ondersteund, maar wel indirect via de 
ondersteuning van hypothesen H1 en H2a. 
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in de eerste empirische studie ontwikkelde en geteste constructen voor het meten van 
netwerkeffecten en sociale interactie-effecten. Deze constructen zijn licht aangepast 
om een mening van de respondenten over een periode van vijf jaar te verkrijgen. 
Voor het testen van deze gewijzigde constructen is opnieuw gebruik gemaakt van 
meetmodellen in LISREL 8.3. Het resultaat van deze test is dat de betreffende 
constructen wederom in alle opzichten betrouwbaar en valide zijn. De 
bedrijfsgerelateerde mechanismen van increasing returns en de bedrijfsprestatie zijn 
in deze studie gemeten met de financiële gegevens uit de jaarverslagen van de 
betreffende bedrijven. Deze metingen zijn eveneens verricht over een periode van 
vijf jaar. De financiële bedrijfsgegevens zijn gevalideerd door minutieuze 
bedrijfsspecifieke checks op dataconsistentie en door correcties voor inflatie, voor 
outliers en voor negatieve groeipercentages.  
 
De hypothesen zijn in deze studie getoetst middels lineaire regressiemodellen. 
Wegens het geringe aantal waarnemingen (36) kon geen gebruik gemaakt worden 
van causale modellen in LISREL 8.3. De uitkomst van deze toetsing is dat alle 
getoetste hypothesen worden ondersteund.97 In deze studie zijn aanvullende tests 
uitgevoerd voor mediërende effecten. De uitkomst van de eerste test is dat 
netwerkeffecten de relatie tussen sociale interactie-effecten en het potentieel voor 
schaal- en leereffecten volledig mediëren, wat betekent dat de invloed van sociale 
interactie-effecten op het potentieel voor schaal- en leereffecten altijd verloopt via 
netwerkeffecten. 
 
Derde empirische studie 
De derde empirische studie is een analyse van (1) de Wet van Verdoorn, dat is de 
relatie tussen groei van output en groei van productiviteit, en (2) de relatie tussen 
groei van productiviteit en groei van bedrijfsprestatie. Deze studie is uitgevoerd voor 
118 grote Nederlandse bedrijven genoteerd aan de Amsterdam Stock Exchange 
(AEX). In deze studie zijn de bedrijfsgerelateerde mechanismen van increasing 
returns en de bedrijfsprestatie gemeten met de financiële gegevens uit de 
jaarverslagen van de betreffende bedrijven. Deze metingen zijn verricht over een zo 
lang mogelijke periode, die per bedrijf verschilt, afhankelijk van de beschikbare 
bedrijfsdata. Voor de beste beste bedrijven waren financiële data van 1983 tot en met 
2002 beschikbaar. Hiermee is sprake van een dynamisch onderzoeksontwerp. De 
financiële bedrijfsgegevens zijn hier eveneens gevalideerd door minutieuze 
                                                          
97 Aangezien in deze studie productprestatie en bedrijfsprestatie niet afzonderlijk zijn gemeten, 
komen hypothesen H4 en H6 te vervallen. 
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bedrijfsspecifieke checks op dataconsistentie en door het aanbrengen van correcties 
voor inflatie, voor outliers en voor negatieve groeipercentages.  
 
De relatie tussen de groei van output en de groei van productiviteit staat in de 
literatuur bekend als de Wet van Verdoorn. Verdoorn vond in 1949 dat er op 
sectorniveau een lineair verband bestond tussen de groei van output en de groei van 
productiviteit, met een coëfficiënt van tussen de 0.41 en 0.57. De betekenis hiervan is 
dat elk procent outputgroei leidt tot tussen de 0.41 en 0.57 procent 
productiviteitsgroei, en dat er dus sprake is van increasing returns, namelijk van de 
realisatie van schaal- en leereffecten. Deze wetmatigheid is in de literatuur 
veelvuldig getest en aangetoond, overigens met verschillende uitkomsten, op 
landenniveau, op regioniveau en op sectorniveau. In dit proefschrift wordt de Wet 
van Verdoorn voor het eerst toegepast en getoetst op bedrijfsniveau. De Wet van 
Verdoorn is in deze studie gebruikt als meting van de relatie tussen het potentieel en 
de realisatie van schaal- en leereffecten (onderzoekshypothese 3). De output is 
immers gerelateerd aan het potentieel om schaal- en leereffecten te benutten, de 
productiviteit is het resultaat daarvan: het realiseren van schaal- en leereffecten. 
Analoog hieraan is de relatie tussen de groei van productiviteit en de groei van 
bedrijfsprestatie gebruikt als meting van de relatie tussen de realisatie van schaal- en 
leereffecten en de bedrijfsprestatie (onderzoekshypothese 5).  
 
De hypothesen zijn in deze studie getoetst middels lineaire regressiemodellen. De 
regressies zijn uitgevoerd voor de 118 individuele bedrijven, voor 13 sectoren op 
basis van gepoolde bedrijfsdata en voor de AEX als geheel, eveneens op basis van 
gepoolde bedrijfsdata. Deze regressies leiden tot gedeeltelijke onderstening van de 
hypothesen. De Wet van Verdoorn houdt stand voor 68.8% van de bedrijven, voor 
alle 13 sectoren en voor de gehele AEX, waarbij de gemiddelde coëfficiënten variëren 
van 0.399 tot 0.542, waarden die redelijk overeenstemmen met de in de literatuur 
gerapporteerde waarden op landenniveau, sectorniveau en regioniveau. Aanvullende 
modellen zijn gebouwd en analyses uitgevoerd waamee op deze waarden nog 
correcties kunnen worden uitgevoerd. De relatie tussen de groei van productiviteit en 
de groei van bedrijfsprestatie houdt stand voor 66.9% van de bedrijven, voor 8 van 
de 13 sectoren en voor de gehele AEX, waarbij de gemiddelde coëfficiënten variëren 
tussen de 2.534 en 3.493. Met andere woorden: de invloed van productiviteitsgroei 
op groei van de bedrijfsprestatie is aanzienlijk. 
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Conclusies 
De in dit proefschrift uitgevoerde onderzoeken hebben een aantal bevindingen 
opgeleverd die het geformuleerde onderzoeksmodel ondersteunen. Ten eerste zijn de 
marktgerelateerde mechanismen van increasing returns positief en significant van 
invloed op de bedrijfsgerelateerde mechanismen van increasing returns. Ten tweede 
zijn de bedrijfsgerelateerde mechanismen van increasing returns positief en 
significant van invoed op de bedrijfsprestatie. Ten derde is er geen bewijs gevonden 
voor een directe relatie tussen de marktgerelateerde mechanismen van increasing 
returns en de bedrijfsprestatie. We kunnen dus concluderen dat, in aanwezigheid van 
de marktgerelateerde mechanismen van increasing returns, een betere 
bedrijfsprestatie alleen gerealiseerd wordt door het exploiteren van de 
bedrijfsgerelateerde mechanismen van increasing returns. De conclusies ten aanzien 
van de afzonderlijke hypothesen worden samengevat in de onderstaande tabel. 
 
Studie: 
 
 
Onderzoekshypothesen: 
Eerste 
empiri-
sche 
studie 
(hfdst. 7) 
Tweede 
empiri-
sche 
studie 
(hfdst. 8) 
Derde 
empiri-
sche 
studie 
(hfdst. 9) 
H1 Hoe groter de sociale interactie-effecten, hoe 
groter de netwerkeffecten 
Onder-
steund 
Onder-
steund 
Niet 
getest 
H2a Hoe groter de netwerkeffecten, hoe groter het 
potentieel voor schaal- en leereffecten 
Onder-
steund 
Onder-
steund 
Niet 
getest 
H2b Hoe groter de sociale interctie-effecten, hoe 
groter het potentieel voor schaal- en 
leereffecten 
Niet 
onder-
steund # 
Onder-
steund 
Niet 
getest 
H3 Hoe groter het potentieel voor schaal- en 
leereffecten, hoe groter de realisatie van 
schaal- en leereffecten 
Onder-
steund 
Onder-
steund 
Gedeeltel
ijk onder-
steund 
H4 Hoe groter de realisatie van schaal- en 
leereffecten, hoe hoger de productprestatie 
Onder-
steund 
Niet 
getest 
Niet 
getest 
H5 Hoe groter de realisatie van schaal- en 
leereffecten, hoe hoger de bedrijfsprestatie 
Onder-
steund 
Onder-
steund 
Gedeeltel
ijk onder-
steund 
H6 Hoe hoger de productprestatie, hoe hoger de 
bedrijfsprestatie 
Onder-
steund 
Niet 
getest 
Niet 
getest 
# Er is wel een indirecte invloed van sociale interactie-effecten op the potentieel vor schaal- 
en leereffecten door de ondersteuning van hypothsen H1 en H2a 
Samenvatting van de toetsingresultaten van de onderzoekshypothesen 
 
Dit onderzoek kent een groot aantal beperkingen ten aanzien van het gehanteerde 
framework, de gehanteerde methoden en samples en de onderzochte relaties. Wegens 
de schaarste aan bestaand empirisch onderzoek naar increasing returns is voor dit 
proefschrift in eerste instantie gekozen voor het onderzoeken van de hoofdrelaties, op 
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basis van een bestaand en bekend framework en met behulp van bestaande, 
eenvoudige methoden. Dit betekent dat er legio mogelijkheden zijn om op basis van 
het huidige proefschrift het onderzoek naar increasing returns voort te zetten en uit te 
breiden. 
 
Managementimplicaties 
De implicaties van het verrichte onderzoek voor managers die te maken hebben met 
increasing returns mechanismen in hun markten en bedrijven zijn drievoudig: ten 
eerste zullen managers de relaties tussen de verschillende mechanismen van 
increasing returns, de gevolgen van deze mechanismen voor de werking van de markt 
en de gevolgen voor de prestatie van hun bedrijf moeten leren begrijpen. Dit 
onderzoek levert hiertoe een aantal theoretisch en empirisch ondersteunde 
bouwblokken (zie onderstaande figuur). 
 
Sociale
interactie-
effecten
Netwerk
effecten
Potentieel
voor schaal- en 
leereffecten
Realisatie
van schaal en 
leereffecten
Product 
prestatie
Bedrijfs-
prestatie
Herkennen
Managen door:
• beslissingen t.a.v. complemen-
tariteit, compatibiliteit en 
substitutie van producten en 
technologieën
Meten door:
• vragenlijst
• herkennen van marktpatronen
Internaliseren
Managen door:
• shaper/follower strategie
Meten door:
• Wet van Verdoorn
Exploiteren
Managen door:
• generieke concurrentie-
strategieën
Meten door:
• productiviteit-prestatie
relatie
 
Managementimplicaties 
 
Ten tweede zullen managers in staat moeten zijn om de increasing returns-
gevoeligheid van hun markt en hun bedrijf te herkennen en de hoogte ervan in te 
schatten. Dit proefschrift levert een aantal meetinstrumenten aan, die hiervoor 
gebruikt kunnen worden. De constructen voor het meten van netwerkeffecten en 
sociale interactie-effecten komen als betrouwbaar en valide uit de tests en kunnen 
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dus voor dit doel worden ingezet. Voor het meten van schaal- en leereffecten en de 
impact op bedrijfsprestaties is de analyse van de Wet van Verdoorn en van de relatie 
tussen productiviteit en prestatie beschikbaar. Voor de grotere beursgenoteerde 
bedrijven is deze ondernemingsspecifieke analyse reeds verricht (opvraagbaar bij de 
auteur); voor alle andere bedrijven kan een dergelijke analyse gemaakt worden 
wanneer de benodigde financiële gegevens beschikbaar zijn. 
 
Ten derde zullen managers in staat moeten zijn om de strategische implicaties van de 
aanwezigheid van increasing returns mechanismen in hun markten en bedrijven te 
doorgronden. Op basis daavan kunnen zij actie ondernemen om ontstane 
mogelijkheden te exploiteren en valkuilen te vermijden. Dit proefschrift levert een 
aanzet tot de strategieën die hierbij gevolgd kunnen worden. Verder onderzoek is 
echter nodig om op dit gebied valide uitspraken te kunnen doen. 
 
Samenvattend: concurreren in een increasing returns markt is zeker meer risicovol en 
vergt andere managementvaardigheden dan concurreren in een meer traditionele 
markt. Dit zou de indruk kunnen wekken dat concurreren in een increasing returns 
markt een soort Russiche roulette is, waarbij  het management vrijwel machteloos 
staat tegenover de krachten van de markt. Toch is dit niet het geval. Indien managers 
een goed inzicht hebben in de mechanismen van increasing returns en de 
consequenties ervan, zullen zij wel degelijk in staat zijn de uitdagingen van het 
concurreren in increasing returns markten aan te gaan.  
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